SCS is actually quite far from major US and allied bases
China's SCS Strategy Thread
- Thread starter lilzz
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SCS is actually quite far from major US and allied bases
plawolf
Lieutenant General
The devil is in the details.
While generally your comments are correct, in terms of the SCS specifically it is not.
There are no operationally relevant US military bases within fighter range of the SCS.
That means any US military action there will have to rely pretty much exclusively on naval power.
The USN will pretty much have to concentrate their entire deplorable fleet to have the kinds of advantage and odds that would make the risks and costs of a military showdown with China in the SCS even thinkable.
The Chinese thought long and hard before pulling the trigger on those islands, and you can bet your bottom dollar one of the first scenarios they gamed out was a worst case all out attack situation.
That factored into why they built those bases so big, so quickly, at the same time and chose the islands they did to build their primary islands.
The Chinese designed and built those islands as the cornerstones for a meat grinder death trap where enemy fleets goes to die.
Of all the possible flash points and hot spots, the SCS is the worst place the US could pick for a naval confrontation with China.
The reason the US is so obsessed about the region now is because they secretly realise that, and just cannot handle the idea of China being able to carve out a potential battlefield where they cannot just steamroll like everywhere else.
These islands won’t be taken easily in the event of war even today, and as each day and year passes, they become even harder and more costly for any potential adversaries to think about taking by force.
The problem they are not fighting near Pasadena. USN has already overstretched itself trying to counter NKorea. More activity in SCS my fear is they will humiliate themselves in the future.
When Chinese Navy achieves parity they will patrol along east/west coast of US
I don't disagree with most of your assessment, however I do want to point out one part, which is the issue of the usual "peacetime" deployment/armament status of the islands.
As we can see, the islands have yet to be armed with any missile systems (AShM or SAM), or fighters or AEW&C, MPAs etc, during peacetime at present. In future we might see a more consistent military presence on the island, but at present the islands are mostly bare and vulnerable most of the time.
I believe that the Air Force and Navy have probably simulated scenarios where they have to rapidly reinforce and arm up the islands, to both deploy fighters and missile systems and other logistics support onto the island bases organically, while also deploying more naval vessels and aircraft around the islands, in times of crisis, and once such a deployment has occurred it will be a very capable, multi system, mutually supporting defensive network.. but before those systems are rapidly deployed, the islands will be vulnerable to a "surprise" attack IMO, because the ability to launch "surprise" attacks are fairly easy and will remain so in the foreseeable future, such as by a large number of cruise missiles launched many hundreds of kms away, or by carriers that operate in westpac/near SCS routinely, and so on.
So in that sense, I believe that the islands are technically vulnerable to surprise attacks, however surprise attacks are usually also preceded by times of heightened tensions and political and military intelligence on both sides will likely warn their respective sides of the other's intentions, to provide them of sufficient warning time to make the military deployments and reinforcements before a shot is fired in anger by either side. In that sense, I expect that the Chinese military would likely not allow a "surprise attack" to catch them by strategic surprise... however I do believe if the US side hypothetically manages to achieve strategic surprise in a future timespan when the islands are still not yet routinely armed with missile systems and fighters and a consistent high Chinese naval presence in the SCS, then the islands will indeed be very vulnerable.
IMO, the Chinese air and naval strategy for the SCS in the medium term future should be to avoid deploying missile systems and defenses onto the islands during peacetime (unless they are provoked into doing so), due to the potential regional backlash, but instead develop their forces in a two pronged way:
1: develop the systems and logistics to rapidly reinforce and deploy defenses onto the islands at very short notice in event of a crisis
2: maintain a high level of routine physical presence in the SCS during peacetime in both air and at sea, to provide a high level of peacetime ISR and combat readiness, and to have sufficient MPAs and naval vessels in the SCS to keep a physical tab for each major task force (or preferably, each major surface combatant) of a potential foe for the time in which they remain in the SCS for, to achieve an at least equal balance of fighting capability to potential foes when they remain in the SCS, as a way of deterring any surprise attacks and to be able to counter or mitigate any surprise attacks if they occur while also providing a way to buy time to allow the island bases to be reinforced and for the rest of the navy and air force to reinforce the overall SCS theatre in event of such a conflict.
Fortunately, both are things that the Chinese military is perfectly capable of doing, but no. 2 I think will be a more longer term goal that needs the air force and navy to develop and commission new ships and aircraft in larger numbers, but also to have the confidence and the routine to deploy them in the SCS in a more persistent manner.
But eventually, if the Chinese Air Force and Navy is capable of having at least one carrier strike group on call to be rapidly deployed into the SCS to meet a potential foe's CSG, plus one or two SAGs worth of surface combatants actively patrolling the SCS at any time, supported by a handful of HALE UAVs and a handful of MPAs patrolling the SCS to have at least one or two in the air at any one time for ISR support, with Hainan based fighter and strike fighters and bombers patrolling the perimeter of the SCS every single day, then that would provide a sufficient peacetime force of deterrence, to be adjustable based on the deployments of foreign navies and air forces that may operate there over the course of an average year.
And time.
Equation
Lieutenant General
The American people have already been bogged down with all those regime change adventures in the Middle East that costs both in lives, materials, and money. There is no way would many Americans simply accept a much larger sacrifice to a deadlier foe or adversary like China over a few small islands out in the SCS.
Exactly, those islands are "feelers", sensor nodes, they are there primarily as a way to "piss people off", its no mistake that they were built up under the previous feckless US administration. Now they are there, gathering information, intelligence, listening outposts. China basically called the Obama administrations bluff, and used those built up reefs to push China's borders out, and to exert a controlling influence in the SCS, simple as that....
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Hendrik_2000
Lieutenant General
Via Emperor from CDF. This UAV will make it possible to resupply the smaller islands with mail. food, medicine, parts economically and fast
Could drone that can deliver cargo to islets in South China Sea secure presence in disputed waters?
Unmanned aerial vehicle could take military supplies from Hainan Island to the Paracels in an hour, and can land and take off using a dirt track or field
PUBLISHED : Saturday, 28 October, 2017, 9:08pm
UPDATED : Saturday, 28 October, 2017, 11:34pm
Stephen Chen
China has carried out a test flight of an unmanned aerial vehicle, or drone, that could provide rapid cargo delivery to remote islets in the South China Sea without airstrips, in Beijing’s latest move to secure its presence in the disputed waters.
The drone – built from a modified low-cost fixed-wing plane – can carry 1.5 tonnes of cargo and land on a runway of just 200 metres, according to the Institute of Engineering Thermophysics at the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing, which led the project.
It can also use a dirt track or grass field for take off and landing at military facilities that do not have an airfield, the institute said on its website on Friday.
It said the AT200 drone had made its maiden flight in Weinan, Shaanxi province the previous day.
“This drone has astonishing capabilities for military transport ... [and it] will play an important role in securing military supplies for islands and islets in the South China Sea,” the institute said.
With a PT6A turboprop engine made by Pratt & Whitney Canada producing 750 horsepower, the drone can cover a range of 2,000km.
From Sanya on Hainan Island, the drone could reach the Paracel Islands in just an hour, Scarborough Shoal in three hours, the Spratly Islands in four hours and the southernmost James Shoal in about five hours.
China has built radar stations, missile launch systems, fighter jet hangars and deepwater harbours for its navy ships in the South China Sea in recent years. But these military facilities depend on external supplies of fuel, food, medicine and other necessities, which are delivered by ship. It can take weeks for supplies to arrive from China in bad weather.
The AT200 drone’s cargo compartment is 10 cubic metres and it can take 1.5 tonnes of cargo, the institute said. In comparison, the K-MAX unmanned helicopter being developed for the US government and military can lift 2 to 3 tonnes of cargo, according to Lockheed Martin, one of the companies behind it.
“For islands where it is impossible to land and take off, the research team will add an airdrop function for upcoming models,” said the institute, which has carried out many research and engineering projects for the People’s Liberation Army.
Supplies could be delivered by airdrop to a landing zone as small as 10 metres in diameter.
The research team said it was trying to obtain an airworthiness certificate from the Chinese aviation authorities “as soon as possible”.
Yang Chao, a senior aircraft designer at the aeronautical science and engineering school at Beihang University in Beijing, said China had been converting planes into drones since the 1950s.
Drones can carry out a mission without human assistance, even making a decision while in the air if the connection to the ground station is lost.
Yang, who was not involved in the project, said the South China Sea would be an ideal testing ground for the cargo drone given the lack of air traffic to the remote islets – meaning there would be less of a technical challenge or safety risk.
“Aviation authorities will be more comfortable about approving regular drone flights in and out of the South China Sea than for other areas,” Yang said.
“Drones don’t have a pilot on board. They can’t ‘talk’ to air traffic control ... they can only carry out ‘point-to-point’ flights in scarcely populated areas,” he added.
China lays claim to 90 per cent of the South China Sea, despite an international tribunal ruling invalidating its claim last year. Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam have overlapping claims in the resource-rich waters.
It also has some of the world’s busiest cargo shipping routes, with some US$3 trillion worth of seaborne trade passing through the contested waters every year.
The cargo drone project is part of Beijing’s efforts to boost its presence in the area. It is also building nuclear power plants on floating platforms to provide electricity for civilian and military facilities, where the growing list of hardware – including anti-air radar systems – cannot be run continuously because of an energy shortage.
It recently set up a maritime rescue squadron for the South Sea Fleet, which oversees the disputed waters – a move seen as an attempt to improve combat readiness of the Chinese military.
China has also used some of the world’s largest and most advanced dredging vessels to create and expand man-made islands in the region.
Could drone that can deliver cargo to islets in South China Sea secure presence in disputed waters?
Unmanned aerial vehicle could take military supplies from Hainan Island to the Paracels in an hour, and can land and take off using a dirt track or field
PUBLISHED : Saturday, 28 October, 2017, 9:08pm
UPDATED : Saturday, 28 October, 2017, 11:34pm
Stephen Chen
China has carried out a test flight of an unmanned aerial vehicle, or drone, that could provide rapid cargo delivery to remote islets in the South China Sea without airstrips, in Beijing’s latest move to secure its presence in the disputed waters.
The drone – built from a modified low-cost fixed-wing plane – can carry 1.5 tonnes of cargo and land on a runway of just 200 metres, according to the Institute of Engineering Thermophysics at the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing, which led the project.
It can also use a dirt track or grass field for take off and landing at military facilities that do not have an airfield, the institute said on its website on Friday.
It said the AT200 drone had made its maiden flight in Weinan, Shaanxi province the previous day.
“This drone has astonishing capabilities for military transport ... [and it] will play an important role in securing military supplies for islands and islets in the South China Sea,” the institute said.
With a PT6A turboprop engine made by Pratt & Whitney Canada producing 750 horsepower, the drone can cover a range of 2,000km.
From Sanya on Hainan Island, the drone could reach the Paracel Islands in just an hour, Scarborough Shoal in three hours, the Spratly Islands in four hours and the southernmost James Shoal in about five hours.
China has built radar stations, missile launch systems, fighter jet hangars and deepwater harbours for its navy ships in the South China Sea in recent years. But these military facilities depend on external supplies of fuel, food, medicine and other necessities, which are delivered by ship. It can take weeks for supplies to arrive from China in bad weather.
The AT200 drone’s cargo compartment is 10 cubic metres and it can take 1.5 tonnes of cargo, the institute said. In comparison, the K-MAX unmanned helicopter being developed for the US government and military can lift 2 to 3 tonnes of cargo, according to Lockheed Martin, one of the companies behind it.
“For islands where it is impossible to land and take off, the research team will add an airdrop function for upcoming models,” said the institute, which has carried out many research and engineering projects for the People’s Liberation Army.
Supplies could be delivered by airdrop to a landing zone as small as 10 metres in diameter.
The research team said it was trying to obtain an airworthiness certificate from the Chinese aviation authorities “as soon as possible”.
Yang Chao, a senior aircraft designer at the aeronautical science and engineering school at Beihang University in Beijing, said China had been converting planes into drones since the 1950s.
Drones can carry out a mission without human assistance, even making a decision while in the air if the connection to the ground station is lost.
Yang, who was not involved in the project, said the South China Sea would be an ideal testing ground for the cargo drone given the lack of air traffic to the remote islets – meaning there would be less of a technical challenge or safety risk.
“Aviation authorities will be more comfortable about approving regular drone flights in and out of the South China Sea than for other areas,” Yang said.
“Drones don’t have a pilot on board. They can’t ‘talk’ to air traffic control ... they can only carry out ‘point-to-point’ flights in scarcely populated areas,” he added.
China lays claim to 90 per cent of the South China Sea, despite an international tribunal ruling invalidating its claim last year. Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam have overlapping claims in the resource-rich waters.
It also has some of the world’s busiest cargo shipping routes, with some US$3 trillion worth of seaborne trade passing through the contested waters every year.
The cargo drone project is part of Beijing’s efforts to boost its presence in the area. It is also building nuclear power plants on floating platforms to provide electricity for civilian and military facilities, where the growing list of hardware – including anti-air radar systems – cannot be run continuously because of an energy shortage.
It recently set up a maritime rescue squadron for the South Sea Fleet, which oversees the disputed waters – a move seen as an attempt to improve combat readiness of the Chinese military.
China has also used some of the world’s largest and most advanced dredging vessels to create and expand man-made islands in the region.
plawolf
Lieutenant General
That is why I specifically mentioned a Pearl Habour like attack as a vulnerability. And that is one of the key reasons the Chinese are not forward deploying a lot of military assets on those islands.
Because think about it, without forward deployed military assets, what is there for an attacker to attack on those islands?
They will just be bombing civilians.
If China forward deployed a lot of military assets, that gives an attacker more legitimate targets for a surprise attack, and they will be able to materially weaken Chinese defences by taking out so many high value military assets in an opening attack.
As such, not forward deploying high value military assets to those islands is part of the Chinese defence plans.
Without those high value assets to strike, that only leaves invasion and occupation as a worthwhile military option for a surprise attack on those islands. Because to truly knock those islands out as Chinese assets, you need to occupy them or else the Chinese will just quickly replair any damage from the initial attack, no matter how devastating, and then forward deploy high value military assets who would be on a shoot on sight policy and won’t be caught out by a surprise attack.
A surprise attack is one thing, occupation is a very different ball game.
Even if we for the moment gloss over the absurdity of any hostile amphibious assault fleets going unnoticed and unchallenged as they got within strike range of all those islands and deployed troops, and just for the sake of argument say they took those islands within hours. Then what? Does anyone think China will just call quits at that point?
Now the attacker has a real nightmare of a problem because the logistical burden they would face trying to resupply and reinforce those islands so far away from friendly support bases.
Those islands are only fortresses for the Chinese because of the close proximity of their geographic location to mainland bases. Without that critical component, they would truly become the sitting duck liabilities that the western media tries so hard to paint them as, for any hostile occupation force. And any occupation troops they deploy on the islands are liable to get pounded to oblivion by Chinese counter attacks launched from those same close proximity mainland bases.
Without first systematically destroying or at least crippling Chinese long range strike and power projection capabilities, all a surprise invasion of those islands would achieve is to give China easy targets to shoot back at; while effectively tying down your fleets and giving up your greatest naval asset of mobility; and to put the cherry on top, you make any and all Chinese retaliatory military action bullet-proof diplomatically.
The Chinese strategy is not to build a fortress in the SCS, but to subtly lay the ground work to allow such a fortress to be created pretty much overnight.
By doing that, China both presents potential adversaries with a grim operating environment, but also deny them any juicy targets to hit along with any possible diplomatic pretext for a first strike.
Hostile enemy fleets can not operate freely in the SCS when they know they are being tracked by sensors and surveillance assets deployed from those islands; and because they know those islands could pretty much turn into fortresses overnight. So they could not afford to simply bypass them on their way to strike at mainland targets or threaten Chinese shipping in the SCS, as they risk getting surrounded and destroyed. But attacking those islands on their way in would destroy their element of surprise while also dealing a mortal blow to their cause diplomatically.
While on paper, those islands might look vulnerable to attack right now. In reality, anyone foolish enough to attack those islands out of the blue would do very little to harm their military worth to China at best, or trap themselves trying to defend those islands from a Chinese counter attack and get ground to scrap by China’s overwhelming logistical and geographical advantages fighting in the region.