China's SCS Strategy Thread

[AsuraGodFiend]

Baited by candles lol

 

[zyklon]

We must also question the behavior of the PLAN and CCG ships following the collision. As I understand it, the CCG personnel are likely in the custody of the Filipinos. If this is true, it is unacceptable. Not only do these two captains engage in a reckless and ill-advised (particularly in the case of the PLAN vessel) pursuit, but after the almost-inevitable collision, they flee without attempting to rescue their own men.

Is there any credible evidence that the authorities in Manila are currently holding CCG sailors?

Can't imagine Little Bong Bong holding back on a would be propaganda goldmine like that at all: so if the claim is true, there should be no shortage of photographic evidence.

 

[FriedRiceNSpice]

Someone earlier proposed using small FPV drones to drop tear gas, which sounds like a workable solution. Drop tear gas, then board and detain. Another solution could be to deploy unmanned surface vessels to harass and potentially ram PCG vessels.

 

[zhangjim]

Given the current response from the Chinese government, its approach to handling public opinion, and the current state of public sentiment within China, it is unlikely that the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or any other authoritative institution will step forward to provide any explanation or follow-up reports on this matter. Such a major scandal, if made public at the official level, would only lead to even more intense ridicule and mockery, especially since China's domestic opposition would not be satisfied by such attempts at appeasement; they would only celebrate even more vigorously.

I have no confidence in their ability to handle things. In the field of public crisis, they have shown extreme incompetence over the past many years.

What an embarrassing performance... someone shall certainly be court-martialed for this. Why exactly the PLAN brought such a large ship into such close quarters is a question that must also be asked.

The ones who really need to go to court are those who demand control over the scale of the conflict. But obviously, this is a necessary sacrifice for 'obeying the overall situation'. So those who make policies will never be tried.

Ngl, this incident is getting way more ridicule that it deserves compared to say, May 7th... Although one thing I am happy for is that Chinese PLA fans are more rational and accepting of this blunder, unlike bhakts with theirs.

We are not shameless enough to promote failure as victory, which is equivalent to 'punishing my enemy's feet with my butt'.

 

[valysre]

Is there any credible evidence that the authorities in Manila are currently holding CCG sailors?

Can't imagine Little Bong Bong holding back on a would be propaganda goldmine like this at all: so if this claim is true, there should be no shortage of photographic evidence.

No, and I recently saw some more PCG footage showing that the CCG vessel dropped a RIB. The point on abandoning Chinese sailors can be dropped. The rest I believe still stand.

Look, the South China Sea isn’t “China’s sea.” International law, especially UNCLOS, is clear: maritime claims depend on coastlines, not vague “historic rights.” The 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled China’s “nine-dash line” has no legal basis. These waters belong to all coastal states, not the biggest navy. Major shipping lanes pass through here — no one benefits from militarizing them. Time for Beijing to drop the fantasy and follow the rules everyone else respects.

So here’s the question: once Xi Jinping is eventually gone, will China finally come to its senses and abandon this nonsense?

I'll raise you one better: International law is worth less than the paper it's written on, and any country worth its salt knows to ignore any international court ruling against it, and to bash its geopolitical opponents over the head with any international court rulings against them.

 

[Lethe]

This is clearly a serious and embarrassing operational failure on the part of PLAN and/or CCG, likely involving loss of life and with considerable propaganda value for PCG, the Philippines, and all who would question the professionalism and competence of China's maritime forces. Looking at the range of possible responses and dynamics from this point forward, I see three basic postures for China and two basic postures for the Philippines.

China #1: the Baseline Response. The first response involves incremental adjustments to existing operational procedures while preserving broader objectives. The focus here is on identifying the specific factors that contributed to the collision, and to eliminate or at least greatly reduce them going forward. Likely lines of inquiry concern the involvement of PLAN assets in what has generally been understood to be CCG-led operations, the specific involvement of such a large and relatively cumbersome PLAN combatant in pursuit of a dramatically smaller and more agile vessel, situational awareness and decision-making aboard the CCG vessel, possible failures or shortcomings in communication and coordination between PLAN and CCG assets. Looking further afield, consideration would also be given to the ship characteristics that are desirable for these kinds of operations.

China #2: Building upon the first response, this response would significantly revise the operating directives given to CCG and/or PLAN maritime assets, with the objective of more categorically eliminating the risk of further embarrassing "blue on blue" incidents, perhaps also with an eye to reducing the risk of inadvertent "blue on red" incidents. This would necessarily imply greater freedom of movement for PCG and other Philippines assets and potentially undermine Beijing's ability to pursue its objectives in the area.

China #3: Also building upon the first response, this "face saving" response would also seek to more categorically eliminate the risk of further such incidents but, rather than achieving this by altering PLAN/CCG behaviour as in #2, would do so by attempting to coerce changes in PCG behaviour. This would likely involve revising operating directives and rules of engagement to include a broader ranger of kinetic responses, including lethal responses, across a broader range of circumstances.

Philippines #1: This response celebrates this incident as a spectacular propaganda coup, and evaluates the PCG crew's conduct as both daring and effective, providing a blueprint for future operations.

Philippines #2: While recognising the propaganda value of this incident, this response is more wary of escalatory dynamics, recognising that this was nearly an incident of another kind entirely, i.e. a catastrophic collision between the PCG ship and PLAN 052D. PCG crews are counselled accordingly.

Clearly, the combination of China #3 and Philippines #1 would be the most escalatory going forward, while the combination of China #2 and Philippines #2 would be the least. I make no comment on the relative likelihood of each prospect.

 

[zhangjim]

Look, the South China Sea isn’t “China’s sea.” International law, especially UNCLOS, is clear: maritime claims depend on coastlines, not vague “historic rights.” The 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled China’s “nine-dash line” has no legal basis. These waters belong to all coastal states, not the biggest navy. Major shipping lanes pass through here — no one benefits from militarizing them. Time for Beijing to drop the fantasy and follow the rules everyone else respects.

So here’s the question: once Xi Jinping is eventually gone, will China finally come to its senses and abandon this nonsense?

The reason why you can say these words is because the reason for this tragedy is that the soldiers must obey the leadership who afraid of escalating the conflict, and then engage in a boring bumper car game.
If this kind of thing happens a few more times, I can't imagine what the next generation of leaders will do - if they don't want to be seen as incompetent cowards and power hungry tyrants.

 

[zhangjim]

This is clearly a serious and embarrassing operational failure on the part of PLAN and/or CCG, likely involving loss of life and with considerable propaganda value for PCG, the Philippines, and all who would question the professionalism and competence of China's maritime forces. Looking at the range of possible responses and dynamics from this point forward, I see three basic postures for China and two basic postures for the Philippines.

China #1: the Baseline Response. The first response involves incremental adjustments to existing operational procedures while preserving broader objectives. The focus here is on identifying the specific factors that contributed to the collision, and to eliminate or at least greatly reduce them going forward. Likely lines of inquiry concern the involvement of PLAN assets in what has generally been understood to be CCG-led operations, the specific involvement of such a large and relatively cumbersome PLAN combatant in pursuit of a dramatically smaller and more agile vessel, situational awareness and decision-making aboard the CCG vessel, possible failures or shortcomings in communication and coordination between PLAN and CCG assets. Looking further afield, consideration would also be given to the ship characteristics that are desirable for these kinds of operations.

China #2: Building upon the first response, this response would significantly revise the operating directives given to CCG and/or PLAN maritime assets, with the objective of more categorically eliminating the risk of further embarrassing "blue on blue" incidents, perhaps also with an eye to reducing the risk of inadvertent "blue on red" incidents. This would necessarily imply greater freedom of movement for PCG and other Philippines assets and potentially undermine Beijing's ability to pursue its objectives in the area.

China #3: Also building upon the first response, this "face saving" response would also seek to more categorically eliminate the risk of further such incidents but, rather than achieving this by altering PLAN/CCG behaviour as in #2, would do so by attempting to coerce changes in PCG behaviour. This would likely involve revising operating directives and rules of engagement to include a broader ranger of kinetic responses, including lethal responses, across a broader range of circumstances.

Philippines #1: This response celebrates this incident as a spectacular propaganda coup, and evaluates the PCG crew's conduct as both daring and effective, providing a blueprint for future operations.

Philippines #2: While recognising the propaganda value of this incident, this response is more wary of escalatory dynamics, recognising that this was nearly an incident of another kind entirely, i.e. a catastrophic collision between the PCG ship and PLAN 052D. PCG crews are counselled accordingly.

Clearly, the combination of China #3 and Philippines #1 would be the most escalatory going forward, while the combination of China #2 and Philippines #2 would be the least. I make no comment on the relative likelihood of each prospect.

The Philippines would choose option 1, but I don't think China would choose any of the options you mentioned. I am worried that China may continue to take some symbolic but impractical tough measures, just like the unfortunate death of the fishermen last time.

 

[MortyandRick]

Look, the South China Sea isn’t “China’s sea.” International law, especially UNCLOS, is clear: maritime claims depend on coastlines, not vague “historic rights.” The 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled China’s “nine-dash line” has no legal basis. These waters belong to all coastal states, not the biggest navy. Major shipping lanes pass through here — no one benefits from militarizing them. Time for Beijing to drop the fantasy and follow the rules everyone else respects.

So here’s the question: once Xi Jinping is eventually gone, will China finally come to its senses and abandon this nonsense?

Such BS and unfettered hypocrisy.

Where were these so called "rules" that you do proudly tout when the US was bombing sovereign countries?
Where were these so called "rules" when the US overthrew democratically elected governments?
Where were your so called "rules" for the Palestinians undergoing genocide and starvation?
Where were your so called "rules" when the US reneged on previous trade agreements and basically sidelined the WTO?
Where were your so called "rules" when US sanctions countries with medical emergencies? Eg. Blocked medical equipment to Cuba during the pandemic, hoarded vaccines.
Where were your so called "rules" when the US refused to vacate Cuban land in Guantanamo bay, where they abused many innocent prisoners.

Shall I go on?

Let me guess? "Rules for thou, but not rules for me".

Don't bring your "holier than thou " attitude here. We see through the hypocrisy pretty clearly.

 

[MortyandRick]

The Philippines would choose option 1, but I don't think China would choose any of the options you mentioned. I am worried that China may continue to take some symbolic but impractical tough measures, just like the unfortunate death of the fishermen last time.

Soo again I ask you, it's easy to criticize, how would you have handled it?

You've made your distrust and negative feelings toward the current Chinese govt well known. But they have made china powerful enough to stand up against the US and the west.

What would you have done differently? Please enlighten us? I'm very eager to know how COMPETENT you are compared to China's current leaders?