China's semiconductor task is nigh impossible:
"The manufacturing chain for any given semiconductor is extraordinarily complex and relies on as many as 300 different inputs, including raw wafers, commodity chemicals, specialty chemicals, and bulk gases; all
and
by
of 50 different types of processing and testing tools. Those tools and materials are sourced from around the world, and are typically highly engineered. Further, most of
in semiconductor manufacturing, such as
and metrology machines, rely on complex supply chains that are also highly optimized, and incorporate hundreds of different companies delivering modules, lasers, mechatronics, control chips, optics, power supplies, and more. The “installed base” within a semiconductor factory today represents the cumulation of hundreds of thousands of person-years of R&D development. The manufacturing process that integrates them into a single manufacturing chain could represent hundreds of thousands more.
The types of products for which these manufacturing processes are designed are nearly as varied as the manufacturing inputs themselves. There are at least 20 major semiconductor product categories (from optical sensors to battery management modules to CPUs) and each category usually contains hundreds of different stock keeping units—distinct items for sale—for specialized applications. This complexity leads to a large market filled with myriad niches, in which specialized world-class companies have built defensible market positions through decades of targeted research and development.
Complexity also makes semiconductors a winner-take-all industry. The top one or two players in any given niche—whether a small one, such as furnaces, or a giant one, such as server CPUs—
all the economic profits in that niche due to scale, learning efficiencies, and high switching costs for customers. It is rare to see newcomers break into these oligopoly positions. For instance, the market leader in graphics processing units (GPUs), Nvidia,
the segment in 1999 and never relinquished its lead. While China has early-stage startups in the GPU segment, its market share is essentially zero. TSMC, based in Taiwan, was the first dedicated competitor in the foundry segment and has not relinquished its lead in its 33-year history. Indeed, SMIC, China’s leading competitor in the foundry segment,
four or five years behind TSMC in technology, despite almost two decades of investment."
Even if China succeeds in becoming 100% independent, it will still fail, because:
For one thing, the economics of an “only in China for China” supply chain do not work. Even if Chinese companies at each stage of the value chain win 80% of potential business from every potential Chinese customer, Chinese companies would collectively generate less than 15% of the industry’s overall R&D capacity—and likely less as prices in China tend to be lower, leaving less profit to re-invest in R&D. Such an indigenization strategy would still leave China behind the rest of the world: How can products developed with 15% of the world’s R&D compete with those from entrenched companies spending collectively far more? Of course, PRC government subsidies can and are closing that funding gap. But keeping such large-scale subsidies in place for the decades required to build the industry would likely generate a set of companies so dependent on government largesse that they may not be commercially viable.
This is why, at the end of the day, this is not a purely technological or economic problem. China needs allies and good foreign relations abroad so that its companies have access to markets, supplies, talent, and R&D from other countries to reinforce its own. This is not optional; it is mandatory.