I thought I'd clarify. Just saying that type 22s are not as small as some people would indicate. Of course, 039s are larger.
Chinese submarines thread
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I thought I'd clarify. Just saying that type 22s are not as small as some people would indicate. Of course, 039s are larger.
Schumacher
Senior Member
If what is said of the size of the Yuan & Song is correct, I think that would put it closer to the class of Collins & Oyashio.
I've always assumed these 2 are bigger than the Scorpene, U214, Gotland etc because they're designed to go 1 on 1 with the nukes in open ocean.
I wonder if this means PLAN has similar doctrine with respect to the Yuan & Song. If so, I think that would be contrary to what many have in the past assumed of how PLAN would use these SSKs, ie in the coastal waters.
I've always assumed these 2 are bigger than the Scorpene, U214, Gotland etc because they're designed to go 1 on 1 with the nukes in open ocean.
I wonder if this means PLAN has similar doctrine with respect to the Yuan & Song. If so, I think that would be contrary to what many have in the past assumed of how PLAN would use these SSKs, ie in the coastal waters.
maozedong
Banned Idiot
if they are AIP, I think they should be going to far, the question is whether they can through the island chains.
what's matter of the two "Song" from Shanghai? appeared on the web site yesterday, are they just completed or being maintenance? China really stop to produce song? Russia still produce Kilo and Amur both,is that right?
what's matter of the two "Song" from Shanghai? appeared on the web site yesterday, are they just completed or being maintenance? China really stop to produce song? Russia still produce Kilo and Amur both,is that right?
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you need to be a little more specific, which two songs from Shanghai? The Russians are not producing any more kilo for it's own navy. This is kind of interesting, a diesel sub model from China using X-tail with the 7 blade propeller.
I don't think these are pictures of new Songs. That's for sure. They shouldn't be building anymore songs right now.
The size is not an "if". Its an absolute surety. You can go to Google Earth and measure the subs directly. Note that the subs will be slightly longer than what you measured because part of the sub is underwater. The 75m I am mentioning covers to the visible part of the bow to the rear tail fin, not the tip of the propeller or part of the bow underwater. The true length of the Song/Yuan is probably anywhere between 75 to 80m, the Yuan probably a little longer due to the snout.
The size of the subs are fairly big to justify the use of passive flank sonars which both Songs and Yuans were equipped. Many older and smaller conventional submarines are not equipped with flank sonars, including the Kilos and Type 209s. Just having this gives the Song/Yuan a distinct sensor range advantage over the Kilo. Another thing is the large sails these subs have, which are probably packed with sensors and ECM equipment.
As to what respect the PLAN has for a doctrine for these subs, we don't really know. Oyashio and Collins are big, but they are for countries that do not have plans to use a nuclear submarine---Japan's own constitution bars it so. Thus they are big to go 1 on 1 with nukes. On the other hand, the PLAN has their own nuclear submarines.
It makes you kind of question why do they need big conventionals, or even AIP, when you already have nuclear submarines.
My first hypothesis is that these programs were given an early emphasis when there is not that much confidence on China's own nuclear sub program.
The second hypothesis is that the nuclear subs are too expensive and you need the conventionals to fill in the gaps.
The first and second hypothesis is being challenged by the shanking new assembly complexes you can see in GE at Huludao, indicating a major investment to mass produce the nuclear subs. There are also rumors suggesting that the numbers of 093s may be higher than previously thought.
The third hypothesis is that the conventionals are kind of like the 022, made for coastal defense. The size of these subs however, kind of refutes that, since they are bigger than many coastal subs.
I have an interesting theory that the PLAN may have two submarine doctrines running in parallel. A "Northern" school of thought that pushes for the nuclear subs, or a heavily sub intensive naval strategy, with surface ships only secondary. This school is also focused more on blue water and is more forward strategic thinking. This is in contrast to a "Southern" school of thought, that has a greater emphasis in surface ships, with a secondary conventional nuclear sub strategy. The second school also has a more coastal defense-littoral intensive point of view, heavily flavored with a Taiwan invasion scenario.
The Northern school is responsible for the Varyag, the 091, the 092, the 093 and 094 subs, and the Type 051B/C ships.
The Southern school is the ones that heavily pursued the Kilo and Sov purchases, the 052 and 054, the Song and Yuans, as well as the 022s.
These are just old pictures that have not surfaced before. The subs lack the white warning markings for the sonar and the new tail extension seen in later pictures.
With the diesel subs and nuclear subs my impressions was always a Hi-Lo mix present in airforce and ground force. Most distinct for the ground force is the MBT T96 and T99, while for airforce, J-10 and J-11.
So presuming that this is a trend of following old soviet doctrines. PLAN is having a Hi-Lo mix for its sub fleet. Having the Lo as Song/Yuan while the Hi 093.
Another presumption was that 093 unit cost was much much higher, and couldn't be acquired in large numbers as the cheaper conventional ones.
Second presumtion was that convetional subs were easier to construct taking less time from construction to operational while nuke subs more complex construction and its size took longer.
Third presumption was that diesel sub building technology was much more mature than its nuke subs. So with its existing knowledge of convetional subs they are being produced while its young knowledge about nuke subs are still in trial and error phase. So more facilities are allocated for diesel subs. As all of PLAN nuke subs are sited in North Fleet.
So presuming that this is a trend of following old soviet doctrines. PLAN is having a Hi-Lo mix for its sub fleet. Having the Lo as Song/Yuan while the Hi 093.
Another presumption was that 093 unit cost was much much higher, and couldn't be acquired in large numbers as the cheaper conventional ones.
Second presumtion was that convetional subs were easier to construct taking less time from construction to operational while nuke subs more complex construction and its size took longer.
Third presumption was that diesel sub building technology was much more mature than its nuke subs. So with its existing knowledge of convetional subs they are being produced while its young knowledge about nuke subs are still in trial and error phase. So more facilities are allocated for diesel subs. As all of PLAN nuke subs are sited in North Fleet.
The problem of a sub hi-lo mix is that the conventional subs cannot move as fast as the nuclear subs, and therefore they cannot keep up the pace. This is not true of the ZTZ-96 vs. 99 or J-10 vs. J-11 mixes. To put it in a metaphor, diesel and nuclear subs are like oil and water, but a ZTZ-96 vs. a 99 or a J-10 vs. J-11 would be like two different grades of oil.
Tactically, using a 96 with a 99 or a J-10 with a J-11 does not hamper each other's tactical mobility. But for a diesel sub and a nuclear sub, if they have to operate with each other, they would literally cancel out each other's advantages. The nuclear sub is noisier and removes the stealth advantage while the diesel sub will force the nuclear sub to go slow.
The history of sub warfare of the Soviet Union was that once the SU perfected their nuclear subs, their vast fleet of diesel boats, consisting of Foxtrots, Romeos, Julietts, etc,. went into a rapid decline. While the SU produced a whole slew of nuclear sub designs for their next generation, only one was made for the diesel subs and that was the Kilo. The Kilo itself was concieved as a littoral sea guardian in the Baltic and Black Seas, and to give Warsaw Pact countries a submarine arm. If you look at the sub orbat of the Soviet Union, the nuclear subs vastly outnumber the last generation diesel boats. For example there were more than twice the number of Victors alone compared to the number of Kilos in the Soviet Navy.
The Royal Navy, which also once operated both nuclear and diesel subs, closed the chapter on their diesel subs with the Upholders.
You see, once in the deep ocean, the conventional submarine becomes a tactical liability. Nuclear subs for example, can keep up and escort your main fleets, and fast enough to get to the spot to engage enemy fleets. Diesel subs can't. They have to operate on their own and acts as ambushers.
Another thing that is really funny at least in China is that its technological development is asymmetrical. In a sense, China's nuclear sub technology is actually more mature than its diesel sub technology. The nuclear reactor is homegrown. So is the steam turbines and everything associated with it. On the other hand, for the diesel subs, the main engine has to be licensed from Germany, and all that stuff about AIP has to be researched, probably studied from European techs.
Of course we have to factor the procurement cost. Generally it is assumed that a diesel sub is about 1/3rd the initial cost of a nuclear sub. But tactical liabilities and advantages do not have a price tag however. The operating cost of a diesel sub may turn out to be more expensive than a nuclear sub in the long run, thanks to the constant appetite for fuel.
Can't compare to Japanese, German or Swedish policies. The Japanese constitutionally outlawed themselves from using nuclear means in any form of military from powerplant to warhead. The Germans, Swedish and the Australians want to be "green" and planet friendly.
In my view, the PLAN sub strategy is operating at two different levels. The first level is a coastal defensive doctrine with a Taiwan to First Island Chain sea denial scenario. This is where the diesel subs come in. The second level is one of power projection and that's where the nuclear subs come in. My opinion is that the doctrines and it applies to the surface fleet as well is that the doctrines are a bit schizophrenic. My guess is that the high authorities in the CMC are uncertain themselves and have okayed the different approaches, and figure out later how they fall into place.
In my own projection though, the PLAN may move more into the Shang and Jin's successors, and the fact we have not heard in rumor much about the Yuan's own successor, may suggest that this line may have a more limited future.
Tactically, using a 96 with a 99 or a J-10 with a J-11 does not hamper each other's tactical mobility. But for a diesel sub and a nuclear sub, if they have to operate with each other, they would literally cancel out each other's advantages. The nuclear sub is noisier and removes the stealth advantage while the diesel sub will force the nuclear sub to go slow.
The history of sub warfare of the Soviet Union was that once the SU perfected their nuclear subs, their vast fleet of diesel boats, consisting of Foxtrots, Romeos, Julietts, etc,. went into a rapid decline. While the SU produced a whole slew of nuclear sub designs for their next generation, only one was made for the diesel subs and that was the Kilo. The Kilo itself was concieved as a littoral sea guardian in the Baltic and Black Seas, and to give Warsaw Pact countries a submarine arm. If you look at the sub orbat of the Soviet Union, the nuclear subs vastly outnumber the last generation diesel boats. For example there were more than twice the number of Victors alone compared to the number of Kilos in the Soviet Navy.
The Royal Navy, which also once operated both nuclear and diesel subs, closed the chapter on their diesel subs with the Upholders.
You see, once in the deep ocean, the conventional submarine becomes a tactical liability. Nuclear subs for example, can keep up and escort your main fleets, and fast enough to get to the spot to engage enemy fleets. Diesel subs can't. They have to operate on their own and acts as ambushers.
Another thing that is really funny at least in China is that its technological development is asymmetrical. In a sense, China's nuclear sub technology is actually more mature than its diesel sub technology. The nuclear reactor is homegrown. So is the steam turbines and everything associated with it. On the other hand, for the diesel subs, the main engine has to be licensed from Germany, and all that stuff about AIP has to be researched, probably studied from European techs.
Of course we have to factor the procurement cost. Generally it is assumed that a diesel sub is about 1/3rd the initial cost of a nuclear sub. But tactical liabilities and advantages do not have a price tag however. The operating cost of a diesel sub may turn out to be more expensive than a nuclear sub in the long run, thanks to the constant appetite for fuel.
Can't compare to Japanese, German or Swedish policies. The Japanese constitutionally outlawed themselves from using nuclear means in any form of military from powerplant to warhead. The Germans, Swedish and the Australians want to be "green" and planet friendly.
In my view, the PLAN sub strategy is operating at two different levels. The first level is a coastal defensive doctrine with a Taiwan to First Island Chain sea denial scenario. This is where the diesel subs come in. The second level is one of power projection and that's where the nuclear subs come in. My opinion is that the doctrines and it applies to the surface fleet as well is that the doctrines are a bit schizophrenic. My guess is that the high authorities in the CMC are uncertain themselves and have okayed the different approaches, and figure out later how they fall into place.
In my own projection though, the PLAN may move more into the Shang and Jin's successors, and the fact we have not heard in rumor much about the Yuan's own successor, may suggest that this line may have a more limited future.
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