An 8% default rate translates into a 4% loss rate for corporate debt—painful, but hardly critical. Mortgage and personal loan default rates are likely to be quite low because household finances are very strong.
There remains opaque business of “trust loans,” that is, loans which the banks buy, wrap into a “trust”, and sell to customers looking for high yields. Reorient analysts assumed an extremely high default rate of 15% and an extremely low recovery rate of 25%, and further assumed that banks would have to make all the defaults out of their own capital.
Add it all up, and Chinese banks would have a one-time loss rate of 4.9% of assets. That’s painful, again, but far from life-threatening. Reorient summarized the prospective losses at Chinese banks in the table below:
Dec-15 Balance
(RMB trn) Default
Rate Recovery Loss
(RMB trn)
Mortgage 10.4 5.0% 90% 0.1
Personal 16.6 5.0% 70% 0.2
Corporate 68.8 8.0% 50% 2.8
Trust 16.3 15.0% 25% 1.8
Total 112.1 4.9
NPL ratio
4.4%
Bank lending has grown rapidly in China, but not nearly as rapidly as in the United States during the bubble years, or for that matter Spain.
Private credit provided by the US banking system grew from 120% of GDP in 1995 to 200% of GDP in 2008. Chinese bank credit only reached 120% of GDP in 2013. China is still underbanked: its households have enormous savings and enormous wealth in the form of residential property, and enormous capacity to borrow. Internet finance will probably advance more quickly in China than anywhere else in the world, as a new generation of Chinese skips the bother of visiting bank branches and conducts its personal finance business by smartphone. Big data makes it possible to score consumer credit in real time with great accuracy, integrating e-commerce and e-finance into a far more efficient consumer economy.
Consumption only accounts for 35% of China’s GDP, compared to 75% in the US. Some of that probably is due to a difference in the way Chinese GDP is calculated, but it is clear that China has enormous room for consumption-driven growth.
Some of the Chicken Little stories about China point to a scary-sounding statistic: total debt in China amounts to 2.4 times GDP. That’s a big number, but it is matched by a much larger volume of savings. Some areas of debt, to be sure, are growing too fast. Some of the older state-owned enterprises remain money sinks, and it will take time for China to slim them down and phase them out. That is a management problem, not a debt crisis.
China’s central government and provincial governments have the cleanest balance sheets among major world economies. Public debt securities outstanding are only a fifth of GDP, compared to 100% of GDP in the US. That gives the Chinese government enormous scope to use its balance sheet to reorganize other forms of debt before they turn into a problem.
That gives China a lot of flexibility, and the government is using it to pre-empt possible financial problems. One area of concern is local government finances. China’s infrastructure boom is the great wonder of today’s world. Fly into any major city in China, and you pass through a brand-new airport to new superhighways and high-speed rail lines. American cities seem like Third World backwaters by comparison. Local governments created development corporations backed by land and project revenues (called “local government financing vehicles”) and ran up 20 trillion RMB of debt. Most of the land behind the local government vehicles has soared in value, but problems might crop up in certain cities. Local governments, moreover, pay much higher interest rates than the central government. So the government will swap the whole RMB 20 trillion of local government debt for bonds issued at lower rates by China’s provinces, backed by tax revenues. The swap will be completed in three years. It will bring public debt securities up to about 45% of GDP, still half of the US level.
The sky may not be falling in China, but the stock certainly has fallen. Part of this is the result of a generalized run out of all emerging market equities in response to the Federal Reserve’s ill-advised decision to raise short-term interest rates.
There is no economic reason for China to trade in lockstep with (for example) Brazil, a commodity exporter with little manufacturing industry. China gains and Brazil loses when commodity prices fall. Rather, the near-perfect correlation between the broad emerging market index and the China MSCI Index (internationally tradeable Chinese stocks) arose from the broad liquidation of risk positions in response to the Federal Reserve.
China, to be sure, made a number of policy blunders that compounded its problems. By linking the RMB to the soaring US dollar, China allowed its own real effective exchange rate to soar. The dollar link forced China to keep real interest rates at the highest level of any of the world’s major economies.
Source: BIS
China has taken steps to correct the problem (by shifting from a dollar target for the RMB to a trade-weighted basket of currencies), but it acted too late to avoid the impression that it was driven by events, rather than in charge of them. Regulatory mistakes (failing to stop banks from circumventing limits on stock market leverage, for example) made the problem worse. The factors affecting Chinese equity prices require more detailed explanation on another occasion.
The good news for equity investors is that the combination of market panic and official fecklessness conspired to reduce Chinese equity valuations to levels that now seem extremely attractive.