China's SCS Strategy Thread

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dingyibvs

Senior Member
The Philippines is facing a historic opportunity. Rather than being a junior partner in America's island chain to contain China, it could become China's doorway to the Pacific. Fighting crime is a nice populist move by Duterte to get elected, but it won't be a lasting legacy without fundamental changes to the Filipino economy, bureaucracy, and society. By ditching the U.S. and aligning with China, it could be a historic event in Filipino history, in Asian history, and really in world history.
 
Blackstone

Blackstone

Brigadier
tidalwave said:
That means US can't use military to defend scarborough like what they planning now for Philippines.
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To the contrary, US has no intention of using military force over Scarborough, and that's the basic message Ambassador Goldberg related to President Duterte. And when it comes to the Philippines mainland, it's also clear US would only fight if Philippines is attacked. So, if the A-10s and two CBGs were meant as redlines over the SCS, Goldberg's 'no-bid' message to Duterte kneecapped it.

Vietnam and rest of ASEAN also got the message: if US wouldn't go to bat for a treaty ally, what's the real value of US security guarantee?
 
Brumby

Brumby

Major
joshuatree said:
Again, don't see the PCA seeking submission of facts on Itu Aba from Taiwan. Per the Amicus Curiae submitted by CSIL of Taiwan, PCA only sought comments from the Philippines and PROC in regards to ROC's press release No 23 and only sought those two for all other matters. The court accepted CSIL's self initiated Amicus Curiae around April 2016 but this is more reactive than proactively seeking anything from Taiwan.
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You are right that specifically Taiwan's role to-date is an unilateral initiation with its Amicus Curiae and not as a direct request from the PCA. I stand corrected on this point. The request on Itu Aba was directed at the Philippines and the PRC. However, Taiwan's Amicus Curiae also serves to confirm that the issue of Taiping island is clearly within the orbit of the PCA's consideration. The issue is how and if at all Taiping island would play a role in the ruling. We will know in a week's time.

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joshuatree said:
Recalling factual impediments are important. While the Philippines made point numbers 8 & 9 in its "Relief Sought" that Scarborough should only be entitled to 12 NM and that it should be able to exploit resources in waters adjacent to Scarborough, what is actually happening around Scarborough does not support any notion that China is impeding the Philippines economic access around the Scarborough area outside of 12 NM. I am open to presentation of any verifiable incidents as I could not find any yet. And any such incidents should be outside of Itu Aba's potential 200 NM EEZ to be truly in violation of UNCLOS as opposed to disputed waters. Facts were presented in court I'm sure but that does not preclude selective facts. Example - Paul Reichler's presentation of facts on Itu Aba in court are far different from the facts submitted by CSIL's Amicus Curiae.
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Claims 8 and 9 are with reservations and IMO is because of Itu Aba. Claim 13 is purposely structured to avoid the same trip wire that ended up with reservations for claims 8 & 9. Collectively, it depends on primarily how the PCA would address the issue of Itu Aba and then on the facts of the impediments. On the latter it is not what facts we are aware of that is important but what facts are presented and made available to the PCA. We will know soon enough at least whether there were sufficient facts.
 
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ahojunk

Senior Member
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Xinhua, July 5, 2016

China on Monday slammed remarks by the Philippines' chief lawyer on the international arbitration of the South China Sea disputes, saying his comments prove the court is "only a mouthpiece for certain groups."

An international ruling this month is expected to deprive China of any legal basis for its claim to most of the South China Sea, the Philippines' chief lawyer in the case, Paul Reichler, told Reuters last week.

"It is no surprise for Mr. Reichler to know the Philippines' thinking, as its attorney, but it is strange that he seems to know what the ruling will be even before there is one," Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei said when asked to comment on the lawyer's remarks.

"Reichler's comments prove the court is only a mouthpiece for certain groups. His words show the case filed by the Philippines has to do with sovereignty over islands and reefs as well as maritime demarcation," Hong said.

His remarks prove that former Philippines President Benigno S. Aquino III has been telling lies for years, Hong said.

The arbitral tribunal established at the request of the Philippines has no jurisdiction over the case, and the upcoming ruling will result from abuse of the law and is therefore invalid, the spokesperson said.

China's territorial sovereignty and rights in the South China Sea, backed on a historical and legal basis, are immune to the illegal ruling, Hong said.
 
Blackstone

Blackstone

Brigadier
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As the date for the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s release of its ruling in Philippines v. China nears, Asia’s attention is focused on how the ruling will affect China’s claims and behaviors in the South China Sea. It is safe to say that the ruling will have a big impact on China’s strategic behavior in Asia, as well as the United States’ role in Asia (not to mention other claimant states’ positions and likely actions).

Although it is correct to focus on the likely strategic consequences of the ruling, we should keep in mind that there is another battle that has been ongoing for quite some time: the struggle over discursive power and the narrative with regard to the South China Sea. This is so because the South China Sea is not only strategically important for China, the United States, and other claimant states; it is also significant in terms of who controls the global discourse on international law and global order.

So far China has been in the defense when it comes to international law as many international analysts believe that its non-participation in the arbitration case hurts Beijing’s international image very badly. The U.S. and its allies can easily attack China for demonstrating a lack of respect for international law, even though the U.S. itself has not ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, despite strong domestic support.

Of course, whether China’s non-participation and non-compliance with the arbitration ruling even constitute real violations of international law is debatable. There is evidence to support either position. The United States and its allies seek to paint a picture of China being the regional bully and an irresponsible power whereas China seeks to portray the United States as the ultimate hypocrite with ulterior intentions in the South China Sea. If this is a battle of narratives, then there is no clear winner, as both China and the United States find support for their positions in their traditional camps (China among developing countries and the United States among developed states).

Narrative is about who controls the power to define a problem and to offer solutions. It is a kind of soft power that can sometimes best military power in conflict resolution. China has been a weak player in soft power games for a long time; but, in recent years, Beijing has been catching up very quickly, thanks to the growing power of its think tanks.

The rapid rise of Chinese think tanks has been a relatively new phenomenon since 2013. Popping up like mushrooms, Chinese think tanks are gaining international influence steadily, particularly in issue areas like the South China Sea disputes. It used to be the case that foreign think tanks would open branches in China, such as the
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in Beijing and the
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. Both are operated by major U.S. think tanks and both are playing a positive role in deepening U.S.-China mutual understanding. Feeling the inadequacy to directly influence U.S. policy opinions, China has recently invested to set up research centers in the United States. For example, the newly launched
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in Washington, DC, aims to “bring together Chinese and American academic scholars as well as policy practitioners… to provide a window into their respective worldviews.”

And this is only the beginning of a new trend. Chinese think tanks are beginning to bring their workshops and conferences directly to Washington, hoping to communicate face-to-face with U.S. scholars and policymakers. For instance, another influential think tank in China, the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin Univeristy, will co-organize a conference on the South China Sea with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in DC on July 5, led by senior diplomats like Dai Bingguo (former state councilor) and John Negroponte (former deputy secretary of state). What this and similar meetings will produce remains to be seen, but the important point is that both China and the United States are actively communicating with each other — a crucial point that sometimes gets ignored by hotheads in both countries.

Long gone are the days when China only listens quietly to Western powers about how the world should operate. As China’s power continues to rise, it was inevitable that it would seek a chair at the table of global rule- and norm-making. Certainly, there is still a long way to go before China can reap the fruits of real discursive power, but we can already see the result of its efforts in the South China Sea. It is China’s long-term strategy have some say over global narratives, beyond its economic power and military power. Perhaps we should indeed let “one hundred flowers bloom” when it comes to global governance, because healthy competition would only make the world work better.
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tidalwave

Senior Member
Registered Member
I heard China ready to militarily take back Dongsa and Taiping from Taiwan after the ruling with the recent backdrop of the missile incidence.
 
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