Future PLA strategic procurement priorities

Bltizo said:

The US military has been openly discussing the need to occupy those features without the requisite nations consent.

The SCS region most definitely will become a primary theater equal to the eastern direction given its pivotal role in acting as a chokepoint for Chinese SLOC.

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If the US has forcibly occupied Malaysian or Indonesia islands, it is effectively an act of war against these countries.
And we're literally talking about a handful of islands with little infrastructure.
Is there really a mission for a JH-XX here?

And I also see the South China Seas SLOCs as being secondary to the Taiwan theatre.
In the event of a war, China will have to accept that most of its trade is going to be lost, which is really going to hurt.

But China is big enough and self-sufficient enough to continue.
There was a RAND study 5 years ago which looked at how much the Chinese and US economies would be damaged in a notional war. Yes, China would be hurt more than the US, but China still ended up with a larger economy overall. Since then, both economic and military developments have continued to shift significantly in favour of China.

If Taiwan is run as a larger version of Hong Kong, where people can leave if they want to, what purpose would an extended war serve anyone?

AndrewS said:

I don't think there is a mission for the envisioned JH-XX

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A few that were mentioned were:

1. High speed armed recon due to both being able to carry a very powerful radar (larger than fighters), weapons and being stealthy simultaneously.

2. Tactical strike from odd directions unlike truck mounted missiles, and equal or greater ranges (since most weapons launched by truck you can also launch by air)

3. Hitting extremely well defended targets within 2000-3000 km with organic CAP that has IR search capability.

One mission that a H-20 and trucks really can't do well, but a JH-XX can: long range interceptor. Instead of a pure strike loadouts it can load some air to air munitions too for both self defense and sniping high value targets of opportunity like AWAC, transport, tanker, etc.

AndrewS said:

If the US has forcibly occupied Malaysian or Indonesia islands, it is effectively an act of war against these countries.
And we're literally talking about a handful of islands with little infrastructure.
Is there really a mission for a JH-XX here?

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Yes definitely. Setting up distributed fire bases with IRBMs/HGVs and distributed small air bases with which they can operate F-35s from most definitely are viable and important targets to be capable of striking.

AndrewS said:

And I also see the South China Seas SLOCs as being secondary to the Taiwan theatre.
In the event of a war, China will have to accept that most of its trade is going to be lost, which is really going to hurt.

But China is big enough and self-sufficient enough to continue.
There was a RAND study 5 years ago which looked at how much the Chinese and US economies would be damaged in a notional war. Yes, China would be hurt more than the US, but China still ended up with a larger economy overall. Since then, both economic and military developments have continued to shift significantly in favour of China.

If Taiwan is run as a larger version of Hong Kong, where people can leave if they want to, what purpose would an extended war serve anyone?

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In that case I think we have differing views for the long term requirements that China has for the PLA.

The way I see it, any Taiwan contingency will be composed of two complementary, simultaneous missions and requirements:
1. The Taiwan "invasion" proper, including all of the operations needed to gain air superiority, sea control, SEAD/DEAD, amphibious assault, ground operations around Taiwan island proper and on the island itself.
2. The "deterrence" mission, which requires a massive multipronged air-naval-missile force capable of surrounding the region around Taiwan so as to preemptively meet and track any movement of aircraft and ships from outside nations that may either seek to directly intervene on behalf of Taiwan or to use military force to undermine the Chinese war effort (including blockades of SLOCs and so on). That is to say, there is a requirement to not only be capable of outright defeating a highly capable outside hostile force on even terms, but also to be capable of significantly undermining or crippling an enemy's ability to conduct a blockade at least in the overall western pacific region (that includes the SCS).

Perhaps my view of these requirements are a bit more ambitious than yours, which is why I view the proposed mission of the JH-XX in the way that I do.

All of this is growing outside the scope of the thread, therefore if you continue this further then I will move the relevant posts in a different thread.
If not, well I have said my part.

AndrewS said:

If the US has forcibly occupied Malaysian or Indonesia islands, it is effectively an act of war against these countries.
And we're literally talking about a handful of islands with little infrastructure.
Is there really a mission for a JH-XX here?

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Potentially, yes. Because you can’t predict what the politics of Malaysia or Indonesia or some other SEA country out past the 1IC will be in 20 years. But it’s also not like the amount of strategic and tactical power a mid-large sized supersonic low observable striker hinges purely on this scenario. US CVGs will remain the linchpin of the US’s strategic position in the Asia Pacific, and the more the US commits to a strategic contest against China the more they will work to develop and harden their defenses of their fleet with new technologies, systems, and tactics. You want to get ahead of that sort of development rather than fall behind it, and a low observable supersonic bomber is a powerful capability to blunt that kind of momentum.

Bltizo said:

Yes definitely. Setting up distributed fire bases with IRBMs/HGVs and distributed small air bases with which they can operate F-35s from most definitely are viable and important targets to be capable of striking.

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To be honest, I'm of two minds about the importance of the JH-XX - both you and @AndrewS make very good arguments for and against it. I want to bring up the point here that the H-20 would be more than capable of these island base strike missions (in fact, it would be overkill). Depending on how favourable the situation in the air is, even H-6s would be suitable.

I also want to bring up the possibility of the PLA embracing tactical nuclear warfighting. It require a significant change in doctrine, but heavily fortified islands in IRBM/HGV range can be efficiently taken care of (even rendered uninhabitable for militarily relevant periods) with such methods. I would respond to the objections about escalation by stating that under my envisioned scenario, China would have strategic parity with the US, which would deter it from conducting nuclear strikes on the Chinese homeland lest it suffer the same in its own homeland. I'd also point to the "hot swap" feature of the DF-26 as evidence that the PLARF is at least thinking in this direction.

Bombing island fortifications (possibly illegally occupied) is very different from bombing populated territory.

AndrewS said:

If the US has forcibly occupied Malaysian or Indonesia islands, it is effectively an act of war against these countries.

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Indeed, and? What are they going to do about it beyond crying at the UN General Assembly?

Bltizo said:

but also to be capable of significantly undermining or crippling an enemy's ability to conduct a blockade at least in the overall western pacific region (that includes the SCS).

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Agreed. Very few people understand that a Taiwan conflict would and must extend far beyond Taiwan - beyond even the Western Pacific as you state here. I would argue that China needs to be able to defend its SLOCs throughout their entirety (extending to the Mediterranean) and be economically, financially, and diplomatically powerful enough to deter its trade partners (ex. the US) from taking even economic measures against an invasion of Taiwan.

This is the reason why I don't expect a war to occur (at least one launched by China) until mid-century when I see these trends converging.

ZeEa5KPul said:

To be honest, I'm of two minds about the importance of the JH-XX - both you and @AndrewS make very good arguments for and against it. I want to bring up the point here that the H-20 would be more than capable of these island base strike missions (in fact, it would be overkill). Depending on how favourable the situation in the air is, even H-6s would be suitable.

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As I've written multiple times, the H-20 would take precedence over JH-XX in terms of opportunity cost and industry resources and funding.

The mission that JH-XX covers can be partially covered to varying extents by a variety of other aircraft, missiles and platforms, which is why I do not see it as high of a priority.... But the mission for it definitely exists, and a notional JH-XX could do the mission in a far superior way to the the other systems (including H-20).

But this all depends on what kind of overall force structure we are looking at and procurement at the national/strategic level.


What should not be in dispute imo, is that a mission definitely exists for JH-XX. It just probably isn't that high on the PLAs priorities ... Yet.

latenlazy said:

You want to get ahead of that sort of development rather than fall behind it, and a low observable supersonic bomber is a powerful capability to blunt that kind of momentum.

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I question whether a supersonic stealth bomber can be broadband VLO. Low frequency radars would be able to detect the bomber at a reasonable distance, and while the ships can't directly engage, the group can vector F-35s at it. At this point the JH-XX is just a glorified Tu-22.

I suppose that's better than having SM-2s and F-35s coming at it, but it isn't a fundamental solution to the problem.

Bltizo said:

But the mission for it definitely exists, and a notional JH-XX could do the mission in a far superior way to the the other systems (including H-20).

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Would you mind elaborating? I understand that the speed and (presumably lower) cost of the JH-XX are advantages, but how would it be far superior to the H-20 in naval strike and island bombardment - the mission set I assume you think it outshines other capabilities - specifically in light of the problems with broadband VLO and other detection methods like IRST (where it would be hotter thanks to supersonic flight).

Bltizo said:

But this all depends on what kind of overall force structure we are looking at and procurement at the national/strategic level.

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Sure. I think (or rather, I like to think) that the PLA has moved beyond the niche, asymmetric 杀手锏 phase and is pursuing broadly applicable symmetric capabilities (if indeed there was a H-20/JH-XX exclusive decision and the former won out).

ZeEa5KPul said:

I question whether a supersonic stealth bomber can be broadband VLO. Low frequency radars would be able to detect the bomber at a reasonable distance, and while the ships can't directly engage, the group can vector F-35s at it. At this point the JH-XX is just a glorified Tu-22.

I suppose that's better than having SM-2s and F-35s coming at it, but it isn't a fundamental solution to the problem.

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Even if JH-XX doesn't possess broadband stealth in the way an H-20 would, it would make up the survivability by being able to defend and maneuever and escape better than an H-20 would.

All of course also with the fact that JH-XX can reach the target faster in a way that H-20 could not.

It's a very specific mission profile.

ZeEa5KPul said:

Would you mind elaborating? I understand that the speed and (presumably lower) cost of the JH-XX are advantages, but how would it be far superior to the H-20 in naval strike and island bombardment - the mission set I assume you think it outshines other capabilities - specifically in light of the problems with broadband VLO and other detection methods like IRST (where it would be hotter thanks to supersonic flight).

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Getting to the target faster is the primary one, but also being able to defend itself better (with or without friendly support), being able to egress better.

You're essentially trading greater speed for lower range/payload and trading a degree of RCS reduction for greater maneuvrability ( all relative to H-20).
Basically, the mission profile would be more reliably striking mobile moving targets, or time sensitive targets, in the 2500km distance class.

Sure, they can all be serviced to one extent or another by LACMs or IRBMs or HGVs, but JH-XX would be able to do it much more reliably (in addition to the ISR and EW and potential regional interceptor missions it can contribute to), which is why I say its a mission profile that definitely exists, but which is not one that probably needs to be vitally filled in comparison with the rest of the priorities the PLA has.

@Bltizo you wrote something on Reddit a short while ago that somewhat ties into the H-20/JH-XX conversation, so I'd like to respond to that here rather than there where it would drive the chimps into a frenzy I'd rather not deal with.

I do not think China's aviation industry will be able to outproduce the US. For one, the imbalance that exists in the shipbuilding industry between China and the US (that favours China) is reversed in the aviation industry (favouring the US). Of course this is most prominent in leading 5th gen fighter types

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I think this only holds for the short/medium term (particularly, I think it holds only for the 5th generation). I think this is primarily due to China's historical weakness in turbofans, which really weighed down on the expansion rate of Chinese military aviation. In fact, I'm pleasantly surprised it got this far working with Russia's surplus engine production.

But I see this gap with America being comprehensively closed before 2035, when 6th gen production really takes off. I also wouldn't foreclose on the possibility of triple digit annual J-20 production (or at least J-20+J-XY production) for some years between now and when 6th gens begin production in earnest. Unfortunately, I think your conclusion that F-35s will ultimately outnumber J-20s + J-XYs by a significant margin would still be true; the price of being a laggard.

but also I wouldn't be surprised if the US would consider directly striking aviation industry sites (factories, subsuppliers etc) all of which could significantly hinder production given how complex modern military aircraft are. Meanwhile, US factories would of course remain unmolested and enjoy intact supply lines.

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I'm going to have to put an X on that one. This is the mission where the H-20 would shine: tactical nuclear bombardment of US war production facilities in response to any kind of attack on Chinese facilities. By this I mean something like an attack on Newport News shipbuilding with stealthy cruise missiles armed with ~1 kiloton nuclear warheads fired by H-20s.

AndrewS said:

Realistically, there are no land targets which are 2000-2500km away.

Guam is too far away

And the possible 2000-2500km targets in Japan and the Philippines would require overflying a large portion of their land mass, which is not realistic for an aircraft without broadband stealth and in the face of fighter opposition

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But if we want to talk about maritime targets, you could take a 1900km JASSM-XR ($1.5M) and add $3M to turn it into an LRASM.

Launched from mainland China, that would take you to at least 1500km offshore, again accompanied by fighter cover.
And it would be far more time-sensitive than trying to organise a large coordinated airstrike with JH-XX aircraft.

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Better question: Why does the manned Strike mission even exist anymore when Cruise Missiles already exist?

I think the answer is dogma.

Military History is full of events where dogmatic practices get exposed on the battlefield.