I wouldn't call the tariffs a "failed policy". It was a necessary response to the previous administration's surprising hostility towards a long time trading partner. Critical Australian imports began to be seen as vulnerabilities, and the tariffs signaled Chinese customers to look for potential alternatives. Was it an overreaction? Maybe.
Beijing's response to Canberra's increasing hostility consisted of two major components: diplomatic, and economic. Shutting down diplomatic relations with Australia was reasonably effective, and furthered a narrative here that the Morrison government had been reckless in so thoroughly alienating Beijing. Tick.
The economic sanctions leveraged on Australian imports were much less effective, and indeed I believe they were counter-productive. The sanctions justified and reinforced existing anxieties about China, and allowed political figures like Morrison and Dutton to portray themselves as fearless defenders of Australia's national interests*. Radical policy developments such as AUKUS would not have slid through the political system nearly as easily if it were not for the atmosphere of hostility bred over the previous few years, to which the sanctions regime contributed.
Ultimately, the lessons Canberra has drawn from its experience with Beijing these last few years is that Beijing's bark is worse than its bite. It was (and is) commonly understood that China's growth has fueled Australian prosperity over recent decades, such that there was a real fear of jeapordising that relationship. But we now "know" Beijing's policy toolbook, the costs that it will impose on us and those it is prepared to bear in exchange (not a lot), and we know that we can absorb those costs without making sacrifices to core interests and without significant political difficulties domestically. The fear of alienating China turns out to have been worse than the reality of alienating China. I'm not saying that's a sensible narrative, only that it is the dominant one.
* Of course the Liberal/Coalition government was defeated, but only because the then-Labor opposition both minimised the differences between themselves and the government (e.g. by signing up to AUKUS within
twenty four hours of being briefed on its existence) and directly attacking the Coalition government's credentials as defenders of Australia's national security (by charging that the Solomon Islands' signing a port agreement with Beijing represented Australia's "worst foreign policy failure in the Pacific since 1945"). That is to say, we should not be confused that the Coalition's anti-China narrative was repudiated by voters, rather Labor succeeded because they embraced the same narrative and effectively charged the Coalition with being asleep at the wheel. It was good electoral politicking, but not anything that Beijing can reasonably draw comfort from.
Personally I would like an end to the finger-pointing and a return to pre-2018 relations, so I'm hoping for a positive outcome to the meeting.
Unfortunately I don't think a return to 2018 is possible, but some cooperation is possible, namely in matters of trade and multilateral institutions such as the AIIB. Canberra wants a robust economic relationship with China, but will not put matters of national security on the table to secure it. What we are (probably) willing to negotiate on is the broader economic war that Washington is waging upon China and trying to persuade everyone else to participate in.
Leaving aside questions of who is responsible for the present hostility in the relationship (we are) and whether or not Beijing's response was productive (it was not), at the end of the day Canberra wants something from Beijing (trade normalisation) and Beijing therefore has some leverage that it can use to further its interests. The key is to clearly identify those interests and to discern what is achievable and what is not.