CV-18 Fujian/003 CATOBAR carrier thread

[Lethe]

Anyhow, whether it is 89, 91, or 100, my principle point still stands...the number for the US alone is a huge number and I am unaware of the Chinese ever indicating...or desiring for that matter...to match it with their own Type 52D and Type 55 vessels, which are their equivalents.

I too think it is very unlikely that China will ever field as many large warships (or aircraft carriers, or nuclear submarines) as the US does. But that does not imply that China's naval strength will not surpass the US. China will continue to maintain significant fleets of medium and perhaps even small combatants, and these too contribute to a nation's naval strength.

Even today, China's medium and small warships comfortably exceed their US equivalents in both numbers and capabilities, and this will disparity will only grow going forward, even as the disparity in large warships diminishes.

The naval structure of each nation is dictated by its strategic geography. China has areas of concern and potential conflict close to home, and therefore an enduring interest in smaller warships (which are more numerous for a given level of resources). The United States is hegemonic within the western hemisphere and therefore has little use for small warships, while potential areas of concern are located at great distances from the continental United States, circumstances that favour large warships that are necessarily fielded in fewer numbers (for a given level of resources).

One structure is not better than the other, but they have different relative strengths. Notwithstanding contributions from the PLAAF, the closer a potential conflict is to China, the more China is favoured by virtue of being able to bring a greater proportion of her total strength to bear on the conflict (i.e. small warships, conventional submarines). The further the conflict is from China, the more those resources are marginalised (although they are certainly not useless, as their presence close to home frees up large warships for duties further afield). Looking to the post-2035 environment, it is quite likely that China will have more "total firepower" than USN, and the question of one Navy prevailing over the other is, to a large extent, determined by where the conflict occurs and what proportion of China's superior total strength can be brought to bear.

 

[Richard Santos]

In addition, while Britain did not truly enjoy hegemonic position in Europe, the rise of another hegemonic power in Europe could and alway did directly imperile britain's existence, not just her overseas power. So the option to letting rival hegemonic aspirants fight it out was never a truly viable option for Britain. If another hegemonic power threaten to rise, Britain is locked into a fight to the death.
America stands off by thousands of nautical miles from either Europe or Asia, and is more self-sufficient in all her needs than any other major power. The rise of a hegemonic power in either Europe and Asia would be awe fully inconvenient for the US, but unless that power is simultaneously hegemonic in both Europe and Asia, that power presents no existential threat to the US. So the US has the option to gauge her own strength and pick her own fights, and is not dictated to fight to the death just for her own survival whenever a hegemonic power threaten to rise in either Asia or Europe.

 

[Intrepid]

Is this a history and politics seminar here?

 

[Richard Santos]

I too think it is very unlikely that China will ever field as many large warships (or aircraft carriers, or nuclear submarines) as the US does. But that does not imply that China's naval strength will not surpass the US. China will continue to maintain significant fleets of medium and perhaps even small combatants, and these too contribute to a nation's naval strength.

Even today, China's medium and small warships comfortably exceed their US equivalents in both numbers and capabilities, and this will disparity will only grow going forward, even as the disparity in large warships diminishes.

The naval structure of each nation is dictated by its strategic geography. China has areas of concern and potential conflict close to home, and therefore an enduring interest in smaller warships (which are more numerous for a given level of resources). The United States is hegemonic within the western hemisphere and therefore has little use for small warships, while potential areas of concern are located at great distances from the continental United States, circumstances that favour large warships that are necessarily fielded in fewer numbers (for a given level of resources).

One structure is not better than the other, but they have different relative strengths. Notwithstanding contributions from the PLAAF, the closer a potential conflict is to China, the more China is favoured by virtue of being able to bring a greater proportion of her total strength to bear on the conflict (i.e. small warships, conventional submarines). The further the conflict is from China, the more those resources are marginalised (although they are certainly not useless, as their presence close to home frees up large warships for duties further afield). Looking to the post-2035 environment, it is quite likely that China will have more "total firepower" than USN, and the question of one Navy prevailing over the other is, to a large extent, determined by where the conflict occurs and what proportion of China's superior total strength can be brought to bear.

The problem for this outlook is the total economic and industrial power, and military potential of Eurasia that is not china considerably will exceed the economic ans industrial power and military potential of china for the foreseeable future, while the total economic and industrial power of America That is not the US is a tiny fraction of economic and industrial power, and military potential of the US.

So the US always can rally powerful forces on Eurasia opposed to Chinese influence in Eurasia to do America's bidding, while china has few comparably effective option to return the favor in the Americas.

So the US will for the foreseeable future be in a much stronger position to undermine china in China's backyard, than china would be to do the same to the US in America.

In other words, when the exchange of peripheral interests is over, china will be on the strategic defensive vs the US in the long run.

 

[Lethe]

The problem for this outlook is the total economic and industrial power, and military potential of Eurasia that is not china considerably will exceed the economic ans industrial power and military potential of china for the foreseeable future, while the total economic and industrial power of America That is not the US is a tiny fraction of economic and industrial power, and military potential of the US.

So the US always can rally powerful forces on Eurasia opposed to Chinese influence in Eurasia, while china has few comparably effective option to return the favor in America.

So the US will always be in a better position to undermine china in China's backyard, than china would be to do the same to America.

Yes, what you have written is certainly relevant to the broader "great power competition" between the United States and China, I was only speaking of a strictly hypothetical comparison between the respective Navies of the two nations. Clearly the geostrategic picture is more complicated than that.

But conversely, it is precisely because nations such as (most significantly) Japan exist that I believe PLAN will in fact seek parity with USN. More specifically, it is not that China seeks to supplant America's role in the world, or that parity with USN is a goal in and of itself, rather the goal will be to secure China's interests throughout the Asia-Pacific region, and this will require force levels roughly on par with USN, in that it will require the ability to neutralise a significant proportion of USN's total strength, plus that of other nations that might seek to threaten China's interests. This calculus means that China's strategic planners will not be comfortable until they have amassed forces roughly on par with USN, they will agitate until those levels are achieved, and China's economy and political structures will, over time, be in a position to deliver those outcomes.

 

[Richard Santos]

Long before the Chinese navy reach parity with the USN, the US would undoubtedly excert its influence, and realign its geostrategic relationshiod, to multiply non-naval threats to china, such as Indian and japanese missile and air power, so as to attempt to put other priorities ahead of naval expansion in China's defense outlook.

 

[Richard Santos]

This is the real strategic problem for china. China can be threatened by air, land and sea from locations near china. China could not establish any secure defensive perimeter with just sea power. There is relatively little likelihood that those occupying the big holes in any Chinese naval perimeter could be brought around to see the rise of china as anything less than a grave (in the case of India, and undoubtedly eventually Russia) or existential (in the case of Japan) threat.

So China can only afford to fully focus on her navy in a very benign international environment, and Chinese naval expansion will undermine that benign environment even if nothing else does. In any seriously tense international environment, the most immediate danger for China's probably could not be addressed by further strengthening the navy.

 

[Lethe]

Long before the Chinese navy reach parity with the USN, the US would undoubtedly excert its influence, and realign its geostrategic relationshiod, to multiply non-naval threats to china, such as Indian and japanese missile and air power, so as to attempt to put other priorities ahead of naval expansion in China's defense outlook.

I find this discussion very interesting but I have tried to keep the focus on military affairs to maintain some relevance to the thread and hopefully avoid the wrath of the moderator.

I think you are correct to note that China is and will continue to find itself on the strategic "defensive" due to its ambiguous relations with other regional powers and their relations with the current hegemonic power, the United States. Yet what does it mean for the world's largest economy, and one that presently has a modest level of military spending relative to that economy, coupled with a centralised political apparatus, to find itself "on the defensive"? If China's strategic planners are anxious, or feel that the country is threatened, they have a lot of room to maneuver. That's not to say that it would be wise for China to jack up its military spending to e.g. 6% of GDP, or that doing so would in fact relieve the nation's strategic insecurity, but it would certainly have deleterious effects on broader human society both within China and outside of it. As such, we should not necessarily conflate China being "on the defensive" with a stable or satisfactory state of affairs for everybody else.

The other thing I would note is that China, USA, and other regional powers are not automatons drawn by the irresistible forces we describe. It is probably impossible for China to continue rising without producing a certain level of alarm and response amongst other regional nations, particularly those with existing territorial claims or other political conflicts with China. At the same time, the degree of that alarm and those responses can be modulated by China's behaviour and diplomacy. Similarly, while the United States is undoubtedly compelled to mitigate against the erosion of its hegemony occasioned by China's rise, this does not necessarily mean that it will pursue policies ideally calibrated to that effect. Trump's abandonment of the TPP is a perfect example: domestic politics trumps foreign policy imperatives. The opportunity for China presented by the Duterte administration in the Philippines is another example of real world variability that China can, potentially, take advantage of. China may have a generally weaker strategic hand than the US, but it is possible for China to play that hand better than the US plays its own.

 

[Hendrik_2000]

This is the real strategic problem for china. China can be threatened by air, land and sea from locations near china. China could not establish any secure defensive perimeter with just sea power. There is relatively little likelihood that those occupying the big holes in any Chinese naval perimeter could be brought around to see the rise of china as anything less than a grave (in the case of India, and undoubtedly eventually Russia) or existential (in the case of Japan) threat.

So China can only afford to fully focus on her navy in a very benign international environment, and Chinese naval expansion will undermine that benign environment even if nothing else does. In any seriously tense international environment, the most immediate danger for China's probably could not be addressed by further strengthening the navy.

I doubt it if India or Japan will be a factor. China has a lot of leverage to mitigate any one of those countries gang up against her.
Let face it western hope to make India a counterweight against China rise is forlorn hope and based on delusion

Were India foolish enough to challenge China , She will be at the receiving end of terrible retribution like she never know before.With China defense budget of 3 or 4 time larger than India. The chance of success is slim
Last time around China is gracious and magnanimous with India. No army has returned their war booty back and treated the prisoner war with kindness and respect like this video show

The same with Japan. One on One China has no problem with Japan.
Even now the navy is bigger than japan

 

[Lethe]

This is the real strategic problem for china. China can be threatened by air, land and sea from locations near china. China could not establish any secure defensive perimeter with just sea power. There is relatively little likelihood that those occupying the big holes in any Chinese naval perimeter could be brought around to see the rise of china as anything less than a grave (in the case of India, and undoubtedly eventually Russia) or existential (in the case of Japan) threat.

So China can only afford to fully focus on her navy in a very benign international environment, and Chinese naval expansion will undermine that benign environment even if nothing else does. In any seriously tense international environment, the most immediate danger for China's probably could not be addressed by further strengthening the navy.

I am not suggesting that PLAN will (eventually) achieve parity with USN as the result of a disproportionate focus on PLAN at the expense of other services. While there will probably continue to be a slow generational shift in resources away from the Army going forward, I am not anticipating anything drastic. Rather I expect the parity I describe to come about "naturally" as a result of a generation of comparable levels of investment.

The enormous disparity that exists today between USN and PLAN is based on the accumulated disparities of the past 30-40 years. Even as of 2017, PLAN is at least "playing in the same league" as USN in terms of the tonnage of ships being commissioned and the level of technology embodied in those ships. Going forward, PLAN will increasingly "keep pace" with contemporary USN activity, while the accumulated disparities of decades past increasingly dissipate. Thirty years from now, they will be gone.