Hendrik_2000
Lieutenant General
Here is an interesting article about disposition of forces lining up against each other . He think that if any conflagration broke out. It should be in September when the weather is clear
It a long article by Indian blogger in Indian defense review. It is a long article Here is some excerpt
It also give Indian troop disposition. China has better infrastructure of road, railway, warehouse, communication etc. In a long protracted war it is logistic that is the deciding factor. He also said China has been training for fighting in winter condition. Interesting
Duel In The Himalayas: How India And China Square Off
By
-
July 26, 2017
The prolonged standoff at Dolam, Bhutan between India and China has removed the facade of perpetual stability along their mutual frontier that certain quarters have sought to portray based on their unshakeable belief in the efficacy of various confidence building measures the two sides have put in place over the past few decades. However, the fact is, that ‘despite not a shot being fired’ for a long time across the 4057 kilometre (km) long Line of Actual Control (LAC) that separates India and China, the Chinese have assiduously sought to change the territorial status-quo, one road construction unit at a time. But that strategy is something that the Indian Army (IA) is not willing to countenance anymore. Indeed, the IA is no longer willing to let China do so even in Bhutan, keeping aside the strategic military significance of Dolam for the moment.
For years, India had deliberately kept its frontier with China devoid of much access infrastructure due to a premise that the absence of such connectivity would lead to attacking forces getting bogged down, thereby giving time to the Indian military to regroup and respond to an invasion. Even now, the Indian strategy in a few sectors seeks to let Chinese forces concentrate within the narrow confines of a valley before focusing an assault from the flanks. However, this outlook of basically conceding some territory up-front during an enemy advance began changing by the early 1990s, when Beijing started building a massive rail and road network of its own in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) that created a situation whereby the People’s Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF) and the People’s Armed Police (PAP) can attempt both creeping encroachment as well as salami-slice tactics along the LAC between India and China.
As such, the LAC is divided into three segments: the Western Sector, from the Karakoram Pass to Demchok in Eastern Ladakh, the Middle Sector, from Demchok till the Indian border with Nepal and the Eastern Sector, from Sikkim up to India’s border with Myanmar. In some places, particularly lacking in connectivity, the Chinese could even build some rudimentary infrastructure of their own even during peacetime, as evidenced by the discovery of Chinese helipads inside Indian territory in the past. In fact, an official Indian report from 2010 mentioned the possibility that India may have lost a small parcel of land to Chinese encroachment in Eastern Ladakh.
The Chinese could also create a favourable balance of forces (for themselves) along certain points on the LAC and then even sustain gains by extending their own border infrastructure very short distances into Indian territory, relatively quickly. In at least two places in Ladakh, Chinese border roads extend till points that lie within what India perceives to be territory controlled by it. Typically, the Chinese ‘road head’ is either right up to the LAC or is just a few hundred metres short of it while the Indian ‘road head’ could be anywhere between a several hundred metres to several kms short of the LAC, although this is changing now. In any case, the Chinese have built motorable tactical roads from their Western and Eastern highways in TAR till all 31 passes (eleven in the Western Sector, five in Middle Sector and 15 in the Eastern Sector) that are of military significance along the LAC. In addition to this various border ‘laterals’ of low classification also exist just south of subsidiary axes to the main tactical roads that may be used for an advance.
With India now pushing back against Chinese encroachment both at the LAC as well as what it considers to be its sphere of influence in South Asia, tensions are on the rise. Three years ago, what was supposed to be a new beginning for India-China relations, with President Xi Jinping becoming the first major head of State to visit India after Modi assumed office, turned sour as Chinese troops intruded into Indian territory in Eastern Ladakh, even as the visit was underway. Since then, India’s ties with China have been characterized by dissonance, with China opposing India’s entry into the Nuclear Supplier’ Group (NSG), Indian worries about trade imbalances, Chinese hostility towards the Dalai Lama’s travels to Arunachal Pradesh and finally India’s decision to oppose China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), made in no small part due to BRI’s flagship project being the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which impinges on India’s sovereignty. Throughout this period, the LAC has seen numerous Chinese transgressions in certain sectors as well as airspace violations.
It a long article by Indian blogger in Indian defense review. It is a long article Here is some excerpt
It also give Indian troop disposition. China has better infrastructure of road, railway, warehouse, communication etc. In a long protracted war it is logistic that is the deciding factor. He also said China has been training for fighting in winter condition. Interesting
Duel In The Himalayas: How India And China Square Off
By
-
July 26, 2017
The prolonged standoff at Dolam, Bhutan between India and China has removed the facade of perpetual stability along their mutual frontier that certain quarters have sought to portray based on their unshakeable belief in the efficacy of various confidence building measures the two sides have put in place over the past few decades. However, the fact is, that ‘despite not a shot being fired’ for a long time across the 4057 kilometre (km) long Line of Actual Control (LAC) that separates India and China, the Chinese have assiduously sought to change the territorial status-quo, one road construction unit at a time. But that strategy is something that the Indian Army (IA) is not willing to countenance anymore. Indeed, the IA is no longer willing to let China do so even in Bhutan, keeping aside the strategic military significance of Dolam for the moment.
For years, India had deliberately kept its frontier with China devoid of much access infrastructure due to a premise that the absence of such connectivity would lead to attacking forces getting bogged down, thereby giving time to the Indian military to regroup and respond to an invasion. Even now, the Indian strategy in a few sectors seeks to let Chinese forces concentrate within the narrow confines of a valley before focusing an assault from the flanks. However, this outlook of basically conceding some territory up-front during an enemy advance began changing by the early 1990s, when Beijing started building a massive rail and road network of its own in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) that created a situation whereby the People’s Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF) and the People’s Armed Police (PAP) can attempt both creeping encroachment as well as salami-slice tactics along the LAC between India and China.
As such, the LAC is divided into three segments: the Western Sector, from the Karakoram Pass to Demchok in Eastern Ladakh, the Middle Sector, from Demchok till the Indian border with Nepal and the Eastern Sector, from Sikkim up to India’s border with Myanmar. In some places, particularly lacking in connectivity, the Chinese could even build some rudimentary infrastructure of their own even during peacetime, as evidenced by the discovery of Chinese helipads inside Indian territory in the past. In fact, an official Indian report from 2010 mentioned the possibility that India may have lost a small parcel of land to Chinese encroachment in Eastern Ladakh.
The Chinese could also create a favourable balance of forces (for themselves) along certain points on the LAC and then even sustain gains by extending their own border infrastructure very short distances into Indian territory, relatively quickly. In at least two places in Ladakh, Chinese border roads extend till points that lie within what India perceives to be territory controlled by it. Typically, the Chinese ‘road head’ is either right up to the LAC or is just a few hundred metres short of it while the Indian ‘road head’ could be anywhere between a several hundred metres to several kms short of the LAC, although this is changing now. In any case, the Chinese have built motorable tactical roads from their Western and Eastern highways in TAR till all 31 passes (eleven in the Western Sector, five in Middle Sector and 15 in the Eastern Sector) that are of military significance along the LAC. In addition to this various border ‘laterals’ of low classification also exist just south of subsidiary axes to the main tactical roads that may be used for an advance.
With India now pushing back against Chinese encroachment both at the LAC as well as what it considers to be its sphere of influence in South Asia, tensions are on the rise. Three years ago, what was supposed to be a new beginning for India-China relations, with President Xi Jinping becoming the first major head of State to visit India after Modi assumed office, turned sour as Chinese troops intruded into Indian territory in Eastern Ladakh, even as the visit was underway. Since then, India’s ties with China have been characterized by dissonance, with China opposing India’s entry into the Nuclear Supplier’ Group (NSG), Indian worries about trade imbalances, Chinese hostility towards the Dalai Lama’s travels to Arunachal Pradesh and finally India’s decision to oppose China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), made in no small part due to BRI’s flagship project being the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which impinges on India’s sovereignty. Throughout this period, the LAC has seen numerous Chinese transgressions in certain sectors as well as airspace violations.
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