And they'll remain reluctant as long as they have access to top of the line weapons from established arms makers.
The lure of shiny and expensive foreign products is undeniable, but I think it is a symptom of the problem rather than the problem itself. It should be possible and even desirable to leverage the products, technologies and expertise in Europe, USA, Russia and Israel to accelerate the development of India's own MIC. Yet this does not seem to be happening, at least not in any generalisable or systemic fashion or over reasonable timeframes (witness the various rounds of "foreign consultation" in the LCA program since the 1980s!).
What I appreciated about Admiral Prakash's comments here was that he was willing to suggest that the expectations of the services are part of the problem, and he was realistic about the timeframes required for improvement: 20 or 30 years. In relation to the first point, the services need to accept what the Indian MIC can actually deliver, which will not necessarily align with what the services want or be remotely competitive with foreign products available on the world market. India needs to create a "virtuous cycle" of orders (and revenue!), production, feedback, and refinement (using said revenue!). Without this cycle, a malnourished Indian MIC is forever being asked to deliver products that "run" when in fact it is struggling to deliver products that can "stand", let alone "walk". The second point, timelines, is related to the first and is mostly institutional in nature. There needs to be clear, long-term strategic-industrial direction emanating from the top, coupled with institutional reforms that allow for engineering best practices to flourish. I think
may be the article that Admiral Prakash was referring to (originally published elsewhere). One thing that emerges from this article is a lack of test facilities and low testbed hours. This is the kind of boring, unsexy work that must be attended do rather than dreaming up PowerPoints for 5.5G VLO composite aircraft.
We also need to acknowledge the limits of this approach. India's armed services will, quite reasonably, not tolerate a situation whereby Indian equipment is grossly inferior to that of threat actors (we all know who they are). Imports (and limited "Made in India" joint ventures) will be part of the equation for the foreseeable future. The challenge is to make use of the world market without becoming beholden to it. It would probably be too inflexible to specify minimum/maximum proportions of procurement budget to be spent domestically or abroad, but nonetheless there should be an overriding principle that foreign procurement should not come at the expense of investment in domestic R&D or domestic production.
India's aftermarket and very
aerial refueling solution for the SEPECAT Jaguar. Forward visibility? What's that?
If it works and is indigenous and affordable, then this is probably a good development. There are major challenges with stuffing a major assembly like a refueling probe into a nose section that was not originally designed to accommodate one, and Jaguar is not a large aircraft with a large nose to begin with. The Americans have even gone with a podded IRST for Super Hornet rather than take the more expensive and elegant route of an integrated solution.
India needs more of this kind of thinking, not less.
