CONTINUED:
Even if a Biden administration has the political will to initiate efforts to form a multilateral coalition that Biden often talks about to pressure China (not that I think his admin even has the will), there are severe problems with this approach with how far such a coalition can go. I've posted this comment before, but posting it here since I thought it was relevant:
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Many people have the view that Biden's multilateral approach of gathering allies to confront, contain, and ultimately weaken China will be much more successful than Trump's. However, my perspective is that for an effective Biden administration strategy to work to successfully build a powerful, global anti-China alliance, there are four components people should consider:
- Is there even enough political will in such an Biden administration and government to initiate the building and negotiating of an effective anti-China alliance? Biden's climate goals will mean having to seek cooperation with China, thus potentially complicating such an effort.
- Will American allies even agree to take part in an anti-China alliance? The interests of US allies with regards to China do not necessarily mutually coincide with that of the US's. Germany and South Korea have deep economic interests in China, as do many of the US allies, and may need share the view that China must by systematically or fundamentally weakened and contained. After all, especially if China powers the global economic recovery in the next 2 years, which countries in SEA, South Korea, Japan, or Europe may want to take advantage of, may lead them to reconsider committing to actions that might impact their future relationship or interests with China and their countries' own bottom lines.
- Furthermore, in the wake of this election, it is clear Trumpism as a political force is not dead, which may complicate any efforts of Biden trying to initiate and organize an anti-China alliance, especially if allies in Europe and Asia feel Biden's position is less than secure, and view that the US remains undependable if Trump was so close to winning this election, another Trumpian candidate may again emerge in 4 years
- Even if an anti-China alliance is agreed upon, how far are member allies willing to go? What would be the fundamental goal of such an anti-China alliance? Mere pressure, or total and merciless containment and isolation of China? This relates to #2 in that, while the US may want to see China permanently contained and stagnant so as to maintain its hegemonic position in the world, other countries may only be willing to go so far in certain actions to pressure China before they themselves will face certain impact. For example, such an alliance might be willing to agree to actions such as a military deterrence to pressure China, but they might yet oppose economic or technological sanctions, such as the US aiming to prevent companies like Tokyo Electron or Samsung from selling to Chinese firms, or a permanent sanctioning of SMIC by not only the US and its allies. As such, allied countries like Japan, South Korea, or Germany might have much to lose if the actions of such anti-China alliance go too far; this as such might likely limit the degree of efficacy an anti-China alliance and its actions might have on China compared what the US has in mind.
- China driving the global economic recovery from the COVID economic collapse may also play a factor in countries' hesitation to do anything substantive in such an allaince. Like it or not, China is the only major economy to report growth this year, and lead the global recovery next year. Countries' leaders will first seek to satisfy their domestic bottom lines (i.e. economy first), and would be fools to decouple from the Chinese economic recovery engine, essentially amounting to an own-goal. This takes precedence before any moral concerns over China's recent behavior, so I highly doubt such an anti-China alliance, even if agreed upon and successfully organized, will contribute towards any particularly meaningful or substantive against China.
- Even Japan knows this; they literally backtracked from last year's declaration that they would leave RCEP as India withdrew, now saying they agree to sign the RCEP agreement later this month, essentially because RCEP likely will be an important factor that drives their own economic recovery along with the rest of Asia's; notice how despite concerns that RCEP being a trade agreement now dominated by China without an effective counterbalance like India, Japan still decided to cling onto it?
- What will China's response to such an alliance be? China might be able to leverage economic relations with many of the American allies which are supposed to be part of this anti-China alliance. They might adopt policies to counteract the actions of this anti-China alliance which might hurt China economically or geostrategically. I feel like point 4 is not often discussed when it comes to discussion about Biden's potential policy approach to China if Biden wins, as if China always only on the receiving end, which it isn't. For example, how might China leverage RCEP in case the US tries to renegotiate its presence and weight back into TPP (now CPTPP)?
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Overall, I feel like its a common view that Biden would be much tougher for China in that we would be more willing to rally a global diplomatic alliance across the West against China. Will that even materialize, however? I would argue countries like Germany and South Korea have vested economic interests in China such that their interests will not necessarily align or coincide with the US's view of the need to contain China, especially if China powers the global economic recovery in the next 2 years, which countries in SEA, South Korea, Japan, or Europe may want to take advantage of.
Arguably, if a common alliance against China cannot be found by now, I am skeptical of anything effective Biden can accomplish by potentially creating a "global anti-China alliance", especially considering these countries, such as the EU, aren't willing to jeopardize their own relations and interests in China right now, much less go into an alliance with the US under a Biden administration. If such an anti-China alliance could be so easily formed, what is stopping Germany and the rest of Asia from either, a) informally aligning with Trump's current course of action against China in their policies, or b) formally forming an alliance between themselves without US involvement to contain China?
Hence, I do not really subscribe to the view that a Biden administration will be able to magically conjure and arrange an anti-China alliance; such an alliance would demand mutually coinciding interests in dramatically weakened, isolated, contained, or stagnant China, between the countries of the EU and the Indo-Pacific, which is not necessarily the case.
Furthermore, Biden's seeking of cooperation with China in areas dealing with climate change may further complicate efforts of global alliance containing China; it has been argued that under Obama, engagement with China in order to get their cooperation on climate change distracted other efforts by the US to contain China's rise and promote a harsher approach against China. That view is also espoused in this article by Foreign Policy:
Overall, not only do I doubt a Biden administration's capacity and ability to put together a global anti-China alliance, but I furthermore have doubts over the willingness of a Biden administration to build such an alliance if it is detrimental to Biden's other major part of his agenda, his climate change policy agenda.
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To conclude, my main argument isn't necessarily whether or not a grand anti-China alliance can or can't form, but more addressing a common view that allies in Europe and Asia are just waiting for a Biden administration to go gung-ho aggressive on China, as if such an alliance will magically or easily fall in place almost immediately.
This will not likely happen, as Biden will have to contend with conflicting and varying interests in such an alliance; the US may want China to fail, but other countries not necessarily, which means that, even if an anti-China alliance is formed, it may not go very far and be very effective in stopping China's rise, if alliance members disagree as to what they want to do to China, either strong peer pressure by France or South Korea on China, versus a total and complete containment, isolation, and weakening of China by the US.
