Indian Military News, Reports, Data, etc.

Lethe said:

The hypothetical example given is equivalent in all relevant aspects. Nonetheless, it is only an example that serves to illustrate the point already adequately made: that a "limited military operation", even if successful, can precipitate a wider conflict, and that this possibility must be acknowledged.

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sanblvd said:

@Lethe With all due respect, I read and re-read what you just typed and I still have no idea what are you trying to say. That seems to be pretty common with a lot of Indian people, a lot fancy argument that sounds really sophisticated but in the end, no one really understands it or the purpose of it, I'm not sure even you do.

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But here is my respond to you, it still seems your argument is that you think the situations is "stabilized" after India invaded China, that China is the one that must trend carefully since a new status quo as been establish

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Lethe said:

The situation is not "stabilised" but it does nonetheless have the special status of being the "present", aka "reality". To reiterate, all parties at all times should act with due regard for the consequences of their actions, which includes how other parties are likely to react, which requires a high level of understanding of those other parties.

The injunction to consider the consequences of one's actions is not a carrot extended upon reciprocity, to be withdrawn when the other party acts in a way that we deem unacceptable, rather it is an essential precondition of successful policy making in the real world. No nation can conduct an effective foreign policy by listening solely to its own echo chamber of interests, facts, ideologies, laws, etc. because the real world consists of other actors as well, who will not necessarily follow the script you set out for them.

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vincent said:

It's kinda funny you keep on emphasizing China should take India's reaction into account, yet you never critize the one that took the first action: India. Did India consider how China will react and what action will China take when Indian sent its troops across the border?

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Why Bhutan Is the Wildcard in the Ongoing India-China Standoff at Doklam
The choices that Bhutan makes will steer the resolution of the ongoing Himalayan impasse.

By Ankit Panda
July 31, 2017

For more than a month now, Indian and Chinese troops have been caught up in a stand-off on an obscure piece of Himalayan territory known as Doklam, which is disputed between Bhutan and China. The fundamental question is the location of the so-called triboundary point – where all three countries meet.

A range of factors have made this incident the most serious such stand-off between the two nuclear-armed Asian giants, who are no strangers to border incidents. Both saw serious encounters in 2013 and 2014 in the Kashmir sector of their disputed border.

First, from the Chinese perspective, the Indian army transgressed international norms by crossing what is seen as a settled international boundary to intervene on territory disputed between a third country and China. This is the first time Indian troops have engaged China from the soil of a third country.

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China was seemingly taken aback by the Indian Army’s response in mid-June, which it claims involved the bulldozing of certain road features it had already constructed. In the weeks since, China’s official reaction, accompanied by state media, has suggested a state of frenzy, with frequent references to the “lesson” of 1962, when China defeated India in a major war.

Second, in the Indian view, matters are more subtle. New Delhi concurs that it and Beijing have agreed that the Himalayan ridge line in the area should form the basis of a final border, but that border has yet to be finally demarcated and delineated.

From the Indian perspective too, there is ample reason for the intervention. The People’s Liberation Army’s alleged plans to extend a road – the spark for the stand-off – was seen as both threatening to India’s security interests in the region and Bhutan’s sovereignty.

Third, India and Bhutan have maintained a special relationship where Delhi exercised considerable persuasive power over the small Himalayan kingdom’s foreign and security policy from 1949 on, under a treaty of friendship. That agreement was revisited in 2007 to grant the Bhutanese great autonomy as the kingdom transitioned from an absolute monarchy to a parliamentary monarchy.

Caught between two giants, Bhutan, with the exception of issuing a demarche to Beijing and a short statement, has maintained its silence.

As July 2017 comes to a close, the situation at Doklam appears to be stable and tense, with neither side likely to escalate matters soon. India continues to defy a Chinese ultimatum that diplomacy can only take place once Indian troops withdraw to their side of the Himalayan ridge line.

If China does escalate, it may choose to do so in another sector. Perhaps China’s military may take steps to seize territory on the Indian side of the Line of Actual Control in eastern Ladakh. In the meantime, the longer the stand-off persists, the more unilateral drawdown becomes an unappetizing loss of face for either side.

Neither of these proud and rising Asian powers wants to be seen as capitulating in a scenario where both sides are convinced of the fundamental righteousness of their positions. Ultimately, it comes down to complex hermeneutics around a 1890 convention between British India and the Qing Empire and subsequent agreements, including a non-public 2012 agreement in which India claims China would agree to resolve outstanding triboundary disputes in consultation with the concerned third parties – Bhutan, in this case.

Bhutan, China’s only neighbor with which it has no diplomatic ties, has engaged in 24 rounds of border negotiations with Beijing. Doklam is not the only sector where Bhutan and China have disputes and, while the sector matters immensely for India, where it is seen as a natural bulwark against the PLA’s access to the vulnerable Siliguri corridor, for Bhutan, there are good reasons to allow favorable concessions to China at Doklam.

In 2005, Bhutan, then still obliged to defer to Delhi on matters of foreign and security policy, reportedly had made important unilateral concessions toward China that left Indian policymakers livid. Though the exact offer remains secret, it is likely that Beijing offered to settle for a small concession at Doklam in exchange for Bhutan’s gaining a wider swathe of territory in the north and east.

Though the 2005 matter was hardly reported and managed carefully between India and Bhutan behind the scenes, it leaves the sense that Thimphu is the key to the ongoing stand-off. If the PLA’s move to extend the road in June was more than tactical, it may have sought to highlight the growing schism between India and one of its closest allies and neighbours.

Bhutan’s incentives to defect on the Doklam question will now receive intense attention during next year’s parliamentary elections in the country too. If the India-China stand-off lasts through the winter – and it will likely last a good deal longer as China’s 19th Party Congress approaches – the matter could grow increasingly uncomfortable for India.

And so the stand-off at Doklam will simmer on between India, China and Bhutan, likely maintaining its ongoing ossified state well into the winter of 2017. For India and China, the Doklam stand-off has metastasized into another bit of geopolitical competition between two aspirational giants.

For tiny Bhutan in the meantime, each choice made during this stand-off could well end up charting its place in Asia for decades to come.

A version of this article originally appeared in the South China Morning Post. It is republished here with kind permission.

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China on Wednesday laid out its position on India's incursion into Chinese territory in the Himalayas.

China's Position Concerning Indian Border Troops Crossing of the China-India Boundary in the Sikkim Sector was published Wednesday to allow the international community to become better acquainted with the facts of the issue, and to fully explain China's stance on the matter, according to a press statement by the Foreign Ministry's Geng Shuang.

India's action "severely violates" China's territorial integrity and poses "grave challenges" to regional peace and stability, said Geng.

Over 270 Indian troops crossed the Sikkim sector of the China-India border and obstructed Chinese road works in the Dong Lang area (Doklam) on June 18. As of end of July, over 40 members of the Indian military and one piece of heavy earth-moving equipment remained in Chinese territory.

Since the incident, the Chinese side has made serious representations to the Indian side, demanding an immediate withdrawal of Indian troops.

The China-India boundary in the Sikkim sector is delimited by the 1890 Convention between Great Britain and China Relating to Sikkim and Tibet, and is recognized by both Chinese and Indian governments.

According to the 1890 convention, the area in question is indisputably Chinese territory. Once established, the boundary came under the protection of international law. The unauthorized crossing of such a delimited boundary is a "very serious incident," the document said.

India's accusation of the "serious security implications" of road building and its attempt to make territorial claims on Bhutan's behalf have no "factual or legal grounds."

China's road building is being conducted entirely within Chinese territory and India has been kept fully informed of all proceedings throughout, a reflection of China's goodwill in the matter.

The intrusion is nothing more than an attempt to "change the status quo" of the boundary, according to the document.

Mount Ji Mu Ma Zhen is the eastern starting point of the boundary in question and also the junction of the boundaries between China, India and Bhutan. The Indian incursion occurred more than 2,000 meters from Mount Ji Mu Ma Zhen and has nothing to do with the the boundary junction.

As good neighbors, China and Bhutan have had several rounds of boundary talks, and as a third party, India has no right to interfere in or impede those talks, still less the right to make territorial claims on Bhutan's behalf.

China will defend its territorial sovereignty, safeguard the principles of international law and the basic norms of international relations, Geng said.

"Justice will prevail," the spokesperson said.

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