France Military News, Reports, Data, etc.
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Jura The idiot
General
Today at 5:12 PM
OK now some hype:
Ever heard of Texelis? The French firm thinks you will.
... actually it looks like an SUV to me LOL!
OK now some hype:
Ever heard of Texelis? The French firm thinks you will.
Jura The idiot
General
google translation of
16/02/2018
:
"Negotiations for the sale of additional Rafale between France and Egypt are hampered by the United States. Washington refuses to export an American component aboard the Scalp cruise missile that Cairo wants to acquire.
It stuck seriously in negotiations between Paris and Cairo for the sale of additional Rafale (12 fighter planes) to the Egyptian Air Force, according to concordant sources. And this is not a funding issue as in the past. According to these sources, France is currently unable to deliver scalp cruise missiles manufactured by MBDA to Egyptians because of an American component. Contacted by La Tribune, Dassault Aviation and MBDA declined to comment.
Paris had given the green light to export the Scalp missile after its passage before the inter-ministerial commission for the study of exports of war materials (CIEEMG), but the United States blocked the sale. Washington follows the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Good war for the Americans. But this situation greatly irritates both the Egyptians, who absolutely want Scalp missiles, and Dassault Aviation, who does not want to miss a new Rafale sale.
Towards a new Franco-American arrangement?
If the supply of Rafale is not in danger, one explains to the Tribune, this operation is clearly slowed down in spite of the frequent comings and goings between Paris and Cairo of the Egyptian and French negotiators these last weeks. And all the pressure is on MBDA, which is in the sight of the Egyptian authorities, very up against the missile. So much so that Cairo wants the Scalp ... for free. What MBDA refuses. However, by the end of 2017, everything seemed to be in place for a signing between Cairo and Dassault Aviation at the beginning of this year at the time of a visit by Emmanuel Macron. It missed.
Either MBDA changes this component, or France and the United States find an arrangement at very high level. At the invitation of Donald Trump, Emmanuel Macron will also visit the United States on 23 and 24 April. It should be remembered that François Hollande's visit to the United States in February 2014 had already settled the sale of two spy satellites in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The United States then refused to export some of the "made in USA" components needed to manufacture these two satellites."
Rafale en Egypte : les Etats-Unis bloquent
16/02/2018
:
"Negotiations for the sale of additional Rafale between France and Egypt are hampered by the United States. Washington refuses to export an American component aboard the Scalp cruise missile that Cairo wants to acquire.
It stuck seriously in negotiations between Paris and Cairo for the sale of additional Rafale (12 fighter planes) to the Egyptian Air Force, according to concordant sources. And this is not a funding issue as in the past. According to these sources, France is currently unable to deliver scalp cruise missiles manufactured by MBDA to Egyptians because of an American component. Contacted by La Tribune, Dassault Aviation and MBDA declined to comment.
Paris had given the green light to export the Scalp missile after its passage before the inter-ministerial commission for the study of exports of war materials (CIEEMG), but the United States blocked the sale. Washington follows the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Good war for the Americans. But this situation greatly irritates both the Egyptians, who absolutely want Scalp missiles, and Dassault Aviation, who does not want to miss a new Rafale sale.
Towards a new Franco-American arrangement?
If the supply of Rafale is not in danger, one explains to the Tribune, this operation is clearly slowed down in spite of the frequent comings and goings between Paris and Cairo of the Egyptian and French negotiators these last weeks. And all the pressure is on MBDA, which is in the sight of the Egyptian authorities, very up against the missile. So much so that Cairo wants the Scalp ... for free. What MBDA refuses. However, by the end of 2017, everything seemed to be in place for a signing between Cairo and Dassault Aviation at the beginning of this year at the time of a visit by Emmanuel Macron. It missed.
Either MBDA changes this component, or France and the United States find an arrangement at very high level. At the invitation of Donald Trump, Emmanuel Macron will also visit the United States on 23 and 24 April. It should be remembered that François Hollande's visit to the United States in February 2014 had already settled the sale of two spy satellites in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The United States then refused to export some of the "made in USA" components needed to manufacture these two satellites."
Jura The idiot
General
says it's new
, looks cool:
Jura The idiot
General
Jura The idiot
General
Feb 18, 2018
Missile sale from France to Egypt depends on US permission, Dassault head says
related:
Missile sale from France to Egypt depends on US permission, Dassault head says
Jura The idiot
General
I'll be putting here google translation of
Syrie : première utilisation du MdCN ?
vendredi 16 mars 2018
as I read it:
It is not a question here of taking up all the elements that could lead to the use of force in order to prevent the Syrian regime from using combat gases or reducing its military capabilities. In any case, there is little doubt in these lines on the use of these gases, whereas a new UN report once again makes reference to the evidence of the reconstitution of a chemical arsenal despite the fact that existence of a Russian control over the suppression of the precedent. Nor will there be any mention of the use of such weapons by other protagonists of this conflict because they do not belong to one of the categories of legitimate non-state armed groups to found a State and thus to participate in the enactment of an international order.
In a very modest way, it is a question of proposing a brief overview of the French naval strike capabilities according to what is perceived as the demand of the policy. The government seems determined to give credit to the red lines enacted about the use of chemical weapons while seeking a new gateway to the diplomatic process around the Syrian civil war, Paris being largely excluded since the uprising -face of 2013 and the 2015 Russian intervention. This is tantamount to asking what is possible to do militarily and what can be expected from a strategic point of view.
The debate is currently about the powerful but simple connection between the desire to make red lines on the diplomatic front and their credibility. Making credible such an assertion to impose red lines on others implies being able to enforce them, by force if need be. In 2013, this credibility collapsed. But since the general elections in the countries concerned, the United States showed a change in gear by conducting such strikes on April 6, 2017. And France would study the possibility of doing the same in March 2018, in full autonomy if needed. .
After more than seven years of civil war in Syria (2011 - ...), the air defense capabilities of the Syrian regime remain largely operational. And they are no longer alone since the Russian intervention since 2015 has, in particular, materialized by the coastal deployment of a naval air defense bubble point to the installation of Russian S-400 systems in Syria from 2015 followed by S -300 (S-300V and more?) In 2016. These batteries largely cover the Syrian territory, especially the Assad regime.
The recent Israeli raid in early February showed that these defenses could be bypassed, or even destroyed for some. This action materializes several issues: the presence of Russian anti-aircraft systems impose, de facto, to take them into account and to negotiate a total or partial air deconfliction of the Syrian skies. In addition, the suppression of Syrian air defenses in connection with the reduction of the military capabilities of the regime amounts to employing a strike force combining several operational capabilities. Also, it is to take and assume the risk of human and material losses, hence the necessary use of crew recovery capabilities (CSAR), which does not remove the risk of capturing crews. Finally, each weapon system has a failure rate that is not elegant to advance commercially. Each non-target cruise missile is as much a blessing for propaganda as a relative loss of military credibility as an unintentional dispersal of technological materials."
goes on below ...
Syrie : première utilisation du MdCN ?
vendredi 16 mars 2018
as I read it:
"The chain of military actions in Syria on the part of the protagonists sees the anti-chambers chancelleries openly consider a new coercive use of force since the strikes ordered by President Donald J. Trump (59 missiles Tomahawk, April 6, 2017). In this perspective, and again since August 2013, a French military action coalition or even autonomous - dixit the CEMA - is again mentioned. What naval participation is it possible?
It is not a question here of taking up all the elements that could lead to the use of force in order to prevent the Syrian regime from using combat gases or reducing its military capabilities. In any case, there is little doubt in these lines on the use of these gases, whereas a new UN report once again makes reference to the evidence of the reconstitution of a chemical arsenal despite the fact that existence of a Russian control over the suppression of the precedent. Nor will there be any mention of the use of such weapons by other protagonists of this conflict because they do not belong to one of the categories of legitimate non-state armed groups to found a State and thus to participate in the enactment of an international order.
In a very modest way, it is a question of proposing a brief overview of the French naval strike capabilities according to what is perceived as the demand of the policy. The government seems determined to give credit to the red lines enacted about the use of chemical weapons while seeking a new gateway to the diplomatic process around the Syrian civil war, Paris being largely excluded since the uprising -face of 2013 and the 2015 Russian intervention. This is tantamount to asking what is possible to do militarily and what can be expected from a strategic point of view.
The debate is currently about the powerful but simple connection between the desire to make red lines on the diplomatic front and their credibility. Making credible such an assertion to impose red lines on others implies being able to enforce them, by force if need be. In 2013, this credibility collapsed. But since the general elections in the countries concerned, the United States showed a change in gear by conducting such strikes on April 6, 2017. And France would study the possibility of doing the same in March 2018, in full autonomy if needed. .
After more than seven years of civil war in Syria (2011 - ...), the air defense capabilities of the Syrian regime remain largely operational. And they are no longer alone since the Russian intervention since 2015 has, in particular, materialized by the coastal deployment of a naval air defense bubble point to the installation of Russian S-400 systems in Syria from 2015 followed by S -300 (S-300V and more?) In 2016. These batteries largely cover the Syrian territory, especially the Assad regime.
The recent Israeli raid in early February showed that these defenses could be bypassed, or even destroyed for some. This action materializes several issues: the presence of Russian anti-aircraft systems impose, de facto, to take them into account and to negotiate a total or partial air deconfliction of the Syrian skies. In addition, the suppression of Syrian air defenses in connection with the reduction of the military capabilities of the regime amounts to employing a strike force combining several operational capabilities. Also, it is to take and assume the risk of human and material losses, hence the necessary use of crew recovery capabilities (CSAR), which does not remove the risk of capturing crews. Finally, each weapon system has a failure rate that is not elegant to advance commercially. Each non-target cruise missile is as much a blessing for propaganda as a relative loss of military credibility as an unintentional dispersal of technological materials."
goes on below ...