I'm struggling to think of an example
Gau mutra as far as the eye can see
Indian Military News, Reports, Data, etc.
- Thread starter bd popeye
- Start date
Here you go again. India claiming Bangladesh refused entry for Pakistan warship.
Why should the Pakistan warship need to dock at Bangladesh when Bangladesh is out of the way. Once again lies from Indian media.
The Pak warship is on the way from Shanghai to Pakistan. Just look at the map.
Docking at Bangladesh is a waste of fuel since you have take the long route. Stupid
I have to apologize though, I used the wrong map.
I notice the Kashmir part is labelled wrongly. All of it should belong to Pakistan, not India. Chose the wrong map. Sorry. I will send myself to re-education camp tonight.
Arunachal Pradesh is also labelled wrongly. Belongs to China. I used the Bharat version of the map. Crap.
Sikkim also belongs to China.
India's defense industry is hard at work to come up with better technology for the Indian military
That is made in China junk, bought from aliexpress probably.
This is real Indian military technology:
Look at India bicycle stunts. Way more manly and scarier than
I tremble in fear every time I see Indian soldiers doing bicycle stunt.
Just finished reading an article from The Diplomat in which the magazine interviewed a retired U.S. Army Colonel who wrote a book on India's Military, namely the officers that make up the military, their threat perceptions and outlook into what they perceived as India's enemies: Pakistan and China.
This is the link of the book, it's publicly available to be downloaded or read:
I took the liberty of extracting the book's assessment of India with China from decades past (the bitter loss Indian Army suffered in 1962) to the most current date which was 2 years ago where the book was published coincided with the Ladakh standoff.
Perception of China 1/2
The first two decades of the study period coincided with a period of enormous political and economic reform in China guided by Deng Xiaoping and a group of reformist political allies. Their goal, summarized as the “Four Modernizations” of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and the military, was designed to put China on a path to becoming a global superpower. This had obvious regional implications for India. In April 1998, the author accompanied U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Dennis Reimer to India on a visit to his Indian counterpart, General V. P. Malik. During the visit, Minister of Defence George Fernandes hosted a briefing by the three Indian service chiefs, the main takeaway being India’s concern about the emergence of China and the need to match its growing military capacity. China, despite its nuclear capability, was not considered in 1979 to be militarily or economically capable of posing an existential threat to India. The general attitude of DSSC students was “distrust of Chinese motives” along the still-disputed northern border. Students in the Army Wing were grudgingly respectful of China’s performance against the Indian Army in 1962, and worried about a similar future embarrassment. Memories of that war were painfully evident when the current commander of the 8th Mountain Division, a unit that had suffered large casualties in that war, was a guest speaker in 1984. He assured the students, “This [embarrassment] will never happen to us again,” but little thought appeared to be given to the prospect of China being on track to pose a strategic threat.
A decade later, China was still viewed as a secondary threat to that posed by Pakistan, and then only along the contested borders. China’s economy and military capability were growing, but not to a level that threatened India’s regional dominance. China was the thinly disguised Chandol Desh, the notional enemy in the DSSC mountain warfare exercises, and there were occasional references to Chinese support to Naxalite militants.191 By the turn of the century, DSSC senior officers, the DS, and guest speakers universally perceived China to be India’s largest strategic threat and the clear motivation behind the Indian Navy and Air Force modernization plans. The 1999 Student noted a divergence in opinion between the Indian students who remained preoccupied with Pakistan as the major threat and the senior officers and DS who seemed more worried about China. Publicly, China was referred to as a “competitor of India rather an enemy.” Coincidentally, or perhaps as a consequence of this ambivalent attitude, the DSSC did not conduct any exercise in which the Chandol Desh was engaged in a full-scale war with India. The mountain warfare exercises were always in the context of a minor incursion into disputed territory that had to be eliminated. The friendly force operations were limited to minor operations aimed at regaining a specific piece of territory belonging to India. In the low-intensity conflict scenarios involving Nark Desh (Pakistan), Chandol was assumed merely to be providing limited support to Nark forces. In making the comparison between these two countries, Indian officers routinely referred to Pakistan as being little more than a “yipping little dog” while India considered itself on par with China in terms of its place in the region. Nevertheless, only the more “visionary students”—the “twenty percenters”—considered China to be the major threat facing India, with many privately expressing frustration with classmates who were “obsessed with Pakistan.”
This is the link of the book, it's publicly available to be downloaded or read:
I took the liberty of extracting the book's assessment of India with China from decades past (the bitter loss Indian Army suffered in 1962) to the most current date which was 2 years ago where the book was published coincided with the Ladakh standoff.
Perception of China 1/2
The first two decades of the study period coincided with a period of enormous political and economic reform in China guided by Deng Xiaoping and a group of reformist political allies. Their goal, summarized as the “Four Modernizations” of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and the military, was designed to put China on a path to becoming a global superpower. This had obvious regional implications for India. In April 1998, the author accompanied U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Dennis Reimer to India on a visit to his Indian counterpart, General V. P. Malik. During the visit, Minister of Defence George Fernandes hosted a briefing by the three Indian service chiefs, the main takeaway being India’s concern about the emergence of China and the need to match its growing military capacity. China, despite its nuclear capability, was not considered in 1979 to be militarily or economically capable of posing an existential threat to India. The general attitude of DSSC students was “distrust of Chinese motives” along the still-disputed northern border. Students in the Army Wing were grudgingly respectful of China’s performance against the Indian Army in 1962, and worried about a similar future embarrassment. Memories of that war were painfully evident when the current commander of the 8th Mountain Division, a unit that had suffered large casualties in that war, was a guest speaker in 1984. He assured the students, “This [embarrassment] will never happen to us again,” but little thought appeared to be given to the prospect of China being on track to pose a strategic threat.
A decade later, China was still viewed as a secondary threat to that posed by Pakistan, and then only along the contested borders. China’s economy and military capability were growing, but not to a level that threatened India’s regional dominance. China was the thinly disguised Chandol Desh, the notional enemy in the DSSC mountain warfare exercises, and there were occasional references to Chinese support to Naxalite militants.191 By the turn of the century, DSSC senior officers, the DS, and guest speakers universally perceived China to be India’s largest strategic threat and the clear motivation behind the Indian Navy and Air Force modernization plans. The 1999 Student noted a divergence in opinion between the Indian students who remained preoccupied with Pakistan as the major threat and the senior officers and DS who seemed more worried about China. Publicly, China was referred to as a “competitor of India rather an enemy.” Coincidentally, or perhaps as a consequence of this ambivalent attitude, the DSSC did not conduct any exercise in which the Chandol Desh was engaged in a full-scale war with India. The mountain warfare exercises were always in the context of a minor incursion into disputed territory that had to be eliminated. The friendly force operations were limited to minor operations aimed at regaining a specific piece of territory belonging to India. In the low-intensity conflict scenarios involving Nark Desh (Pakistan), Chandol was assumed merely to be providing limited support to Nark forces. In making the comparison between these two countries, Indian officers routinely referred to Pakistan as being little more than a “yipping little dog” while India considered itself on par with China in terms of its place in the region. Nevertheless, only the more “visionary students”—the “twenty percenters”—considered China to be the major threat facing India, with many privately expressing frustration with classmates who were “obsessed with Pakistan.”
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2/2
Although the Chinese military and economy continued to grow at a rapid pace, the 2005 Student did not perceive that China was regarded as the main threat to India. The Indian students, he explained, had less respect for the military professionalism and competence of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) than for the Pakistan Army. They had more respect for China’s growing naval power projection capability. The major joint exercise at the DSSC that year was an amphibious operation to regain the Andaman Islands that had been seized by Chandol. Because Indian Army doctrine was largely based on a quantitative assessment of resources, any land war with China meant the sheer numbers of the PLA merited respect. As the first decade of the new century ended, the threat from Pakistan remained “real and visceral” to most of his classmates, while the threat from China was not perceived to be as great, and certainly was not existential. He added that the old Nehruvian slogan of Hindi Chini bhai (“India and China are brothers”) continued to resonate with many students. The 2007 Student A discerned a degree of symbiosis: both India and China were reaping the benefits of economic reforms, there was a burgeoning trade relationship between them, and everyone had great confidence that the lingering border dispute could be managed without conflict. It was not until 2011 that China clearly began to be perceived by all three groups at the DSSC as “India’s biggest threat.” The 2011 Student A noted that few of his classmates had ever had any interaction with Chinese people, and that Chinese behavior puzzled them. He also had difficulty understanding why India was so preoccupied with China’s conventional military capability when the avenues of approach into India led across the enormous Tibetan plateau and through the rugged Himalayan Mountains. He did notice, however, a growing concern about the prospect of a two-front war with Pakistan and China that might expand into a three-front situation if the Chinese Navy continued to grow, modernize, and operate in strength in the Indian Ocean. Still, there remained a curious reluctance to declare that China was an “enemy” of India, with many students still preferring to label it merely a “competitor.”
There was a lot of discussion about various Chinese regional stratagems like the “string of pearls,” in which China was seeking to build or gain access to ports along the Indian Ocean sea frontier, and the Belt and Road Initiative projects designed to enhance Chinese economic power throughout Asia. The major challenge for the Indian armed forces seemed to lie in the maritime domain, and the strategy required was a combination of naval modernization and new shipbuilding. Apparently not to be outdone by the navy, the army was beginning to modify its ground forces doctrine along the northern border from the traditional “defensive attrition model” to one that featured the rapid forward movement of offensive forces, the apparent objective being to take the offensive early against any Chinese ground incursion. To this end, it was in the process of modernizing artillery and creating a rapid-response airborne regiment. Also in 2011, a new reference book on China was issued to DSSC students. As may be seen in the extracts below from a section titled “Indian Perception of China,” it laid out a curiously ambivalent assessment of the threat to India posed by China: India has a strategic and cooperative partnership with the People’s Republic of China which has been further progressed during high level visits in 2009-10. The two countries are seeking to build a relationship of friendship and trust, based on equality, in which each is sensitive to the concerns and aspirations of the other. However, at one extreme are some who see China as incorrigibly aggressive and expansionist, posing a perennial threat to India. At the other extreme are those who perceive it as a benign neighbour and an ancient civilisation that has been exploited in the past. But, the majority of Indians seem to carry in their minds a more mixed picture, with both positive and negative ingredients. The irritants that constantly plague Sino-Indian relations are as under: - (a) Boundary dispute. (b) Dalai Lama issue. (c) China’s assistance to Pakistan’s Missile and Nuclear weapon programme. … As far as India is concerned, it cannot be ignored that every major Indian city is within reach of Chinese missiles and this capability is being further augmented to include Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). … The armed forces of both the nations are engaged in building greater understanding through joint military exercises, regular defence dialogues since 2007 and exchange of military delegations. India has obviously taken note of China’s statement in the White Paper on China’s National Defence in 2008 that it will never seek hegemony or engage in military expansion now or in future.
Meanwhile India has also taken note of the double digit growth in Chinese defence expenditures over the previous 20 years, which has led to significant modernisation of its armed forces, both in terms of quality and quantity. In the same White Paper, China stated its objective to develop strategic missiles and space based assets, enhance its blue water capabilities for the navy and upgrade infrastructure, reconnaissance, surveillance and quick response capabilities in the border areas. India believes that this will affect the overall military environment in the neighbourhood of India and hence it needs to monitor the defence modernisation of China carefully.195 The 2016 Student noted the absence of urgency in confronting China militarily either on land or at sea despite the fact that it was moving swiftly to build a capability to challenge India in many new areas and from several new directions. There was growing concern about Chinese success in establishing a permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean by gaining guaranteed access to ports in Africa at Djibouti, in Pakistan at Gwadar, in Sri Lanka at Hambantota, and in Burma at Kyaukpyu. Although they were confident in being able to defeat the Pakistan Air Force in any future conflict, a few students expressed concern that China might provide Pakistan enough high-technology aircraft to offset India’s qualitative and quantitative edge over the PAF.
By now there was also no disputing the fact that India had been “left behind” in the past decade and was clearly behind China in most measures of economic and military power. Now in the DSSC wargames, the China-like opponent was no longer Chandol, but “Yellowland” if the principal enemy was the Pakistan-like opponent and “Redland” if it was the only opponent. Shortly after the 2017 course ended, on June 16, China attempted to extend a road southward in Doklam, a territory claimed by both China and Bhutan. India was concerned that a road in this region might allow China to cut off Indian access to the northeastern states. Claiming to have acted on behalf of Bhutan, with which it has a “special relationship,” New Delhi moved troops into the area to prevent any further work on the road. After 73 tense days of face-to-face confrontation, the two sides agreed on August 28 to pull back more or less simultaneously. Prime Minister Modi subsequently visited China in September 2017 for a BRICS summit, and on the sidelines of the summit met with Chinese president Xi Jinping. The two agreed to reaffirm ties and carry forward an agreement made earlier that year that differences between them should not be allowed to become disputes.197 More recently, beginning in May 2020 and still ongoing at the time of this writing, have been a series of Chinese border incursions at multiple locations along the LAC in Ladakh in the eastern section of Jammu and Kashmir. Ashley Tellis notes that these actions suggest a high degree of premeditation and top-level approval for the military’s activities that might be linked to India’s August 2019 decision to change the political status of Jammu and Kashmir. The current crisis also reveals, in his opinion, that China has scant respect for India’s efforts to freeze the status quo along the LAC or New Delhi’s attempts to avoid the appearance of collusion with the United States against Beijing. By treating New Delhi’s recent actions in Jammu and Kashmir as a provocation, China is now confronting India with the difficult choice of either accepting a new status quo on the LAC or escalating through force if the negotiations presently under way are unsuccessful.
The Diplomat article/interview:
Although the Chinese military and economy continued to grow at a rapid pace, the 2005 Student did not perceive that China was regarded as the main threat to India. The Indian students, he explained, had less respect for the military professionalism and competence of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) than for the Pakistan Army. They had more respect for China’s growing naval power projection capability. The major joint exercise at the DSSC that year was an amphibious operation to regain the Andaman Islands that had been seized by Chandol. Because Indian Army doctrine was largely based on a quantitative assessment of resources, any land war with China meant the sheer numbers of the PLA merited respect. As the first decade of the new century ended, the threat from Pakistan remained “real and visceral” to most of his classmates, while the threat from China was not perceived to be as great, and certainly was not existential. He added that the old Nehruvian slogan of Hindi Chini bhai (“India and China are brothers”) continued to resonate with many students. The 2007 Student A discerned a degree of symbiosis: both India and China were reaping the benefits of economic reforms, there was a burgeoning trade relationship between them, and everyone had great confidence that the lingering border dispute could be managed without conflict. It was not until 2011 that China clearly began to be perceived by all three groups at the DSSC as “India’s biggest threat.” The 2011 Student A noted that few of his classmates had ever had any interaction with Chinese people, and that Chinese behavior puzzled them. He also had difficulty understanding why India was so preoccupied with China’s conventional military capability when the avenues of approach into India led across the enormous Tibetan plateau and through the rugged Himalayan Mountains. He did notice, however, a growing concern about the prospect of a two-front war with Pakistan and China that might expand into a three-front situation if the Chinese Navy continued to grow, modernize, and operate in strength in the Indian Ocean. Still, there remained a curious reluctance to declare that China was an “enemy” of India, with many students still preferring to label it merely a “competitor.”
There was a lot of discussion about various Chinese regional stratagems like the “string of pearls,” in which China was seeking to build or gain access to ports along the Indian Ocean sea frontier, and the Belt and Road Initiative projects designed to enhance Chinese economic power throughout Asia. The major challenge for the Indian armed forces seemed to lie in the maritime domain, and the strategy required was a combination of naval modernization and new shipbuilding. Apparently not to be outdone by the navy, the army was beginning to modify its ground forces doctrine along the northern border from the traditional “defensive attrition model” to one that featured the rapid forward movement of offensive forces, the apparent objective being to take the offensive early against any Chinese ground incursion. To this end, it was in the process of modernizing artillery and creating a rapid-response airborne regiment. Also in 2011, a new reference book on China was issued to DSSC students. As may be seen in the extracts below from a section titled “Indian Perception of China,” it laid out a curiously ambivalent assessment of the threat to India posed by China: India has a strategic and cooperative partnership with the People’s Republic of China which has been further progressed during high level visits in 2009-10. The two countries are seeking to build a relationship of friendship and trust, based on equality, in which each is sensitive to the concerns and aspirations of the other. However, at one extreme are some who see China as incorrigibly aggressive and expansionist, posing a perennial threat to India. At the other extreme are those who perceive it as a benign neighbour and an ancient civilisation that has been exploited in the past. But, the majority of Indians seem to carry in their minds a more mixed picture, with both positive and negative ingredients. The irritants that constantly plague Sino-Indian relations are as under: - (a) Boundary dispute. (b) Dalai Lama issue. (c) China’s assistance to Pakistan’s Missile and Nuclear weapon programme. … As far as India is concerned, it cannot be ignored that every major Indian city is within reach of Chinese missiles and this capability is being further augmented to include Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). … The armed forces of both the nations are engaged in building greater understanding through joint military exercises, regular defence dialogues since 2007 and exchange of military delegations. India has obviously taken note of China’s statement in the White Paper on China’s National Defence in 2008 that it will never seek hegemony or engage in military expansion now or in future.
Meanwhile India has also taken note of the double digit growth in Chinese defence expenditures over the previous 20 years, which has led to significant modernisation of its armed forces, both in terms of quality and quantity. In the same White Paper, China stated its objective to develop strategic missiles and space based assets, enhance its blue water capabilities for the navy and upgrade infrastructure, reconnaissance, surveillance and quick response capabilities in the border areas. India believes that this will affect the overall military environment in the neighbourhood of India and hence it needs to monitor the defence modernisation of China carefully.195 The 2016 Student noted the absence of urgency in confronting China militarily either on land or at sea despite the fact that it was moving swiftly to build a capability to challenge India in many new areas and from several new directions. There was growing concern about Chinese success in establishing a permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean by gaining guaranteed access to ports in Africa at Djibouti, in Pakistan at Gwadar, in Sri Lanka at Hambantota, and in Burma at Kyaukpyu. Although they were confident in being able to defeat the Pakistan Air Force in any future conflict, a few students expressed concern that China might provide Pakistan enough high-technology aircraft to offset India’s qualitative and quantitative edge over the PAF.
By now there was also no disputing the fact that India had been “left behind” in the past decade and was clearly behind China in most measures of economic and military power. Now in the DSSC wargames, the China-like opponent was no longer Chandol, but “Yellowland” if the principal enemy was the Pakistan-like opponent and “Redland” if it was the only opponent. Shortly after the 2017 course ended, on June 16, China attempted to extend a road southward in Doklam, a territory claimed by both China and Bhutan. India was concerned that a road in this region might allow China to cut off Indian access to the northeastern states. Claiming to have acted on behalf of Bhutan, with which it has a “special relationship,” New Delhi moved troops into the area to prevent any further work on the road. After 73 tense days of face-to-face confrontation, the two sides agreed on August 28 to pull back more or less simultaneously. Prime Minister Modi subsequently visited China in September 2017 for a BRICS summit, and on the sidelines of the summit met with Chinese president Xi Jinping. The two agreed to reaffirm ties and carry forward an agreement made earlier that year that differences between them should not be allowed to become disputes.197 More recently, beginning in May 2020 and still ongoing at the time of this writing, have been a series of Chinese border incursions at multiple locations along the LAC in Ladakh in the eastern section of Jammu and Kashmir. Ashley Tellis notes that these actions suggest a high degree of premeditation and top-level approval for the military’s activities that might be linked to India’s August 2019 decision to change the political status of Jammu and Kashmir. The current crisis also reveals, in his opinion, that China has scant respect for India’s efforts to freeze the status quo along the LAC or New Delhi’s attempts to avoid the appearance of collusion with the United States against Beijing. By treating New Delhi’s recent actions in Jammu and Kashmir as a provocation, China is now confronting India with the difficult choice of either accepting a new status quo on the LAC or escalating through force if the negotiations presently under way are unsuccessful.
The Diplomat article/interview:
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