Lethe
Captain
I don't think these narratives of Russia over France or France over Russia provide a useful framework for thinking about these matters.
Moscow is not India's friend. Paris is not India's friend. Tel Aviv is not India's friend. Washington is definitely not India's friend. All of these nations want to sell India the milk and keep the cow. India has more leverage than most customers because of the current and potential future scale of its requirements (and because India can plausibly source from essentially all but Chinese vendors). But this only works to the extent that India is actually willing to commit funds commensurate with what it is asking for. MMRCA was dashed against precisely those rocks: GoI was not willing to commit funds on the scale that was required to realise the ambitions that had been formulated.
The objective is to leverage platforms and technologies from a variety of nations to both meet military needs in the present, while furthering the long-term development of indigenous capabilities. Becoming too dependent on any one partner nation is to be avoided because it both exposes India to potential adverse political developments and, more prosaically, reduces India's bargaining power in future negotiations. This is the problem they are now having with General Electric, which knows that it is in a strong bargaining position and so does not feel particularly compelled to offer generous terms.
India went all-in on Su-30MKI around the turn of the millennium. This was the big win (for Moscow) and big commitment/dependency (for Delhi) that should not be overlooked simply because it is "old news" -- it has framed everything since. Combined with then-recent and ongoing MiG-29 commitments, the appetite for Russian hardware was more than sated and there was accordingly a strong presumption against a Russian solution for MMRCA. If IAF/MoD could not get Rafale alone across the line in the early-mid 2010s, there was no prospect of being able to simultaneously pursue FGFA on top of it. Sacrificing the latter was an easy choice to make. Post MMRCA, attention has continued to remain fixed on acquisition of new western combat aircraft, preferably Rafale. It is not about being anti-Russian, but about not becoming too dependent on Russia while also trying to maintain momentum towards a solution that is already well understood across a robust network of relationships. Trump has certainly simplified matters by highlighting the risks of dependency on Washington.
Accordingly, if and when that Rafale acquisition eventually closes, there will again be the opportunity space to consider Russian solutions. Moreover, the timeframe for a future Russian acquisition has now been pushed out far enough that future Su-57s can actually directly replace Su-30MKIs such that it would not reflect a further deepening of dependency. Conversely, the notion of building upon a large Rafale acquisition by also hitching up with FCAS would be problematic as it would risk becoming overly dependent on France. It is more complicated than that owing to the interactions with AMCA, the pathway to a notional indigenous engine, and the potential for India to wield more leverage in its relations with France than it can with Russia, but the basic principle of diversified dependency remains.
Moscow is not India's friend. Paris is not India's friend. Tel Aviv is not India's friend. Washington is definitely not India's friend. All of these nations want to sell India the milk and keep the cow. India has more leverage than most customers because of the current and potential future scale of its requirements (and because India can plausibly source from essentially all but Chinese vendors). But this only works to the extent that India is actually willing to commit funds commensurate with what it is asking for. MMRCA was dashed against precisely those rocks: GoI was not willing to commit funds on the scale that was required to realise the ambitions that had been formulated.
The objective is to leverage platforms and technologies from a variety of nations to both meet military needs in the present, while furthering the long-term development of indigenous capabilities. Becoming too dependent on any one partner nation is to be avoided because it both exposes India to potential adverse political developments and, more prosaically, reduces India's bargaining power in future negotiations. This is the problem they are now having with General Electric, which knows that it is in a strong bargaining position and so does not feel particularly compelled to offer generous terms.
India went all-in on Su-30MKI around the turn of the millennium. This was the big win (for Moscow) and big commitment/dependency (for Delhi) that should not be overlooked simply because it is "old news" -- it has framed everything since. Combined with then-recent and ongoing MiG-29 commitments, the appetite for Russian hardware was more than sated and there was accordingly a strong presumption against a Russian solution for MMRCA. If IAF/MoD could not get Rafale alone across the line in the early-mid 2010s, there was no prospect of being able to simultaneously pursue FGFA on top of it. Sacrificing the latter was an easy choice to make. Post MMRCA, attention has continued to remain fixed on acquisition of new western combat aircraft, preferably Rafale. It is not about being anti-Russian, but about not becoming too dependent on Russia while also trying to maintain momentum towards a solution that is already well understood across a robust network of relationships. Trump has certainly simplified matters by highlighting the risks of dependency on Washington.
Accordingly, if and when that Rafale acquisition eventually closes, there will again be the opportunity space to consider Russian solutions. Moreover, the timeframe for a future Russian acquisition has now been pushed out far enough that future Su-57s can actually directly replace Su-30MKIs such that it would not reflect a further deepening of dependency. Conversely, the notion of building upon a large Rafale acquisition by also hitching up with FCAS would be problematic as it would risk becoming overly dependent on France. It is more complicated than that owing to the interactions with AMCA, the pathway to a notional indigenous engine, and the potential for India to wield more leverage in its relations with France than it can with Russia, but the basic principle of diversified dependency remains.
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