Chinese Hypersonic Developments (HGVs/HCMs)

ougoah

Brigadier
Registered Member
25K km not 40K km

You're confusing miles with kilometers.

40,000 km ≈ 25,000 miles ≈ length of the equator (the purpose of this number is simply to suggest it is global range rather than suggest the vehicle flew straight and the distance of the equator).

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I should add at this point that this is not a FOBs like thing. That's the politics. FOBS has weapons connotations and is embedded in the thinking of the technology from the Cold War... even though FOBS was technologically unfeasible in the same scope as today's "FOBS". By both US and Chinese accounts, this "FOBS" flew within the atmosphere (so it's really not exactly the Cold War type of conception) and also launched something which the US calls a technology that can be used to deliver nukes (or conventional weapons) and Chinese side hinting that it is an "aircraft" that's capable of deploying aka launching a defensive interceptor. Basically the hint seems to suggest the hypersonic vehicle is capable of firing an interceptor for the purpose of defending the vehicle itself but of course the purpose side is mired in speculation and any launching of objects from a hypersonic vehicle could potentially be tasked with delivering nukes. Both US and China are probably far further ahead in hypersonic and DEW tech then they let on in public.
 
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caudaceus

Senior Member
Registered Member
The Chinese hypersonic test flight that according to the US state, flew "(around) 40,000km in over 100 minutes".

This is basically the range of one circle of the globe along its maximum distance (no doubt it didn't do a straight line flight though but the range and discussions on it use the 40,000km distance covered to basically indicate global range) and in over 100 minutes could mean any amount of time that's reasonable but probably means between 100 minutes and 150 minutes. This means an average speed throughout that roughly 2 hour long flight is between Mach 15 and Mach 20. This is an average speed, not top speed.

DF-100 is a HCM in the sense that it is powered (propelled) but it doesn't look like it's a waverider or glider and the suggested range is nowhere near global. There isn't much info on this platform except that it's hypersonic and a "cruise missile". So apart from the DF-ZF seen on the DF-17 and the DF-100, there are other hypersonic projects, weapons or not. Most of them we only hear of tests or statements from US or China.

Does China have something like HAWC?
 

escobar

Brigadier
The Chinese hypersonic test flight that according to the US state, flew "(around) 40,000km in over 100 minutes".

This is basically the range of one circle of the globe along its maximum distance (no doubt it didn't do a straight line flight though but the range and discussions on it use the 40,000km distance covered to basically indicate global range) and in over 100 minutes could mean any amount of time that's reasonable but probably means between 100 minutes and 150 minutes. This means an average speed throughout that roughly 2 hour long flight is between Mach 15 and Mach 20. This is an average speed, not top speed.

DF-100 is a HCM in the sense that it is powered (propelled) but it doesn't look like it's a waverider or glider and the suggested range is nowhere near global. There isn't much info on this platform except that it's hypersonic and a "cruise missile". So apart from the DF-ZF seen on the DF-17 and the DF-100, there are other hypersonic projects, weapons or not. Most of them we only hear of tests or statements from US or China.
DF-100 not a HCM but a near Space long range Supersonic cruise missile
 

ougoah

Brigadier
Registered Member
DF-100 not a HCM but a near Space long range Supersonic cruise missile

Maybe. It's either a HCM or a super long range "high supersonic" cruise missile. The confusion with the DF-100 is because HCM is poorly understood and not that well defined for the masses to understand easily. And of course confusion over the term "high supersonic" in Chinese. It could mean either mach 4 to 5 or mach 5 and above (hypersonic). The words "high supersonic" in Chinese is often also used to describe hypersonic.

Whatever it is, all we know about the DF-100 is that it's powered and it's "high supersonic" (a term in Chinese that is often used for hypersonic).

When people hear cruise missile, they typically think those long tubular, turbine powered subsonic terrain hugging missiles. An HCM is simply a hypersonic "missile" that is propelled by an engine. In that case, if DF-100 is above mach 5, then it would be an HCM. I call it an HCM because it is described as "high supersonic" and it is engine powered.
 

Topazchen

Junior Member
Registered Member
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So it's really just a spin on the AUKUS partnership. Nothing really happening.
AUKUS is the top of America's tiered alliances targeting China. The submarine deal was the first of many weapons that will be developed, and expect them to move to other domains .From cyber to space to air to chemical to biological, expect them to develop China specific weapons in the coming decades .
Don't underestimate Anglos who are determined to maintain their hegemony.
 

ougoah

Brigadier
Registered Member
A reminder of what?

A reminder he got confused between articles quoting the distance in miles and articles quoting the distance in kilometers.

As for the IRBM question from pages back that seems to be the discussion again. For now, neither Japan, South Korea, or any other intermediate ranged nations have hosted US IRBMs. It would be a precarious move as it opens their nations up for counter attack for nothing more than being the launching platform for the US and suffering the brunt of retaliatory attacks. This however isn't something to count on and China surely needs to still expand IRBM numbers, not only to attack US regional bases in case of war but also any potential strategic assets placed around those regions. The key here is to be able to attack and destroy the supply lines. An airfield can be repaired with time but if you can attack the suppliers then one strike is enough to put those regional bases out of action for good. It really just comes down to extending the naval A2AD space.

The US cannot resupply and repair destroyed bases and assets if it is unable to reach them. It's a tall ask for China's forces at these ranges but herein lies the real struggle between the two with the US aiming to push USN's safe operating sphere closer to Taiwan and within first island chain and China aiming to push USN beyond that.

No doubt those island forward bases are very exposed in case of war, but they are no less exposed than US regional bases which are going to be destroyed or taken over. The main goal for both would be how far USN presence can come in case of war, denying of that presence and the specific range of presence.

It's been mentioned that the US won't care for South Korea or Japan but they should care for themselves not to host and launch US offensive IRBMs if they do not wish for retaliatory strikes. But if it's direct war between US and China, the US mainland would need to be struck. ICBMs are simply too wasteful to use in conventional attacks unless they are of extremely valuable MIC targets. Even then, the attrition balance isn't favourable because you eventually run out of ICBMs that you can spare for conventional use before they run out of ability to repair and put back into production those MIC structures.

It all comes back to how far back can China hold the USN. Being able to sink the carriers would put a stop to US military aggression for decades unless that is they wish for a nuclear exchange at intercontinental ranges.

The IRBM question becomes a silly one. If the US eventually manages to corrupt regional nations to the point they are happy to place US IRBMs to strike Chinese MIC and military targets on the mainland, China does the same in Cuba and Venezuela. Both can only put an extremely finite number of IRBMs next to each other anyway and their destruction (conventionally) amount to very little... several sites hit out of hundreds. Sites that can be quickly and relatively cheaply repaired and put back into action. This strategy isn't pursued by anyone anymore for good reason. There are way too many ways to overcome and defeat it while it's also hard not to escalate dramatically.

The US cannot resupply their Japanese and South Korean bases with IRBMs after one salvo fired during the opening of a war. Ballistic missiles with conventional warheads have extremely limited destructiveness and ought to be used on extremely valuable targets. China would be hitting those sites with hundreds of cruise missiles and ballistic missiles over weeks and the wartime A2AD would be in full swing. The main task for Chinese IRBMs (which is reflected by the roles of the two major Chinese IRBMs that aren't called the DF-17) is to target and hit carriers.
 
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ougoah

Brigadier
Registered Member
In the 2000s the main Chinese A2AD weapon was the "Assassin's Mace" stuff that was really only whispered about until the late 2000s when it was revealed they were the world's first workable and functioning anti-ship ballistic missiles (I say workable and functioning because this concept was attempted by the Soviets but the tech of the era couldn't make the concept work... concepts are useless when they exist only in theory). A decade later, second and third gen ASBMs in service with a wider and more sophisticated network of sensor nodes.

Two decades later, this A2AD involves a much more capable and numerous PLAN and the new hypersonic weapons.

The US wants extremely stealthy, unprecedented long range, fighter-attack aircraft to "replace" the F-35s. Their stated design goals include a combat radius equal or surpassing the range between second island chain and central eastern China - so like Yunan from edge of second island chain. The aim is to keep the carriers outside the range of current DF-21 and DF-26 ASBMs (launched from fairly deep within China though lol) but China wants to extend the range of their carrier killers as well and including various hypersonic weapons into the mix while constantly upping the strength, numbers, and combat capability of PLAN. The evolution of this struggle isn't limited to this singular domain of A2AD and the consequential adapting to it, it also includes the electromagnetic weapons, crippling the sensor nodes and so on. The mainstream conversation on this topic in public military discussions is limited to the usual buzzwords, carriers, F-35, stealth, bases, islands, ASBM (more recently because the western audience on this is always late to catch on), and now HGVs and hypersonic. I bet the reality includes a lot more subsurface, space, code, and digital infrastructure that isn't talked about.
 
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