H-20 bomber (with H-X, JH-XX)

I have an idea that makes the H-20 survivable no matter how prevalent close-in US fires become. It's a neat blend of modern war and old school Mao tactics: base the H-20s under a mountain. China already has the Underground Great Wall for its road mobile ICBMs, it can refurbish and repurpose some of it for the H-20 bomber force.

If US fires haven't been sufficiently degraded, the H-20s stay holed up. The worst the US can do is close the entrances, which can be unclogged later. Once US assets in the FIC have been destroyed, the bombers can come out and base in the open and conduct their missions normally. Should the US be able to reconstitute its forces (unlikely), back under the mountain they go.

H-20 山寨.

Jason_ said:

Yes, and my argument is that there are no alternatives that makes as much sense as the H-20 originally imagined (i.e. sino-B2) and thus it is unlikely to be canceled or significantly revised.

The H-20 also offers certain capabilities that cannot be offered by smaller aircrafts (range, variety of integrated sensors, large/deep weapon bay for XXL weapons, nuclear missions, CONUS missions, prestige, etc.)

The flight time of S/IRBM means that it is very feasible to coordinate time on target so that the H-20 penetrate at the same time as the missiles barrage or after the missiles take out significant parts of the IADS in which case the H-20 would target the remnants of the IADS or the rest of the air base.

Guam will not be the linchpin of US operations in the future because the US recognize its inherent limitations and vulnerability. The offensive component of the future US strategy will center on high sortie generation of B-21s from bases in Hawaii and Australia, which are currently outside the effective range of the PLARF.
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I need to emphasize that nothing in the US arsenal poses any where close to as much threat to China as many squadrons of forward deployed B-21s. It is absolutely imperative that China develop a way to neutralize these bases. 5000km is ICBM territory and not cost effective for conventional ballistic missiles which means China needs an Australia-ranged bomber.

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Let's not forget another key component in this interesting discussion: VLO refuellers, something US is working on. Maybe I missed the news where China is working on something similar?

ZeEa5KPul said:

I have an idea that makes the H-20 survivable no matter how prevalent close-in US fires become. It's a neat blend of modern war and old school Mao tactics: base the H-20s under a mountain. China already has the Underground Great Wall for its road mobile ICBMs, it can refurbish and repurpose some of it for the H-20 bomber force.

If US fires haven't been sufficiently degraded, the H-20s stay holed up. The worst the US can do is close the entrances, which can be unclogged later. Once US assets in the FIC have been destroyed, the bombers can come out and base in the open and conduct their missions normally. Should the US be able to reconstitute its forces (unlikely), back under the mountain they go.

H-20 山寨.

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The size of such huge caverns to accommodate the singular large size of airframes would be a bit difficult. That said, it can likely offer some mitigation measures, but whether that's enough for them to actually procure the H-20 in the near term geostrategic environment, I'm less sure about.

ZeEa5KPul said:

DF-27.

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HGVs are great but I have my doubts that China will be able to produce enough of those to halt & more importantly keep halted sortie generation from Australia or Hawaii with DF-27s alone, let alone both. A very large number would be required. Remember Alaska too.

Comports with my thinking that short/medium term attrition war prep = survivable distributed long range strikes where production chain can be sheltered, which basically leaves underground missile factories even if per unit of fire more expensive than large reusable platforms that can't be effectively protected due to size. Hence no reason to spam prestige/expensive carriers or H20s. Still good to have/hedge program to build competencies/knowledge. But I imagine there's a lot of tunnel boring machines and underground construction expertise that can be directed at building out parallel production lines for 80ft icbms to keep dishing out punches and throw up ISR when attrition game starts. At that point it's pointless to worry about unit cost of fires than being able to reliably sustain fires to chip away / degrade adversary ability to coordinate as well as morale. Need to be able to scare the tail as much as tooth, especially with disproportionate size of support to keep complex reusable platforms running. Minimum viable deterrence is ensuring no maintainence crew in Alaska, Hawaii, WestAU air fields feel safe/sustainable. Next level up is figuring out how to hit subsonic tankers/awacs/bombers in transit. I know Blitzo hates Stephen Chen rag pieces, but imo there's enough bread crumbs from different research "efforts" in the last few years to hint at genuine interest in trying to just get advanced rocketry to do it all. Utimately if something spends most of it's life on the ground, that something can likely be destroyed. Third Front -> fourth (geo)front.

ZeEa5KPul said:

I have an idea that makes the H-20 survivable no matter how prevalent close-in US fires become. It's a neat blend of modern war and old school Mao tactics: base the H-20s under a mountain. China already has the Underground Great Wall for its road mobile ICBMs, it can refurbish and repurpose some of it for the H-20 bomber force.

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Underground aircraft bases are expensive as h, you're de facto building a stationary aircraft carrier with all the same facilities (but fight for every inch of space for one).
Bases for strategic bombers specifically(i.e. tunnels 50+ m wide with enough space and means to maneuver them around) will make the whole enterprise even more ridiculous.

And dubious, too - the larger the cavity, the more vulnerable it is.

Blitzo said:

The size of such huge caverns to accommodate the singular large size of airframes would be a bit difficult. That said, it can likely offer some mitigation measures, but whether that's enough for them to actually procure the H-20 in the near term geostrategic environment, I'm less sure about.

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If located deep in the interior of China and range boosted through aerial refueling, what really is the risk to the airframe even if hanging in the open? If the US can strike the middle of China with impunity, well there would be much bigger issues for China than a few stealth bombers. It would already mean that the whole PLA navy was sunk since they would be far easier to hit than the middle of China.

Gloire_bb said:

Underground aircraft bases are expensive as h, you're de facto building a stationary aircraft carrier with all the same facilities (but fight for every inch of space for one).
Bases for strategic bombers specifically(i.e. tunnels 50+ m wide with enough space and means to maneuver them around) will make the whole enterprise even more ridiculous.

And dubious, too - the larger the cavity, the more vulnerable it is.

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It's a very difficult and expensive infrastructure project, exactly the sort of thing China excels at. The layout wouldn't need to be as sophisticated as a carrier because "sortie rates" are meaningless. The mountain facility is for long-term storage, it's not an operational base. It doesn't matter if it takes days to get them all out; they're just there to survive the initial phases of the war.

The cavern could be made deep enough and sealed with blast doors to withstand a direct nuclear strike. If it reaches that point, we're past considerations for a conventional war.

ZeEa5KPul said:

Buying many more cheaper GJ-X UCAVs will still be very useful and will provide a very robust strike capability over the 2IC+ theatre. The great thing is a lot of the cost of developing a GJ-X has already been paid into the H-20 program. Improved autonomy and MUMT with Sino-NGAD (or J-XD as you call it) has opened up a lot of options. Ironically, this was the original intent of the JH-XX (a limited range theatre bomber).

I wonder if the GJ-X could be made with two engines and be similarly sized to the B-21. Does that blow up the cost and run into the limited number hangar queen H-20 problem?

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Blitzo said:

I'm not sure if a twin engine (say, two non-AB WS-10s) would be appropriate as it would likely be at least as big as B-21 and it would be well and truly be much larger than a big tactical sized aircraft.
Unless you go for say, two non AB WS-13 sized engines, which is certainly an option.

Anyway, the goal of "greater quantity + greater ability to disperse" while retaining "useful capability for 2IC+ distances" I think is probably a useful way of thinking about what a "fixed wing penetrating strike bomber" may be, if indeed H-20 is being pushed back.

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A large flying-wing VLO UCAV equipped with two non-AB variant of WS-21/19 engines should have comparably better payload capacity and strike range than with only one non-AB variant of WS-10/15 engine onboard.

We aren't just talking about the combined thrusts (~114-120+ kN versus 89-105 kN military thrust) and electrical power outputs from those engines, but also how the components can be arranged inside the plane's fuselage and wings (engines, fuel tanks, weapons bay, landing gears, computer systems etc), which directly dictates how much fuel can be carried onboard, how the computer systems and hydraulics can be placed onboard, plus how much and how big the payloads can be carried onboard.

The present GJ-11, alleged to be equipped with one non-AB variant of WS-13, is capable of carrying 2 tons of payload at max. I'm confident that a GJ-11 "Pro-Plus-Max" with two WS-21s or WS-19s can do much better.

Besides, with the prospect of the air force variant of the J-35/J-31 being inducted into PLAAF service in the future looks to be increasing as we follow the J-35/J-31's recent developments, having a larger fleet of warplanes in the PLAAF that utilize the WS-21/19 should also greatly help in simplifying logistics and maintenance while also spreading out costs (albeit the obvious contrasts between AB and non-AB variants should be noted as well).

And compared with how the USAF had planned for loyal wingman bomber UCAVs to accompany the B-21s before it got cancelled on the grounds of cost - China's solution should be way more flexible and viable.

Of course, as I have mentioned previously - They can even form a family of large flying-wing VLO UAVs for non-combat roles (reconnaissance, surveillance, communications relay, EW, buddy tankers, light transport etc).

In the meantime, I do agree with the notion that the H-20 as how we have typically envisioned it (i.e. a Chinese B-2-equivalent) isn't anywhere being close to being a bad idea at all (in fact, ) - It's just not as acutely needed by the PLA war-planners currently, considering the PLA's power projection capabilities in the IndoPac region at present and for the rest of the 2020-decade.

Jason_ said:

The offensive component of the future US strategy will center on high sortie generation of B-21s from bases in Hawaii and Australia, which are currently outside the effective range of the PLARF.

I need to emphasize that nothing in the US arsenal poses any where close to as much threat to China as many squadrons of forward deployed B-21s. It is absolutely imperative that China develop a way to neutralize these

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Yes

A) B-21 will be shot down by J-20

B) Bases will be destroyed by 095

C) H-20 will be flown to CONUS