Why do you suppose the bomber would not be ready to fly publically if it has already flown?
in Terms of flight dynamics, a large bomber optimized for high altitude subsonic penetration, even a pure flying wing, is much less complex than a fighter expected to frequently maneuver at the very edge of controllability, such as the J-10 or j-20. If this thing can fly, it can fly at air shows.
Also, I think the desired service date of H-20 would not be governed by Xi’s optimistic scenario of china’s untroubled ascension to global power projection capability. It would be governed by the pessimistic scenario that Taiwan would be successfully encouraged to declare outright independence well before China achieve global power projection capability as a means of discrediting the CCP and thus checking china’s progress towards global power projection capability. So 2025 seems a geostrategic ally very desirable target date.
also, it is reasonable for the Chinese to suppose the greatest geopolitical pressure and ostracization China will face will occur during the period when the threat of China achieving 1) regional conventional parity, 2) second strike nuclear parity with any plausible American led alliance clearly is there, but the actual attainment of that parity has not yet occurred.
Once the parity occurs, the dynamic will change and some sort of detent will no doubt occur.
Before that is achieved the pressure will be all towards squeezing and ostracizing China. So the longer China takes to achieve parity, the longer and more cumulatively damaging the pressure and ostracization campaign will be. So it behoves China to achieve its target of comprehensive regional parity and nuclear second strike parity quickly rather than slowly and deliberately.