I echo some of the points raised by Tacoburger. In fact I remember reading around 2015-16, from a Chinese state space executive, that they strongly believed that SpaceX won't succeed in making reusable rockets commercial, and hence they are going the route of making normal expendable rockets cheaper through economies of scale and better system design. This was a huge miscalculation that has resulted in a lag of 7-8 years vis-a-vis US.
Now, however since the market and technology have been proven, I am optimistic.
However these things need to be thought about:
- How did China misjudge this emerging technological trend? How can it avoid similar mistakes in space and other sectors later?
- How to catch up fast with SpaceX?
- How to put more focus on disrupting things rather than simply continuing with the current gravy train.
Do not listen to the stories fabricated by fans of Elon Musk in China. The story you mentioned never actually occurred.
The upper echelons of China's space program have always been very focused on the technology of reusable launch vehicles. This interest began before the year 2000, but due to China's insufficient economic strength at the time, the focus was on following the technological research and reserve efforts of the United States, Europe, and Japan, without drawing much attention. In reality, China has conducted research on various types of space shuttles, including the American and Russian space shuttles (side-mounted), the European space shuttle (top-mounted), the X-33 (single-stage to orbit with an expander cycle hydrogen-oxygen engine), and the K-1 rocket (parachute recovery for both stages). Around the turn of the millennium, there was in-depth research based on the K-1 and European space shuttle technology pathways.
Before the CZ-5 project was initiated, there was an exploratory study on the technology of reusable launch vehicles within the Chinese space sector. This study aimed to thoroughly understand the associated requirements. Around 2005-2006, research on reusable launch vehicles began, which was divided into two parts: one for the second-stage reusability and the other for the first-stage reusability, with the goal of achieving both by the year 2020. The first-stage plan was officially shifted into development around 2010 and completed two test flights (AT-1b) between 2021-2023. This AT-1b was benchmarked against the American Boeing XS-1. The outcome was that Boeing abandoned the project, while China's was successful. The second-stage plan, which was benchmarked against the X-37, also completed two flights.
Therefore, between 2010 and 2020, China has been consistently working on the development of reusable launch vehicles (VTHL configuration scheme).
SpaceX's Falcon 9 is a VTVL (Vertical Takeoff, Vertical Landing) reusable launch vehicle, which primarily requires deep throttling and the parallel operation of multiple engines (with thrust within a hundred tons). It must also use hydrocarbon fuel, with China and Russia being the main countries developing hydrocarbon fuels. Meanwhile, the United States, Europe, and Japan have been focusing on high-thrust hydrogen-oxygen propulsion. As a result, VTVL has not seen widespread development. Once SpaceX and Blue Origin began working on VTVL, China promptly started a 10:1 deep throttling research for the YF-100 engine in 2014. The slower emergence of China's VTVL is not due to other reasons but because the thrust of the YF-100 is too high, and the minimum thrust required for landing does not match the YF-100's minimum thrust capability. Therefore, it was necessary to domestically develop new engines (with a thrust of 60-100 tons) and large-diameter rocket bodies (3.8-4.2 meters). The core goal was to ensure that the engine thrust and mass required for landing would be compatible.
In fact, SpaceX mainly benefited from the appropriate thrust of the Merlin 1 engine. It took them about a decade (from 2006 to 2015) to go from the initial development of the Falcon 9 to the reusability of its first stage. China's decision to move forward with VTVL was around 2017-2018, primarily for the purpose of near-Earth small satellite constellations, which is why there are now 5-6 Falcon 9 competitive rockets on the market.
SpaceX is not as crucial or impressive as you might think. In fact, its lead is due to the need to redevelop rocket engines and airframes at this scale. The engines and airframe of SpaceX's Falcon 9 were more suitable for this task from the outset.
The engines on the shelves of other companies are too powerful. Starting from scratch is also very time-consuming (the normal engine development cycle is 5 years, and the rocket is another 5 years, adding up to 8-10 years to produce an entirely new rocket). Before proposing a brand-new VTVL (Vertical Takeoff, Vertical Landing) route in 2017-2018, China also proposed two plans, CZ-6X and CZ-8R. The CZ-6X was considered to have too little payload capacity to be of practical value (as stated by exhibitors at the 2018 Zhuhai Airshow), and the CZ-8R faced significant difficulties in engine throttling (the YF-100 engine's thrust is too high when throttled down by 50%), so the CZ-8R is still in development. I hope you recognize that before 2017-2018, the Chinese space industry was thinking about how to quickly modify a VTVL rocket from off-the-shelf technology. After 2017-2018, the Chinese space industry essentially abandoned this technological route. Apart from the CZ-10, it mainly involves new engines and new rocket airframes.
Now, SpaceX's Starship has a multitude of issues and has completely undermined the Artemis program. It is, in fact, a very flawed design. China's CZ-9 did not make the same mistakes as SpaceX's Starship. Of course, the average person does not understand this and will only think that the CZ-9 is copying the Starship. Just as many people believe that the J-10 copied the Lavi/F-16, the J-20 copied the F-22, and the J-35 copied the F-35. They do not understand the differences in technology and design philosophy, especially the significant differences in technology and parameter design caused by different design philosophies.
What is left of the Starship besides its boastful payload capacity, maximum takeoff mass, and thrust? Look at how the payload coefficient has become such a poor parameter.
The Starship V1's low Earth orbit (LEO) payload capacity is not even as much as that of the Falcon Heavy. One has a takeoff mass of 5000 tons, and the other is 1200 tons. What is there to learn from this?