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Dizasta1

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vikram-01.jpg


Any description as to what ships are in that photo, apart from the obvious two aircraft carriers?
 
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Dizasta1

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Am I missing something here? The specs on the Su-30MKi show that the Mission-Computer for the aircraft, i.e the display processor is the MC-486 and DP-30MK, manufactured by Defence Avionics Research Establishment - Bangalore. So if they indians are experiencing MFD blackouts, why are they calling the Russians for it when they themselves manufacture the Mission-Computer/Display-Processor?
 

Jeff Head

General
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Any description as to what ships are in that photo, apart from the obvious two aircraft carriers?
YEs. The group consisted of:

1 x Vikramaditya R33 Carrier
1 x Viraat R22 Carrier
2 x Delhi Class DDGs
1 x Rajput Class DDG
2 x Talwar Class FFGs
1 x Shivalik Class FFG
1 x Brahmaputra Class FFG
1 x Deepak, Replensihment Tanker


That's two carriers, three guided missile destroyers, four guided missile frigates, and a replenishment tanker that made up the combined group.
 

Blitzo

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And not one of them has a VLS that can launch SAMs that exceed short range point defence :mad:

I don't understand why the IN didn't seek a Russian VLS for the shivalik FFGs. Arm launchers are simply obsolete, especially if they currently make up the mainstay of your escort fleet
 

Jeff Head

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And not one of them has a VLS that can launch SAMs that exceed short range point defence :mad:

I don't understand why the IN didn't seek a Russian VLS for the shivalik FFGs. Arm launchers are simply obsolete, especially if they currently make up the mainstay of your escort fleet
Well, the single arm launchers the Indians use do launch the 9M317E SAM which has an engagement range out to 50 km. It is a very good air defense missile. You simply have to have quite a few launchers and directors to be able to hope to defend against any saturation attack. This is carried on the Delhi Class DDGs (2 launchers on each ship) and on the Shivalik FFGs (1 launcher). The Delhis, the Shivalik, and the Brahmaputra vessels shown also carry a 32 cell VLS launcher for the Barak 1 Missile which has a range of 12km. The Talwars have two Kashtin CIWS each.

But the 9M317E has a good range and is a very decent missile. That group has five launchers for the system, so they could put a good number of those missiles into the air in defense of the carriers. with that, and with the short range Barak 1s, the group does have a decent two layer defense system. Certainly not nearly as good as the newer AEGIS and AEGIS-like air defense ships, but still something that can defend the carriers.

It will not be until the Kolkatas enter service with the Barak 8 missiles before the Indians can rapidly launch longer range missiles (but still only out to 70km) from any single, major air defense ship.

By comparison you have US AEGIS vessels with 128 or 96 missiles each that carry anti-air systems that can engage threats from sea skimming out into space, and that have ranges from Close-in out to 185 km with the SM-2ER, and now out to 240 km with the SM-6 which achieved Initial Operational Capability in late 2013. This does not include the SM-3 Block IB missiles that AEGIS vessels can currently carry for BMD which have a range out to 700 km, or the newer SM-3 Block IIA missiles coming in 2015 which will have a range out to over 2000 kms.
 
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Blitzo

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I'm not criticising the 9M317E, but rather the limitation of the arm launchers. Less reliable, less capable to deal with saturation attacks and generally less efficient than VLS.

I suppose I also think the IN has done a bad job at developing the escort fleet for their carriers overall.

Out of all the nations with serious flattop/amphibious assault ships (I.e.: excluding Brazil and Thailand), India has probably developed/is developing the least impressive surface escort fleet. So that is including USN, RN, MN, PLAN, JMSDF, ROKN, and even navies like those of Russia, Italy, or Spain, hell even Australia is going to have a more capable air defence destroyer force than the INs kolkatas with their Hobart DDGs.


I suppose I am just a little confused because by all accounts the Indian Navy should have a lot of money to throw around yet they have acquired and are in the process of acquiring surface escorts with relatively mediocre capability in the most important air defence domain.
 

kwaigonegin

Colonel
I'm not criticising the 9M317E, but rather the limitation of the arm launchers. Less reliable, less capable to deal with saturation attacks and generally less efficient than VLS.

I suppose I also think the IN has done a bad job at developing the escort fleet for their carriers overall.

Out of all the nations with serious flattop/amphibious assault ships (I.e.: excluding Brazil and Thailand), India has probably developed/is developing the least impressive surface escort fleet. So that is including USN, RN, MN, PLAN, JMSDF, ROKN, and even navies like those of Russia, Italy, or Spain, hell even Australia is going to have a more capable air defence destroyer force than the INs kolkatas with their Hobart DDGs.


I suppose I am just a little confused because by all accounts the Indian Navy should have a lot of money to throw around yet they have acquired and are in the process of acquiring surface escorts with relatively mediocre capability in the most important air defence domain.

I have to agree with your assessment. While they are no doubt trying real hard, IN still has a long ways to go to match many Western navies or even PLAN for that matter. One thing they do have experience in is naval aviation and it looks like that trend will continue in the foreseeable future.

I personally think they lack balance in their fleet. While I'm an obviously big fan of flat tops there are other types of vessels that needs to be acquired before venturing too far out into the world of carrier aviation. The Kolkata's are a good start but they need more of them.
To have an effective CSG you need very capable aaw ships to provide an effective multi tiered defensive umbrella . At this point in time the rajput and Delhi class will leave the entire fleet very vulnerable in a multi point saturation attack under heavy ecm environment. Not only are their defensive weapons system lqcking range but their sensors are also a generation or two behind to adequately fend off a well planned air or surface attack.

Once the Kolkatas come online in significant numbers thier surface capabilities will improve significantly. As big a country as India is, I feel very strongly also that they need LPDs or LHDs. The only one they have now is a 50 yr old USN Austin class LPD.
 

thunderchief

Senior Member
IN is geared towards two main objectives :

1. Blockade Pakistan in case of war.

2. Stop Chinese incursions into Indian Ocean in case of war .

In first scenario, realistically, there is very little chance that PAF and PN could muster enough strength to launch saturation attack on Indian fleet, which I imagine would be at some distance from Pakistani coast. IAF would simply keep them busy around the clock. On the other hand, small scale raid with up to 10-12 aircraft are possible. At the present moment, INS Vikramaditya doesn't have CIWS and potential escorts have limited capability so potential vulnerability exists .

In a second scenario, PLAN needs at least 10 more years to build up enough strength to successfully project power against India . That would mean more carriers, more bases close to Indian Ocean and more blue water experience.

There is a remote possibility of combined action of China and Pakistan against India, but I won't speculate about that because in that case I'm almost certain that India would get some help from outside .
 
Interesting revelation on how the 1962 Sino-China War started. Indian Army's own secret internal inquiry revealed that the Nehru Administration provoked China into the conflict.


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Two weeks ago, the Australian journalist Neville Maxwell finally made part of the Henderson Brooks report public, by putting it up on his blog. The report was an internal Indian Army enquiry into its rout in the 1962 war with China — Maxwell was the New Delhi correspondent for The Times, London, at the time — but in the 51 years since the report was written up by Lt Gen Henderson Brooks and Brig PS Bhagat, successive Indian governments have refused to make it public. Only two copies of the report were thought to be in existence, although there was never any doubt that Maxwell had had access to the report for his 1970 book India's China War quoted extensively from it. In his first interview to the Indian media since he made the report public, the now 88-year-old Maxwell tells Parakram Rautela that he had been trying to make the report public for years but that nobody would publish it. He adds that he was only able to get hold of Volume I of the report, minus 45 pages, and that he never laid eyes on Volume II. And of course he still blames Nehru for the war, not the Chinese.
 
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aksha

Captain
indigenous-aircraft-carrier-300x225.jpg
Making of Indigenous Aircraft Carrier
The project for an Indigenous Aircraft Carrier took shape in 1979. Under the terms of the Indo–French MOU of 1988, an agreement was signed with DCN of France for assistance by its design group, STCAN, in the concept design of the Sea Control Ship (SCS) and for transfer of technology.

An Indian Naval Design and Liaison Team (INDLT) of Naval architects was deputed to DCN for participating in the design process, for ascertaining the major areas of design work to be entrusted to selected consultants during subsequent stages of design work, and to audit Cochin Shipyard for its capability to build the carrier.

By 1990, the concept study by France’s DCN, assisted by the INDLT, had evolved designs for a 25,000 ton catapult version and a ski jump version and confirmed that the carrier could be built in the Cochin Shipyard. The financial crisis of 1991 precluded sanction for a carrier of that size and the next few years were spent in juggling designs for a smaller carrier. The grey area was the type and number of aircraft that the carrier would operate.

In the mid 1990s, Russia offered India the Gorshkov along with the carrier-borne version Mig 29 K. Meanwhile, development had also commenced of the carrier-borne version of the indigenous land-based Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) by the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA).

These developments helped to finalise the types of combat aircraft that would fly from the ADS. The carrier would embark:-

V/STOL Sea Harriers already in service.
Seaking MK 42-B ASW/ASV helicopters, already in service.
The Russian STOBAR MIG 29 Ks (to be inducted with the Gorshkov).
The indigenous Naval LCAs (when eventually developed by HAL).
The indigenous Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH).
The staff requirements were finalised for a gas turbine propelled, 28-knot, 37,000-ton carrier with an angled deck and a ski jump, to operate an air group of 30 combat aircraft and helicopters and manned by 1400 personnel.

CCS approval for IAC was accorded in 2003 and Cochin Shipyard commenced construction in 2005. Meanwhile, the nomenclature of the carrier project had changed from Sea Control Ship (SCS) to Air Defence Ship (ADS) and finally to Indigenous Aircraft Carrier (IAC). The IAC is expected to enter service by 2015.

General Factors Affecting Aircraft Carrier Design

Aircraft carriers are designed for the type and numbers of aircraft to be operated. A Naval carrier borne aircraft have an expected life of 25 years. However, they are designed for a life of atleast 50 years. Aircraft carrier design therefore caters for operating at least two generations of carrier-borne aircraft.

An aircraft carrier is a floating airfield. Aircraft are launched from the front end of the flight deck by a catapult; they land by engaging their tail hooks in one of the arrestor wires spread across the rear end of the flight deck.

Naval carrier-borne aircraft are usually variants of Air Force shore-based aircraft. They cost less because of the economies of scale in design, development and production. For special requirements like Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft, a Naval variant has to be developed separately.

To operate Short Take Off/Vertical Landing (STOVL) combat aircraft like the Sea Harriers, it is useful for the carrier to have a ski jump at the front end of the flight deck to assist short take-off, which obviates the need for a vertical take-off. Vertical landing (that uses up more fuel and reduces endurance) dispenses the need for arrestor wires. Dispensing with the catapult and the arrestors reduces the length of the carrier and therefore its tonnage and cost. In this case, the Airborne Early Warning task has to be performed by dedicated AEW helicopters like the Russian Kamov 31.

To operate longer range, heavier armed, combat and AEW aircraft, the carrier needs to have both catapult and arrestor gear–the length of the carrier increases so does its tonnage and cost.

Given the uncertainty as to which type of aircraft would be operating 25 years in the future, carrier design has emerged in three variants:-

STOBAR — Short Take off but Arrested Recovery. In this variant, the tonnage of the carrier can be kept low by foregoing the catapult and retaining arrestor wires for the aircraft to hook on to for landing. However, it would never be possible to retrofit a catapult.
CATOBAR — Catapult Assisted Take-Off but Arrested Recovery. In this case, the carrier initially could have ski-jump and arrestors to operate the current generation of aircraft in the STOBAR mode and subsequently retrofit a longer catapult for the next generation of heavier longer-range, better-armed aircraft in the CATOBAR mode.
The third hybrid variant is a carrier having a STOVL skijump with an angled flight deck, catapults and arrestor wires. This design permits operation of STOVL fighter aircraft and CATOBAR AEW aircraft.
General Features of IAC

The ship has a length of 252 m, max breadth of 58 m, draft of 8 m, depth of 25.6 m and a deep displacement of 37,500 tonnes. The ship will be propelled by four LM 2500 Gas Turbines generating a total power of 80 MW (1,20,000 HP approx) enabling the ship to do a maximum speed of 28 knots.

The ship has an endurance of 7,500 nautical miles at 18 knots and logistic endurance of 45 days. The ship will have a complement of 1600. It can carry a maximum of 30 aircraft and 17 of these can be accommodated in the hangar. Air operations can take place up to sea state 5. The ship will have two tramlines for take off and a landing strip with 3 arrester wires.

Design

The design is being undertaken by the Navy’s own Design Bureau. The preliminary design has already been completed and detailed design is in hand. The ship will be built using IHOP (Integrated Hull Outfit and Painting) method using high strength ABA grade steel developed in house between DRDO and SAIL. The ADS will require about 20,000 tonnes of steel.

Contracts

Italian ship design & construction yard M/s Fincantieri has been selected by Cochin Shipyard Ltd to assist in:-

Integrating the main propulsion system.
Making the main engine room layouts.
Preparation of the Build Specification for the ship.
The inputs in respect of MIG-29 K aircraft will be provided by the Russian side who will also assist in the associated design work for aviation facilities such as Flight Deck, Hangar, Aircraft Lifts, Ammunition Lifts, Aircraft Launch & Recovery systems, etc.

The ADS, however, in its conception and final execution of plans, has had an interesting journey. Conceived initially on the lines of a large carrier, plans for its building were scaled down considerably (in the early 90s) when it was re-envisioned as a ‘Small Harriers Carrier”. This was only to change again in the early years of the next decade. Commodore Jitendran (presently Chairman & Managing Director of Cochin Shipyard where the Indigenous Aircraft Carrier is being built) was associated with the carrier project since the 1980s. He recalls:-

“I joined the Directorate of Naval Design as Deputy Director of the Aircraft carrier project in mid 1988. The Navy was then working for a big carrier to operate heavy fixed wing aircraft, above 20 tons All Up Weight (AUW). Being a new dimension, some assistance in the initial design was considered prudent as we had no database. Finally, in Sep 1989, a delegation of four Naval Officers was deputed to France to work along with Ms DCN on a concept design of what was then known as a “Sea Control Ship”. This concept design envisaged fixed wing aircraft to be operated from a large carrier with French collaboration.

The concept design was similar to “Charles-de-Gaulle”, the French Carrier which was under construction at that point in time in a Naval Yard in the South of France. The main difference was that the French Carrier was nuclear powered, whereas our Indian Carrier envisaged gas turbine propulsion.

We returned from France in Mar 1990. We had a complete concept design which essentially described how the ship would look like, its main features, approximate cost and timeframe to build it in India. A report was also rendered on the augmentation required in Cochin Shipyard to build the ship of that type. This concept design documentation was presented in the Navy and the MoD. The high level visiting French Delegation then gave a very informal indicative price of about Rs 2500 Crores for delivery of the ship in 2002, complete in all respects except for aircraft.

We were told later on that there was a serious financial crisis and that there would be no money for the Sea Control Ship.

The delivery cost of Rs 2500 Crores was considered frightfully expensive. Adm Ramdas, took over as CNS and the slogan put out was to achieve “Much more with Much less”. This actually applied to the carrier project to a large extent, with the displacement of the ship coming down from 40,000 tonnes to less than 14,000 tonnes of a small Harrier Carrier. The CNS had gone to Italy and when he came back the 14,000 tonne GARIBALDI size appeared appropriate because of the crisis of money. So the design process actually took a U turn and we started to design a ship smaller than the existing INS Viraat.

Later on, the Soviet Union broke up and the carrier project fell into the ‘backburner’ status. There were a lot of officers who did not support the size coming down so much. There were intense debates about the requirement of fixed wing aircraft. So the project virtually died for a period of about 8 years in the early and mid 90s. In 1998, we started again on designing a much larger ship. There was a focus and resurgence in the thinking that we need to really have a blue water navy with heavier types of aircraft.

There was also a strong feeling that the Harriers would not be the future for “Sea Control” and even though we went ahead with the subdued nomenclature “Air Defence Ship”, the ship which we were designing was almost similar in size to the one which we had earlier abandoned but it had added features like ski jump, options to operate aircraft upto 22 tons AUW.3



This article has been sourced from Republic News Network: Indian Defence Review

Author
Vice Adm. (Retd.) G M Hiranandani
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