Future PLAN orbat discussion

Tam said:

The problem is that I don't see the Bohai shipyard able to produce more than two to four hulls a year. If you have two to three Bohais geared up then you have a case of massive SSN production, but you only have one shipyard. And its not clear if the nuclear submarine production is mainly for SSBNs and not SSNs.

I don't see an SSN getting through a CSG escort screen and launch torpedoes at short range getting away with it.

Do realize that no matter how quiet a sub is, its not immune from pinging. Its like a quiet aircraft doesn't make it active radar immune.

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Four hulls a year sustained would be a world leading number.
The new facility should be for both SSN and SSBN sized submarines, the rail gauges are obvious testament to that.


I'm also not exactly sure what your point is with regards to "not immune to pinging" -- the idea isn't that an SSN is meant to get through a CSG's escort screen and "get away with it".
The point is that a fleet of capable SSNs in general is an essential component of any naval force that wants to fight a high intensity conflict, just as how a fleet of capable surface combatants in general is an essential component for a naval force that wants to fight a high intensity conflict as well.

Nuclear submarines are no more a type of "silver bullet" weapon than any other type of weapon, but having a variety of good quality weapons across every single domain -- carriers, surface combatants, nuclear submarines, naval aviation, long range air power, long range strike power -- allows the system to work better where they are greater than the sum of their parts.

Actually no.

I might argue it is the surface warship itself that might be the most optimal and cost effect solution because in the end, it is about sinking another ship, and VLS offers the highest density of missiles possible you can bring to the battlespace. Submarines can deal with ships, but not aircraft. Aircraft can deal with ships, but not submarines unless you're ASW helicopters and maritime patrol aircraft. Ships is the only segment that can deal with the trinity of on the water, above the water and under the water all at the same time in the same package.

You can go on and further argue, what kind of antiship missiles carrier strike aircraft can carry and how many they can carry, and at what over all is the 'delivery' cost per missile. Maybe the J-15 can carry four YJ-83 or 2 YJ-83 and two YJ-91, but these don't have the range or the strike power of a YJ-12 or YJ-18. You still have to get to a certain range to use these missiles, YJ-83K at least under 250km, and the YJ-91 half of that. Which means they are going to be at risk with defenses. With the YJ-83 being a subsonic missile, I may also say the ability to overwhelm defenses by sheer speed would fall more to the YJ-12 and YJ-18's advantage, along with the greater damage potential. Even assuming you got J-35s, Tomahawk sized missiles ain't going to fit on your internal bay. Can you be able to confidently say, you can take a J-15, slung a single YJ-62 or YJ-12 underneath the center pod and take off from the carrier. Let's assume you can do so using EMALs, how big is your strike force? 8 jets, 16 jets, 24 jets, each carrying a single big missile.

Or you can have a single ULVS ship launch the equivalent of 8, 16, 24 similar missiles in one sitting.

I would even see the role of CVs in the PLAN to be more defensive, providing air cover , AEW, and reconnaissance information for the surface fleet. In addition to interception and air superiority, their best job is to look for the targets, both air and sea. Airborne tankers and enemy AEW would be ideal. If they spot the enemy force, and relay that information to the home fleet. But instead of a modern day Midway like strike where a carrier is hurrying up with a strike wing being loaded with antiship missiles and towed to the catapult, I would rather see your surface vessels opening their VLS and launching wave after wave of antiship missiles to that location. If the enemy is looking to destroy your offensive capability by targeting your carrier, your overall strike lethality is distributed with every ship afloat in your formation.

An SSGN, let's say we convert an 094 so that all its silos are firing U-VLS type missiles. Or let's say a stretched 093X with a back of VLS. Essentially an SSGN is an underwater arsenal ship. You have the question of the sonar's range, and its ability to detect a mobile CSG group and precisely track it at long ranges, much less even identify the noises of the CSG amidst ambient noise over a few hundred kilometers. The best, and most precise long range spotting and tracking information available is still going to be airborne, by patrol aircraft, helicopters, drones and satellite. Your sub still has to be near the surface to obtain this information, and isn't that much different from a U-VLS equipped warship except that it bobs in and out of the water and costs way more as a delivery vehicle. The best purpose I see having an SSN is to fight other subs. Even with a sub loaded with YJ-18 for stand off antiship, like with Yuans or 093, the corresponding density of missile per vessel is low.

I don't see the PLAN going full symmetrical until past 2030 or something. In fact, I would see the fear of a more immediate war and a slowing economy to cause the PLAN to tilt back into being more asymmetric.

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I mean, the sort of procurement we are talking about is the PLAN organizing and developing a fleet for the post 2030 era.

Everything that you've described here is basically the equivalent of "what is the next best way for the PLAN to use suboptimal naval assets to fight a high intensity conflict if it wasn't able to afford or develop XYZ systems" (XYZ in this case being whether it is a fleet of competitive SSNs or a fleet of competitive CSGs etc).
If the PLAN's resources were limited, then sure, perhaps adopting a more surface combatant heavy fleet would be appropriate but that would only be because they lacked the funds to develop and procure the full spectrum of high end naval capabilities.

Everything I've written in my previous post, and the whole point of my post, is that in the long term, the only true way to fight is to have everything and to fight as symetrically as possible because that is the only way to have a chance of winning a deep blue water high intensity naval conflict.

AndrewS said:

I see 2 major assumptions in this statement

Point 1. a Chinese-US conflict will be drawn out.
Point 2. a Chinese victory requires the PLAN to obtain blue-water sea control.

Point 1

If China conquers Taiwan, would the US be willing to spend years to build up the forces required to dislodge the Chinese Army?
We're talking about the modern day equivalent of D-Day or Operation Olympic.

Point 2

Heavyweight fighter jets and land-attack cruise missiles have an operating range of approximately 1500km.

Given the geography of the Western Pacific, it is credible for the Chinese military to achieve and maintain absolute military superiority within 700km of the Chinese mainland. And for a no-man's land (which includes an air/sea blockade) to stretch out to 1500km, which would cover the entire 1st Island Chain

So China can achieve its military objectives using land-based assets operating within 700km. For example

1. Taiwan is only 200-400km away
2. Okinawa and the Ryuku Islands are within 500-700km
3. All of South Korea is within 400-700km

Within that space, the Chinese military has both strategic and tactical initiative, and can choose weak points to attack.

And the US has no choice but to try defend all these potential targets.
But the 1st Island Chain has no strategic depth for safe rear area bases and resupply.

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I would counter your points differently.

1. we don't know how drawn out a China-US conflict could be. It could be a fast and furious westpac HIC conflict, or it could be a more drawn out blockade/interdiction campaign beyond the second island chain, or a mixture, or anything in between.

2. we don't know what the definition of victory means in a hypothetical conflict, because victory is ultimately defined by political goals. However, given the scale with which the US and China are now sizing each other up, I suspect that it would be presumptive for the PLA to believe that merely denying the US the ability to operate in the 1st and 2nd island chains would be sufficient as a declaration of victory or terms for peace, because the US also are not stupid and would seek to exploit their greater blue water naval power in other parts of the world outside of the western pacific to enforce either blockades or conduct longer range naval missile strikes against China over a longer period.


In other words, yes, if China is able to achieve air-naval control or superiority up to 700km or even 1500km of its mainland, then sure that is a necessary first step for the conditions for victory.
However, I also think we have to assume that the US are not stupid and have political resolve as well. The PLA should have to assume that the US would seek to continue such a conflict through the avoidance of combat and avoiding deploying assets into the region and instead carrying out interdiction and blockading actions and long range strike actions to gradually wear the PLA down before carrying out intensive deeper strikes.

That means it is not enough for the PLA to merely be able to fight and win battles in its near-periphery, but also to be able to have a fleet that can hunt and match the opfor's mobile naval air task forces.

AndrewS said:

A SSN can deploy a radio buoy with a broadcast delay to cue a rough location.
This has been around for decades.

At full speed, a CSG could cover say 60nm in the space of 2 hours.
That's good enough for follow-on airborne or spaceborne assets that can sweep the area in a few minutes.

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There's no need to chase a CSG at full speed, because the average CSG speed will be lower.

Remember that the Burke escorts only have a cruise range of 220 hours at 20knots with 1 turbine.
So at full speed with 4 turbines, a Burke would only have 2 days of endurance.

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Personally, I would task the SSN to go after the ships resupplying the CSG to achieve a mission kill.
They are easier targets and much lower risk

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A radio buoy would be detected by air and shipborne ESM, triangulated and located.

Even an SSN need to be deployed ahead where the CSG might be. You only end up with an opposing SSN waiting for you.

Going after the supply ships is a much better choice.

Bltizo said:

Four hulls a year sustained would be a world leading number.
The new facility should be for both SSN and SSBN sized submarines, the rail gauges are obvious testament to that.

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It means you cannot build enough SSNs to do what these others think of doing. This means half of your production is in SSBNs, the other half are for SSNs escorting those SSBNs.

I'm also not exactly sure what your point is with regards to "not immune to pinging" -- the idea isn't that an SSN is meant to get through a CSG's escort screen and "get away with it".

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No sub is immune to active sonar end of story. Being quiet does not mean you are anti-echo reflective, and there is no perfect anechoic coating.

The point is that a fleet of capable SSNs in general is an essential component of any naval force that wants to fight a high intensity conflict, just as how a fleet of capable surface combatants in general is an essential component for a naval force that wants to fight a high intensity conflict as well.

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Fairly large submarines forces fielded by the Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy proved to be indecisive in the Second World War, aside from successful individual feats.

You don't try to be symmetrical for the sake of being symmetrical. The RN saved itself by mass producing all sorts of emergency destroyers and frigates, and in the end, it was the small warship that won the Battle of the Atlantic.

I mean, the sort of procurement we are talking about is the PLAN organizing and developing a fleet for the post 2030 era.

Everything that you've described here is basically the equivalent of "what is the next best way for the PLAN to use suboptimal naval assets to fight a high intensity conflict if it wasn't able to afford or develop XYZ systems" (XYZ in this case being whether it is a fleet of competitive SSNs or a fleet of competitive CSGs etc).
If the PLAN's resources were limited, then sure, perhaps adopting a more surface combatant heavy fleet would be appropriate but that would only be because they lacked the funds to develop and procure the full spectrum of high end naval capabilities.

Everything I've written in my previous post, and the whole point of my post, is that in the long term, the only true way to fight is to have everything and to fight as symetrically as possible because that is the only way to have a chance of winning a deep blue water high intensity naval conflict.

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I would say that SSNs are much more suboptimal than you think as they tend to be highly focused to achieve a certain goal. Submarines are doctrine sensitive and brittle. If you don't have a proper idea how to use them, it will all fail. And by the way, the IJN thought of their submarines as fleet submarines meant to support surface fleets in large intensity battles. Exactly what you are thinking. That failed totally.

The large submarine forces fielded by the Soviet Navy were meant to interdict supply convoys from the US to NATO in the event of a European War. The submarine forces fielded by the RN and USN were meant to interdict these Soviet submarines. Both sides had a clear idea how they plan to use their subs.

The whole purpose of fighting asymmetrically is to defeat symmetrical forces. That's why the German Navy managed to achieve a terrific toll on the Allies, and this was done by letting the subs loose doing their own thing. Admiral Raeder thought symmetrically --- he wanted to match the British battleship by battleship, cruiser by cruiser --- using large fleets to interdict British convoys and raid supply routes. But Doenitz thought differently, he wanted to approach the problem asymmetrically with a concentrated U-boat fleet and for that, nearly brought the UK down. And as I said before, that was only successfully countered by massive production and deployment of emergency destroyers, frigates and corvettes. The IJN had a terrific submarine fleet, they were not inferior to the Germans technologically, and in fact, it can be said, the Japanese might have better submarines. But the disproportionate lack of success the IJN had with their submarines comes with them trying to frame submarines as a symmetrical weapon, e.g. build them because other big navies are building them, and then use them to support their battleship and carrier forces. At the same time, the terrific toll the Allies extracted on Japanese supply routes, were exacerbated by the lack of destroyers, frigates, escorts and corvettes dedicated for AAW and ASW roles until it was far too late.

Tam said:

It means you cannot build enough SSNs to do what these others think of doing. This means half of your production is in SSBNs, the other half are for SSNs escorting those SSBNs.

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No, why do you believe the PLAN needs a 1:1 ratio of SSNs and SSBNs?

Furthermore, if we look at the new facility at Bohai, it's pretty clear that the amount of floor space that will be needed to conduct final assembly of an SSBN is going to be anywhere from twice to four times greater than an SSN.

No sub is immune to active sonar end of story. Being quiet does not mean you are anti-echo reflective, and there is no perfect anechoic coating.

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I don't think I've ever suggested that any submarine is immune to active sonar, so I'm not sure why you are bringing this up.

Fairly large submarines forces fielded by the Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy proved to be indecisive in the Second World War, aside from successful individual feats.

You don't try to be symmetrical for the sake of being symmetrical. The RN saved itself by mass producing all sorts of emergency destroyers and frigates, and in the end, it was the small warship that won the Battle of the Atlantic.

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And how are the historical experiences of those respective navies in their respective eras relevant to the PLAN's procurement strategy going into the future?
This entire post of yours would be much stronger if you'd simply left this part out.

I would say that SSNs are much more suboptimal than you think as they tend to be highly focused to achieve a certain goal. Submarines are doctrine sensitive and brittle. If you don't have a proper idea how to use them, it will all fail. And by the way, the IJN thought of their submarines as fleet submarines meant to support surface fleets in large intensity battles. Exactly what you are thinking. That failed totally.

The large submarine forces fielded by the Soviet Navy were meant to interdict supply convoys from the US to NATO in the event of a European War. The submarine forces fielded by the RN and USN were meant to interdict these Soviet submarines. Both sides had a clear idea how they plan to use their subs.

The whole purpose of fighting asymmetrically is to defeat symmetrical forces. That's why the German Navy managed to achieve a terrific toll on the Allies, and this was done by letting the subs loose doing their own thing. Admiral Raeder thought symmetrically --- he wanted to match the British battleship by battleship, cruiser by cruiser --- using large fleets to interdict British convoys and raid supply routes. But Doenitz thought differently, he wanted to approach the problem asymmetrically with a concentrated U-boat fleet and for that, nearly brought the UK down. And as I said before, that was only successfully countered by massive production and deployment of emergency destroyers, frigates and corvettes. The IJN had a terrific submarine fleet, they were not inferior to the Germans technologically, and in fact, it can be said, the Japanese might have better submarines. But the disproportionate lack of success the IJN had with their submarines comes with them trying to frame submarines as a symmetrical weapon, e.g. build them because other big navies are building them, and then use them to support their battleship and carrier forces. At the same time, the terrific toll the Allies extracted on Japanese supply routes, were exacerbated by the lack of destroyers, frigates, escorts and corvettes dedicated for AAW and ASW roles until it was far too late.

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I want to reiterate that I've never suggested that SSNs are some sort of magic weapon or silver bullet to the PLAN's strategic challenges going into the future.
All I am saying is that I believe having a capable and modern SSN fleet that is placed on par with surface combatant fleet capability and modernity and your carrier fleet capability capability and modernity would be ideal, because a modern force on force high intensity air-naval conflict conducted at medium to very long distances from shore will inevitably require a fleet of capable SSNs to support your operations.

Regarding symmetry versus asymmetry -- fundamentally, I believe the PLAN's goal going forwards into the future is to seek to fight with a symmetric force -- i.e.: specifically having the capability to fight a high tech and high capability opfor in blue water distances without friendly land based support and have the ability to win.
Of course that doesn't mean the PLA at large will not take up certain asymmetrical traits into their future strategy for the western pacific specifically (the content of which I described in a previous post; leveraging mainland based long range air and strike power etc).

Furthermore, if some sort of new technology emerges that plays to the PLA's strengths and allows it to carry out an effective asymmetric strategy, then sure by all means it could be viable. But at present there are no such technologies that I see on the horizon that could be decisively viable that would allow the PLA the luxury to go without seeking a symmetric procurement strategy.


I also want to reiterate that I believe in the 21st century, with the current balance of global naval bases that the respective world powers have (including China), and the shipping lanes and sea lanes of communication that currently exist, that it is completely non-viable to believe that a surface combatant force lacking in their own air support is capable of escorting a your convoys around the world when you are facing a high capability naval-air power like the USN and USAF.
Surface combatants operating in isolation would be easy prey for CSGs and land based air power if they lack their own friendly (preferably organic) fixed wing high capability air support.

That is why I've been saying that in this day and age, if you want to even think about "escorting" your convoys around the world in various locations with surface combatants, what it means is that you need the ability to deploy at least a CSG to that location to fight off opfor CSG or land based air power as well.... which takes us back to why I believe the PLAN will seek a symmetrical naval procurement strategy going forwards into the future.

Bltizo said:

No, why do you believe the PLAN needs a 1:1 ratio of SSNs and SSBNs?

Furthermore, if we look at the new facility at Bohai, it's pretty clear that the amount of floor space that will be needed to conduct final assembly of an SSBN is going to be anywhere from twice to four times greater than an SSN.

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It still means SSNs are going to be used to cover SSBNs. They are used that way in the USN and in the Soviet Navy.

I don't think I've ever suggested that any submarine is immune to active sonar, so I'm not sure why you are bringing this up.

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Because its not a magical bullet.

And how are the historical experiences of those respective navies in their respective eras relevant to the PLAN's procurement strategy going into the future?
This entire post of yours would be much stronger if you'd simply left this part out.

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Actually quite relevant to study always from history. If you don't have a strong and aggressive doctrine of submarine use, or thought very well how to use them, you are not going to use them well. Submarine forces are not part of a symmetrical naval force. By their nature, they are asymmetrical and history has shown they had the most success when used independently and asymmetrically from your main naval forces.

I want to reiterate that I've never suggested that SSNs are some sort of magic weapon or silver bullet to the PLAN's strategic challenges going into the future.
All I am saying is that I believe having a capable and modern SSN fleet that is placed on par with surface combatant fleet capability and modernity and your carrier fleet capability capability and modernity would be ideal, because a modern force on force high intensity air-naval conflict conducted at medium to very long distances from shore will inevitably require a fleet of capable SSNs to support your operations.

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Why do you think its ideal? Because its symmetric? You never explained clearly what is your vision for China using its submarines.

Regarding symmetry versus asymmetry -- fundamentally, I believe the PLAN's goal going forwards into the future is to seek to fight with a symmetric force -- i.e.: specifically having the capability to fight a high tech and high capability opfor in blue water distances without friendly land based support and have the ability to win.

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That is extremely vague and general.

Of course that doesn't mean the PLA at large will not take up certain asymmetrical traits into their future strategy for the western pacific specifically (the content of which I described in a previous post; leveraging mainland based long range air and strike power etc).

Furthermore, if some sort of new technology emerges that plays to the PLA's strengths and allows it to carry out an effective asymmetric strategy, then sure by all means it could be viable. But at present there are no such technologies that I see on the horizon that could be decisively viable that would allow the PLA the luxury to go without seeking a symmetric procurement strategy.

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I think there is, and that is ballistic and hypersonic missiles launched en masse from VLS tubes. How are you going to defend your carriers from that?

Two ways.

Intercept the missiles. Ships with very large and powerful radars that can detect and track the missiles at long range and precisely, then set large SAMs to go after them.

Ships that can send their own hyper fast antiship missiles to sink the threat ships before they get to launch theirs.

You come down to it, that's not too different from a Type 055 like ship shooting Zircons off its arrays of large VLS while intercepting likewise with SM-6 like SAMs. Even the USN is looking at serious proposals for its LSC (Large Surface Combatant) that calls for an all new VLS system. Either way, you are going to invest in new generation large surface combatants.

I also want to reiterate that I believe in the 21st century, with the current balance of global naval bases that the respective world powers have (including China), and the shipping lanes and sea lanes of communication that currently exist, that it is completely non-viable to believe that a surface combatant force lacking in their own air support is capable of escorting a your convoys around the world when you are facing a high capability naval-air power like the USN and USAF.

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I would also currently reiterate that upcoming technologies can easily render huge investments of capitals ships and submarines obsolete just like that.

Surface combatants operating in isolation would be easy prey for CSGs and land based air power if they lack their own friendly (preferably organic) fixed wing high capability air support.

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That is why they need to operate in unison and as a part of a network in addition for the ships to being able to defend itself, each ship, vigorously.

That is why I've been saying that in this day and age, if you want to even think about "escorting" your convoys around the world in various locations with surface combatants, what it means is that you need the ability to deploy at least a CSG to that location to fight off opfor CSG or land based air power as well.... which takes us back to why I believe the PLAN will seek a symmetrical naval procurement strategy going forwards into the future.

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Let's say in the Indian Ocean, your PLAN CSG is escorting a convoy of oil from Iran, and you got some Indian Navy destroyers and frigates looking for a nasty fight. If your carrier is already spotted by maritime patrol or drone, and some pretty fast and long range BRAHMOS is already headed its way launched from these ships, its not necessary to involve India's carriers or its nuclear submarines into the fight. If those Brahmos are going to get through, your PLAN carrier is going to be in a deep pot of hurt. Your survival will depend on those very destroyers and frigates that are with you that can intercept these missiles, and likewise, your escorts will have to shoot their own super fast antiship missiles to sink those other ships before they can get off with another round of missiles. On the other side, those destroyers and frigates are going to use their defenses against the missiles thrown at them. In all these time, you may not have enough time to set up and launch a strike group. It still is in the end, going to boil down with surface ships slinging each other with arrows and holding their shields.

Once you have invested into carriers, which are a money and a resource pit, you are also thrown into a black hole of investing in massive resources in how to defend them. How many carriers did the USN have? Ten to twelve depending on deployment, refit or retirement. Yet there are about over 80 AEGIS ships, bolstered with allied ships. The result of China building more carriers is going to result in China building more surface ships to protect them. It won't mean less surface warships.

Tam said:

It still means SSNs are going to be used to cover SSBNs. They are used that way in the USN and in the Soviet Navy.

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Not to a 1:1 ratio.

Because its not a magical bullet.

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Well then you can stop bringing it up because in case you didn't notice, I've never suggested SSNs are a magic bullet.

Actually quite relevant to study always from history. If you don't have a strong and aggressive doctrine of submarine use, or thought very well how to use them, you are not going to use them well. Submarine forces are not part of a symmetrical naval force. By their nature, they are asymmetrical and history has shown they had the most success when used independently and asymmetrically from your main naval forces.

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I'm not saying that one shouldn't study from history -- I'm saying your direct comparisons between those naval encounters in the past being directly compared with the PLAN today and into the future in context of contemporary and foreseeable geopolitical basing and positioning and modern technologies means direct comparisons can be confusing if you don't explicitly layout what specific historical measure you're comparing.

Why do you think its ideal? Because its symmetric? You never explained clearly what is your vision for China using its submarines.

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It is ideal because without an equal or competitive naval force and naval aviation capability, you will be at a targeting and weapons/effects-range deficit.

1. Escorting your surface formations (whether they're SAGs or CSGs) for the purpose of contributing to the formation's ASW capabilities.
2. Conducting independent or small group patrolling activities to contribute to the overall theater naval picture and supplement friendly surface formations fire power against opfor targets (via cruise missiles), and also carrying out independent anti-surface missions when such opportunities present themselves.
(3. Escorting your SSBNs to an extent)

That is extremely vague and general.

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It's pretty straight forward -- it suggests the PLAN will seek to emulate similar high end blue water surface, subsurface and naval aviation capabilities like the USN.

I think there is, and that is ballistic and hypersonic missiles launched en masse from VLS tubes. How are you going to defend your carriers from that?

Two ways.

Intercept the missiles. Ships with very large and powerful radars that can detect and track the missiles at long range and precisely, then set large SAMs to go after them.

Ships that can send their own hyper fast antiship missiles to sink the threat ships before they get to launch theirs.

You come down to it, that's not too different from a Type 055 like ship shooting Zircons off its arrays of large VLS while intercepting likewise with SM-6 like SAMs. Even the USN is looking at serious proposals for its LSC (Large Surface Combatant) that calls for an all new VLS system. Either way, you are going to invest in new generation large surface combatants.

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You defend your carriers in two ways:

1. Targeting imbalance. Your carrier has fixed wing ISR and maritime surveillance capabilities, while surface ships do not. In a naval battle where both sides are fighting on "even ground," your CSG will defeat your SAG because your CSG has far superior ISR and can actually recon and target the ocean to know where the enemy is in the first place.
2. Your CSG will be able to outrange the SAG because they have fixed wing naval aviation that can deploy long range munitions in addition to the range of the aircraft themselves.

Yes, future surface combatants will obviously have larger and longer range weapons but you still need a targeting solution. On equal ground, your CSG is going to be able to out-reconnoiter the SAG easily. CSGs will have first look and first shoot capability and effectively outrange SAGs.

I would also currently reiterate that upcoming technologies can easily render huge investments of capitals ships and submarines obsolete just like that.

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Well unless some sort of agreement is reached in terms of what future technologies may emerge and what it could mean in terms of future warfighting, debates over future procurement can't exactly be done.

That is why they need to operate in unison and as a part of a network in addition for the ships to being able to defend itself, each ship, vigorously.

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To clarify -- when I say "surface combatants operating in isolation" I mean surface combatant formations.
Whether it's a single destroyer or an entire SAG of 8+ destroyers and frigates etc.

If those warships are operating in isolation without significant fixed wing support and preferably organic fixed wing ISR, CAP and AEW&C and preferably offensive fixed wing strike capabilities of their own, they will be at a deficit against CSGs or land based aviation.

Let's say in the Indian Ocean, your PLAN CSG is escorting a convoy of oil from Iran, and you got some Indian Navy destroyers and frigates looking for a nasty fight. If your carrier is already spotted by maritime patrol or drone, and some pretty fast and long range BRAHMOS is already headed its way launched from these ships, its not necessary to involve India's carriers or its nuclear submarines into the fight. If those Brahmos are going to get through, your PLAN carrier is going to be in a deep pot of hurt. Your survival will depend on those very destroyers and frigates that are with you that can intercept these missiles, and likewise, your escorts will have to shoot their own super fast antiship missiles to sink those other ships before they can get off with another round of missiles. On the other side, those destroyers and frigates are going to use their defenses against the missiles thrown at them. In all these time, you may not have enough time to set up and launch a strike group. It still is in the end, going to boil down with surface ships slinging each other with arrows and holding their shields.

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The CSG has the massive advantage of fixed wing AEW&C that is capable of greatly lengthening the effective SAM engagement range of your destroyers and frigates against lower flying targets and providing longer range warning as well.
Not to mention the CSG has fixed wing CAP on station with their own fighters that have airborne sensors and AAMs to contribute to the air defense picture and firepower.


But that scenario is flawed to begin with, it assumes the CSG's own CAP hasn't detected and taken out the opfor's airborne recon assets before they are able to provide sufficient targeting data.
Furthermore, the CSG's own ISR should be able to detect and assemble a targeting solution against the opfor's ships first, given the CSG has far superior ISR and targeting capabilities, meaning the CSG should be able to much easily have the first look, first shoot capability.

Once you have invested into carriers, which are a money and a resource pit, you are also thrown into a black hole of investing in massive resources in how to defend them. How many carriers did the USN have? Ten to twelve depending on deployment, refit or retirement. Yet there are about over 80 AEGIS ships, bolstered with allied ships. The result of China building more carriers is going to result in China building more surface ships to protect them. It won't mean less surface warships.

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Fundamentally, I do not believe that carriers are a liability, but rather they are a necessity.

However, it requires your carriers to be able to achieve a minimum threshold of capability in the first place.
Obviously the current STOBAR carriers are significantly lacking, and 100k ton super carriers that can carry extensive fixed wing tactical combat aircraft and fixed wing AEW&C and ISR aircraft is the goal.

Bltizo said:

I would counter your points differently.

1. we don't know how drawn out a China-US conflict could be. It could be a fast and furious westpac HIC conflict, or it could be a more drawn out blockade/interdiction campaign beyond the second island chain, or a mixture, or anything in between.

2. we don't know what the definition of victory means in a hypothetical conflict, because victory is ultimately defined by political goals. However, given the scale with which the US and China are now sizing each other up, I suspect that it would be presumptive for the PLA to believe that merely denying the US the ability to operate in the 1st and 2nd island chains would be sufficient as a declaration of victory or terms for peace, because the US also are not stupid and would seek to exploit their greater blue water naval power in other parts of the world outside of the western pacific to enforce either blockades or conduct longer range naval missile strikes against China over a longer period.


In other words, yes, if China is able to achieve air-naval control or superiority up to 700km or even 1500km of its mainland, then sure that is a necessary first step for the conditions for victory.
However, I also think we have to assume that the US are not stupid and have political resolve as well. The PLA should have to assume that the US would seek to continue such a conflict through the avoidance of combat and avoiding deploying assets into the region and instead carrying out interdiction and blockading actions and long range strike actions to gradually wear the PLA down before carrying out intensive deeper strikes.

That means it is not enough for the PLA to merely be able to fight and win battles in its near-periphery, but also to be able to have a fleet that can hunt and match the opfor's mobile naval air task forces.

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I understand the reasoning.

But the point is that China achieving greater absolute control near China's coast forces the US to engage in heavy combat where China's forces have an advantage.

And the US doesn't have the luxury of avoiding that offer of combat, as it means abandoning Taiwan or South Korea for example.
If Chinese Army controls Taiwan or South Korea, there is no way that the US can recover them by force afterwards, because they are just too close to China.
Given that China already has a larger economy than the USA, the Chinese will likely build up a larger military in a drawn-out war.

And from a cost competition point of view, land-based forces on the Chinese mainland are far cheaper their US equivalents operating at sea or from distant bases like Guam.

I agree that China eventually should build up a blue-water Navy that can match an Opfor Naval-Air taskforce.
But that is for 2030 onwards when the Chinese economy and military spending have a decisive advantage over the US, and if US-Chinese relations remain bad.
Until then, the focus should be on military capabilities that leverage the geographic advantages of the Chinese mainland.

However, the big exception is fielding a large force of nuclear submarines, which do have the ability to operate and survive globally, to cover vulnerable chokepoints like the Panama Canal.

In terms of nuclear-powered submarines, we should not expect that the PLAN will attempt to match the U.S. Navy in terms of hulls. China is unlikely to be lured into an arms race. In terms of SSBNs, it is reasonable to start an assessment based on China wanting at least two geographically distinct SSBN patrol areas/bastions. This will provide some redundancy and survivability (if one area is compromised), but it is also important given China’s nuclear posture will include contingencies not only for the U.S., but also for India. Second, it would be reasonable to work on a figure of at least four SSBNs per patrol area/bastion to ensure one boat is always available to be on patrol. The French and Royal Navies work on this number, and it is reasonable to assess that the PLAN, given its history of fielding nuclear-powered submarines, can be confident with this number. At a worse case it may reach five SSBNs per area. So, this gives us a total of 8 – 10 SSBNs for deterrence work. It would also be reasonable to expect the PLAN keep one of two (more likely older) SSBNs in service for testing and trials, be it for new missiles or systems.

In terms of SSNs the number of hulls will be guided by the requirements for: protection of the SSBNs, Carrier Battlegroup (CBG) escort, and independent tasks. This is a more difficult number to determine. For SSBN protection at least one SSN will need to be available every time an SSBN goes on patrol. For CBG escort there will be a requirement for between one and two SSNs for each CBG, and looking not too far into the future we can reasonably work on a total of four CBGs. Determining the number of SSNs required for independent tasks is extremely difficult, as we do not know the requirements placed on the PLAN. Therefore, at a mature state c.2030, there may be a requirement for around 17 to 30 hulls.