H-20 bomber (with H-X, JH-XX)

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
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If located deep in the interior of China and range boosted through aerial refueling, what really is the risk to the airframe even if hanging in the open? If the US can strike the middle of China with impunity, well there would be much bigger issues for China than a few stealth bombers. It would already mean that the whole PLA navy was sunk since they would be far easier to hit than the middle of China.

It's less about being hit with impunity, but more that even a lucky couple of munitions getting through (the rest being intercepted) can greatly diminish the combat effectiveness of your overall fleet if your fleet size is insufficiently large and insufficiently dispersed.
 

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
It's less about being hit with impunity, but more that even a lucky couple of munitions getting through (the rest being intercepted) can greatly diminish the combat effectiveness of your overall fleet if your fleet size is insufficiently large and insufficiently dispersed.

When I previously modelled this, a single DF-26 with a ball bearing cluster payload could theoretically ensure every bomber or tanker on Andersen Air Force Base would receive on average, 1-2 hits equivalent to a bomblet. There's a whole bunch of assumptions here, but I think it does indicate how vulnerable large aircraft are.

So from the Chinese perspective, even if H-20s are based deep in the interior in Gansu, they can still be reached with a 3000km LRHW missile launched from above Japan.
 

ismellcopium

Junior Member
Registered Member
When I previously modelled this, a single DF-26 with a ball bearing cluster payload could theoretically ensure every bomber or tanker on Andersen Air Force Base would receive on average, 1-2 hits equivalent to a bomblet. There's a whole bunch of assumptions here, but I think it does indicate how vulnerable large aircraft are.

So from the Chinese perspective, even if H-20s are based deep in the interior in Gansu, they can still be reached with a 3000km LRHW missile launched from above Japan.
Could China just employ an ACE-type concept? Are ARRW type weapons able to hit mobile targets?
 

MarKoz81

Junior Member
Registered Member
I'll use this comment as general reference:

To me, the equivalent of H-20 (i.e.: large, expensive, likely to be procured in limited numbers and being presently inappropriate for the PLA's geostrategic situation) is aircraft carriers. Aircraft carriers hold a vital and unique role of course, but we see how the PLAN are not immediately moving into producing more carriers and are taking a measured approach, and I suspect part of that is because they recognize the geostrategic positioning is not favourable at the moment for carriers.
I see H-20 and carriers as similar in that way -- there will always be a mission and requirement for them, but the issue for us is whether it makes sense for them to procure them for the near term in the next 5-6 years for example.

The term "geostrategy" is not a combination of "geography" and "strategy" but of "geopolitics" and "strategy" so it always refers to strategy being informed geographical as well as political context. Carriers however are not a geostrategic consideration but purely a geographic consideration. Whenever geography allows for establishing of land bases they are always preferable to carriers due to their lower cost, greater flexibility, greater capacity for sortie generation and greater resiliency.

US uses carriers because they can't afford to have land bases everywhere, as well as are constrained by legal matters of deploying assets under department of the navy vs maintaining an airbase and deploying air force personnel (see: legal requirements of deploying marines vs army before 9/11). Because carriers are used as symbolic representation of US power in propaganda people who are less informed on the matter assume that having a carrier is a pre-requisite of having ability to project power, when in reality it is the consequence of being able to project power at a certain level which makes it possible to support a very inefficient floating airbase to achieve strategic goals.

China's artificial islands are a good example. Why waste money on a carrier when you can build an island? Note that the island costs more but the money is not wasted on it.

The US is located more than 3000km from Europe, 2000km South America and 5000km from Asia. It can either maintain permanent airbases or build a carrier which is inefficient but cheaper in absolute terms because it will only be deployed some of the time.

It's a geographical calculation, not a strategic or tactical one.

North America needs carriers because that's the cheapest way to project power at the rest of the world. China doesn't need carriers because it doesn't need North America while everywhere else is reachable by land one way or another. Even South America is better approached through a series of military alliances allowing for creation of bases, with support of the host nation rather than expeditionary carrier fleets.

A similar situation occurs with strategic bombers. The development of US bomber doctrine - which happens in the 1930s - was dictated by geography. Bombers were thought to be the ultimate technological tool of winning war without having to deploy troops, especially at the time when US Army was small compared to what it became after US entry into WW2. This is why the US continues to approach so many conflicts in this manner (see: Yugoslavia). It's the consequence of their strategic culture shaped by geography. The US is a remote as well as an extensive country, therefore distance and overcoming it is very strongly present in their thinking. They have an aversion to deploying large armies because US deploying large armies even to neighbouring countries is more challenging logistically than say Russia deploying large army to neighbouring countries. That's because Russia - despite its superficial characteristics - is a less extensive and less remote society than the US. The territory is huge. The distribution of populations is much more contained compared to the US. Even China is not as extensive because due to greater population the distribution is more contiguous. The US has 15-20% of its population on the distant West Coast and the rest is spread in clusters over similar area as China's east. That must have an effect on the way people view the world, and it does.

And if we realise that strategy is all about influencing humans and consequently start thinking in terms of human geography - population and its spatial distribution - then having carriers or long range bombers becomes a very questionable choice.

world-population-density-map.jpg
Just consider that in a purely hypothetical scenario Chinese army can literally march over land to anywhere in Asia, Europe and Africa. Suez Canal is 350m wide. The Bering Strait is 100km wide.

America simply doesn't have another way of accessing the "World Island" other than by sea or air. And that leads to the necessary development of naval and aerial modes of transport which open possibilities of using them as more economical power projection tools.

H-20 will be more relevant as a long range multi-role VLO platform rather than just a strategic bomber. Even B-21 isn't intended to serve as a traditional bomber. That role has largely became obsolete by the time B-2 entered service and B-2 was already attempting to address issues of tactical obsolescence. Increasingly I'm thinking "long range heavy fighter" rather than "strategic bomber". For both.

So many people are psychologically fixated on V-2 when V-1 was the actual revolutionary innovation as demonstrated by the numbers in so many post-war studies.

It's counter intuitive because humans have emotional reaction to the notion of getting injured - we're not lizards or amphibians who can sacrifice and then re-grow a body part - so we don't process "higher loss for higher gain" the same as "no loss for lower gain". Which is why warfare is so challenging logically, especially for regular members of society. Mathematically - when treating warring societies as mathematical systems - the optimal scenario is to kill many of your soldiers in order to kill even more of enemy soldiers. The alternative is more palpable but less effective.

And let's not forget that since 2022 we have an example of a country managing to retain core function and fighting under constant bombardment. Similarly Germany from 1942 to 1944 was managing to hold its own and even increase production if at high cost. "Air power wins wars" is just a marketing slogan for US aerospace industry.

The Sino-American strategic contest won't be settled by aircraft carriers or stealth bombers. The only traditional weapon system that will have a significant role is the submarine because it influences movement of resources at a much greater ratio than either of the other two. Submarines largely won the Pacific theatre for USN and would win the Atlantic i.e. blockade Britain for Germany if numbers were sufficient at an earlier stage and were followed by a proper strategy.

Obsessing about carriers and bombers is trying to make the American feel insecure by driving a bigger car than he has. It achieves nothing of substance and betrays an underlying even greater insecurity.

Ultimately this type of strategic contest is settled by Balboa's law: "it's not about how hard you hit, but how hard you can get hit and move forward". Another counter-intuitive principle governing the universe is that natural selection is not about methods of elimination but methods of survival. Sun Tzu understood that. Shame that so many here don't.
 
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W20

Junior Member
Registered Member
but the issue for us is whether it makes sense for them to procure them for the near term in the next 5-6 years for example.

Yes, no, there is no hurry

On the other hand it might not be worth it economically now that I think about it more carefully, and the ability to conventionally counter-attack CONTUS might be cheaper with rockets.

or maybe it's worth it, I don't know.

In any case:

A) B-21s are detected and shot down

B) Bases are destroyed by the 095s and

C) there is a conventional counter-attack on CONTUS with H-20 or with rockets
 
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Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
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I'll use this comment as general reference:



The term "geostrategy" is not a combination of "geography" and "strategy" but of "geopolitics" and "strategy" so it always refers to strategy being informed geographical as well as political context. Carriers however are not a geostrategic consideration but purely a geographic consideration. Whenever geography allows for establishing of land bases they are always preferable to carriers due to their lower cost, greater flexibility, greater capacity for sortie generation and greater resiliency.

I consider carriers to be part of the geostrategic environment that the PRC experiences because the ability of US carriers to deploy in the region (westpac as a whole) is a reflection not purely of geography but because of the politics that enables US basing in the region.



US uses carriers because they can't afford to have land bases everywhere, as well as are constrained by legal matters of deploying assets under department of the navy vs maintaining an airbase and deploying air force personnel (see: legal requirements of deploying marines vs army before 9/11). Because carriers are used as symbolic representation of US power in propaganda people who are less informed on the matter assume that having a carrier is a pre-requisite of having ability to project power, when in reality it is the consequence of being able to project power at a certain level which makes it possible to support a very inefficient floating airbase to achieve strategic goals.

China's artificial islands are a good example. Why waste money on a carrier when you can build an island? Note that the island costs more but the money is not wasted on it.

The US is located more than 3000km from Europe, 2000km South America and 5000km from Asia. It can either maintain permanent airbases or build a carrier which is inefficient but cheaper in absolute terms because it will only be deployed some of the time.

It's a geographical calculation, not a strategic or tactical one.

North America needs carriers because that's the cheapest way to project power at the rest of the world. China doesn't need carriers because it doesn't need North America while everywhere else is reachable by land one way or another. Even South America is better approached through a series of military alliances allowing for creation of bases, with support of the host nation rather than expeditionary carrier fleets.

A similar situation occurs with strategic bombers. The development of US bomber doctrine - which happens in the 1930s - was dictated by geography. Bombers were thought to be the ultimate technological tool of winning war without having to deploy troops, especially at the time when US Army was small compared to what it became after US entry into WW2. This is why the US continues to approach so many conflicts in this manner (see: Yugoslavia). It's the consequence of their strategic culture shaped by geography. The US is a remote as well as an extensive country, therefore distance and overcoming it is very strongly present in their thinking. They have an aversion to deploying large armies because US deploying large armies even to neighbouring countries is more challenging logistically than say Russia deploying large army to neighbouring countries. That's because Russia - despite its superficial characteristics - is a less extensive and less remote society than the US. The territory is huge. The distribution of populations is much more contained compared to the US. Even China is not as extensive because due to greater population the distribution is more contiguous. The US has 15-20% of its population on the distant West Coast and the rest is spread in clusters over similar area as China's east. That must have an effect on the way people view the world, and it does.

And if we realise that strategy is all about influencing humans and consequently start thinking in terms of human geography - population and its spatial distribution - then having carriers or long range bombers becomes a very questionable choice.

View attachment 131078
Just consider that in a purely hypothetical scenario Chinese army can literally march over land to anywhere in Asia, Europe and Africa. Suez Canal is 350m wide. The Bering Strait is 100km wide.

America simply doesn't have another way of accessing the "World Island" other than by sea or air. And that leads to the necessary development of naval and aerial modes of transport which open possibilities of using them as more economical power projection tools.

I don't think any of this particularly contradicts what I wrote. If anything I agree with most of it, but it's not particularly relevant to the point I was trying to make.


H-20 will be more relevant as a long range multi-role VLO platform rather than just a strategic bomber. Even B-21 isn't intended to serve as a traditional bomber. That role has largely became obsolete by the time B-2 entered service and B-2 was already attempting to address issues of tactical obsolescence. Increasingly I'm thinking "long range heavy fighter" rather than "strategic bomber". For both.

I also agree with this.
I think you may be fixating a bit much on the term "bomber" or the "fixed wing long range penetrating strike bomber" term. It goes without saying that everything will be multirole now and into the future, so that can be taken as assumed.
That said, the "strike bomber" role will ultimately still be one of the major missions for these large multirole VLO platforms and will be one of the major determinants of its form factor (weapons bay geometry, overall airframe size, which determines powerplant etc), so we also can't exactly escape the term for now.


When I previously modelled this, a single DF-26 with a ball bearing cluster payload could theoretically ensure every bomber or tanker on Andersen Air Force Base would receive on average, 1-2 hits equivalent to a bomblet. There's a whole bunch of assumptions here, but I think it does indicate how vulnerable large aircraft are.

So from the Chinese perspective, even if H-20s are based deep in the interior in Gansu, they can still be reached with a 3000km LRHW missile launched from above Japan.

I don't think we need to get into such specific examples. Just a generic understanding that everyone is aware that a degree of vulnerability to enemy long range fires should be assumed for baseline (no matter which side you are), and your procurement and basing should reflect it.




Hi,
is it not a possibility for china to literally buy a island next to Australia, and what can they
do about finding something next to Hawaii like a Guam kind of base ? In near future
thank you

Even if they did so (which frankly is unrealistic and impractical), having a forward base that is so far from and having limited supports from the rest of the PLA just makes the base a target rather than a means of projecting effective power.
 

siegecrossbow

General
Staff member
Super Moderator
In their latest episode, the Guanqi gang thinks the H-20 delayed or cancelled discussion are all rumors started by Americans. That said I don't trust them at all.

PLAAF commander mentioned that H-20 is on track to journalist from HongKong earlier this year during the two sessions. I don’t think he’d assert something like this with no evidence.
 

sunnymaxi

Major
Registered Member
PLAAF commander mentioned that H-20 is on track to journalist from HongKong earlier this year during the two sessions. I don’t think he’d assert something like this with no evidence.
all this discussion triggered by a random dude on Weibo .. LOOL

i have said this before, Weibo is unhealthy. this social media platform have way more false information.. only trusted accounts are fine..

1000119307.jpg

he is deputy commander of PLAAF and representative in National people's congress.. highest political authority of PLAAF in NPC.

when deputy commander of the PLAAF has made it clear that this (China has the ability to develop H-20 without bottlenecks) is the case. How could there still be people who think that the water (H-20) has become cold (cancelled)?

H-20 project going absolutely well and nothing has changed..
 
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