I think you are correct!
I actually think that's the point, which then begs the question: Why is this?! We actually see it in so many – actually all – programs, and Tejas is perhaps just a media-friendly example that's in the spotlight... if you look at the list (no guarantee of completeness), the list seems endless:
- Tejas = neverending story
- Uttam Radar ... above all, lots of wild promises, but the reality is, even the IAF prefers an Israeli AESA
- Super-30 / MKI-PLUS: similar! Lots of announcements without real results
- Rafale-N + Vikrant/Vikramaditya: ... to date, NO concrete idea of how they are supposed to operate from the carriers, as the elevators and the lower deck are simply too small/shallow!
- MRCA ... as I said, we're exactly where we were in January 2012, namely when the recommendation was made to buy and build more Rafales.
- FGFA ... exit in 2018, and now the purchase of Su-57E is being discussed again.
- TEDBF ... will probably end as a Tejas 3.4-story!
- new AEW ... endless story, but at least the decision was made for an A320-based model, current planning in three years from 2025! (?)
- New tankers ... as often as now, repeated tenders always with the surprisingly same result: A330 MRTT ... still no decision
- HJT-36 Sitara/Yashas: first flight in 2003 ... now planned as Yashas in 2026 in the form of four leased aircraft, no IAF order yet
- HTT-40 ... not quite as long in development
- Question about new C-17s: The fact that this keeps popping up is surprising, even though everyone knows the production line is closed and dismantled
- And we don't even need to talk about engines like the Kaveri
... in fact it is not only a mess, it's pure embarrassment!
I think that some of these examples can be accounted for as essentially political struggles over the allocation of finite resources. For example, the choice to drop FGFA and kick Su-30MKI upgrades into the weeds, and to limit commitment to LCA reflects not only judgements about those specific programs, but also the overriding priority given to the large-scale acquisition of modern western combat aircraft. Just as USAF resisted various proposals in the 1990s and 2000s to induct more upgraded teen-series fighters because it saw them as threatening its vision of an all-VLO inventory, we can view the "benign neglect" of Su-30MKI as, at least in part, emerging from the IAF's dogged pursuit of the MRCA, MMRCA, and now MRFA acquisition programs. We can come to our own conclusions about how those struggles between competing priorities amidst limited resources have played out, but the dynamic is at least conceptually comprehensible.
The larger issue for me is not so much the pace of progress, or even the lack of progress, but rather the apparently systemic inability of the Indian system to execute on the projects they have assigned themselves, on anything even remotely resembling the timelines that were envisaged. If you don't know where you are, and you can't honestly assess both your own capabilities and the terrain that lies between where you are and where you want to go, then the journey is likely to be a tortuous one indeed. That seems to be where India is at, much of the time. The contrast with China in past generations is stark: the J-8 was not an impressive aircraft, but it reflected what could be achieved at the time, and it was achieved. From this perspective, otherwise unimpressive and even deeply flawed projects that nonetheless deliver concrete outcomes with some level of operational utility are to be celebrated: for all its problems, HAL Dhruv and its derivatives are a success story with hundreds of airframes built and performing useful functions in service. While regular crashes with loss of life are regrettable, they are nonetheless preferable to projects like LCA that run for decades with little to no visible outputs, and that operational experience feeds into ongoing improvements to the platform.
Clearly the reasons for India's malaise are diverse and complicated. I suspect that one of those reasons is the prospect of imports coming at the cost of domestic development efforts, which encourages domestic institutions to be wildly optimistic in relation to capabilities, schedules and budgets. If it was more clearly appreciated in the late 1990s and 2000s just how far LCA still had to go, it's likely that different procurement paths would've been pursued, and it's plausible that those paths may have undermined support for the LCA program in the first place. But issuing unrealistic timelines is only a short-term fix, as the lesson that the services learn is that they can't afford to rely on proclamations emerging from domestic industry, entrenching the preference for imports.
TL;DR: If you don't know where you are, and you can't honestly assess both your own capabilities and the terrain that lies between where you are and where you want to go, then the journey is likely to be a tortuous one indeed
