Indian Military News, Reports, Data, etc.
- Thread starter bd popeye
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IMHO, Hypersonic glide vehicles, especially 'AI' enabled HGVs (which don't need network updates) represent the endpoint of this technological cycle. In order to counter HGVs, advances in fundamental physics will be needed, which haven't really occurred since the time of Einstein and the advent of Quantum Mechanics. Until that happens, China and the US will be at a stalemate, where neither can counter the other side's HGVs. This works in China's favor, which is why they are the ones pushing into this domain. This is classic long-term strategic planning.
Gosh that must be unprecedented! Pakistan ballsy and competent enough to bomb a nuclear nation. Never happened before!
It's just a matter of strategic imperatives (all bravado aside.) Praven Sawhney, a senior Indian analyst and a former JANES editor, has provided a detailed analysis of this Pak-India (+China) dynamic. He argued shortly after the event, that Pakistan was always going to retaliate and India was always going to back down. You can check the Force Magazine channel for the details, but to give a one-liner summary: Pakistan is ready and willing to go to war, and India isn't. They were bluffing, we were not.
Sawhney has also predicted that by 2030, the operational and strategic landscape will fully shift in Pakistan's favor. He is urging India to make peace with Pakistan before 2030, because two important things will happen in that year:
1) The current Chinese Military Modernization Plan will be complete
2) The PLAAF-PAF integration will also be complete
Sawhney has stated that it's no coincidence that both of these developments converge on the same year. It's also no coincidence that China has created a new Theater Command on India's border, and is building up the required logistical infrastructure to amass forces there.
That was one of the many problems for the IAF that day. Another was that the PAF had jammed all their comms. That's why their Mig ended up crossing the border. He couldn't hear the warnings from GCI to turn back. He flew straight into the kill box, while the Flankers and Mirages had already bugged out. The jammed comms also likely increased the level of panic, leading to the fratricide of the chopper.
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What are you smoking?
Lmao! senior Indian analyst or self proclaimed wannabe analyst on Indian military affairs...he is a well known foreign dalal in India.... when is Pakistan going to be ready by the way? wasn't removing article 370 not good enough reason or are you going to wait for another 70 years?
Keep coping realities on grounds are completely different.
So what? CCP can't bend geography and realities on ground no matter what it raises on border.
No.....PAF only managed to jamm comms of Mig 21 which abhinandan was flying.....as it wasn't carrying safe encrypted Comms which was well known.
@ougoah SAP 518 jammer's reduce sukhoi detection considerably even against most advance radar threats...was sukhoi carrying SAp 518 or DARE pod when AMRAAM was fired on it will remain a mystery.
antiterror13
Brigadier
Look very outdated .. 3-4 generations behind the top notch
himshakti is a upgraded variant of samyukta ew suite which was developed way back in 2002.
here are the capabilities of samyukta ew suite.
SAMYUKTA is a Indian mobile integrated electronic warfare system.
The System is fully mobile and is meant for tactical battlefield use. It covers wide range of frequencies and coverage of electromagnetic spectrum is handled by the communication segment and the non-communication segment. Its functions include various ELINT, COMINT and ECM activities.
It is an integrated EW system covering the 1.5MHz–40GHz bandwidth. The system comprises both communications (com) and non-communications (non-com) segments and encompasses 145 wheeled vehicles for housing sensors for electronic surveillance, interception, monitoring, analysis andjamming of all communications and radar signals.and can cover an area of 150 km by70 km.
samyukta is a 145 vehicles based integrated EW system consisting of electronic intelligence (ELINT), communications intelligence (COMINT) combined with electronic countermeasures (ECM) and electronic support measures (ESM) blocks covering both radar and communication frequency bands ranging from 1.5 MHz - 40 GHz i.e all the way from High Frequency (HF) to Millimetre Wave (MMW).
samyukta is capable of intercepting, detecting and classifying pulsed, CW, PRF agile, frequency agile and chirp radars is very much in keeping with the move towards wideband digitally flexible SIGINT systems in the ISR domain to deal with an increasingly congested and complex threat spectrum. The key enabler of wideband jamming capability in the case of samyukta is a multiple beam jammer array antenna with Rotman lens that can handle numerous threats simultaneously in X - Ku bands.
The com segment’s COMINT/ELINT sensors include those for detecting emissions from pulsed airborne synthetic aperture radars (SAR), from the active radars of air-to-surface precision guided-munitions and from radar altimeters, from airborne early warning &control radars, and from terrain-following radars while they are still 150km away.
The three types of active jammers employed include those for wide-band jamming of hostile field artillery radio proximity fuzes over an area of 600,000 square metres, and for simultaneous jamming up to eight hostile X-band airborne radars in azimuth and elevation. SAR radars operating up to 80km away can be jammed, while the X-band monopulse pulse-Doppler airborne radars of combat aircraft can be jammed out to a distance of 50km. The efficient emitting power of the jammer is not less than 580kW. The jammers can be deployed in two patterns: 16 as a battalion, and 6 as a company.
Frequency detection sensitivity is 110-123dB/W, while the frequency measurement accuracy is 1MHz. Bearing accuracy is automatically achieved between 1-3 degrees. The measurement accuracy of temporal pulse parameters 0.05 milli-second at a pulsed length of 0-2-70 milli-seconds. The measurement accuracy of the pulsed repetition period is 0.05 milli-second for a minimal pulse duration of 1 milli-second. Measurement accuracy of the pulse string-repetition period is 0.1 second.
The system’s internal database contains frequency libraries of up to 2,000 types of radars. Another type of jammer operates in the 13,333-17,554MHz frequency bandwidthand can process incoming signals like simple-pulse, quasi-continuous wave (CW) and CW, pulsed chirp-modulated, and phase code-shift keyed with pseudo-random frequency-tuning signals. The input sensitivity of a receiver fitted with frequency determination and reproduction sensors is minus 90, while the radiated power is 600 Watt. The frequency-accurate interference signals reproduction is +/-0.5MHz. Spectrum-matching of the reproduced interference signal is fully automated. Jamming signals emitted include MP-1, MP-2, MP-1 + noise, MP-2 + noise, quasi-CW noise, spot jamming in frequency and range deception signals. The system can also jam GPS signals out to a distance of 70km, and multi-frequency autodyne radio proximity fuzes.
The non-com component’s COMINT/ELINT suites can operate autonomously and are also available in man-portable versions with GIS and digital moving map overlays. They can undertake panoramic frequency-band surveillance and produce time-and-frequency analysis in three formats: gain-frequencypanorama, time-and-frequency panorama, and frequency-intensity panorama.Frequencies are monitored in the 30-18,000MHz bandwidth, and the direction-finding error is not more than 3 degrees. The suites are thus optimized for providingsearch, intercept, analysis and monitoringcapabilities of hostile communicationsemissions.
Man you just know everything inside out don't you? You clearly know AIM-120C inside out.
@Brumby There you go... the old 120C better stay out of the MKI's way.
AMRAAM Kill-Map in Syria shows how PAF F-16s missed Su-30MKI by miles.
SOURCE: MAHESHA M / FOR MY TAKE / IDRW.ORG
40 Years old fighter bomber Su-22 was recently in news over Syria after Turkish F-16 fired AIM-120-C5 Beyond visual range missile was successfully dodged by the aircraft over long-range. The incident occurred on March 3rd before that Turkish F-16 was shooting down jets over Syria with AIM-120-C5 BVR AAMs with ease and already had 4 Kills in recent times as seen in the picture.
Before the March 3rd incident, Turkish Armed Forces managed to shoot down three Syrian Air Force jets over the skies of rural Idlib, this prompted the Russian military to get involved to limit the SyAAF’s losses. AMRAAM Kills in Syria 2012 onwards shows a particular situation where AMRAAMs were effective only when fired up within 30-40km range and not at DMAX range of over 100km as Pakistani air force wants to show to its people.
Back to the Su-22 incident in Syria. Presence of Russian military aircraft particularly when Russian ISR (Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance) aircraft like Tu-214R was monitoring airspace and Su-30SM were kept on high alert for intercepts, meant that Turkish F-16 were pushed back and were not able to intrude Syrian air space at free will anymore but on March 3rd a Syrian Su-22 on a bombing mission over are where Turkish backed terror outfits were present prompted Turkish F-16s to come near the border and fire a long-range AIM-120-C5 BVR AAM at a juicy target Su-22 which was over 50km away from the launch F-16 aircraft.
According to media reports, Russian Tu-214R monitored AIM-120-C5 BVR AAM launch from the border by the Turkish F-16 and informed the Syrian pilot who was flying Su-22 which allowed him to push his thrust throttle and make a run for back to his airbase. AMRAAM launched over 50km should have had very high pK (probability of kill) against a jet which is 40 years old and lacks modern EW systems to escape, especially for a missile system which claims a range over 100km against fighter jet sized targets but it was not to be, not only 40 old fighter bomber was warned about missile launch direction and was already running back at supersonic speed towards his airbase and successfully managed to dodge the missile.
Su-22 is not equipped with advance EL/L-8222 Airborne Self Protection Jammer (ASPJ) pods like Su-30MKI which was armed that day when PAF F-16B piloted by Squadron Leader Hassan Siddiqui fired a volley of AIM-120-C5 BVR AAMs at Su-30MKI ” Avenger-1″ at DMAX. According to Sameer Joshi, ex-Indian Air Force fighter pilot, Siddiqui fired AMRAAMs when Su-30MKI was over 60km away from this aircraft. Su-30MKI ” Avenger-1″ effective deployed chaff and flares along with its EL/L-8222 Airborne Self Protection Jammer (ASPJ) to dodge a volley of AMRAAMs and after making aggressive defense maneuvers.
According to PAF, Siddiqui was awarded Su-30MKI kill based on the thermal target being take down by an AMRAAM fired by him which was recorded by the PAF’s SAAB 340 AEW&C. IAF’s Squadron Leader Minty Agarwal who was the Fighter Controller that day said that Su-30 not only survived AMRAAMs even made a run towards PAF F-16s which were already running back after an aggressive push by Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman with his Mig-21Bis.
IAF Chief also confirmed that AMRAAMs were fired at DMAX and fake Su-30kill was made only to divert counterclaim made by IAF of PAF F-16 being shot down. Squadron Leader Minty Agarwal and Sameer Joshi have confirmed one thing is that deployment of chaff and flares and the use of Israeli EW pod by the Su-30MKI was one of the major reasons why the aircraft was able to dodge the AMRAAMS. Lack of any evidence presented by the PAF also confirms that what Siddiqui took down was chaff and flares deployed by the Su-30MKI and later missile also being jammed by the EL/L-8222 successfully.
Look at AMRAAM Kill-Map in Syria since 2012 shows that AIM-120-C5 BVR AAMs have no recorded claims of shotting down any combat jets or even 50km let alone 60km which Siddiqui has claimed. In fact, since the induction of AMRAAMs in the 1990s, there is no recorded kill over the 60-80km range even when AMRAAMS like C5 version have a range over 100km and most of the recorded kills have been around 20-30km range and over 40km against only against light trainer jet which was not equipped with any internal EW or RWR or even MAW).
SOURCE: MAHESHA M / FOR MY TAKE / IDRW.ORG
40 Years old fighter bomber Su-22 was recently in news over Syria after Turkish F-16 fired AIM-120-C5 Beyond visual range missile was successfully dodged by the aircraft over long-range. The incident occurred on March 3rd before that Turkish F-16 was shooting down jets over Syria with AIM-120-C5 BVR AAMs with ease and already had 4 Kills in recent times as seen in the picture.
Before the March 3rd incident, Turkish Armed Forces managed to shoot down three Syrian Air Force jets over the skies of rural Idlib, this prompted the Russian military to get involved to limit the SyAAF’s losses. AMRAAM Kills in Syria 2012 onwards shows a particular situation where AMRAAMs were effective only when fired up within 30-40km range and not at DMAX range of over 100km as Pakistani air force wants to show to its people.
Back to the Su-22 incident in Syria. Presence of Russian military aircraft particularly when Russian ISR (Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance) aircraft like Tu-214R was monitoring airspace and Su-30SM were kept on high alert for intercepts, meant that Turkish F-16 were pushed back and were not able to intrude Syrian air space at free will anymore but on March 3rd a Syrian Su-22 on a bombing mission over are where Turkish backed terror outfits were present prompted Turkish F-16s to come near the border and fire a long-range AIM-120-C5 BVR AAM at a juicy target Su-22 which was over 50km away from the launch F-16 aircraft.
According to media reports, Russian Tu-214R monitored AIM-120-C5 BVR AAM launch from the border by the Turkish F-16 and informed the Syrian pilot who was flying Su-22 which allowed him to push his thrust throttle and make a run for back to his airbase. AMRAAM launched over 50km should have had very high pK (probability of kill) against a jet which is 40 years old and lacks modern EW systems to escape, especially for a missile system which claims a range over 100km against fighter jet sized targets but it was not to be, not only 40 old fighter bomber was warned about missile launch direction and was already running back at supersonic speed towards his airbase and successfully managed to dodge the missile.
Su-22 is not equipped with advance EL/L-8222 Airborne Self Protection Jammer (ASPJ) pods like Su-30MKI which was armed that day when PAF F-16B piloted by Squadron Leader Hassan Siddiqui fired a volley of AIM-120-C5 BVR AAMs at Su-30MKI ” Avenger-1″ at DMAX. According to Sameer Joshi, ex-Indian Air Force fighter pilot, Siddiqui fired AMRAAMs when Su-30MKI was over 60km away from this aircraft. Su-30MKI ” Avenger-1″ effective deployed chaff and flares along with its EL/L-8222 Airborne Self Protection Jammer (ASPJ) to dodge a volley of AMRAAMs and after making aggressive defense maneuvers.
According to PAF, Siddiqui was awarded Su-30MKI kill based on the thermal target being take down by an AMRAAM fired by him which was recorded by the PAF’s SAAB 340 AEW&C. IAF’s Squadron Leader Minty Agarwal who was the Fighter Controller that day said that Su-30 not only survived AMRAAMs even made a run towards PAF F-16s which were already running back after an aggressive push by Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman with his Mig-21Bis.
IAF Chief also confirmed that AMRAAMs were fired at DMAX and fake Su-30kill was made only to divert counterclaim made by IAF of PAF F-16 being shot down. Squadron Leader Minty Agarwal and Sameer Joshi have confirmed one thing is that deployment of chaff and flares and the use of Israeli EW pod by the Su-30MKI was one of the major reasons why the aircraft was able to dodge the AMRAAMS. Lack of any evidence presented by the PAF also confirms that what Siddiqui took down was chaff and flares deployed by the Su-30MKI and later missile also being jammed by the EL/L-8222 successfully.
Look at AMRAAM Kill-Map in Syria since 2012 shows that AIM-120-C5 BVR AAMs have no recorded claims of shotting down any combat jets or even 50km let alone 60km which Siddiqui has claimed. In fact, since the induction of AMRAAMs in the 1990s, there is no recorded kill over the 60-80km range even when AMRAAMS like C5 version have a range over 100km and most of the recorded kills have been around 20-30km range and over 40km against only against light trainer jet which was not equipped with any internal EW or RWR or even MAW).
Akula class? In such a case were the sub is on lease, how does India and Russia decide on repairs? Sail it to Russian docks for repairs and then investigate damage, cause etc? Janes article suggests explosion caused by fault of the sub itself rather than user error.