Chinese Aviation Industry

ARJ21-700 AC 102 shifted to Jiayu Pass Airport and conducted crosswind fight test on April 23rd, 2012. AC 102 will be under CAAC certification flight tests for engine inlet distortion, engine exhaust, APU exhaust and bleed air contamination, ground course stability, etc.

Click to expand...

escobar said:

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

A strategic partnership has been signed between Cessna Aircraft Company, the China Aviation Industry General Aircraft Company Ltd., (CAIGA) and the Shijiazhuang Municipal Government. This agreement is a progression stemming from the strategic framework that Cessna entered into with CAIGA parent company, Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), in March 2012. Specifically, this next step forms a cooperation framework for an eventual joint venture whose purpose will be the final assembly, sales, and customer support for the Cessna Caravan in China for the Chinese market.

"It is important to understand that today's (Thursday's) agreement is a direct result of the overarching agreement signed with AVIC in March. This agreement picks up where that announcement left off," said Mike Shih, Vice President, China Strategy and Business Development for Cessna. "Not only does this continue Cessna's involvement in the development of General Aviation in China, but it also paves the way for aircraft sales to which we would not have otherwise had access. These Cessna aircraft will be manufactured in the United States, in Kansas, and sent to Shijiazhuang, China, to undergo final assembly and then be sold in China."

Cessna and CAIGA plans include locating the joint venture's operations at the CAIGA facilities in Shijiazhuang to conduct final assembly, painting, testing, interior installation, customization, flight testing and delivery of the Cessna Caravan to in-country customers.

"As a subsidiary of AVIC, CAIGA has demonstrated great capabilities with general aviation production, and this made the choice of the Shijiazhuang facility a simple one," said Lannie O'Bannion, Business Leader for Caravan aircraft. "The cooperation between Cessna and CAIGA will enable us to deliver the Cessna Caravan within China for many different purposes. We have seen interest for the Caravan for use in commuter aviation fleets as well as China's growing tourist and sightseeing businesses. The versatility of the Caravan makes it a great fit for this market."

"We continue to be extremely pleased with the cooperative relationship between AVIC and Cessna," said Scott Ernest, Cessna president and CEO. "China's potential in general aviation is tremendous, and represents an exciting opportunity for Cessna. Since we do expect China to be one of the largest general aviation markets in ten year's time, we are excited to see that it will be Cessna aircraft that will help meet this demand in the years to come."

Click to expand...

The fatal crash of a Xian MA60 aircraft operated by Indonesian carrier Merpati Nusantara in 2011 has been attributed to the crew"s failure to adhere to standard operating procedures and their loss of situational awareness.

The aircraft, registration PK-MZK, was operating on the Sorong-Kaimana route on 7 May 2011. As it was preparing to land, the weather at Kaimana was overcast with showers, says a final report from Indonesia's National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC).

The poor weather had reduced visibility around the airport to just 2km. Although the Director General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) and Merpati require a visibility of 5km for a visual approach, the crew ignored this requirement. Kaimana is also not equipped for instrument approaches.

During the flight, the co-pilot was acting as pilot-in-command. When the aircraft was on final approach, however, the pilot took command of the aircraft. The reasons for this are unclear, but the NTSC says the change may have "[increased] crew workload at a critical phase of flight."

As the aircraft approached the airport, the pilot asked the co-pilot three times whether he could see the runway. The co-pilot replied that he could not.

At 376ft (114m) pressure altitude, the crew decided to let the aircraft climb and perform a go-around. As the aircraft passed 537ft pressure altitude, the torque of its left and right engines were increased to 70% and 82% respectively.

Upon reaching 550ft pressure altitude, the landing gear was retracted and its bank angle increased to 33 degrees to the left. This grew to 38 degrees, after which the aircraft rapidly descended into the sea, killing all 19 passengers and six crewmembers.

The NTSC attributed the rapid descent to a high bank angle, the retraction of flaps to zero, engine torque, low airspeed and the aircraft's nose-down pitch. The crew also lost situational awareness as they peered out the window attempting to locate the runway.

The NTSC report cited the pilots' inexperience with the MA60. The pilot had just 199 hours on the type and the co-pilot, 234. Merpati's safety division requires a pilot to have 250 hours on a type to be considered an "experienced pilot".

The NTSC said the pilots failed to conduct an approach briefing and landing checklist. It also found that communication between the two was limited.

One possible issue the NTSC pointed to was the use of non-standard English aviation language in both the flight crew operations and aircraft maintenance manuals.

NTSC recommends that Merpati Nusantara review its training procedures, as well as improve aircraft documentation and manuals.

Generally, it recommends that the DGCA review the adequacy of airline training, crew pairing policies and safety management systems.

Click to expand...

7freedom7 said:

Crew inexperience led to Merpati MA60 crash: NTSC

Click to expand...

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

Crash: Merpati MA60 at Kaimana on May 7th 2011, impacted waters before runway




By Simon Hradecky, created Monday, May 7th 2012 13:57Z, last updated Monday, May 7th 2012 13:57Z

Indonesia's NTSC released their final report concluding the probable cause of the crash was:

- The flight was conducted in VFR in condition that was not suitable for visual approach when the visibility was 2 km. In such a situation a visual approach should not have been attempted.

- There was no checklist reading and crew briefing.

- The flight crew had lack of situation awareness when tried to find the runway, and discontinued the approach.

- The missed approach was initiated at altitude 376 feet pressure altitude (250 feet radio altitude), the pilot open power to 70% and 82% torque followed by flap retracted to 5 and subsequently to 0. The rapid descent was mainly caused by continuously increase of roll angle up to 38 degree to the left and the retraction of flaps from 15 to 0 position.

- Both crew had low experience/flying time on type.

- Inadequacy/ineffectivity in the training program may lead to actions that deviated from the standard procedure and regression to the previous type.

The captain (55, ATPL, 24,470 hours total, 199 hours on type) was pilot monitoring, the first officer (36, CPL, 370 hours total, 234 hours on type) was pilot flying.

During the approach to Kaimana the cockpit voice recorder did not record any crew briefing nor did it record any checklist reading. This resulted in the engine regime remaining in cruise mode, which seriously limited the engine torque and impaired the performance of the aircraft during the later go-around, where engines reached 82% instead of 95% torque. As a further result the crew was not in synchronisation with their plans for the approach.

Following the last communication with the Kaimana flight information service, in which AFIS reported the visibility was still 2000 meters and it was raining, the crew continued the approach south of the aerodrome with the intention to attempt a visual approach.

During the turn to final the captain took control of the aircraft, the investigation was not able to determine why that change of crew roles occurred in this critical phase of the flight which possibly increased the work load of the crew. The autopilot was disengaged when the aircraft descended through 960 feet MSL. About 17 seconds after the captain took control of the aircraft the EGPWS announced "Minimum, Minimum" at 580 feet MSL (456 feet AGL), the approach at that point was not stabilized, which should have prompted the crew to go around.

The captain queried the first officer several times whether he could see the runway, the first officer replied he could not see the runway.

At 376 feet MSL the captain decided to discontinue the approach, increased engine power, initated a turn to the left and initiated a climb, the flaps were retracted from 15 to 5 and landing gear was retracted, the flaps retraction in contradiction to requirements by the flight crew operating manual which required flaps 15 to be maintained until above 400 feet AGL and above 135 KIAS.

The aircraft reached 585 feet MSL at 124 KIAS and 1.8 degrees nose down attitude. The aircraft rolled left continuously until reaching 38 degrees while descending through 482 feet MSL, the flaps were retracted from 5 to 0 degrees, the rate of descent increased to 3000 feet per minute and impacted the shallow sea. The main wreckage came to rest at position S3.6522 E133.6875. All 25 occupants perished in the crash.

A ground witness phoned Kaimana's flight information service, the officer could not see the crash site because it was blocked by trees. The NTSB added: "There were four personnel of the airport rescue and fire fighting deployed to the coastline near the beginning of Runway 01, followed by one ambulance, eight security personnel and ten airport personnel."

The NTSC annotated that the captain's calls and behaviour suggested that he may have reverted to procedures for his former aircraft type, a Fokker 100, which he had flown for 6,982 hours and where flaps 5 was typical for a go-around.

The NTSC analysed that the crew pairing was in contradiction to safety recommendations, both crew were below 250 hours of experience on the accident aircraft type which such may have contributed to the accident.

The NTSB summarized their analysis: "The investigation determined that the aircraft was being flown under visual flight in condition that was not suitable for a visual approach. The crew did not follow standard operating procedures and did not conduct an approach briefing or complete the landing checklist.

The crew were continually seeking to establish visual reference with the runway but were unsuccessful. Following the decision to discontinue the approach, the PIC deviated from the standard go-around procedures while the aircraft was in close proximity to the water.

The rapid descent was mainly a result of a combination of situations such as high bank angle (up to 38 deg to the left) and the flaps retracted to 5 and subsequently to 0 position, and also the combination of other situations such as; engine torque, airspeed, and nose-down pitch."

Aerial overview of the crash site (Photo: NTSC):

Flight trajectory (Graphics NTSC):

Graphics representation of flight data (Graphics NTSC):

Click to expand...

Dolcevita said:

Perhaps a more comprehensive account of the Indonesian NTSC report

Click to expand...

asif iqbal said:

China should have a deal, u either send ur pilots for serious training in China or u get no planes

u do not want to send out a similar message to what Russia does, sells planes and then leaves it at that, which results in many bad accidents

loss of life is not acceptable due to pilots errors, simply not acceptable, pilots must be trained and trained and drilled, Emirates has the toughest training for its pilots to the highest ever standard

China should make a package, buy the plane and get ur pilots trained is well and get maintenance etc etc more money for China also

Click to expand...

asif iqbal said:

China should have a deal, u either send ur pilots for serious training in China or u get no planes

u do not want to send out a similar message to what Russia does, sells planes and then leaves it at that, which results in many bad accidents

loss of life is not acceptable due to pilots errors, simply not acceptable, pilots must be trained and trained and drilled, Emirates has the toughest training for its pilots to the highest ever standard

China should make a package, buy the plane and get ur pilots trained is well and get maintenance etc etc more money for China also

Click to expand...