While the choice of the phrase could have been better, that's not really important. it is important that you (and hopefully others ) understood the point I was trying to make.
Building up an economy, armed forces and islands in SCS is also a matter of PR. One has to weigh the long term and short term consequences and not just blaze down the route of fastest growth. There is a point where PR will take a second seat to short term efficiency but I don't think that point is going to be crossed for another decade or two.
I understand your meaning, but my point was that "salami slicing" phrase or tactic is one that's been used in quite a different context. For others used to "salami slicing" being used in one specific context, applying it here could just create confusion.
Not least the phrase has some "sneaky" connotations with it, and using it in this context almost makes it seem like China has been trying to be sneaky with their military procurement or that they should be "sneaky" to "slice away" new capabilities without others observing them.
Anyway, I do agree with you to an extent that the speed to which one seeks new capabilities may create an increased sense of threat from potential adversaries and cause reactions that may be less than desirable.
However, I also think the PLA and PRC overall have been quite good in trying to control this as much as they can. They generally do not flaunt new procurement decisions or new capabilities until quite late into their development cycle or until they are difficult to conceal. Standard geopoliticking can also help to mitigate perceptions of threat somewhat, and there are also other confounding factors that may cause potential adversaries to perceive a greater threat simply based on perceived intent.
I do feel that you were a bit blase in suggesting that the act of building carriers at an increased pace could seek the US to wage a preemptive war in such a direct A to B case. I know that's not what you meant, and that you were saying a more rapid procurement of capability may be a factor adding to US fears/paranoia interacting with other factors as well that may lead to a preemptive war or at least increased risk of conflict, but the way you wrote it was a bit too off the cuff IMO.
Furthermore, I also think we should consider that the PRC leadership have probably thought about this quite carefully as well, and if they feel like they need to build two CATOBAR carriers close to each other in sequence then it's because they judge there to be a need for it, with the benefits greater than the potential consequences when considering the likely divergent paths that the future could hold. Because another way of interpreting your post is that you may think the PRC are being overenthusiastic or making procurement decisions without sufficient strategic forethought or coordination with geostrategic planning, which IMO is a bit much.
(Slight tangent; I've long believed that Perceived Threat = Perceived Capability x Perceived Intent... and for the purposes of seeking greater national power a nation should seek to increase their capability while assuaging others of their intent)
