I probably didn't make myself clear enough in my above post.
What I was trying to say was that if they just want to maintain the same number of brigades, there doesn't appear much room for J-10Cs because it's the lowest priority among J-20, Flankers and J-10Cs. But if they're going to expand the number of brigades, yes I do see it makes sense to maintain low production rate of J-10Cs a bit longer, because it's going to be too expensive to have a fleet of predominantly stealth fighters and heavy twin-engine aircraft and of the reason you mentioned. We can't rule out the latter possibility completely.
Yes, J-10x is still relevant in the next 15 years, but that doesn't necessarily mean it will be continually produced for that long.
I doubt the J-10C production line will be discontinued in the next few years. Serial production of the J-10C started in 2015, according to the public data we have access to, from 2004 to 2012, about 296 J-10s were produced, which gives an annual production of 37 units.
J-10B entered series production in 2013, J-10C entered series production in 2015, in the period from 2013 to 2020(J-10B and J-10C production years), the total number of J- 10 in service at the end of 2020 was 468 units, with an expansion of an additional 172 units in service in the number of J-10s in the PLAAF, offering an annual production of 21 units of the "B" version and the "C" version. , but that doesn't mean that 21 units are being produced each year, that's because we don't know to what extent the "C" version of the J-10 is replacing previous versions, this just gives us a number of the PLAAF's expansion rate under the J-10C production line.
Until 2017, the number of J-10C in service was 96 units, this means that in a period of 3 years (2015-2017), there was an annual production of 32 units. This could mean that among the 500--600 J-10 units, about 224 are already made up of J-10C units and with the decommissioning of previous versions, we can expect more than 400 J-10C units in the PLAAF by 2030 , which would effectively be an annual production of 22 J-10C units by the beginning of the next decade, a pace below the historic annual production rate of 32-37 J-10 units. If series production continues at 32 units per year, by 2030 around 480 units will be in service.
The J-10B lineup has likely already been phased out with all production geared towards the J-10C which is equipped with AESA radar and better avionics compared to the previous version of the J-10B with PESA radar. The current number of units in service of the J-10 must be more than 500 units in the PLAAF, it means that the Chinese will continue for a long time the J-10C production line to replace all the old aircraft from the previous versions of the J-10 and if there is any occurrence to motivate increasing the annual production line, it could be done.
You also addressed the production preference of the J-10 and J-16 over the J-10C.
There is no way the PLAAF can keep a large number of aircraft units in service if it prioritizes an expansion of J-20 and J-16 production without also prioritizing J-10C production. The PLAAF needs numbers, not just because of the US, but because of regional actors.
If you look at Chinese sources, you will see that the value of each unit of J-16 is relatively below the unit price of the J-20. The values are not announced, but there are bases for making comparisons. The overall cost of Chinese fighter jets is generally about 1/3 less than the same type of fighter in the United States, judging by the unit price, the J-20 is only $30 million more than the J-16. The current news is that the price of the J-20 is around 800 million yuan (US$125 million), while the price of the J-16 is in the range of 600 million yuan (US$94 million), just for the purposes of In comparison, the J-10 is taken as a reference price at US$40 million and can reach US$50 million, which means that the price of each J-10 is 2.5x-3.1x lower than a J-20.
If the PLAAF expects to have 200 J-20s in service, we can expect somewhere around 600 J-10s in service, and somewhere around 300-400 J-16s in PLAAF service, that means between 1,100 to 1,200 units in service, not counting other aircraft, in view of the degrading scenario, I am suspicious of these numbers.
I would highly doubt these numbers, sources claim that the number of J-20s produced and in service could reach 150 units earlier this year, by 2030, J-20 production could reach 216 units if you consider an annual production of 24 units, this would configure a number of 366 J-20s in service until 2030. If we are based on the information of an annual production of 40 units of J-20 until 2030, something around 360 units will have been produced, which would configure 510 J-20s in service by 2030.
In reference to the price of J-10 (high-end) is 40 million.
The situation is that the PLAAF has the trio of J-20, J-10C and J-16 aircraft as standard within established air doctrine.
Check this information here:
As the three aircraft are working together, a proportionally greater number of J-20s also offers a greater number of J-16s and especially the J-10C.
If the PLAAF expects to have somewhere around 400 J-20s in service, at the very least we can expect somewhere around 800 J-10s in service, and somewhere around 500-600 J-16s in service. in the PLAAF, this would mean between 1,700 and 1,800 units in service.
JH-7:
I would also very much doubt that the JH-7 would be taken out of service within 5 years. The new JH-7A2 version was presented in 2019, improvements were made - it updated the avionics system on the original model, updated the airborne weapons and is equipped with new photoelectric sighting pods (JDC-3) and electronic jamming pods. Not only that, but it is also revealed that the optimized JH-7A2 will continue to serve until 2030.
One of the factors for this reason to keep the aircraft at least until 2030 is the cost of construction and the other is to break new ground for newer models.
As I said earlier, the J-16 has a unit price of around 600 million yuan, which is almost 100 million US dollars. The JH-7A2, even being an updated version, its unit price is still relatively cheap compared to the J-16. Also, it is unrealistic to mass-produce the J-16 to replace the JH-7A2 in the short to medium term, so upgrading based on the JH-7A is the most efficient way to strengthen the PLA's ability to strike at sea and on the ground.
Another factor is that it will serve to test new capabilities of bombers like the H-20 and JH-XX. So there will be better performing bombers and greater combat power in the future, for the new generation of bombers to be put to successful use, many key technologies need to be verified, and these will likely become the tasks of the JH-7A2. Therefore, the JH-7A2's enhanced combat strength is not only to meet the needs of future operations, but also to pave the way for new generations of bombers.