yuxiaochen
Junior Member
Actually the jets have were already stationed on the island since last year, but in smaller numbers.
China's SCS Strategy Thread
- Thread starter lilzz
- Start date
joshuatree
Captain
These type of reporting grows old. Either it indicates a lack of fact checking or it's propaganda. Xi never said all of the SCS. Otherwise, military deployments on Hainan bases would be "militarizing" the SCS. Xi specifically referred to the Spratlys. And Hua further clarified more back then that pertaining to the Spratlys, defensive military facilities will be pursued and they don't consider that as militarization compared to all the other military exercises being conducted in those waters of late by other forces. Placing 16 fighters in the Paracels does not seem to contradict Xi's vow. Paracels does not equal Spratlys.
Brumby
Major
These type of reporting grows old. Either it indicates a lack of fact checking or it's propaganda. Xi never said all of the SCS. Otherwise, military deployments on Hainan bases would be "militarizing" the SCS. Xi specifically referred to the Spratlys. And Hua further clarified more back then that pertaining to the Spratlys, defensive military facilities will be pursued and they don't consider that as militarization compared to all the other military exercises being conducted in those waters of late by other forces. Placing 16 fighters in the Paracels does not seem to contradict Xi's vow. Paracels does not equal Spratlys.
I had previously noted this rather twisted sense of definition but since this is being brought up I would point to the farce as it is played out in the SCS. In essence, placing military infrastructure and systems in disputed territories are not acts of militarisation but sailing in global commons is. It doesn't matter the former has questionable legitimacy but the latter is a right provided by international law. When it comes to propaganda, I guess logic meaning and sense of perspective gets thrown out. Propaganda might work for the domestic audience but please don't assume we are morons.
Both sides are playing the semantic for all their worth.
The US would argue that reclaiming islands, building runways and enhanced observation posts with accommodations for military personnel and equipment which have the potential to be highly miltiarized is the equivalent of militarization and a provocative act, and that sailing large surface combatants through the SCS and flying highly capable surveillance aircraft and bombers, and maintaining a permanent naval presence in the form of carrier or amphibious task groups is merely exercising their rights in the global commons.
The Chinese would argue that the permanent forward deployment of naval forces in the SCS and conducting highly publicized flybys and sailbys using highly capable aircraft and surface vessels is provocative and a highly militarized act, while arguing their enhanced facilities on the islands only have the potential to be militarized and is not equal to militarization, and may even argue that whatever militarization they conduct is merely in response to preceding acts of militarization by the other party.
I also very much like the part of your post -- "It doesn't matter the former has questionable legitimacy but the latter is a right provided by international law" -- because an act can be conducted safely within international law but still be considered as militarization, or aggressive or a threat, by another party. In other words, you're right (even though I know you are being facetious) -- in this specific context of militarization, the perceived legitimacy of an act or perceived lack of legitimacy may not be as important, but rather the extent and degree of militarization conducted by each side as well as the chronology of who militarized first I think is more important.
That isn't to say that I don't appreciate the effect of perceived legitimacy and legal clarity of actions in the scope of media optics in helping to shape ideas of who is "right" and who is "wrong... but in the limited context of militarization itself, the legality of an act of potential militarization I think is far less important than intensity, breadth and chronology of militarization.
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As for your original post which Joshuatree is replying to -- the issue of deploying fighters to Yongxing island...
The fact of the matter is that we really don't know what Xi said to Obama in February (I believe?). Specifically we don't know whether he was talking about the reclaimed islands in the SCS or the ones that China had long occupied and have already been militarized before -- because Yongxing most definitely has played host to fighter aircraft on rotation for decades, and it is not one of the reclaimed islands that have been featured so much in news shows.
It's also daft for us to try and try and hold statements from heads of state (that may have been paraphrased by media or even spoken in off hand) to any sort of serious account. It's like us criticizing Obama who said repeatedly through his administrations that the US goal was not to contain China, despite making the Pacific Pivot a centrepiece of his foreign policy.
joshuatree
Captain
Both sides twist. It's a farce to be placing blame only on one actor in the Spratlys when other actors have long placed military infrastructure in disputed territories and were even recently the first to initiate large scale land reclamation. Then couple this with sailing in global commons that are done to be agitating and unequal in publicity plus non-stop war games that are supposedly not intended to target anyone.
I only brought up the issue of military infrastructure because it was going to be the natural knee-jerk rebuttal when highlighting that none of the Spratly installations have shown any militarization to date in terms of fighters. But to the issue of military infrastructure in the Spratlys, China has already been stated it will happen when clarifying Xi's comment at the time and thus, would not be breaking such vow. However, I no doubt the hollow charges will continue.
Regarding the issue of not assuming people are morons, it seems those that write articles about China breaking its vow presently when it hasn't certainly do assume people are morons. Cross checks on actual statements and maps readily dispel these articles.
Will there be a day when fighters get deployed to Spratly installations? Let's not be naive and believe any vows are made in a vacuum. If other actors choose certain actions, the dynamics get changed and other actors re-evaluate accordingly.
Brumby
Major
It has become a farce when statement has no meaning because what constitutes rule based behaviour has been thrown out of the window. Actions are judged based on whether it is legitimate and not whether you have a certain preference in defining its meaning. Is the Paracel islands in the SCS? According to your reasoning its location can be excluded just as the Hainan island is. The last time I checked, Hainan island is not in dispute. The source of the contention in the SCS is in the legitimacy of the actions and not in redefining the meaning of words. Rules are present to justify actions and to constrain behaviour. When there are no respect for rules, everything becomes debatable as we now faced. The US conducts war games just as the Chinese do. Is it a problem because the Chinese thinks so? What is the source of China's position? The right to sail in the high seas is a long established norm. China thinks It is provocative because it says so. What is its source to take such a position?
I can understand where you are coming from, but I perceived the area of contention [back in Joshuatree's post 2352] as being about the action of militarization by the various parties, not regarding the degree of legitimacy or lack of legitimacy in regards to militarization. *
Therefore, as I said in my last post, one can conduct very aggressive militarization acts while remaining comfortably within the bounds of accepted international law.
If the discussion was debating the legitimacy of militarization that each party has conducted, then your avenue of approach to the issue would be far more relevant.
* After all, the friction arose from the issue of whether Xi "broke" his "vow" to "not militarize" the SCS... and Joshuatree rightly posted the actual quote which was that China did not intend to conduct militarization at the Nansha/Spratly islands... the statement was not a vow of any sort but rather a reflection of China's intentions at the time. Nor did the statement refer to the Xisha/Paracel islands, which includes Yongxing/Woody island that was photographed with the fighters -- which of course had been militarized for years and played host to Chinese fighter aircraft in the past as well. In other words, the concern was that Xi's original statement was being twisted to become a straw man to try and make it seem like he was somehow going back on his word, when his original statement appears to have been turned into something else entirely different via media paraphrasing.
Brumby
Major
I did not write that article. I shared that article because it quantified 16 fighters were now based off that island. Arguments clearly can be made if one wants to be selective and so is justification to anything including taking exceptions. However as typically with these kind of issues, it can cut both ways and normally why I prefer to stick to rule based issues.
Okay.
In which case, I don't understand your post 2353 in response to Joshuatree's, because it seems to be quite irrelevant to the primary case that he was making (which was that the article was incorrectly quoting Xi and essentially making a straw man), nor was it relevant to the secondary case he was making (which was in regards to the different degrees of militarization that each party had made in the SCS and/or were in the process of making).
From the way I read your post again, it didn't seem to be refuting any of his statements, and you obviously weren't backing up any of his statements so I'm not really sure what your bottom line was.
I'm also not exactly sure what you mean by "farce" in the SCS in regards to militarization there.
eldarlmari
New Member
The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) was the star of a simulated assault exercise by 5,500 US and Philippine soldiers, unleashing six missiles at distant targets from a dry riverbed three hours' drive from Manila.
US Marine Cobra attack helicopters and Philippine S211 jets also buzzed over the Crow Valley training range as Filipino and US troops acted out the capture of imaginary enemy-held territory.
The exercises were staged in the shadow of a festering dispute between the poorly equipped US ally and regional giant China over islands, reefs and waters in the resource-rich South China Sea.
"The truth of the matter is we are allies and as allies, we need to work together," Lieutenant-General John Toolan, the US Marine Corps Pacific commander told reporters, referring to the missile system.
"I think we will be more than happy to share," he said when asked if the US would deploy HIMARS to the Philippines in the case of armed conflict over the South China Sea.
The system's range is 300 kilometres (186 miles), Toolan said, meaning it could hit vessels far from the Philippine landmass.
China claims most of the South China Sea, even waters and rocks close to the coasts of several neighbours that overlap with their claims.
Beijing has reclaimed several reefs claimed by Manila and built structures on them that the Philippines alleges were designed for military use -- a charge China denies.
- 'Highly mobile, lethal' -
Although the United States has not taken a stand on the conflicting claims to the South China Sea, it has opposed China's efforts to claim the waters and has stressed freedom of navigation in the vital sealane.
"We have seen the capability. It is highly mobile, lethal. So I think it is one of the capabilities we want to have," Philippine Navy Vice-Admiral Alexander Lopez said as he watched the missile firing.
Lopez, the commander of Filipino forces in the South China Sea, told reporters this would "raise the skill and the respect for your armed forces, not only for the Filipinos but also in our region".
Toolan said the two-week manoeuvres displayed the capability of both armies to deploy rapidly across the Asian archipelago.
The truck-mounted missile system had been flown aboard a giant military transport plane to an airport near the Crow Valley firing range earlier in the day from the western Philippine island of Palawan.
The Philippines has been improving its defence ties with the United States to help upgrade its capability to defend its territory.
The Philippines has allowed American forces to rotate through five Philippine bases including one on Palawan and another in the north, both close to the South China Sea.
Asked if HIMARS systems would be deployed in these five bases, Toolan said: "That's not necessarily in the plan but obviously, with the mobility the HIMARS gives you, you can use it anywhere."
next comes ASBMs stationed on Huangyan island(when it's ready for deployment in a hypothesized strategic scenario) as tit-for-tat??