France Military News, Reports, Data, etc.
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Jura The idiot
General
google translation of
Qui veut la peau du Mirage 2000D ?
vendredi 1 septembre 2017
"It is known that if the Mirage 2000D left the fight against Daech, it was not at the request of
But it is a choice of the air force to better regenerate its human and organic potential (the Mirage 2000, especially the D, having provided the bulk of the effort against Daech, it is factual and the figures are even public). The Americans could not have blamed the Mirage 2000D because it is a monoreactor because ... most of the non-American aircraft used in this theater, notably by the Arab forces, but also the Belgians for example.
They could not have blamed him either because he does not have a cannon ... because the plane of thefts, the cannon fire is simply almost impossible. We can not blame the Mirage 2000D too many eyes on board, it has two pairs, and it is known, it is always better than one. The Mirage is also much more digitized, especially for air land integration, than most non-American devices fighting Daech. Finally, the crews of Mirage 2000D are simply the ones with the most important experience. Since 2002, this component has experienced (relative) rest in only one year, in 2004 and 2006.
The Americans could not even blame him because he is French: Americans and French convolent on a small cloud for years. The other components may not have reached such a level of integration and cooperation.
But it's true, the 2000D has only two self-protection missiles, in addition to an electronic warfare system. But these missiles, of Magic 2 of MBDA (Matra Defense at the time), arrive at the end of their life. A stop fixed to 2018, theoretically, that could prevent deploy Mirage 2000D in Chammal zone. Except that in Iraq, a priori, it is not expected that these hunters will meet hunters capable of shooting them down. As for the strikes in Syria, it is much more complex. But in this case, this argument was not at the origin of the permutations of hunters between Barkhane and Chammal.
Mirage 2000D is expected to return to Chammal next year, with limits, if the stock of missiles not outdated did not allow it to fly over Syria.
TOO OLD ?
How did we get there? The 2000D have only a tiny 20 years of service, and according to Air Force criteria, they are young aircraft compared to the Super Etendard (41 years) or at the Mirage F1CR (39 years old). Hence the retrofit to mid-life envisaged from the beginning of the years 2010. It is seen, it has been postponed several times since the first retrofit aircraft is still not delivered. Of course, the 2000D carries only two 250 kg bombs, but it is rare for fire support to have much more, and the planes fly on patrol.
The prospect of lighter ammunition can help to alleviate this deficiency. But the device remains very capable, as it has benefited, for its air-ground dimension, from a series of improvements: link 16, GBU-49, Scalp EG, etc. True, it still lacks a true multimodal radar, a cannon (provided in retrofit) and a modern combat missile (also expected). In short, retrofit is minimal, but precisely, the operation allows to maintain 55 hunters (no one wants, on the international market) in operation at a quasi-derisory cost.
Even though in the next four years, the Air Force will not perceive the slightest Rafale, and that the cadences of the French State have never been very high (the ten annual aircraft, between Marine and air force).
Thinking that canceling the retrofit of Mirage 2000D will allocate resources to the Rafale is more than a bet because there is no shortage of priorities (starting with Bercy to find euros wherever he can save). In any case, the air force would quickly lose about sixty hunters, and the economy generated would at best only finance a handful of Rafale. Where a Mirage 2000D could also take police towers of the sky, pre-deployments like in Djibouti. And survive in a disputed sky."
Qui veut la peau du Mirage 2000D ?
vendredi 1 septembre 2017
:
"It is known that if the Mirage 2000D left the fight against Daech, it was not at the request of
But it is a choice of the air force to better regenerate its human and organic potential (the Mirage 2000, especially the D, having provided the bulk of the effort against Daech, it is factual and the figures are even public). The Americans could not have blamed the Mirage 2000D because it is a monoreactor because ... most of the non-American aircraft used in this theater, notably by the Arab forces, but also the Belgians for example.
They could not have blamed him either because he does not have a cannon ... because the plane of thefts, the cannon fire is simply almost impossible. We can not blame the Mirage 2000D too many eyes on board, it has two pairs, and it is known, it is always better than one. The Mirage is also much more digitized, especially for air land integration, than most non-American devices fighting Daech. Finally, the crews of Mirage 2000D are simply the ones with the most important experience. Since 2002, this component has experienced (relative) rest in only one year, in 2004 and 2006.
The Americans could not even blame him because he is French: Americans and French convolent on a small cloud for years. The other components may not have reached such a level of integration and cooperation.
But it's true, the 2000D has only two self-protection missiles, in addition to an electronic warfare system. But these missiles, of Magic 2 of MBDA (Matra Defense at the time), arrive at the end of their life. A stop fixed to 2018, theoretically, that could prevent deploy Mirage 2000D in Chammal zone. Except that in Iraq, a priori, it is not expected that these hunters will meet hunters capable of shooting them down. As for the strikes in Syria, it is much more complex. But in this case, this argument was not at the origin of the permutations of hunters between Barkhane and Chammal.
Mirage 2000D is expected to return to Chammal next year, with limits, if the stock of missiles not outdated did not allow it to fly over Syria.
TOO OLD ?
How did we get there? The 2000D have only a tiny 20 years of service, and according to Air Force criteria, they are young aircraft compared to the Super Etendard (41 years) or at the Mirage F1CR (39 years old). Hence the retrofit to mid-life envisaged from the beginning of the years 2010. It is seen, it has been postponed several times since the first retrofit aircraft is still not delivered. Of course, the 2000D carries only two 250 kg bombs, but it is rare for fire support to have much more, and the planes fly on patrol.
The prospect of lighter ammunition can help to alleviate this deficiency. But the device remains very capable, as it has benefited, for its air-ground dimension, from a series of improvements: link 16, GBU-49, Scalp EG, etc. True, it still lacks a true multimodal radar, a cannon (provided in retrofit) and a modern combat missile (also expected). In short, retrofit is minimal, but precisely, the operation allows to maintain 55 hunters (no one wants, on the international market) in operation at a quasi-derisory cost.
Even though in the next four years, the Air Force will not perceive the slightest Rafale, and that the cadences of the French State have never been very high (the ten annual aircraft, between Marine and air force).
Thinking that canceling the retrofit of Mirage 2000D will allocate resources to the Rafale is more than a bet because there is no shortage of priorities (starting with Bercy to find euros wherever he can save). In any case, the air force would quickly lose about sixty hunters, and the economy generated would at best only finance a handful of Rafale. Where a Mirage 2000D could also take police towers of the sky, pre-deployments like in Djibouti. And survive in a disputed sky."
Good question for me 
Justely i have read these days very good Mag with 3 articles on the Rafale and new variants F3R for 2019, F4 normaly 2025 and no plan for a M-88 variant of 9 t of thrust, the 7.5 t varaint is sufficient
The 9 t variant same power than Typhoon reactor is in fact only a project envisaged for export especialy about 10 years ago for UAE mainly also sometimes mentionned for French AF, also ideas for CTFs on the " back ".
He do very good job very big readiness, engine replaced in 1 hour, deployed aircraft ready to about 95 % ( the best with ofc much spares disponible ) no stealth and 5 th generation but excellent also for range and no chauvinism here, the true.
About 18 - 20000 $ flight hour for a medium fighter of 25 t max reasonnable.
Justely i have read these days very good Mag with 3 articles on the Rafale and new variants F3R for 2019, F4 normaly 2025 and no plan for a M-88 variant of 9 t of thrust, the 7.5 t varaint is sufficient
The 9 t variant same power than Typhoon reactor is in fact only a project envisaged for export especialy about 10 years ago for UAE mainly also sometimes mentionned for French AF, also ideas for CTFs on the " back ".
He do very good job very big readiness, engine replaced in 1 hour, deployed aircraft ready to about 95 % ( the best with ofc much spares disponible ) no stealth and 5 th generation but excellent also for range and no chauvinism here, the true.
About 18 - 20000 $ flight hour for a medium fighter of 25 t max reasonnable.
Here.... yes too expensive coz Mirage III, F1 in part also replaced by 314 Mirage 2000C/D/N .... and in fact build, designed for Saudi Arabia.
I have books
Jura The idiot
General
May 5, 2017
Frégates de deuxième rang : quel volume ?
"Pending the new hierarchy of priorities for which the strategic review is due in October 2017, the hearing of Admiral Prazuck, Chief of Staff of the French Navy (CEMM), before the deputies of the Commission of National Defense and the Armed Forces of the National Assembly is an opportunity to consider the future of the second rank frigates.
The first step is to distinguish between the "second-class frigates" component and the BATSIMAR program (the Surveillance and Marine Response Battalion), so what has been described as frigates third place. Simply put, the second-class frigates are used to participate in a crisis management context or to embellish an established naval group while the third-rank frigates are dedicated to public service missions (from fisheries police to operations against drug traffickers).
The 2009 budget bill - presented at the end of 2008 - before the Senate, may be the oldest known record of us in the BATSIMAR program (the BIS program seems to cover the replacement of BATRALs whose B2Ms have been qualified of "intermediate solution"). "The Navy currently has about 20 patrol boats, half of which are in metropolitan France and overseas. Most of them over 20 years old, they will eventually be replaced by a single surveillance and intervention building "BATSIMAR" is expected to start in 2012. "
What about notices and frigates?
The Estienne d'Orves class notices are converted into High Seas Patrollers (PHM) by reducing their military capabilities from the end of October 2008. First consequence of the postponement of the BATSIMAR program? It is then not specified - according to our knowledge - whether the notices would be replaced, or not, by the latter program. Admiral Prazuck (CEMM), before the members of the National Defense and Armed Forces Committee, on 26 July 2017, finally stated that "these high seas patrol vessels, known as Avisos, are draft horses They are 40 years old, they are indispensable, they must be replaced quickly by BATSIMAR. "
In parentheses, the CEMM reaffirms its calculation of 2016 as to its wish to return to the 1982 format, a logistics vessel and two patrollers by the French archipelago. In this perspective, he asked for 18 BATSIMAR, which would more or less replace the 9 A69 and P400 notices. This would therefore not be a replacement number for many of the patrol boats available in 2008, ten units not replaced.
The situation of the frigates La Fayette and, hence, their replacement soon to come (2025-2035) is much more complicated. The 2008 White Paper on Defense and National Security reduced the size of the surface fleet to 18 first-class frigates, including the La Fayette, which had previously been ranked second. And their operational capabilities testify to this former rank. The 2013 white paper reduced once again the format of 18 to 15 frigates, again with the FLF.
Except that Admiral Rogel, then CEMM, on May 27, 2015, called on the deputies to re-qualify. Intermediate Size Frigates (FTIs) "will not be substitutes for light frigates [La Fayette class light stealth frigates], otherwise they would not be first class frigates." All of a sudden, it overturned the 2008 decision on the authority of the white papers and the format of first-class frigates (18 and 15 boats). And explains its purpose well by the inability of the FLF to respond to the new challenges under and above (ASM and DA) of the surface off the crisis zones by quoting Yemen and Syria."
... goes on below due to size limit
related:
Frégates de deuxième rang : quel volume ?
translated by google:
"Pending the new hierarchy of priorities for which the strategic review is due in October 2017, the hearing of Admiral Prazuck, Chief of Staff of the French Navy (CEMM), before the deputies of the Commission of National Defense and the Armed Forces of the National Assembly is an opportunity to consider the future of the second rank frigates.
The first step is to distinguish between the "second-class frigates" component and the BATSIMAR program (the Surveillance and Marine Response Battalion), so what has been described as frigates third place. Simply put, the second-class frigates are used to participate in a crisis management context or to embellish an established naval group while the third-rank frigates are dedicated to public service missions (from fisheries police to operations against drug traffickers).
The 2009 budget bill - presented at the end of 2008 - before the Senate, may be the oldest known record of us in the BATSIMAR program (the BIS program seems to cover the replacement of BATRALs whose B2Ms have been qualified of "intermediate solution"). "The Navy currently has about 20 patrol boats, half of which are in metropolitan France and overseas. Most of them over 20 years old, they will eventually be replaced by a single surveillance and intervention building "BATSIMAR" is expected to start in 2012. "
What about notices and frigates?
The Estienne d'Orves class notices are converted into High Seas Patrollers (PHM) by reducing their military capabilities from the end of October 2008. First consequence of the postponement of the BATSIMAR program? It is then not specified - according to our knowledge - whether the notices would be replaced, or not, by the latter program. Admiral Prazuck (CEMM), before the members of the National Defense and Armed Forces Committee, on 26 July 2017, finally stated that "these high seas patrol vessels, known as Avisos, are draft horses They are 40 years old, they are indispensable, they must be replaced quickly by BATSIMAR. "
In parentheses, the CEMM reaffirms its calculation of 2016 as to its wish to return to the 1982 format, a logistics vessel and two patrollers by the French archipelago. In this perspective, he asked for 18 BATSIMAR, which would more or less replace the 9 A69 and P400 notices. This would therefore not be a replacement number for many of the patrol boats available in 2008, ten units not replaced.
The situation of the frigates La Fayette and, hence, their replacement soon to come (2025-2035) is much more complicated. The 2008 White Paper on Defense and National Security reduced the size of the surface fleet to 18 first-class frigates, including the La Fayette, which had previously been ranked second. And their operational capabilities testify to this former rank. The 2013 white paper reduced once again the format of 18 to 15 frigates, again with the FLF.
Except that Admiral Rogel, then CEMM, on May 27, 2015, called on the deputies to re-qualify. Intermediate Size Frigates (FTIs) "will not be substitutes for light frigates [La Fayette class light stealth frigates], otherwise they would not be first class frigates." All of a sudden, it overturned the 2008 decision on the authority of the white papers and the format of first-class frigates (18 and 15 boats). And explains its purpose well by the inability of the FLF to respond to the new challenges under and above (ASM and DA) of the surface off the crisis zones by quoting Yemen and Syria."
... goes on below due to size limit
Jura The idiot
General
continuation of the above post:
Clearly, there is the third option where FTIs will be completed after 2025 by three modernized FLFs while the latter two will be converted into PHM. From this perspective it would be simple to reach the format of 18 first-class frigates thanks to an extension of the three modernized FLFs and thus to record a rise to 18 first-class frigates rather than only 15 and to hope to obtain a new one frigate program by 2030.
And the prospect of a new frigate program, with a great burden for the engineering offices due to lack of a new corvette (Gowind) or frigate (FREMM, FTI) to be developed after 2025, could bring DCNS / Naval group to considering a European tender for BATSIMAR and therefore a competitive bidding allowing the Navy to obtain a unit cost of acquisition seriously pulled down, at least very controlled.
In any case, there would be a lot of interest in the concept of light British frigates for the Type 31 program whose financial objective is set at 250 million pounds (273 million euros) for each frigate. Almost half less than a FTI.
For it is there that closes the circle with the question of the replacement of the frigates of Floréal class. In 2013, Admiral Rogel suggested that the FTIs would replace the La Fayette - before requiring their re-qualification in order to obtain their modernization to make the welding with the first FTI and the disarming of the Brestois notices? - but also, and perhaps, the Floréal frigates. It was more or less explicit and accurate depending on the audience.
Admiral Prazuck, again before the deputies and on 12 October 2016, specified for the first time the master plan of the nautical means he intended to obtain for the means devoted to the coastguard function: "A frigate, two patrol boats and one logistic building for each department or overseas collectivity. "Scheme which he partially reaffirms on 26 July 2017. The Floréal are therefore formally excluded from a replacement by BATSIMAR.
As for the component of the second-class frigates, the six Floréal class frigates remain, with some certainty. The first three will have 30 years of service in 2022, the following years in 2023 and the last in 2024. Chance doing things well - or not since FLF and Floréal are the two facets of second-class frigates - the FLF will reach thirty years of service between 2022 and 2029. How can we exclude the hypothesis of an extension of service of five to ten years if a lot of paint helps the hulls to hold? It remains to observe what will happen to the 3 + 5 La Fayette: will they all be modernized? Will they reinforce for three units the first rank (18 frigates, in total) and two units the second rank (8 frigates, in total)?
All this suggests a surface fleet totaling between 15 and 26 frigates at the beginning of the 2030s, plus 18 patrol boats who do not have much interest in being officially qualified as frigates."
"But the La Fayette frigates will be modernized according to the decision reached in 2016 and registered in 2017 for the first three units. Modernization which will maintain their short-range anti-aircraft defense capabilities (from the Crotale to the SADRAL) while they will receive - finally! - a hull sonar and anti-torpedo countermeasures. Is it sufficient to consider that the FTIs replace FFLs that are back in the forefront or that these FTIs supplement the FREMMs (8) and Horizon (2) in order to reach the 15-frigate format, relegating FLFs to second place ?
Clearly, there is the third option where FTIs will be completed after 2025 by three modernized FLFs while the latter two will be converted into PHM. From this perspective it would be simple to reach the format of 18 first-class frigates thanks to an extension of the three modernized FLFs and thus to record a rise to 18 first-class frigates rather than only 15 and to hope to obtain a new one frigate program by 2030.
And the prospect of a new frigate program, with a great burden for the engineering offices due to lack of a new corvette (Gowind) or frigate (FREMM, FTI) to be developed after 2025, could bring DCNS / Naval group to considering a European tender for BATSIMAR and therefore a competitive bidding allowing the Navy to obtain a unit cost of acquisition seriously pulled down, at least very controlled.
In any case, there would be a lot of interest in the concept of light British frigates for the Type 31 program whose financial objective is set at 250 million pounds (273 million euros) for each frigate. Almost half less than a FTI.
For it is there that closes the circle with the question of the replacement of the frigates of Floréal class. In 2013, Admiral Rogel suggested that the FTIs would replace the La Fayette - before requiring their re-qualification in order to obtain their modernization to make the welding with the first FTI and the disarming of the Brestois notices? - but also, and perhaps, the Floréal frigates. It was more or less explicit and accurate depending on the audience.
Admiral Prazuck, again before the deputies and on 12 October 2016, specified for the first time the master plan of the nautical means he intended to obtain for the means devoted to the coastguard function: "A frigate, two patrol boats and one logistic building for each department or overseas collectivity. "Scheme which he partially reaffirms on 26 July 2017. The Floréal are therefore formally excluded from a replacement by BATSIMAR.
As for the component of the second-class frigates, the six Floréal class frigates remain, with some certainty. The first three will have 30 years of service in 2022, the following years in 2023 and the last in 2024. Chance doing things well - or not since FLF and Floréal are the two facets of second-class frigates - the FLF will reach thirty years of service between 2022 and 2029. How can we exclude the hypothesis of an extension of service of five to ten years if a lot of paint helps the hulls to hold? It remains to observe what will happen to the 3 + 5 La Fayette: will they all be modernized? Will they reinforce for three units the first rank (18 frigates, in total) and two units the second rank (8 frigates, in total)?
All this suggests a surface fleet totaling between 15 and 26 frigates at the beginning of the 2030s, plus 18 patrol boats who do not have much interest in being officially qualified as frigates."