China's SCS Strategy Thread

[SamuraiBlue]

What else could we expect? China lacks media tycoons with global reach who can somehow persuade an alternative interpretation of contemporary events. She has hundreds of billionaires but none of them is a Murdoch. So the narrative is inevitably anti-China, even anti-Chinese, given the undertow of unresolved historical , geopolitical baggage and rivalries.

Nonetheless, China must dominate SCS. Her increased presence and improved capabilities would alter all claimants expectation on how they could reasonably resolve this mess. Regardless any solution would need the blessings of both China and US, tacit or otherwise.

Laws were written long time ago in a different age. Today is altogether different time, with new realities and different circumstances. FFS US has pretty much abandoned WTO, no longer fit for her needs. Therein come TTIP and TPP. IMF doesn't fit China's requirement, so we see AIIB. It's great nations' tradition to set the rules as they see fit and have the strength to do what needs to be done. They are exceptions, not meek conformists. US is an exception, so is China.

If UNCLOS, and its attendant PCA ruling ignore China's legitimate needs, what would hold her back to change the rules as she sees fit, sooner or later ? It's a foregone conclusion.

Pretty confusing argument with irrelevant comparison.
WTO and UNCLOS are similar in which it act as regulation of conduct of nations in international relationship. TTP is not an alternative to WTO and will obey any and all WTO rulings.
On the other hand IMF is not by any means an international regulatory body and although it is part of UN, it is the same as AIIB in which they lend money to nations.

Now about SCS, IF (and I stress the IF part) ICJ finds Philippines case favorable towards the Philippines then I believe PRC would have no choice but to cut down several notches and back off because if they do not then it will give the perfect excuse for the US to engage in a more proactive posture to protect the rights of an ally, the Philippines since ICJ had judged that the Philippines argument as fair with validity and justice is on Philippines' side.

 

[Blackstone]

Now about SCS, IF (and I stress the IF part) ICJ finds Philippines case favorable towards the Philippines then I believe PRC would have no choice but to cut down several notches and back off because if they do not then it will give the perfect excuse for the US to engage in a more proactive posture to protect the rights of an ally, the Philippines since ICJ had judged that the Philippines argument as fair with validity and justice is on Philippines' side.

If, ICJ finds for Philippines, China has plenty of choices, and not all of them bad in the grand scheme of things. China would say it legally opted out, and ignore the ruling; Beijing will continue to manage the divisions within ASEAN to prevent a united front against it. On the other hand, if Beijing peals back its relentless effort to create its own Monroe Doctrine, it'd be largely symbolic and short-termed. Why should it do any different? It's in Chinese long-term national interests to dominate the region, control its sea lines of communication, and secure its soft underbelly.

 

[solarz]

Now about SCS, IF (and I stress the IF part) ICJ finds Philippines case favorable towards the Philippines then I believe PRC would have no choice but to cut down several notches and back off because if they do not then it will give the perfect excuse for the US to engage in a more proactive posture to protect the rights of an ally, the Philippines since ICJ had judged that the Philippines argument as fair with validity and justice is on Philippines' side.

There are no international laws that govern the SCS dispute. UNCLOS is frequently cited, but it is irrelevant because UNCLOS does not deal with issues of sovereignty, which is what the SCS dispute is about.

If the ICJ decides to rule against China for political reasons, then it will only be undermining its own legitimacy.

The US is free to take any posture they wish, but there is nothing they can do, short of open war, to stop China from its activities in the region.

 

[Blackstone]

There are no international laws that govern the SCS dispute. UNCLOS is frequently cited, but it is irrelevant because UNCLOS does not deal with issues of sovereignty, which is what the SCS dispute is about.

Philippines' law suit doesn't directly deal with sovereignty. It asked the arbitration court to make all SCS features "rocks," regardless of how they were treated in the past, and it also asked the court to invalidate China's claims of control based on historical rights to the area.

If the ICJ decides to rule against China for political reasons, then it will only be undermining its own legitimacy.

I'm not sure if China is better off playing hardball and take short-term goodwill hits, or finesse any ruling against it by offering some symbolic gestures that don't affect its current SCS strategic positions, and wouldn't impede their efforts to impose their own Monroe Doctrine. My guess is the former is better, because fait accomplis by great powers are awfully hard to forcibly dislodge.

The US is free to take any posture they wish, but there is nothing they can do, short of open war, to stop China from its activities in the region.

The other side of that coin is China has no incentives to stop efforts to impose its own Monroe Doctrine, because US encirclement attempt will continue no matter how China reacts to the arbitration court's ruling. Neocons- who dominates the US government, military, and policy circles- are on record saying even if China adapts US-style democracy, it is still an enemy of the the US. Just think, these people believe a liberal democracy-based China isn't merely a competitor, but an enemy. No wonder President Reagan, in his second term, said he thought those people were crazy.

 

[taxiya]

Surveillance within EEZ is provided for within UNCLOS except China holds a minority view that is not supported by the provisions and the deliberations that preceded to the final text. This has been beaten to death. If there is a misalignment between international provisions and domestic legislation then it is China's responsibility to make that domestic adjustment and not an excuse to act outside what it has signed up for internationally. Otherwise it is simply a farce.

But since US has NOT ratified UNCLOS, how could US take on UNCLOS to justify her survaillance activities?

 

[solarz]

Philippines' law suit doesn't directly deal with sovereignty. It asked the arbitration court to make all SCS features "rocks," regardless of how they were treated in the past, and it also asked the court to invalidate China's claims of control based on historical rights to the area.

Sounds like sovereignty to me.

 

[Blackstone]

Blackstone said: ↑
Philippines' law suit doesn't directly deal with sovereignty. It asked the arbitration court to make all SCS features "rocks," regardless of how they were treated in the past, and it also asked the court to invalidate China's claims of control based on historical rights to the area.

Sounds like sovereignty to me.

Well, it depends on what "historical rights" China assert. If we take the traditional view of "rights," then it has nothing to do with sovereignty, because no state in the region claimed waters far away from its shores as sovereignty territory.

 

[Yvrch]

Pretty confusing argument with irrelevant comparison.
WTO and UNCLOS are similar in which it act as regulation of conduct of nations in international relationship. TTP is not an alternative to WTO and will obey any and all WTO rulings.
On the other hand IMF is not by any means an international regulatory body and although it is part of UN, it is the same as AIIB in which they lend money to nations.

Speaking of dysfunctional regulatory bodies, are you sure what you said about this part : TTP is not an alternative to WTO and will obey any and all WTO rulings. Another balance sheet in the black fiasco, maybe?
Anyway, it's OT. Please carry on with SCS arguments.

 

[solarz]

Well, it depends on what "historical rights" China assert. If we take the traditional view of "rights," then it has nothing to do with sovereignty, because no state in the region claimed waters far away from its shores as sovereignty territory.

Not sure what you're talking about. China is only claiming sovereignty over islands in the SCS, nothing more, nothing less. History is simply one of the supporting factors in China's claim.

 

[Hendrik_2000]

You are conflating between two zones i.e. territory seas and EEZ. A significant outcome of UNCLOS was the creation of the sui generis EEZ. The EEZ was a grand bargain outcome between the coastal states and the maritime powers i.e. balancing between the economic zone expansion for the coastal states but preserving the freedom of navigation for the maritime powers. Article 58 specifically created the notion of sovereign rights for the coastal states as opposed to sovereignty governing the 12 nm territory seas. The distinction is to differentiate resource rights and the other limited jurisdiction in the EEZ. Btw, innocent passage provisions has no application outside territory seas.

China’s position that surveillance is not permitted within the EEZ is not supported by State practice, a plain reading of UNCLOS, or customary laws of the sea. The only place in UNCLOS that address intelligence collection is Article 19(2)(c). That article restricts foreign ships transiting the territorial sea in innocent passage from engaging in “any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal state.” An analogous limitation does not appear in Part V of the Convention which deals with the EEZ. Article 89 provides that “no State may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty” and Article 89 applies to the EEZ pursuant to Article 58(2). In other words, there are no specific provisions in UNCLOS that prohibit the conduct of surveillance activities within the EEZ. It should also be pointed out that in accordance with a generally accepted principle of international law, any act that is not prohibited in international law is permitted as per the Lotus principle.

No I didn't read this passage from the convention of the sea. The freedom to do activity in EEZ are limited and itemized by the the convention No where does it say freedom of snooping or surveillance And China did enumerated their interpretation of UNCLOS when signing the UNCLOS so did India and Malaysia

Beyond the territorial sea, the Law of the Sea Convention also confirms there is freedom of navigation for all vessels. Article 87 provides:


1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked.

Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention and by other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and land-locked States:

(a)freedom of navigation;

(b)freedom of overflight;

(c)freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part VI;

(d)freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted under international law, subject to Part VI;

(e)freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in section 2;

(f)freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII.

2. These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas, and also with due regard for the rights under this Convention with respect to activities in the Area.

While the Law of the Sea Convention makes it clear there is freedom of navigation on the high seas, the same freedom is extended to the EEZ by Article 58(1):


In the exclusive economic zone all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention.

The right of freedom of navigation on the high seas and the EEZ is circumscribed by the notion of “due regard” for the rights of others. As such, if a State is lawfully fishing, or engaged in exploration or exploitation of seabed resources, other States ought not prejudice or interfere with that activity in undertaking their rights. As such, it is clear that undertaking military exercises on the high seas and EEZ of another State would be subject to the non-interference with the rights of other users.[1]



[1] See B. Oxman, “The Regime of Warships under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea” (1984) 24 Virginia Journal of International Law 809.