In October 2001, with much fanfare, India announced the creation of a joint command
in the Andaman and Nicobar island chain, which dominates the western approach to
the Malacca strait. From the perspective of jointness and from what was originally
envisaged by its architects, the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) has turned out
to be a failed experiment. However, this episode sheds light on the Indian military, its
higher defense management and also provides insights about India’s Look East policy
and its military engagements and capabilities in the South China Sea.
India’s model of civil-military relations leaves operational and organizational matters
almost entirely to the military. The ANC was India’s firstjoint command, but the
individual services were opposed to the idea as they feared a loss of power and a
cutback on senior officer billets. They did everything they could to prevent this
experiment from succeeding. This was done mainly by denying service assets to the
ANC. The only major assets it gained in its 13 years of service were an amphibious
landing ship, INS Kesari, and a naval offshore patrol vehicle, INS Saryu, a few fast attack
boats and some Dornier aircraft. Other problems included a bitter inter-service dispute
over land and a failure to agree upon a common military code. The peculiar system of
rotation of the command among the three services resulted in a rapid turnover in the
post of the commander-in-chief, Andaman and Nicobar command (CINCAN), with 12 of
them appointed since 2001, averaging a little over a year in command. To better
appreciate these difficulties, one has to analyze the motivation of individual services.
Due to its maritime imperative the Indian Navy has historically claimed ownership of
the island chain and until 2001 all military units stationed there functioned under a
naval commander. In 2001, in an act of magnanimity, the Indian Navy willingly offered
this post for the joint command "experiment." The leadership at that time believed
that the success of this initiative would lead to otherjoint operational commands. But,
over time, the Navy came to see this decision as a mistake as no more joint commands
were formed. According to reports the navy is currently lobbying the government to
revert this command back to them. While denying assets to the ANC, the Indian navy
has strengthened Eastern Naval Command (ENC), based in Visakhapatnam, which has
emerged as India’s most important naval command. Indeed, the strategic dimensions
of India's Look East policy-in terms of visits and exercises of the Indian Navy in the
South China Sea-are conducted by elements from the ENC instead of the
geographically proximate ANC.
The Indian Air Force was initially enthusiastic about the ANC and went about enlarging
its bases on the islands. After the 2004 tsunami which devastated Car Nicobar air base, leading to the loss of 116 air force personnel and their families, their enthusiasm
waned. The air force has since discarded plans to permanently base aircraft on the
islands and has currently designated Kalaikunda air force station, more than 1000
kilometers away on the Indian mainland, to provide air cover. The impracticality of
this arrangement is seemingly lost on defense planners. The army has little role to
play and few platforms to deploy on the islands. Notably, it has added only a
Territorial Battalion to the ANC while building up an amphibious brigade capability in
Thiruvananthapuram on the mainland.
The Andaman and Nicobar Joint Command therefore has been a “grand failure" in
terms of what was envisaged by its architects. Not only has it failed to usher in more
joint commands, but the experience might be cited by those within the military
community who are opposed to this idea. Among former Commanders in Chief of the
ANC the common refrain was that the experience represented not only a missed
opportunity but an overall “sad story." Significantly, civilians have played no role in
either building up the ANC or pushing for more joint commands. In fact, as noted by a
report of the standing committee on defense, civilians did not even fill up mandated
posts in the ANC, including a diplomatic post, as “no one wanted to go there."
This is not to say that no capabilities have been built up on the islands. In terms of
infrastructure development, there has been some steady progress. A naval air base
was established at Campbell Bay and runway extensions planned for another naval
base at Shibpur. There are plans to build Operational Turn Round (OTR) bases at
Campbell Bay, Dighpur and Kamorta while facilities at Port Blair, including a second
floating dock, are being upgraded. These initiatives, though welcome, do not address
the lack of assets under the ANC. The current CINCAN, Vice Admiral PK Chatterjee,
recently stated that the ANC needs “Command and Control Ships and submarines...we
require an entire fleet."
The failure of the ANC also reflects on the ongoing debate about India’s ties to
broader East Asia. Some analysts argue that ANC will continue to suffer from neglect
unless a considered, and strategically significant, decision is taken to economically
develop the island chain. Currently, only 7% of the land, spread over 570 islands, is
available for revenue purposes as the rest consists of protected forests and water
bodies. There are no international flights to Port Blair, thereby constraining tourism.
Environmental concerns, including protection of indigenous tribes, therefore have
trumped economic development due to which the islands, despite obtaining 30% of
India’s total Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), depend upon the central government for
its fiscal outlays. One of the big ideas that could transform the region has been
debated for a while-the creation of a transhipment hub at Car Nicobar. If
implemented this can be a strategic game changer, as it could rival the ports of
Singapore and Colombo and give India enormous economic and strategic leverage.
Naturally, such an investment will need to be protected and so ANC will be
strengthened, giving it the capability to dominate the sea lanes of the Indo-Pacific. On
the other hand, some in India oppose such a vision not just on environmental grounds
but also argue that having a low military footprint in the Andaman and Nicobar islands
is diplomatically advantageous so that other countries in Southeast Asia do not feel
threatened. Resolving this debate will offer some clues to the outlines of the Indian
counter-reaction to China’s foray into the Indian Ocean and more assertive stance in
the South China Sea.
RDO to abandon Kaveri project The proposal now needs to get the approval of the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and finally the clearance from the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) - a process expected to take at least a year. The Kaveri project, which began in the mid-80s, was aimed at powering the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas. GTRE has spent so far Rs 2,106 crore on the project so far and could only fly the engine for 73 hours on the IL-76 Flying Test Bed (FTB) in Russia. The delay in the project saw DRDO choosing the GE 404 engine for Tejas Mk-1 and GE 414 for Tejas Mk-II. GTRE gets additional funds Sources said that the DRDO has sanctioned Rs 300 crore for GTRE to take up future projects. "The lab is gearing up to take up some futuristic projects and the sanctions have been already given. Another additional sanction of Rs 700 crore is on its way to help realize these gen-next technologies," an official said. Exclusive
