Jura The idiot
General
not sure I understood it properly (google translation is below without like table from the bottom of that post), anyway was interesting to go through
vendredi 8 décembre 2017
:
"Operational maintenance of weapons platforms and systems is one of the factors of military superiority, in that it conditions the availability of force materials for missions that can be ordered. On the naval plane, the MCO is the sine qua non to last at sea, the materialization of the permanent fight against the slightest damage, even the survival of a ship when the breakage is critical, even in the basin.
The MCO budget was in a collapse during the years from 1997 to 2001. As a result, the DTO (Technical Operational Availability) dropped, on average, by 15 to 25% depending on the weapon systems. These same rates regained 10% thanks to an increase of the MCO credits of nearly 30% between 2000 and 2003. The LPM (2003-2008) set itself the objective of 75 to 80% of availability according to the equipment.
The Court of Auditors, through two reports, examined the situation of the military equipment MCO in 2004 and 2014. A number of observations emerged from it, including the constant increase in the volume of this budget, without the objectives in this area (2008) being The savings achieved by rationalizing the number of locations (support and maintenance services) and the posts eliminated in this function have no financial impact.
This is why the Court of Auditors made, in particular, two recommendations: deploy an adapted cost accounting whose expertise would be provided by the maintenance of each environment (SSF for the Navy) which would ensure the synthesis and better integrate the MCO from the design of equipment by reinforcing the role of maintenance workers beyond what is provided for in the training instructions for the 1516 weapons programs.
In 2012, the budget of MCO amounted to 6 billion euros (against 3.32 billion euros in 2002), which breaks down as follows:
53% (including 15% for hunting) of the sum is dedicated to aeronautical equipment,
26% for terrestrial equipment,
21% for naval platforms.
In this perspective, it should be noted that the MCO of the Navy is - in 2017 - nearly 1.56 billion euros. The mid-life redesign of the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle represents an extraordinary operation of 1.3 billion euros that runs for at least two years. The financial volume dedicated to the other platforms is divided between:
$ 628 million for surface ships;
$ 326 million for submarines.
The following table (see below) has no claim to be exact and contains, most probably, too many errors. This is only to propose a few orders of magnitude.
This table shows that maintenance is significantly heavier on a submarine than a surface vessel. So that the strategic availability of the underwater boat is much more rigid than that of the surface boat. The nuclear propulsion surface has a certain but relative impact insofar as the fuel change embedded in the hearts makes it possible to space - in the last few years on the Rubis - the refuelings of fuels every ten years.
In addition, it should also be noted that the gains on the periods during which the submarine is unavailable directly allows to extend the duration of the missions that can be performed by each of the two crews. On the other hand, the gains made for surface combatants benefit much more from the margin in that they do not benefit from a second crew. They are then bound to the number of average sea days to be carried out by each crew which is 96 days in 2017. In 2016, the ten crews of the five ANS 72 (Rubis) managed to last 1000 days at sea (ie 100 days on average per crew). Without a second crew, the progress made on the FREMMs can hardly be exploited.
But this strategic availability includes, for the surface fleet, a reserve equal, at least, to the number of days of sea made. This would allow a surge in a theater of operations to compensate for a limited number of frigates, for example. Knowing that the exploitation of this reserve is in direct contact with the regeneration capacities and that the platform is not without limit. This raises the question of what would be the consequences of using a second crew on the FREMMs with regard to the wear of the systems and equipment and that this would affect the scheduled maintenance of the equipment. Would the situation be comparable to that of ANS? The latter seem to be exploited optimally but without any leeway in case of a punctual and frankly increased need for submarine presence."
MCO : disponibilité stratégique des plateformes navales
vendredi 8 décembre 2017
:
"Operational maintenance of weapons platforms and systems is one of the factors of military superiority, in that it conditions the availability of force materials for missions that can be ordered. On the naval plane, the MCO is the sine qua non to last at sea, the materialization of the permanent fight against the slightest damage, even the survival of a ship when the breakage is critical, even in the basin.
The MCO budget was in a collapse during the years from 1997 to 2001. As a result, the DTO (Technical Operational Availability) dropped, on average, by 15 to 25% depending on the weapon systems. These same rates regained 10% thanks to an increase of the MCO credits of nearly 30% between 2000 and 2003. The LPM (2003-2008) set itself the objective of 75 to 80% of availability according to the equipment.
The Court of Auditors, through two reports, examined the situation of the military equipment MCO in 2004 and 2014. A number of observations emerged from it, including the constant increase in the volume of this budget, without the objectives in this area (2008) being The savings achieved by rationalizing the number of locations (support and maintenance services) and the posts eliminated in this function have no financial impact.
This is why the Court of Auditors made, in particular, two recommendations: deploy an adapted cost accounting whose expertise would be provided by the maintenance of each environment (SSF for the Navy) which would ensure the synthesis and better integrate the MCO from the design of equipment by reinforcing the role of maintenance workers beyond what is provided for in the training instructions for the 1516 weapons programs.
In 2012, the budget of MCO amounted to 6 billion euros (against 3.32 billion euros in 2002), which breaks down as follows:
53% (including 15% for hunting) of the sum is dedicated to aeronautical equipment,
26% for terrestrial equipment,
21% for naval platforms.
In this perspective, it should be noted that the MCO of the Navy is - in 2017 - nearly 1.56 billion euros. The mid-life redesign of the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle represents an extraordinary operation of 1.3 billion euros that runs for at least two years. The financial volume dedicated to the other platforms is divided between:
$ 628 million for surface ships;
$ 326 million for submarines.
The following table (see below) has no claim to be exact and contains, most probably, too many errors. This is only to propose a few orders of magnitude.
This table shows that maintenance is significantly heavier on a submarine than a surface vessel. So that the strategic availability of the underwater boat is much more rigid than that of the surface boat. The nuclear propulsion surface has a certain but relative impact insofar as the fuel change embedded in the hearts makes it possible to space - in the last few years on the Rubis - the refuelings of fuels every ten years.
In addition, it should also be noted that the gains on the periods during which the submarine is unavailable directly allows to extend the duration of the missions that can be performed by each of the two crews. On the other hand, the gains made for surface combatants benefit much more from the margin in that they do not benefit from a second crew. They are then bound to the number of average sea days to be carried out by each crew which is 96 days in 2017. In 2016, the ten crews of the five ANS 72 (Rubis) managed to last 1000 days at sea (ie 100 days on average per crew). Without a second crew, the progress made on the FREMMs can hardly be exploited.
But this strategic availability includes, for the surface fleet, a reserve equal, at least, to the number of days of sea made. This would allow a surge in a theater of operations to compensate for a limited number of frigates, for example. Knowing that the exploitation of this reserve is in direct contact with the regeneration capacities and that the platform is not without limit. This raises the question of what would be the consequences of using a second crew on the FREMMs with regard to the wear of the systems and equipment and that this would affect the scheduled maintenance of the equipment. Would the situation be comparable to that of ANS? The latter seem to be exploited optimally but without any leeway in case of a punctual and frankly increased need for submarine presence."
