You are probably right, I am fantasy-fleeting!
Future PLA combat aircraft composition
- Thread starter Totoro
- Start date
The assumption is that carriers will still matter.
I expect the future air-naval-missile conops of both the US military and PLA to basically involve long range fires against land and naval targets with the requisite ISR to support them, however to achieve that ISR at extended ranges requires organic ability to at least contest air power at those regions to allow your aerial ISR to deploy their sustainably.
What carriers enable -- in addition to fixed wing AEW&C -- is the ability to host an organic forward deployed CAP capability to extend your effective bubble CAP, but more importantly is its ability to deploy large numbers of ISR and strike aircraft (most likely to be flying wing UAV/UCAVs in the coming decade) to supplement the hunt for opposing naval formations (in addition to land based aerial ISR, in addition to submarines, in addition to OTH radar, and in addition to space based systems).
The actual prosecution of the opfor will be done through a combination of long range land based fires and of course organic CSG/SAG/submarine fires in a coordinated fashion -- but first you need the ability to find the enemy, which requires forward deployed CAP and forward deployed ISR.
That is to say -- I expect both USN and PLAN carrier groups of the post 2030 era to have vulnerabilities to each side at the system-of-system level, but there will also be things that cannot be done without carriers.
Carriers will not "lack survivability" -- if you have the adequate systems at the task force level and more importantly at the strategic/theater level to protect and support them, they will still be essential in doing things that cannot be done by any other system of that era (unless a survivable space based real time and persistent maritime surveillance emerges, but even then that is less of a replacement than a supplement)
If the goal was to project power or fight an air-naval conflict with an SEA nation, a carrier fleet is overkill and unnecessary. PLA land based air and strike power and existing surface naval forces are already extensive enough to deter them.
That said, people on F-16.net may also have different visions for what kind of carrier force the PLAN wants or needs, and their track record on PLA strategic intent isn't great either.
There is a reason why I've been stating a 10-12 CATOBAR force post 2040s -- because I think the PLAN will want to achieve their goal of qualitative parity with regional quantitative superiority vis a vis what the US could deploy to the region.
As for 004/eventual PLAN CVN -- even assuming four 004s, the first 004 likely would not enter service until the early 2030s at the earliest, and by the time four 004s enter service it'll probably be after the mid 2030s.
Once you're past 2030, would you really need a CATOBAR's total airwing to include 45 to 60 manned combat aircraft like J-XY given the maturity that UCAVs will have by then?
Probably no more than 30 would be necessary by that time.
I think what is more likely is that PLAN CATOBARs and 076s will both carry UCAVs.
The sortie rate generation that a CATOBAR can generate overall will still be far greater than that of an 076, not to mention the airwing size/tonnage.
Putting it another way, I wouldn't be surprised if the CATOBAR airwing from the mid/late 2030s have fixed wing combat airwings composed 2/3rds by UCAVs/UAVs with only 1/3rd being manned combat aircraft.
It has been considered.
I wrote it as so in previous posts.
My expectation is that CATOBARs and 076s will both carry UCAVs -- CATOBARs will carry mixed formations of manned combat aircraft and UCAVs, and 076s will only carry UCAVs.
Everyone should recall that the benefit of CATOBARs isn't that they can carry manned aircraft, it is that by virtue of their flight deck size and their overall configuration, that they can carry large airwings and enable greater significantly sortie rates than a smaller ship.
The benefits of a UCAV -- in providing greater endurance ISR, long range strike, providing overwatch and even as a missile truck (whether it be A2A or A2G or AShM) -- all still exist on a CATOBAR as well.
The problem with 10-12 CATOBAR is that it's essentially the USN in PLAN colors, i.e, a force designed for international capabilities and liabilities. Unless the Chinese have serious interests outside their immediate sphere, i.e, they want to overrun the planet, there's no reason to go up to 10-12 CATOBAR. Coastal defenses in various modes, combined with some carriers to supplement land-based aviation and other anti-naval forces, is enough for a defensive military posture. Even if China ends up expanding into a sphere of influence, it doesn't need CATOBARs to protect it; it only needs coastal aviation, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and PLAN assets to do the job.
What distinguishes carriers from other types of ships isn't their sea supremacy role, which the Russians and Chinese have attempted to contest, but rather their ability to do long-range, sustained, and inland bombardment of land targets. 10-12 CATOBARs, when we're looking at developing revolutions in naval warfare, isn't self-defense, but imperialism.
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As for projecting into places like Singapore and Malaysia, Singapore is 2000 km away from Hainan, or in other words, it's extremely distant from Chinese basing. The Philippines is 1500 km distant from Guangzhou. The distance is such that it's a long-range strike mission (and so's Japan, for that matter), but carriers, unlike land-based airbases, can get closer and do follow-up hits once air defenses have been suppressed with shorter sortie times and greater payloads.
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6 CATOBARs are Philippines, 12 CATOBARs are Hawaii and Los Angeles, or more realistically considering USAF rebasing in Los Angeles, Paris or Cairo. Mahan pointed out that naval warfare is a winner-take-all thing; the advantages of the development of airpower in naval warfare is that China doesn't have to rely on a fleet in being but can rely on medium-ranged land-based assets for naval defense. For China to rely mainly on a fleet in being as opposed to its land-based assets means that Chinese want the planet, which, for a country of 1.4 billion people on a planet of 8 billion, is insanity. The US vs China is easy to do, but China vs the world, on the world's defensive terms, is suicide.
What distinguishes carriers from other types of ships isn't their sea supremacy role, which the Russians and Chinese have attempted to contest, but rather their ability to do long-range, sustained, and inland bombardment of land targets. 10-12 CATOBARs, when we're looking at developing revolutions in naval warfare, isn't self-defense, but imperialism.
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As for projecting into places like Singapore and Malaysia, Singapore is 2000 km away from Hainan, or in other words, it's extremely distant from Chinese basing. The Philippines is 1500 km distant from Guangzhou. The distance is such that it's a long-range strike mission (and so's Japan, for that matter), but carriers, unlike land-based airbases, can get closer and do follow-up hits once air defenses have been suppressed with shorter sortie times and greater payloads.
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6 CATOBARs are Philippines, 12 CATOBARs are Hawaii and Los Angeles, or more realistically considering USAF rebasing in Los Angeles, Paris or Cairo. Mahan pointed out that naval warfare is a winner-take-all thing; the advantages of the development of airpower in naval warfare is that China doesn't have to rely on a fleet in being but can rely on medium-ranged land-based assets for naval defense. For China to rely mainly on a fleet in being as opposed to its land-based assets means that Chinese want the planet, which, for a country of 1.4 billion people on a planet of 8 billion, is insanity. The US vs China is easy to do, but China vs the world, on the world's defensive terms, is suicide.
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Why though? China as long as it grows will require more and more raw materials for imports. So, at that point (even now) China's lifeline is its imports.
By necessity, China must go out of its way to ensure that its sea lanes are open, and that there is no conflict on important countries so that trade can continue.
Even though China might want to avoid some of the liabilities that the US has, it is impossible for me to think that they wont build a huge blue water Navy (along with naval bases on strategic parts of the world) to protect their development interests
For example, I dont think China likes the current situation where any Middle East conflict can immediately cut off its oil supply
If we are assuming that the PLAN wants to be able to wage a thorough air-naval-missile conflict beyond the first island chain, and ideally into the second island chain and to the middle of the pacific, it will basically require the kind of naval force, endurance, and scope that the USN has, in addition to significant hefts of land based air and missile power.
Yes, and China has three large naval air stations in the SCS that can be used for it if needed.
Obviously carriers would be a useful supplement, but seeking a carrier force for the purpose of waging a SCS conflict against SEA regional nations is both an unnecessary use of resources and also simultaneously likely undershooting the ambitions and requirements of the PLAN.
I'm not sure what this means.
My position is that if you want the ability to wage a robust, layered and multi-layered air-naval-missile conflict, you need large, long range mobile air-naval formations (i.e.: CSGs) to be able to actively go hunting for the enemy's mobile air-naval formations (CSGs) to simultaneously both provide reliable/redundant targeting data for your land based long range strike systems (whether they be missiles or land based air power or both) and to be capable of seizing the initiative "on the field" and maneuver the enemy into unfavourable positions/employ your fires in better effects.
Relying on a static defense with long range strikes, but lacking a maneuver force that is able to actively and organically search for and engage the enemy, is a sure fire way for your own defenses to get sieged, out maneuvered, and ultimately whittled down.
Large long-range mobile air-naval formations to go actively hunting for the enemy's mobile air-naval formations is 4-6 CSGs, not 10-12 CSGs. 10-12 CSGs in the PLAN is basically full parity with the USN, and in the 2040 timeframe it's implying a China that can engage the USN in open waters and win, without the support of land-based missiles.
To put this into perspective, the USN expects to be able to keep 3-4 CSGs operational at any time. It is looking as though it will downsize the USN from 12 CSGs to 10 CSGs. Moreover, Chinese CSGs are likely going to be congregated in the East Asia region for a potential Sino-American War. The US still has global obligations; it is unlikely to shove all 10 CSGs into the East Asia region, and it's more likely to push only 6 CSGs into the region. Your proposal for the PLAN is, at extremis, going to be LARGER than the USN in terms of carrier aviation.
People have pooh-poohed my suggestions for massive missile salvos as a waste of money, but you're looking at 200 billion in carriers and carrier aircraft alone, and likely a total force cost of around 400 billion.
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Symbolically, stuff like AShBMs, cruise missiles, etc, are fundamentally defensive in nature due to their lack of mobility. Carriers, on the other hand, are world-ranging, i.e, you could have a cluster of carriers pop up off New York.
If we consider Chinese A2D2 credible as a way to deter the USN right now, without CATOBARs or 5th gen naval aviation, then 10-12 CSGs are overkill. This is New Cold War, Chinese Edition stuff.
To put this into perspective, the USN expects to be able to keep 3-4 CSGs operational at any time. It is looking as though it will downsize the USN from 12 CSGs to 10 CSGs. Moreover, Chinese CSGs are likely going to be congregated in the East Asia region for a potential Sino-American War. The US still has global obligations; it is unlikely to shove all 10 CSGs into the East Asia region, and it's more likely to push only 6 CSGs into the region. Your proposal for the PLAN is, at extremis, going to be LARGER than the USN in terms of carrier aviation.
People have pooh-poohed my suggestions for massive missile salvos as a waste of money, but you're looking at 200 billion in carriers and carrier aircraft alone, and likely a total force cost of around 400 billion.
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Symbolically, stuff like AShBMs, cruise missiles, etc, are fundamentally defensive in nature due to their lack of mobility. Carriers, on the other hand, are world-ranging, i.e, you could have a cluster of carriers pop up off New York.
If we consider Chinese A2D2 credible as a way to deter the USN right now, without CATOBARs or 5th gen naval aviation, then 10-12 CSGs are overkill. This is New Cold War, Chinese Edition stuff.
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@Inst
Historically the world's largest trading nation builds the world's largest navy to protect its global trade and investments.
China is already the world's largest trading nation, its investments are increasing, and it does have the economic and technology heft to build that navy.
So, I'm saying 10-12 CSGs required because I imagine that during a conflict, the PLAN will aim to have a peacetime deployment model that allows them to be able to surge up to 2/3rds of their overall orbat in the region.
I.e.: with a fleet of 10-12 CSGs, they will aim to be able to sortie 6-8 CSGs at once.
I have nothing against procurement of more long range missiles, however the more of them you have and especially the longer their range is, the more robust of an ISR capability you need.
Procurement of a large fleet of carriers will be very much complementary to procurement of a large stock of long range strike missiles.
Remember, the goal is to achieve qualitative parity at minimum while being able to achieve quantitative superiority in theater -- in terms of not only land based long range strike missiles, land based fighters, etc, but also CSGs.
If the US is able to deploy 4 CSGs to a pacific theater at any one time, of course it would be preferable to be able to outnumber in terms of your own CSGs as well as exploit any home turf advantages you have (land based strike missiles, land based aircraft, land based ISR).
The US is already adjusting their own military strategy to emphasize strikes at greater distances, as well as using air and naval forces to impose blockades at distances further form the Chinese coast.
Going into the 2030s, I suspect PLA procurement and strategy will be defined by the requirement to be able to go out and defeat opposing, capable, air-naval formations at significant distances form China's coast, as far as 4000-5000km away at its maximum.
I think the PLA need several CSG groups (4~6) but not necessarily matching those of USN, my logic is as follows.
The current "reliable range" of PLA's land based ISR and strike capability is maybe 1000~2000km. It is reasonable to believe that, with new technologies and additional support from PLAN CSG as mobile ISR platforms in the 2030s, 3000~4000km off Chinese coast can be safely covered, .
In that case, US trying to wage war within second island chain against China would be overly ambitious and extremely risky. When you fight against a peer competitor, there is simply no reason that you are able to push the fight all the way towards their front yard.
The viable strategy for the US then would be to pull back and remotely block China's SLOC in India ocean and east Pacific, where it would be difficult for PLA to leverage those land based assets to gain advantage. (If US follows that strategy, US allies in east Asia are effectively abandoned. Whether that is acceptable politically is a different matter)
Then what is the PLA's strategy to secure the SLOC? One option is to build 12 CSG and win a traditional sea battle in Indian Ocean. Another possibility is China tries to get more foot hold in south and west Asia (Myanmar, Iran, Pakistan) so PLA can deploy large quantity of survivable land based assets and strike from there, which seems to be much a safer and cheaper solution than the 12 CSG option.
The current "reliable range" of PLA's land based ISR and strike capability is maybe 1000~2000km. It is reasonable to believe that, with new technologies and additional support from PLAN CSG as mobile ISR platforms in the 2030s, 3000~4000km off Chinese coast can be safely covered, .
In that case, US trying to wage war within second island chain against China would be overly ambitious and extremely risky. When you fight against a peer competitor, there is simply no reason that you are able to push the fight all the way towards their front yard.
The viable strategy for the US then would be to pull back and remotely block China's SLOC in India ocean and east Pacific, where it would be difficult for PLA to leverage those land based assets to gain advantage. (If US follows that strategy, US allies in east Asia are effectively abandoned. Whether that is acceptable politically is a different matter)
Then what is the PLA's strategy to secure the SLOC? One option is to build 12 CSG and win a traditional sea battle in Indian Ocean. Another possibility is China tries to get more foot hold in south and west Asia (Myanmar, Iran, Pakistan) so PLA can deploy large quantity of survivable land based assets and strike from there, which seems to be much a safer and cheaper solution than the 12 CSG option.