asif iqbal
Lieutenant General
I disagree
CV-18 Fujian/003 CATOBAR carrier thread
- Thread starter Jeff Head
- Start date
I disagree
Skillworkers are easier to get than sailors and pilots, If China make 3 or more carriers in short time, then who will piloting her warplanes?
Intrepid
Major
The planning phase takes a long time - but it should have been completed long ago. Construction takes just as long as any other ship.
Intrepid
Major
China will then have enough experienced pilots who can work as flight instructors or squadron leaders.
That is the reason why only a few pilots are kept in practice now: because they don't need them yet. The need arises when the ships are built. Everything fits together and was planned many years ago.
Tip of the iceberg, the chief designer of the Kuznetsov class.
The Ford has six years of delays now, and the USA has lot of experience with carrier design/manufacturing.
It is not necessary to see delays, but could be very surprising to not to see any.
We don't know the original schedule, so the carrier can experienced delays already.
All block spent lot of time in the construction area without any activity.
Hendrik_2000
Lieutenant General
I though his son refute the rumor and said his father never work in China can't find the article I will posted when I find it Here it is The news is FAKE
When studying the issue in more detail, it turned out that the CUSA company, which the propagandists called the "Research Institute of Special Shipbuilding in Qingdao" has the full name of China-Ukraine Special Ships Research and Design Academy CO., LTD - a joint Chinese-Ukrainian company with more than one hundred employees, 30 of which these are experts from Ukraine. Its main products are equipment for fish farming, and they also custom-design various ocean and marine equipment, as well as ships, the publication says.
There is no public information from this company on the design of ships and vessels, but on the company's page on linkedin it is indicated that it cooperates with the Academy of Sciences of Shandong Province in China and the Ukrainian "Chernomorsudoproekt", based in Nikolaev, and has unique experience in the design of various types of ships and vessels of various navigation areas.
Valery Babich himself, after retirement, is the author of several biographical books - "Our aircraft carriers" and "The city of St. Nicholas and its aircraft carriers", is also engaged in local history. In addition, he continues to write articles on shipbuilding, including for the Chinese newspaper "Modern Ships", which is published in Beijing, which earned him a serious reputation among local experts, and therefore it was a sensation for local journalists to find him among the team of the Chinese-Ukrainian joint venture.
Note that Babich denied in a comment to the Russian information that he was supposedly emigrating to China. "Everything is not true. I am in Nikolaev," he said in response to questions from journalists.
Note that in 1967 Valery Babich was sent to Nikolaev to work in the department of the chief designer of the Black Sea shipyard as a designer for missile and artillery weapons.
In 1979-1991, he was the head of the design bureau of the chief designer's department for aircraft carriers and the ground testing complex of naval aviation "Nitka" (construction of the TAVKR "Novorossiysk", "Baku", "Tbilisi", "Varyag" ).
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i have no doubt at the beginning the Ukrainians could have given the Chinese much help in refurbishing the Liaoning. Liaoning was new to the Chinese and hearing why the ship was designed the way it was alone would have been a great help to the Chinese.
I doubt the ukrainians still had much to offer the Chinese by the time of Shandong, provided the Ukrainians themsleves still indeed remembered much of what they once knew.
I think by the time of carrier 3, the Chinese now know substantially more than the ukrainians ever did. There is nothing Remaining the Ukrainians ever knew that they could teach.
The US navy, Newport News yard, and Gibbs and Cox may have an unrivaled body of experience In designing and operating carriers, yet their vast experience is only a fraction of what is needed to actually design and manufacture a carrier from component up, Most of the Total body of experience actually resides with the huge sub contractor network spread across much of the US technological research and manufacturing infrastructure. That infrastructure has massively atrophied since mid 1980s. Much of the experience and skill in that network has undoubted been lost to retirement or scattered to the wind through mergers, Bankruptcies, Layoffs and Reorganizations. Due to the slow cadence of American carrier and warship construction, in between each bout of reinforcement of skill and experience, there is long period in which changes in the direction of wind of corporate whim and financial and fiscal reality can take Scatter that experience.
it would be inconceivable in the 1940s-1980s for the first in a new class of carriers to not reach fully operational status within a year or two of Commissioning.
just like after Washington and London naval treaties of the 1920s and 1930s, when low cadence of construction was enforced by treaty and made necessary by Britain’s fiscal situation, the Royal Navy still had more experience in designing and building battleships than anyone else. But The British industry was no longer up to the challenge of making efficiency t and trouble free gun mounts, or supply armor plate at a rate sufficient to allow the British to build battleships at the rate they once did prior to and during WWI.
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