China's SCS Strategy Thread

[PikeCowboy]

I don't understand the NK card, if anything a nuclearized NK is a much bigger threat to China than to the US.
How much control does China have over NK...

 

[solarz]

It is likely that Trump is laying the foundation for future provocations towards China. The Chinese response to this first provocation was sensible, and should be a model for future responses.

It is the interests of the American government and the governments of America's allies to force a confrontation with China whilst they are still in a position to prevail in such a confrontation. Conversely, it is in China's interest to avoid any such confrontation until such time as it can prevail, which is certainly not within the next decade. This may require accepting various humiliations in the interim. At the most extreme, a repeat of 1996 cannot be ruled out. Nonetheless, Beijing should not lose sight of the bigger picture. Make no mistake, there are many within the American foreign policy and military establishments who are spoiling for a fight with China. Do not under any circumstances give it to them.

You mistake de-escalation with accepting humiliation. Between two nuclear capable nations, military escalation is simply madness. De-escalation means a return to status quo while allowing both sides to claim "mission accomplished" to their domestic audience.

 

[AssassinsMace]

China should not fear escalation. They're saying this Taiwan call was about establishing leverage on China because the Sino-US relation has been in China's favor only. Like making hundreds of billions of dollars from outsourcing exploiting slave labor in China hasn't made the US richer than it's ever been? The consequences are far worse for the US beyond just money. Americans expect countries to follow their commitments to the international order. Like Trump thinks he can break the One-China policy anytime he wants? That means China can break commitments. What are they going to say? How evil China is for backing out of their commitments?

Some say the call was really about North Korea ultimately. They mean the country the US and it's allies are too afraid of taking on themselves and want China to do everything for them? And then they think they can take on China... Just let the US make the first move and China should not be afraid of escalation. The US will step back first just like Obama started the Pivot to Asia and caused a mess he didn't expect and he stepped back. Things need to happen for the truth to surface to expose the lies that have been established in this world on how it works especially how the US doesn't need anyone to which why Trump thinks he can be careless.

 

[solarz]

China should not fear escalation.

No, it should not, but neither should it seek escalation. Meet provocations firmly but calmly, and offer to sit down and talk when the other side has finished ranting and raving.

 

[tidalwave]

I don't understand the NK card, if anything a nuclearized NK is a much bigger threat to China than to the US.
How much control does China have over NK...

No way man, NK will collapse within 1 week if China stop shipping them stuffs,
NK's nuke are for protection against US invasion and also used to blackmail US and its allies to get concession.

 

[tidalwave]

No, it should not, but neither should it seek escalation. Meet provocations firmly but calmly, and offer to sit down and talk when the other side has finished ranting and raving.

Tit-for-Tat.

 

[Quickie]

Wrong thread.

 

[Lethe]

You mistake de-escalation with accepting humiliation. Between two nuclear capable nations, military escalation is simply madness. De-escalation means a return to status quo while allowing both sides to claim "mission accomplished" to their domestic audience.

You cannot de-escalate without humiliation if the other party is not interested in de-escalating, and I have already outlined why it could well be that the United States will actively seek confrontation with China going forward, both to distract from troubles at home (see:

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) and in accordance with Power Transition Theory. In such circumstances, the only "de-escalation" involves acceding to US (Japanese, etc.) demands. And I am suggesting that, if necessary, China should do precisely that, rather than engage in a conflict it is not yet capable of winning, and which would endanger all that China has achieved in recent decades.

 

[Blitzo]

You cannot de-escalate without humiliation if the other party is not interested in de-escalating, and I have already outlined why it could well be that the United States will actively seek confrontation with China going forward. In such circumstances, the only "de-escalation" involves acceding to US (Japanese, etc.) demands. And I am suggesting that, if necessary, China should do precisely that, rather than engage in a conflict it is not yet capable of winning, and which would endanger all that China has achieved in recent decades,

There are certain demands or provocations that the US could make which would force China's hand and simply be unacceptable, in which case conflict and a nuclear exchange may well be possible.

China has certain core issues, where if things take a turn for the more brazen, neither side will be willing to back down and China would be forced to go all in knowing it may not be able to win.


I don't want to get anymore detailed than what I described, because this path of discussion is very much not encouraged by the forum rules (and even explicitly prohibited).

 

[Lethe]

There are certain demands or provocations that the US could make which would force China's hand and simply be unacceptable, in which case conflict and a nuclear exchange may well be possible.

China has certain core issues, where if things take a turn for the more brazen, neither side will be willing to back down and China would be forced to go all in knowing it may not be able to win.

I agree that China, like any other nation, has certain "red lines" that cannot be crossed without occasioning armed conflict, irrespective of the prospects for success. Nonetheless, a great many present and potential sources of friction do not fall into this category. For example, I would categorise most of China's interests in the South China Sea to be ultimately expendable to the cause of peace in the near future. That does not mean that China should not pursue her interests in the SCS, nor that she should "fold" at the first objection faxed through from Washington, Tokyo, Manila, etc. only that the fundamental guiding principle for Beijing should be to avoid a conflict that it cannot win.

Time is on China's side. Any concessions or humiliations that China is forced to make or accept in the near future (i.e. over at least the next decade) can potentially be revised or redressed at a future date when the balance of power is more favourable.