Future PLAN naval and carrier operations
- Thread starter Tam
- Start date
What are you even talking about here??? A SECOND front definitely already means war is going on. We are talking about a shooting war between the US and China (such as over Taiwan) that is ALREADY happening and SK foolishly decides to allow the US to use its bases to attack China, in which case China has the option to invade SK through NK and take out said bases and perhaps even unify the peninsula under Chinese terms. This is a viable option not only because Kim knows the survival of his regime depends on the survival of China's current government, but also because China's massive land forces can then be leveraged. And I have no idea what makes you think Chinese forces DON'T have a massive advantage over the single US Army division's worth of soldiers (2nd Infantry Division of the 8th US Army) that is currently stationed in SK. Not to mention I have not yet even brought up the entirety of the NK forces that would also be heading south, most likely to be used as cannon fodder against SK and US forces while Chinese forces do the hard hitting.
Probably better for all sides involved that the SK military mutinies against their occupiers and then have SK stay neutral.
D
Deleted member 13312
Guest
You are making the huge assumption that South Korea is going to automatically jump into the US camp when there is ample evidence that that is the least likely route that South Korea is going to take.
And depending on the situation SK might opt for that, but that is another topic entirely which involves huge ramifications of international politics and SK's interests so I am not going to touch on that here.Suffice to say that if China does not do anything profoundly antagonistic it is unlikely that SK will pay due hostilities in return.
And are you seriously forgetting about the rest of SK's armed forces, half a million men under arms and another million in reserve fighting from one of the most fortified borders in the world.All well equipped and backed by the second or third largest (and among the most sophisticated) air force and navy in the world ? And need I even bring up the fact that NK's army is seriously languishing in nearly all aspects but manpower ? Or that NK-China's relationships are also less clear cut than expected? Why on earth would Kim collude with China if a Sino-US conflict does not involve NK from the start ? The insanity of tying oneself to the outcome of an foreign conflict borders on the insane. Kim has never truly counted on China to support his rule, if so he would not have pushed so hard to get nukes or purged his top officials who have close links to China.
To make it simple :1) SK's allegiance in a Sino-US conflict is not certain. 2) China is not going to have a distinct advantage if it takes the fight to SK and 3) NK-Sino relationship makes it less certain that everything will go as planned.
And all of this boils down to what on earth will China actually gain if it actually did managed to conquer SK. 20,000 US troops hardly matter in a conflict where naval and air assets will be the deciding factor.
Last edited by a moderator:
FriedRiceNSpice
Captain
Thanks! I believe deterrence is one of the reasons that the PLAN is investing in carriers. The likelihood of conflict between two great powers will lessen as the costs to engage in conflict increases. A great power only enters into conflict with another conflict if both it believes if the war goals/aims that it believes it will achieve is worth the costs that it is prepared to expend. Carrier battle groups can enhance the capabilities as well as survivability of the PLA's A2/AD systems, as well as threaten potential adversaries in areas and at distances that would otherwise be out of reach of the PLA. Defensive platforms by themselves can only go so far in establishing a credible deterrent. Furthermore, carriers are very visible and recognized platforms, which further enhances their value in providing deterrence, when compared to less visible platforms such as the PLA's submarines, anti-ship ballistic missiles, and other A2/AD systems. Thus, by building up carrier groups, China can reduce the likelihood that any rival great power will use force to settle any conflicts that they may have. Based on China's historical experience, I would say one of China's highest priorities is to ensure that she will never again have to submit to a militarily superior and more advanced power.
First of all, I never claimed nor assumed that SK would definitely side with the US in a Sino-US war; in fact I think the opposite is far more likely, namely that SK will deny the US use of SK soil to launch attacks against China. I was speaking in the hypothetical situation that SK DOES decide to openly side with the US, what China's response could be (e.g. opening up a second front). Second, SK's naval forces and bases would be well within strike range of many PLAAF bases given its land mass lacks any degree of strategic depth; its ships vulnerable to the dozens of AIP subs the PLAN could swarm the area with in very short order. Same with its air bases that are also vulnerable to the entire ballistic missile arsenal of the PLASAF, including the short-legged DF-11s. The entire Korean peninsula is essentially a Chinese littoral zone. Back in the days of the Korean War the Chinese military had little more than men with rifles. Now the Chinese military can hit every square inch of the peninsula without ever leaving China. Third, Kim absolutely counts on China to support his rule. His earlier bellicosity notwithstanding, his recent behavior and trips to China should be seen as virtual proof of his dependence upon China and his acknowledgement of it. If China stops providing aid, the Kim regime collapses. If China is involved in a war with the US and with SK, and offers Kim the opportunity to control the entire peninsula, why would Kim NOT jump at the chance?
SinoSoldier
Colonel
Well, in order for the PLAN to establish a credible deterrence against US carrier groups, it would need to ensure that USN CBGs would be under a grave, if not existential, threat once they sail near China's shorelines. Aside from A2/AD systems like AShBMs or shore-based platforms, there is little in China's inventory that can pose that kind of threat. China's near-future carrier force, even at its most optimistic estimates (4 functional carriers by 2030) will be woefully-equipped to face USN counterparts and thus its value as a deterrent is greatly blunted. In other words, instead of building massive CVs in hopes of matching or defeating a much-larger and better-equipped foe, China should consider aim for the goal of causing sufficient damage, should an enemy attack, such that the enemy no longer finds it feasible or appealing to undertake that endeavor in the first place.
Agreed in principle on the role of PLAN CBGs in power projection / diplomacy though.
D
Deleted member 13312
Guest
Thanks for the clarification, but I am basing my post base on the original post of the original poster who asserts for no viable reason at all that somehow China is going to invade the Korean Peninsular on nothing.
In the potential scenario as you describe above, SK is far from defenseless. PLAAF bases being in striking range (bar bomber AFBs) of SK means the same in return that SK can also strike back, secondly SK can also field its own AIP subs which while less numerous have the advantage of operating from home base and are no less advanced that what China can field, plus SK ASW capabilities are considerable seeing as they have to contend with NK midget subs on a regular basis. China's ballistic missiles will also have to contend with SK ABM defense, while no single ABM system has been really tested, SK's progress and technological prowess have to been considered and given credit in this regard. And SK to also fields it's own short range ballistic missiles which can strike back. The only real thing them back from fielding even longer range missile would be their requirement for tacit approval from the US, a rather flimsy requirement in wartime.
In short what China can do to SK, SK can do back to China barring nuclear exchange. They may not be able to cover the entirety of China, but they can target key nodes in Northern and Eastern China which are potentially critical in China's operations against the US.
" If China stops providing aid, the Kim regime collapses". And if NK collapse, SK will almost certainly move in and the US bases along side with them all the way up to the Yalu river. That is the catch 22 for both China and NK. Both of them rely on each other but at the same time bemoans each other's dependencies so Kim's trips to China can hardly be taken as tokens of submission but rather tacit understandings between the 2 sides. One does not go around purging an ally's carefully cultivated agents and then expect things to go on just fine.
The problem with the idea that Kim would relish an opportunity to control the Korean Peninsular is 2 fold: To stand any chance, NK would need the entire support of China in the endeavor and if that is to happen China is almost certain to assume overall command of how the operation will be conducted. There is no guarantee that China would be so nice as to hand over a hard won peninsular to NK after all is said and done. All matters considering it will be far likelier for China to replace Kim with another figurehead more pliable to China. Not that it is a hard thing to do seeing as Kim's divine image will be all but broken on the outbreak of war.
Mutual understanding rather than absolute trust is what binds NK and China together, which is the same situation between SK and the US.
Last edited by a moderator:
Did you forget China's subs? Even one single Argentinian submarine (the San Luis) was enough to hold up the entire RN forces while they hunted for this thing during the Falklands War, and they never did find it. Meanwhile the PLAN has dozens of modern diesel subs that it could string out along the littorals, along with thousands of mines, which incidentally have accounted for more damaged and sunk ships since WWII than any other weapon type. I'm not sure why these should not be seen as existential threats to intruding CSGs. In fact they are such existential threats that the USN will certainly not enter into China's littorals at the outset of conflict, but will wait unless it can deal with these threats first or can arrive with overwhelming forces.
FriedRiceNSpice
Captain
I agree with you that in the near-future, PLAN CBGs by themselves cannot pose a credible deterrent to USN counterparts. But I think CBGs and A2/AD deployed in mutual support of each other can be more effective than either type of capability alone. On the one hand, CBGs can operate under the protective cover of shore-based platforms, in which case A2/AD systems can help neutralize the superior firepower of adversary CBGs. The CBG, on the other can extend its protective air cover and surveillance beyond the reaches of land-based air cover. Furthermore, it can provide reconnaissance and surveillance of areas within range of A2/AD platforms but out of range of the sensor of other assets, which be especially important in the case that ASAT weapons have been used. In such a scenario, the CBG could send out its UAVs to search for adversary CBGs, and provide targeting/guidance information for the land based A2/AD assets. A likely tactic that an adversary will use to disrupt A2/AD capabilities is to interrupt the "kill-chain," by seeking to target and eliminate the sensors needed by those platforms, which CBGs can help counter. Lastly, the mere presence of CBGs would help tie down the opponent's naval assets, this can be used to influence opponent force deployments to China's advantage. Just the Air Sea Battle/JAM-GC concept was focused on the close integration of multiple systems and platforms, CBGs working closely with A2/AD can be the foundation of an effective Chinese operational doctrine.
Optimistically, it would be nice to see the PLAN having 6 operational carriers (including the two baby carriers) by 2030, perhaps with some navalized FC-31 derivative not too long afterwards.