Future PLAN orbat discussion

Tam said:

I would think that given the tension, and the increased preoccupation with the "clash of civilizations", the CCP would push the PLAN into building more ships, accelerating build up plans and become even more ambitious in their scope. I would have thought there might be a problem of recruitment with Chinese millennials wanting to be engineers, become factory owners or work in tech companies, but an ensuing wave of patriotism may bring a tidal wave of recruits to the PLAN. Manpower might be the biggest bottleneck to expansion and that maybe getting solved.

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Surely, there is a limit to how many ships are relevant to CCP's defense strategy. China's maritime geography, locked within the first island chain as it is, does not necessitate a navy the size of USN.

I would argue the funds would be better invested in building a larger and more capable airforce, than a huge navy which in a "clash of civilizations" shooting war with the USN and JMSDF would be at a grave risk of being sunk in port strikes, given its limited capability to operate beyond the first island chain. They could however benefit from a larger fleet of nuclear powered submarines.

Max Demian said:

Surely, there is a limit to how many ships are relevant to CCP's defense strategy. China's maritime geography, locked within the first island chain as it is, does not necessitate a navy the size of USN.

I would argue the funds would be better invested in building a larger and more capable airforce, than a huge navy which in a "clash of civilizations" shooting war with the USN and JMSDF would be at a grave risk of being sunk in port strikes, given its limited capability to operate beyond the first island chain. They could however benefit from a larger fleet of nuclear powered submarines.

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It can also depend on how far the South Korean and Japanese navies build themselves up too.

A large blue water fleet would enable China to expand beyond the first and even second island chain. Another factor would be the offensive reach of this blue water fleet when you factor in cruise missiles.

You can also say the PLA should also invest more in the rocket force.

But all these is looking at a hot war situation, not a cold war situation.

In a cold war situation, you need a large blue water fleet to project force and protection of your trade routes to your trading partners. That would mean less with the US as time goes on, but more with Canada, Mexico, Latin and South America, as well as across the Indian Ocean to Africa and the Mediterranean. There is going to be this sea based BRI that the PLAN would be patrolling.

You are going to build yourself up to a level that would send a message that you can win a decisive naval battle. Not necessarily fight one but give the impression that you can.

For that, you don't need numbers, but technological advancement. This is why charting the technical progress of carrier, 055X, 052X and 054X, along with the nuclear subs, is more important than the numbers. That is why I put great weight in studying their subsystems and weapons systems.

Max Demian said:

Surely, there is a limit to how many ships are relevant to CCP's defense strategy. China's maritime geography, locked within the first island chain as it is, does not necessitate a navy the size of USN.

I would argue the funds would be better invested in building a larger and more capable airforce, than a huge navy which in a "clash of civilizations" shooting war with the USN and JMSDF would be at a grave risk of being sunk in port strikes, given its limited capability to operate beyond the first island chain. They could however benefit from a larger fleet of nuclear powered submarines.

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The capability that is required is to break any blockade of China that USA and its partners may seek to impose. The Air Force can assist with this within the first island chain, but its ability to exert influence beyond that diminishes. If a blockade is imposed at the Straits of Malacca, there is very little the PLAAF can do to break it.

The ultimate threat is America's effective control of the Persian Gulf states that collectively supply most of China's oil.

I agree. Basically the PLAN is useful for defending China's coastline, and supporting the take back of Taiwan, but it is also to be used in securing the trade routes to China namely to the Persian Gulf region. The PLAN is to have staging areas in Pakistan for example which are clearly to support this, as is the OBOR initiative and the CPEC.
You have to look at where Chinese naval interests are. These include countries like Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Djibouti, Israel, Greece.
When you overlay that to the transportation networks and pipelines, it becomes obvious that it is to secure the energy transport from the Persian Gulf region and conduct trade with East Africa and Europe via the Southern Mediterranean.

Max Demian said:

Surely, there is a limit to how many ships are relevant to CCP's defense strategy. China's maritime geography, locked within the first island chain as it is, does not necessitate a navy the size of USN.

I would argue the funds would be better invested in building a larger and more capable airforce, than a huge navy which in a "clash of civilizations" shooting war with the USN and JMSDF would be at a grave risk of being sunk in port strikes, given its limited capability to operate beyond the first island chain. They could however benefit from a larger fleet of nuclear powered submarines.

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That is debatable.

Obviously a large and capable air force and rocket force are important, however the ability to fight a war in the ocean is important as well if one can afford it, otherwise you are essentially giving up the capability to operate beyond the first island chain at all.

Specifically, while China may be geographically "locked" in the first island chain, a sufficiently powerful navy, air force and missile force could significantly reduce the relevance of the island chain in adversely affecting Chinese naval operations. A combination of careful peacetime diplomacy and geopolitical and geo-economic plays combined with a sufficiently powerful navy during wartime may even be able to exploit the island chain and enable its use as a line of defense for the PLA instead.

Bltizo said:

Whether the PLAN chooses to continue with a frigate class in the future I think will depend on what the balance of capabilities and cost a future 054B may offer compared to 052D/E.

For example the USN's pursuit of FFGX shows even they see the relevance of a capable frigate design to complement their larger surface combatants.
Additionally, people like fzgfzy are continuing to say that they expect 054B in the future, so for the moment I think projections of future PLAN surface combatants should be made with the assumption that an 054B class will emerge in some form, until a day where it can be overturned.

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Every corvette and frigate project in the world is also jobs and shipyard subsidy industry. For example, if FREMM wins for FFG(X), it gets to be built in the Marinette Marine shipyards, leaving Huntington Ingalls and Bath Iron Works to work on the Burkes. They keep sending out LCS contracts in order to keep two shipyards fed, including their jobs, their manufacturing skill sets, and to their entire vital supply chain.

Every recent publicized frigate project around the world, from the RN Type 26 and 31 frigates, the Australian and Canadian frigate competition, we hear talk about jobs and jobs. India just signed a deal where two of the Talwar II frigates are going to be built in Russia but the other two are going to be built in India. Same things goes with the Type 054AP project, with one or two built in China, the rest in Pakistan.

A 052E is going to be built in the same DL and JN shipyards as the 055. In fact, the two ships will compete for shipyard space, and they seem to be doing it now.

The 054 and the 056 series have been built in smaller and older (albeit modernized) shipyards that isn't going to fit a 052D. Due to the size of these shipyards, they can't get into the super bulk freighter, super tanker, mega container ship business which makes up the large juicy contracts of major shipping corporations. The lack of shipyards that can handle ships of these size also doomed the US shipping industry, since the only dry docks that can support these are used with US aircraft carriers. Its either the carriers or a modern shipping industry and the US choose the former.

So the smaller Chinese shipyards live on the smaller warships, PLAN auxilliaries, trawlers, China Coast Guard ships, and so on. One exception is Hudong Zhonghua, as they can live on making LPDs and LHDs, as normally they would be making a Type 054A next to a Type 071. That place seems occupied with a Type 075 lately. HDZ also has a place for making Type 056s.

In order to achieve the fastest buildup, and more utilization of the Chinese shipbuilding capacity, you need to be also building smaller warships that can be built on smaller shipyards, keep their manufacturing and supply chains humming and their skill sets well exercised. Once the Type 056 contracts ran their course, which appears soon, and the 054A program ending except for the export ships, they are going to need new contracts.

Tam said:

Every corvette and frigate project in the world is also jobs and shipyard subsidy industry. For example, if FREMM wins for FFG(X), it gets to be built in the Marinette Marine shipyards, leaving Huntington Ingalls and Bath Iron Works to work on the Burkes. They keep sending out LCS contracts in order to keep two shipyards fed, including their jobs, their manufacturing skill sets, and to their entire vital supply chain.

Every recent publicized frigate project around the world, from the RN Type 26 and 31 frigates, the Australian and Canadian frigate competition, we hear talk about jobs and jobs. India just signed a deal where two of the Talwar II frigates are going to be built in Russia but the other two are going to be built in India. Same things goes with the Type 054AP project, with one or two built in China, the rest in Pakistan.

A 052E is going to be built in the same DL and JN shipyards as the 055. In fact, the two ships will compete for shipyard space, and they seem to be doing it now.

The 054 and the 056 series have been built in smaller and older (albeit modernized) shipyards that isn't going to fit a 052D. Due to the size of these shipyards, they can't get into the super bulk freighter, super tanker, mega container ship business which makes up the large juicy contracts of major shipping corporations. The lack of shipyards that can handle ships of these size also doomed the US shipping industry, since the only dry docks that can support these are used with US aircraft carriers. Its either the carriers or a modern shipping industry and the US choose the former.

So the smaller Chinese shipyards live on the smaller warships, PLAN auxilliaries, trawlers, China Coast Guard ships, and so on. One exception is Hudong Zhonghua, as they can live on making LPDs and LHDs, as normally they would be making a Type 054A next to a Type 071. That place seems occupied with a Type 075 lately. HDZ also has a place for making Type 056s.

In order to achieve the fastest buildup, and more utilization of the Chinese shipbuilding capacity, you need to be also building smaller warships that can be built on smaller shipyards, keep their manufacturing and supply chains humming and their skill sets well exercised. Once the Type 056 contracts ran their course, which appears soon, and the 054A program ending except for the export ships, they are going to need new contracts.

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I would say that the end fleet size and composition really be driving the long-term shipyard plan.

Smaller countries (with smaller fleet requirements) have a big issue with sustaining a competitive industrial base, but that is not the case with China.
I think they were previously working to a fleet size comparable to the US Navy by 2050, but that was before the technology cold war which everyone in the world (excepting the US) thinks is a huge mistake.

In the short term, the US may get what it wants.

But in the longer-term we'll see a China with a significantly larger and hi-tech economy (with commensurate military/economic influence) and a long memory of how a superpower it should act.

@Bltizo

I think it would be interesting to extend the 2030 Chinese navy prediction to 2040, with the caveat that this is a low projection based on China's economy today. But in all likelihood, we'll probably see the Chinese economy being twice the size in the 2030-2035 timeframe.

I would controversially say that the PLAN would mostly be for holding the 2 island chains and the route to Russia than outside expeditions.

The island chains are geographical walls, anyone who comes inside has to do so through the gates, which makes them predictable. A handful of very advanced ships and subs at those chokepoints can hold back a numerically much larger force.

Straits of malacca is a trap, any force there is making themselves very vulnerable in the narrow straits. IRBM, submarines and long range anti ship cruise missiles etc will all have a field day with whatever’s inside. Someone could blockade it from the Indian Ocean, but that’s going to be very time consuming since it’s an entire ocean.

In wartime, the prime route for resources will be through Russia, which is in practice impossible to attack.

The only way to win would be an assault on the 2 island chains, which is what PLAN has geared up for. The more and larger “groups” China can make to rotate to guard the gates between the islands, the easier it is to hold out. But one of the major keys to the strategy is maintaining a 1on1 advantage, and also excellent networking between frigates, submarines, escort destroyers and fleet destroyers.

It will take at the very least long time until the carrier program will be enough to project power directly into the seas of great power threats. PLAN’s budget simply doesn’t support it. IMO the carriers represent both a technological demonstrator purpose - to keep alive technological leads such as EMALS etc, but also to increase China’s firepower against 3rd world nations.

Came across this randomly:

Predicting the Chinese Navy of 2030
Making predictions for the Chinese Navy a decade in advance is difficult given the PLA’s overall opacity.

By
February 15, 2019


Predictions for the Chinese Navy’s (People’s Liberation Army Navy, or PLAN) growth have often focused on the quantitative number of ships or submarines. Even commentary surrounding the PLAN describes it as the “world’s largest navy” in terms of the number of ships fielded, rather than using more sensible metrics such as tonnage. A 22 class fast missile boat and an 052D class destroyer are both counted as “one” ship, but the difference between a 220 ton craft and a 7,000 ton surface combatant is significant.

Some future predictions for the PLAN have been more acknowledging of the qualitative advancements in addition to quantity. However, only a commentaries have considered the number of each warship type which may be produced. This piece will seek to paint a picture of what the PLAN may look like in 2030 among major warship categories.

...

Future factors

In summary, an early 2019 prediction for PLAN ships in service by 2030 are broken down as such:

• 16-20 055/A destroyers (12,000 ton category)
• 36-40 052D/E destroyers (7,000 ton category)
• 40-50 054A/B frigates (4,000-5,000 ton category)
• Approximately 60 SSKs
• Anywhere from 16 or more SSNs (including six to eight existing SSNs)
• Anywhere from eight or more SSBNs (including four to five existing SSBNs)
• At least four aircraft carriers (two ski jump, two catapult)
• At least eight 071 LPDs (25,000 ton category)
• At least three 075 LHDs (36,000 ton category)

Of the above, frigates, SSNs, SSBNs, and carriers are currently the most difficult to predict, with the most margin for error.

Other ships of note include the approximately 60 056/A corvettes that will complete its production run within the next year or so, as well as the 11 older “non-Aegis” type destroyers and dozen or so older frigates that will likely remain in service as “second line” surface combatants. The 25-30 ship fleet of 072s will likely be retained. It is unknown if the 60 odd fleet of 22 class missile boats will be retained. The numbers of replenishment ships are not predicted here, due to lack of long-term regular production rates that can be extrapolated, though fast launch rates have been demonstrated.

Making predictions for the PLAN a decade in advance is difficult given the PLA’s overall opacity. Unforeseen confounding factors – such as project mismanagement, technological hurdles, economic adversity, military conflict, and natural disaster – are also difficult to consider.

The projection laid out here is not concrete and final, and is likely to evolve in coming years as 2030 approaches. However, use of critical extrapolation and consideration of Chinese naval requirements can provide a gauge for how the PLAN may evolve in the medium term future.



Overall, the predictions in the article are not that far off from @Bltizo , just a little more conservative for both the 055/A and the 052D/E.
I have no idea how credible the author or source is, both those numbers don't look too unreasonable.
I think it would be a mighty fine accomplishment for China to have a fleet of that size and caliber. Should be more than sufficient for her goals and needs.

FriedRiceNSpice said:

Overall, the predictions in the article are not that far off from @Bltizo

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Probably because 'Rick Joe' is Bltizo.