Future PLA combat aircraft composition

AndrewS said:

That's about what I go for as well.

But I'd go with a 100 J-10C delivered over the next 8 years at minimal production levels at Guizhou, rather than in just 3-4 years.
And I'd skip the J-10A upgrade as they already just went through their MLU.
The J-10B are about due a MLU anyway, but they're already similar enough to the J-10C, so I'm not sure what you would want to upgrade?

I'd also keep the Su-35 around, since they are new and also capable.

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PLA has gone through this period where they had a lot of small incremental improvement types to finally at a point where their product is as good or at least in the same sphere as the best in the world. Think J-20, Type 055, 052D, Z-20, ZTZ-99, Y-20 and 054A. Then, they can really start mass production. During this time, they had to go through a lot of incremental blocks which adds to cost. Now that they have arrived at a comfortable point, they can work on lowering costs by trying to reduce their fleet complexity.

As such, things like Su-35, Su-30s and J-11As should get removed from service as soon as they can be adequately replaced. Su-35s still have a lot of time left by 2035, so they might just want to sell that back to the Russians or someone else. J-11Bs that get upgraded should have similar avionics as J-16 to reduce the complexity of maintaining that. J-10As that get upgraded should have similar avionics as J-10C and use WS-10B. Similarly, J-10B/C that still use AL-31FN should be modified to use WS-10B. Fewer subtypes means supply chain will have to maintain fewer product lines. There are more spares around. All good things. All factors that will lower maintenance and improve availability.

We keep talking about numbers. numbers and numbers. Do you know what helps numbers? Availability and lower maintenance cost. You get the same air time with 500 J-10s available 70% of time as 700 J-10s available 50% of time. Why did IAF have such horrible availability with Su-30? It was a foreign product that was not in service with the exporter. Supplier chain was further away and not providing enough support. There were enough spares around. There were a lot of different subtypes in their Su-30 fleet. It's in PLAAF's interest to reduce small sub fleet, subsystem differences, foreign reliance of engines. Getting rid of Su-35/30/J-11A entirely would allow them to not have to support Russian missiles anymore. Similar, you want to replace the original J-20s with WS-10C engine at some point.

A lot of the J-10As are still quite young (some are under 10 years old). There is no rush to upgrade them. Get Guizhou working on producing new J-10Cs for PLAAF right now. Once that's over in 3 or 4 years, they will have some export orders and a lot of upgrades (think 200 J-10A/B) to be busy until well into 2030s. Even the early J-10Cs would need an engine switch at some point. If the goal is to keep Guizhou working, then my proposal will keep them working. If the goal is to keep supply chain well stocked, my proposal should also do that.

By end of 2040, you could be looking at a number of 6th gen aircraft, 1000 J-20s (400 with WS-10 and 600 with WS-15), 400 land version of J-35, 350 J-10s of various types and 350 J-16s. That would be very modern and much reduced in complexity. It will also be a larger fleet than now.

AndrewS said:

The attacker always get to choose where and when they want to fight.
So they can choose when and where to send in 24 fighters with say 2 jamming aircraft.

But if you want to maintain a defensive CAP of 24 fighters and 2 jamming aircraft at all times - with a on-station time of 3hours - you will have to dedicate 8x the number (208 aircraft) to this task. Alternatively, you could conduct 8 [offensive fighter sweeps / strike missions] against airbases instead.

And if you have to be on the defensive in 3 locations, you have used up 624 aircraft already. That would be a third of the entire Chinese Air Force fighter fleet.

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Your account of how many aircraft need to perform a CAP 24 hours a day is not implemented in the real world. No air force has such doctrine even in times of war to utilize "x" amount of aircraft for "y" time, as well as this multiplication account if it has more sites to defend.

A defensive CAP can be done with only a single aircraft if it is going to a certain general contested area, no air force can establish this 24/7 readiness for a certain extended or even limited period of time, no air force has the necessary availability to do this, not even the USAF/USN.

For a well-established air defense, it becomes feasible to use ground radars as well as AWACS to cover the exposed gaps of ground radars, this set of sensors will have to operate for a long period of time, the fighters would only be sent if an offensive by an eventual enemy is detected, but eventually the air force can send some fighters to an area that is by far the most contested within the general scope of the enemy's contingency.

This account of yours is completely imaginary. It would be realistic if the enemy regularly sent aircraft to contest the mainland as the PLAAF does with the ROCAF.

AndrewS said:

If you want to intercept incoming fighters or missiles, it's better to use a SAM system.
Something like a medium-range HQ-16 with up to 72 ready SAMs plus reloads is relatively inexpensive. Pakistan paid roughly $60-80?Mn for their HQ-16 batteries, which is roughly equivalent to the cost of a single fighter jet.
Or you could go for a high-performance HQ-9B SAM system with a range of up to 300km, but the cost will be a lot higher.

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SAM systems cannot effectively defend an area from a saturation attack. Last year, when Hamas launched several salvos of rockets into Israel, the Iron Dome which is one of the most effective C-RAMs in the world failed to effectively defend the homeland, and the Iron Dome's missile stockpile simply stayed at its level. At the very least, the US is still trying to find ways to supply this Iron Dome stockpile to Israel. If Israel had gathered information on the movement and preparation for the rocket launch operation against the country, I have no doubt that the Israelis would take off their fighter jets and bomb the Hamas rocket launch positions, the rockets that were yet to be launched, the Iron Dome would intercept, Israel's doctrine is clearly in that sense, as are most world forces.

As SAM systems are not effective in protecting against saturation attacks, the overall radar coverage is limited by the curvature of the Earth, a fighter is simply able to provide all the advantages that a SAM system does not have.

You want more recent proof. Research the movement of NATO aircraft over Ukraine. Fighters are not the most used aircraft in this rotational movement of intelligence and surveillance operations.

FriedRiceNSpice said:

Why would you need J-10Cs to defend empty ocean? Are you going to be flying J-10Cs from the mainland to defend empty ocean, or are you going to create J-10D with waterskis instead of landing wheels?

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No. Stationing aircraft for air defense functions at forward bases still within the mainland will give the PLAAF freedom to launch offensive operations up to the limit of the First Chain of Islands, if stationing aircraft for air defense functions in expeditionary bases such as the islands in the SCS or Taiwan will give the PLAAF freedom to operate the most capable fighters beyond the First Island Chain.

tphuang said:

By end of 2040, you could be looking at a number of 6th gen aircraft, 1000 J-20s (400 with WS-10 and 600 with WS-15), 400 land version of J-35, 350 J-10s of various types and 350 J-16s. That would be very modern and much reduced in complexity. It will also be a larger fleet than now.

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If we see the WS-15 by 2025, then by 2040, I'd expect all the J-20 WS-10 engines to have reached their 3000h? service life. Then they would presumably be replaced by the WS-15.

I'd also say the fleet looks light from a strike perspective. Like more J-16s to accompany the J-20/J-35 for air superiority and strike missions against airbases.

Suetham said:

No. Stationing aircraft for air defense functions at forward bases still within the mainland will give the PLAAF freedom to launch offensive operations up to the limit of the First Chain of Islands, if stationing aircraft for air defense functions in expeditionary bases such as the islands in the SCS or Taiwan will give the PLAAF freedom to operate the most capable fighters beyond the First Island Chain.

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Here is an illustration of what I am describing, but here it is with PLAN/PLANAF:

Suetham said:

No. Stationing aircraft for air defense functions at forward bases still within the mainland will give the PLAAF freedom to launch offensive operations up to the limit of the First Chain of Islands, if stationing aircraft for air defense functions in expeditionary bases such as the islands in the SCS or Taiwan will give the PLAAF freedom to operate the most capable fighters beyond the First Island Chain.

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I just don't see that happening.

Your opponent can always choose when to send in a massed missile or airstrike with fighters to overwhelm the aircraft assigned for air defence whether in Taiwan or the SCS.

Suetham said:

Your account of how many aircraft need to perform a CAP 24 hours a day is not implemented in the real world. No air force has such doctrine even in times of war to utilize "x" amount of aircraft for "y" time, as well as this multiplication account if it has more sites to defend.

A defensive CAP can be done with only a single aircraft if it is going to a certain general contested area, no air force can establish this 24/7 readiness for a certain extended or even limited period of time, no air force has the necessary availability to do this, not even the USAF/USN.

For a well-established air defense, it becomes feasible to use ground radars as well as AWACS to cover the exposed gaps of ground radars, this set of sensors will have to operate for a long period of time, the fighters would only be sent if an offensive by an eventual enemy is detected, but eventually the air force can send some fighters to an area that is by far the most contested within the general scope of the enemy's contingency.

This account of yours is completely imaginary. It would be realistic if the enemy regularly sent aircraft to contest the mainland as the PLAAF does with the ROCAF.

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Of course. I'm demonstrating that trying to maintain a large defensive CAP doesn't work, and that an opponent can always pick a time when they can mass a large number of fighters and outnumber any aircraft in the air.

But if you start conducting [offensive strike + fighter sweep missions] every 2-3 hours against multiple airbases in the same area, you will always have some fighters to contest any aircraft your opponent manages to launch from those airbases.

Suetham said:

SAM systems cannot effectively defend an area from a saturation attack. Last year, when Hamas launched several salvos of rockets into Israel, the Iron Dome which is one of the most effective C-RAMs in the world failed to effectively defend the homeland, and the Iron Dome's missile stockpile simply stayed at its level. At the very least, the US is still trying to find ways to supply this Iron Dome stockpile to Israel. If Israel had gathered information on the movement and preparation for the rocket launch operation against the country, I have no doubt that the Israelis would take off their fighter jets and bomb the Hamas rocket launch positions, the rockets that were yet to be launched, the Iron Dome would intercept, Israel's doctrine is clearly in that sense, as are most world forces.

As SAM systems are not effective in protecting against saturation attacks, the overall radar coverage is limited by the curvature of the Earth, a fighter is simply able to provide all the advantages that a SAM system does not have.

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Yes. Your opponent can always choose when to conduct an airstrike or missile strike to overwhelm the defenders.
SAMs will help, but it just means your opponent waits until they get a bigger force together.

It's the same logic where the PLAAF can mass a large force, and can always choose where and when it wants to strike in the 1st Island Chain and overwhelm the defenders.

AndrewS said:

I just don't see that happening.

Your opponent can always choose when to send in a massed missile or airstrike with fighters to overwhelm the aircraft assigned for air defence whether in Taiwan or the SCS.

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I don't see your scenario happening.

Putting that a certain amount of fighters have to perform a CAP for a certain period of time is not feasible. A salvo of missiles launched against China would be tracked by ground and even airborne radars, just as a large formation of enemy aircraft would be tracked by aerial surveillance platforms. Only then would the fighters be deployed and/or the SAMs systems would engage the missiles.

AndrewS said:

Of course. I'm demonstrating that trying to maintain a large defensive CAP doesn't work, and that an opponent can always pick a time when they can mass a large number of fighters and outnumber any aircraft in the air.

But if you start conducting [offensive strike + fighter sweep missions] every 2-3 hours against multiple airbases in the same area, you will always have some fighters to contest any aircraft your opponent manages to launch from those airbases.

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It doesn't work the way you think. This 24/7 rotating CAP is not how air forces work.

AndrewS said:

Yes. Your opponent can always choose when to conduct an airstrike or missile strike to overwhelm the defenders.
SAMs will help, but it just means your opponent waits until they get a bigger force together.

It's the same logic where the PLAAF can mass a large force, and can always choose where and when it wants to strike in the 1st Island Chain and overwhelm the defenders.

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Nice. While the PLAAF is carrying out offensive operations against a particular country, which aircraft will carry out continental air defense when the other fighters are being deployed in other missions?

Summarizing better. If China invades Taiwan and Japan, South Korea, Australia, USA and Singapore declare war on China. Will China send all its fighter jets to attack the air bases of all these countries? Will it have enough fighters to carry out both offensive and defensive operations? Will the mainland remain unguarded? Will you defend only with SAMs? By the way, how does your insistence on dedicated offensive operations fit into A2/AD doctrine? More question. If China is really prioritizing the effectiveness of this offensive slant, how will that shape the PLARF? Will the PLARF simply close its doors? Because I believe that there is no longer any need for the PLARF, it would be enough for the PLAAF to send its fighter jets to bomb enemy air bases, and China's problem would end.

tphuang said:

Here is my approach. Order another 100 J-10Cs to be delivered over next 3 or 4 years. Out of the 300 J-10As, upgrade about 150 of them with the latest avionics/weapon support. Do the same with J-10Bs. Then, you have about 500 J-10s that will be around until 6th generation aircraft is ready to be mass produced. Produce another 150 J-16s , which will take until probably near end of this decade. Out of the 200 J-11B/BSs, upgrade about 150 of them with the latest avionics/weapon support. Then, you have about 500 flankers that will be around until 6th generation aircraft is ready to be mass produced. It will probably take another 15 years before 6th gen aircraft is ready to be mss produced. Over this 15 years, we could see 700 J-20s and 300 land version of J-35s produced for the Air Force (+another 200 J-35s for the navy). So we get to a point of 1000 5th generation aircraft + 1000 4++ generation aircraft by 2037 along with a handful of 6th gen aircraft. That to me seems to be a pretty healthy place to be. If USAF retires F-22 as I expect, the 2 Air Force will have similar # of 4th and 5th generation aircraft.

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I want to re-emphasize TP's approach, and which also now seems to be an emerging consensus at SDF, that the PLAAF should aim for parity with USAF by the mid 2030s. I have been around long enough to know that this notion (whether or not it suceeds), was almost unthinkable even 5 years ago.

Realistically, the logistical and strategic strike elements of PLAAF (being the Y-20 and H-20) will likely still not reach parity by md-2030's, but that is another thread.