Future PLAN naval and carrier operations

PanAsian said:

I think this is an appropriate double post, I think the recent discussion on this thread actually originated from the thread I am double posting from.

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Okay I'll reply just in this thread.

Indeed I am saying no to both capability and strategy.

Though if you want to debate capability vs intent, I will say that blindly looking at capability is objective to a degree but also out of context to another. The same forces used for an amphibious landing in Taiwan can be used for an amphibious landing in the Philippines, but China is not going to do the latter. The same forces used for an escorted/secured evacuation of citizens from say a civil war in Africa can be used for an intervention in that civil war but China is not going to do the latter.

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umm I actually agree with you entirely -- that is to say, I believe that the same forces that can be used in a high intensity warfare scenario can be used in other lower intensity scenarios.

However, I am saying that China will also seek the PLA and PLAN to have the ability to fight a high intensity war in the western pacific as well.
There is no reason why China will not seek the ability to fight a high intensity conflict while also having those same assets able to perform lower intensity missions or medium intensity missions as they arise.

Agreed, in that I am saying China's carriers are intended for deterrence even closer to home, to maintain a conventional MAD balance with mainland Japan and perhaps also needed for South Korea to prevent their intervention or escalation in any scenario that does not directly involve them, such as a Taiwan scenario.

Again as above, the same carrier forces or capability that is required for China to reliably hold eastern Japan at risk in any conflict may be very similar to one for an attack on northern Australia but China is not going to do the latter. However such capability is far from what it would take to hold for example the US west coast at risk in any conflict.

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Wait, first of all, no one is talking about holding the US west coast at risk -- I never mentioned anything about holding the US west coast at risk.

What I said in past posts, was about the PLA and PLAN having the capability to fight a high intensity war in the western pacific beyond the second island chain. Geographically, I am thinking between the second island chain and up to and including Hawaii.

For China to be able to have the capability to fight a high intensity war in the western pacific beyond the second island chain in the area I described, means they would have already long had the ability to significantly hold the likes of Japan and SK, and other territories in the first island chain, at risk.

Fair enough but I don't think that will be the driver for long distance Chinese carrier deployment into the Pacific towards the US. The driver is Chinese inability or inconfidence in maintaining land based or home territory/periphery based nuclear MAD deterrence with the US, thereby necessitating it to further develop, deploy, and escort the naval and air legs of its nuclear triad to be in closer range and more confident delivery to the US mainland. THAAD deployment in South Korea as well as the ABM and ASW capabilities of US and allied naval forces no doubt pushed China in this direction. Though it involves expeditionary forces this is actually part of homeland defense.

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There's no reason why it cannot be both -- PLA and PLAN conventional capabilities during a potential nuclear conflict would of course have utility to enhance the survivability of Chinese nuclear weapons and supporting strategic systems.

However, I also strongly believe that the PLA and PLAN will seek the capability and assets to fight a conventional war of annihilation against US pacific forces deep in the pacific beyond the second island chain (aka in "neutral territory") in the long term, for which carriers will likely play a key part.
Of course, such a goal would only be sought after the PLA and PLAN convincingly have the capability to significantly control the first island chain.


That is to say, for the PLA and PLAN to seek to have the capability to fight a high intensity war of annihilation against US pacific forces beyond the second island chain, means that the PLA and PLAN would have already long have attained the capability to make the military forces of Japan, Taiwan, SK, and other nations in the first island chain, largely irrelevant in the early phases of a conflict involving them -- and/or China has used diplomacy to make them neutral in event of a conflict.

Bltizo said:

Okay I'll reply just in this thread.

umm I actually agree with you entirely -- that is to say, I believe that the same forces that can be used in a high intensity warfare scenario can be used in other lower intensity scenarios.

However, I am saying that China will also seek the PLA and PLAN to have the ability to fight a high intensity war in the western pacific as well.
There is no reason why China will not seek the ability to fight a high intensity conflict while also having those same assets able to perform lower intensity missions or medium intensity missions as they arise.

Wait, first of all, no one is talking about holding the US west coast at risk -- I never mentioned anything about holding the US west coast at risk.

What I said in past posts, was about the PLA and PLAN having the capability to fight a high intensity war in the western pacific beyond the second island chain. Geographically, I am thinking between the second island chain and up to and including Hawaii.

For China to be able to have the capability to fight a high intensity war in the western pacific beyond the second island chain in the area I described, means they would have already long had the ability to significantly hold the likes of Japan and SK, and other territories in the first island chain, at risk.

There's no reason why it cannot be both -- PLA and PLAN conventional capabilities during a potential nuclear conflict would of course have utility to enhance the survivability of Chinese nuclear weapons and supporting strategic systems.

However, I also strongly believe that the PLA and PLAN will seek the capability and assets to fight a conventional war of annihilation against US pacific forces deep in the pacific beyond the second island chain (aka in "neutral territory") in the long term, for which carriers will likely play a key part.
Of course, such a goal would only be sought after the PLA and PLAN convincingly have the capability to significantly control the first island chain.

That is to say, for the PLA and PLAN to seek to have the capability to fight a high intensity war of annihilation against US pacific forces beyond the second island chain, means that the PLA and PLAN would have already long have attained the capability to make the military forces of Japan, Taiwan, SK, and other nations in the first island chain, largely irrelevant in the early phases of a conflict involving them -- and/or China has used diplomacy to make them neutral in event of a conflict.

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We do not agree on the capabilities the PLA is seeking, what it is capable of achieving, nor what is driving that development. I am talking about maintaining a nuclear MAD balance with the US mainland, you are talking about winning a conventional expeditionary conflict in the Pacific up through Hawaii, those are inherently different missions despite some of the same capabilities being applicable to both. I am talking about the bulk of Chinese military and diplomatic capabilities as well as options being tied down by its homeland defense needs no matter how powerful China becomes, you are talking about China developing expeditionary capabilities that exceed meeting those needs.

PanAsian said:

We do not agree on the capabilities the PLA is seeking, what it is capable of achieving, nor what is driving that development. I am talking about maintaining a nuclear MAD balance with the US mainland, you are talking about winning a conventional expeditionary conflict in the Pacific up through Hawaii, those are inherently different missions despite some of the same capabilities being applicable to both. I am talking about the bulk of Chinese military and diplomatic capabilities as well as options being tied down by its homeland defense needs no matter how powerful China becomes, you are talking about China developing expeditionary capabilities that exceed meeting those needs.

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I suppose the underlined part is most relevant.

I am saying that Chinese military and diplomatic capabilities will reach a point whereby they are essentially able to adequately the needs of homeland defense, at which point they can start to develop additional capabilities to take the fight beyond the first island chain.


I think the actual area of disagreement is whether "the bulk of Chinese military and diplomatic capabilities/options" weill be "tied down by homeland defense needs no matter how powerful China becomes".

My belief is that once China reaches a certain threshold of power that can meet the needs of homeland defense, it can and will start to develop additional capabilities beyond the needs of homeland defense. Over time, depending on how the course of China's overall national development and growth goes over the subsequent decades, it may be that China will only end up needing a fraction of its eventual military power for the homeland defense mission within the first island chain, and that the bulk of its military capability will be oriented for high intensity missions beyond the first island chain and even second island chain (though of course would easily assist in the homeland defense mission as well, and make it an even easier mission to accomplish).

Bltizo said:

I suppose the underlined part is most relevant.

I am saying that Chinese military and diplomatic capabilities will reach a point whereby they are essentially able to adequately the needs of homeland defense, at which point they can start to develop additional capabilities to take the fight beyond the first island chain.


I think the actual area of disagreement is whether "the bulk of Chinese military and diplomatic capabilities/options" weill be "tied down by homeland defense needs no matter how powerful China becomes".

My belief is that once China reaches a certain threshold of power that can meet the needs of homeland defense, it can and will start to develop additional capabilities beyond the needs of homeland defense. Over time, depending on how the course of China's overall national development and growth goes over the subsequent decades, it may be that China will only end up needing a fraction of its eventual military power for the homeland defense mission within the first island chain, and that the bulk of its military capability will be oriented for high intensity missions beyond the first island chain and even second island chain (though of course would easily assist in the homeland defense mission as well, and make it an even easier mission to accomplish).

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An area of disagreement is also I believe China will always pursue a minimal deterrence strategy, therefore it does not care to develop nor deploy the same type of expeditionary capabilities interventionist powers such as the US and other colonial powers have. It is also much more difficult to the point of not being viable even if China wants to because fulfilling the basing requirements of such expeditionary capabilities is actual colonialism, intervention, or full scale war in the first place, see the cases of Okinawa, Guam, Hawaii, South Korea, Japan, etc. Aside from homeland defense China would stick to diplomatically influencing other countries to be friendly or neutral, arms sales or training to build up friendly countries, any military action will be far down the list, at most be able to carry out MOOTW "in force".

Wait, first of all there's this point I want to clarify: "I am talking about the bulk of Chinese military and diplomatic capabilities as well as options being tied down by its homeland defense needs no matter how powerful China becomes, you are talking about China developing expeditionary capabilities that exceed meeting those needs." -- I want to ask,
A: do you believe that the bulk Chinese military and diplomatic capabilities will always be "tied down" by homeland defense needs no matter how powerful it becomes
and, B: do you believe it would make sense for China to develop capabilities intended to fight a high intensity war from greater distances from its immediate periphery, if China had the capabilities to adequately support the homeland defense needs?

PanAsian said:

An area of disagreement is also I believe China will always pursue a minimal deterrence strategy, therefore it does not care to develop nor deploy the same type of expeditionary capabilities interventionist powers such as the US and other colonial powers have. It is also much more difficult to the point of not being viable even if China wants to because fulfilling the basing requirements of such expeditionary capabilities is actual colonialism, intervention, or full scale war in the first place, see the cases of Okinawa, Guam, Hawaii, South Korea, Japan, etc. Aside from homeland defense China would stick to diplomatically influencing other countries to be friendly or neutral, arms sales or training to build up friendly countries, any military action will be far down the list, at most be able to carry out MOOTW "in force".

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Minimal deterrence is a term used to describe China's nuclear doctrine.

What you are talking about is conventional capabilities, and China has never adopted a "minimal deterrence" posture for their conventional capabilities as such.


Furthermore, just because a nation has highly capable "expeditionary" capabilities does not mean they have to conduct US style intervention or to conduct colonialism. High intensity expeditionary capabilities are just as relevant for fighting great power conflicts.

Of course, you are right in that China will seek to use diplomacy to fulfill its geopolitical aims preferably, and I agree with that.
However, do you at least agree that China faces an environment whereby it may be forced to fight in a high intensity great power conflict, where it would be preferable for such fighting to be done further away from the Chinese mainland if possible?
That is to say, just because China will seek to use diplomacy primarily as the means of fulfilling geopolitical aims, does not mean China has the freedom to not develop highly capable, preferably competitive if not dominating, military systems intended to operate at long ranges such that if any conflict has to be conducted, it can be conducted at distances away from China's major population, economic and political centers?

Totoro said:

Attacking a neutral SK would be counter productive for China. However, attacking a SK which enables US to operate its forces against China from SK soil would be a different matter.

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Remember that the South Korean military and US military are intimately tied together.

South Korea and the USA have a military alliance which means the US President has Operational Control of the South Korean military, not the South Korean President.

And et's take the example of THAAD. US forces operating THAAD detection radars on South Korean territory will BE providing tracks of Chinese missiles.
South Korean AWACs (performing defensive duties) will by default be tracking Chinese planes.

You get the idea.

So attacking a neutral SK is not counter productive, if the US and China are already in a war.

Viktor Jav said:

I have seldom used the word "stupid" to describe a post, but this one here really warrants it. So basically in order to divert attention away from a bigger lost (IE:Taiwan or the SCS), you are saying that China would initiate a diversion war against SK just to score some potential PR image ? Fat lot that is going to help when the public realized that.
Full scale use of South Korea millitary against the USA ? "Victory" over the USA ? Seriously ? At this point I am starting to think that you are raving here. If you are honestly expecting that SK can be coerce into initiating hostilities against the USA you got more than a few facts lost in your notebook.

The entire gist of your argument can be summed up as such: China can't win against the USA, so China is going to try its luck with SK just so it can look like it "won".
That is the most insane, illogical and ridiculous notion I have seen in a long while. I am not even going to bother with the rest of your post as it is the typical tirade of someone who had drunk the Chinese nationalism Kool-Aid one too many time often.

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You obviously haven't read or understood what I previously wrote. I said that it is unrealistic for South Korea to turn on the USA.

From China's point of view in terms of government survival, it is perfectly logical to launch a war against the US forces stationed in South Korea.

And let's look at the actual effect of China obtaining a stalemate or victory in South Korea.

1. With China's control of the media, China can spin the fighting "victory" and then seek peace talks without being seen to have lost.
2. The US has been shown to be unable to protect a military ally from being devastated or conquered. Such an event will reverberate across asia and the globe.

AndrewS said:

You obviously haven't read or understood what I previously wrote. I said that it is unrealistic for South Korea to turn on the USA.

From China's point of view in terms of government survival, it is perfectly logical to launch a war against the US forces stationed in South Korea.

And let's look at the actual effect of China obtaining a stalemate or victory in South Korea.

1. With China's control of the media, China can spin the fighting "victory" and then seek peace talks without being seen to have lost.
2. The US has been shown to be unable to protect a military ally from being devastated or conquered. Such an event will reverberate across asia and the globe.

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Chinese citizens are not as stupid or ignorant as you make them out to be in today's society (this isn't the 60's). They will know if China has lost the war on the sea or not ... a pointless invasion of South Korea (which isn't even guaranteed success) would not be perceived as an overall "victory" at all. In the event of a defeat, the most viable option for China would be to threaten nuclear warfare as means of stopping the conflict and bringing combatants to the negotiating table. China could easily build many more warships and planes with the enormous funds needed to invade South Korea ... and in the case of near total defeat by the US (as you suggested earlier), I'm not sure China would even have the capacity to undertake such an operation. As long as South Korea does not attack Chinese assets or allow the US to use its facilities to mount offensive operations, China has no reason to invade.

AndrewS said:

You obviously haven't read or understood what I previously wrote. I said that it is unrealistic for South Korea to turn on the USA.

From China's point of view in terms of government survival, it is perfectly logical to launch a war against the US forces stationed in South Korea.

And let's look at the actual effect of China obtaining a stalemate or victory in South Korea.

1. With China's control of the media, China can spin the fighting "victory" and then seek peace talks without being seen to have lost.
2. The US has been shown to be unable to protect a military ally from being devastated or conquered. Such an event will reverberate across asia and the globe.

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That delusion of yours sounds nice until one realize several facts
1) Even assuming that China can maintain 100 per cent control over the media. How are they going to explain the fact that somehow people can't travel to Taiwan without a passport. Or how their fishing ships can't fish without permission in the SCS.
2) Even if in the event the US is unable to defend SK from a Chinese attack. They would have still succeed in the greater victory of preventing a Chinese invasion of Taiwan or the SCS and destroying the entirety of the PLAN and PLAAF assets. The US is entirely honest about it's doubts of countering a Chinese land attack at the opening phases of the war. But so long as they have complete control of the sea and air in your hypothetical situation China's defeat is near certain when the attrition via air attacks and naval blockade began to build up.
Plus the blood and cost that China will have to pay to take SK would be so great that it will be a phyrric victory at best, made all the worse by the fact that China is expected to cede the Peninsular to NK.
The idea that China is right to attack US assets in SK when SK is not hostile at China and would most deny the US to use its bases for its war against China not only is patently absurd, it goes against every facet of a just war theory that China can never ever portray it self in a better light.
There is virtually 0 advantage for China to prosecute a pointless war against SK so stop your lunatic ravings.

Bltizo said:

Wait, first of all there's this point I want to clarify: "I am talking about the bulk of Chinese military and diplomatic capabilities as well as options being tied down by its homeland defense needs no matter how powerful China becomes, you are talking about China developing expeditionary capabilities that exceed meeting those needs." -- I want to ask,
A: do you believe that the bulk Chinese military and diplomatic capabilities will always be "tied down" by homeland defense needs no matter how powerful it becomes
and, B: do you believe it would make sense for China to develop capabilities intended to fight a high intensity war from greater distances from its immediate periphery, if China had the capabilities to adequately support the homeland defense needs?

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A) Yes, let's not forget China has plenty of land borders to secure as well as maritime borders. It is reasonable to assume, as has been demonstrated in real life, that China's neighbors will improve their own capabilities as China's improves and at the same time other parties will seek to improve China's neighbors' capabilities as well as foment mistrust and tensions with China.

B) No, due to the constraints of (A) above, (C) and (D) below.

Minimal deterrence is a term used to describe China's nuclear doctrine.

What you are talking about is conventional capabilities, and China has never adopted a "minimal deterrence" posture for their conventional capabilities as such.

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C) Doesn't mean I can't use it to describe China's overall strategy regarding great power conflicts which ultimately but not solely comes down to their nuclear minimal deterrence. As such this is one of the areas where we disagree.

Furthermore, just because a nation has highly capable "expeditionary" capabilities does not mean they have to conduct US style intervention or to conduct colonialism. High intensity expeditionary capabilities are just as relevant for fighting great power conflicts.

Of course, you are right in that China will seek to use diplomacy to fulfill its geopolitical aims preferably, and I agree with that.
However, do you at least agree that China faces an environment whereby it may be forced to fight in a high intensity great power conflict, where it would be preferable for such fighting to be done further away from the Chinese mainland if possible?
That is to say, just because China will seek to use diplomacy primarily as the means of fulfilling geopolitical aims, does not mean China has the freedom to not develop highly capable, preferably competitive if not dominating, military systems intended to operate at long ranges such that if any conflict has to be conducted, it can be conducted at distances away from China's major population, economic and political centers?

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(D) What you are saying is not what I said. I said "fulfilling the basing requirements of such expeditionary capabilities is actual colonialism, intervention, or full scale war in the first place, see the cases of Okinawa, Guam, Hawaii, South Korea, Japan, etc." as in that is a requirement to achieving such a degree of expeditionary capabilities.