China's SCS Strategy Thread

[Zool]

It is worth mentioning that Japan fortifying their islands is not quite the same as what China is doing, because those islands of Japan are considered their territory and not currently embroiled in a territorial dispute, whereas the reclaimed islands that China has built are part of a larger territorial dispute.

That said, the reasoning behind potential militarization of any degree, by any nation, in any theater in the world, is all the same -- that is, it depends on the perceived security environment.

I see it as two separate issues, that of militarizing regional waterways versus territorial ownership disputes. They are not synonymous; militarization being specific to the introduction of new interdictory weapon systems to a theater. So I do not equate what China is currently doing, territorial expansion/development (however one prefers to term it) with militarization.

That said, I do fully expect China will continue on the same path of regional militarization as that of Japan and the US per the circular logic and reasoning I noted in my earlier post. Something will need to change in the equation for this to be altered; perhaps a government level change within one or more of the countries with improved person-person contacts and negotiation prospects as a result. Difficult to say.

 

[Zetageist]

South China Sea arbitration: Beijing puts forward her own views Part One

December 11, 2015

By Alex Calvo

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

"

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

"

South China Sea arbitration: Beijing puts forward her own views Part Two

December 23, 2015

By Alex Calvo

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

"

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

"

 

[delft]

South China Sea arbitration: Beijing puts forward her own views Part One

December 11, 2015

By Alex Calvo

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

"

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

"

I just read Part One and what stuck me at the start were a number of dates:
the piece is dated December 11, 2015, it refers to a new Chinese document dated December 7, 2014 and it writes about the first oral hearings on the substantive aspects of the case, scheduled for late November 2015.
What's this about? Or was the Chinese article already a year old?

 

[advill]

There will be "fireworks" or calm seas in the South China Sea. Hopefully there will be cool head this coming New Year.

 

[Zetageist]

I just read Part One and what stuck me at the start were a number of dates:
the piece is dated December 11, 2015, it refers to a new Chinese document dated December 7, 2014 and it writes about the first oral hearings on the substantive aspects of the case, scheduled for late November 2015.
What's this about? Or was the Chinese article already a year old?

I was buffled with that date too at first, then I found that Chinese Position Paper is indeed dated 7 December 2014:

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

Whatever one thinks about it, it is useful to examine the

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

, dated 7 December 2014 (unclear whether any pun intended), while ...

The author seemed to think there is a pun with that date? Is it because of December 7, 1941?

 

[Ultra]

I was just browsing the web and happened upon this article:




To Defeat China in Battle, America Should Study World War II
The U.S. Pacific strategy was to intercept and deny energy resources
by MICHAEL W. PIETRUCHA


"Military organizations are often accused of fighting the last war. In the case of the U.S. Air Force, the war in question is Desert Storm, the last unambiguous U.S. victory and a major milestone in the development of American air power.

The Gulf War was a major success, demonstrating effective applications of stealth, precision and electronic warfare. But the war was fought with overwhelming logistical, numerical and technological superiority against an adversary that was geographically isolated, poorly trained, badly equipped and ineptly led.

It is unlikely that the United States will operate from such a position of advantage again. Pentagon planners should give up on the fantasy of a short, decisive war against the People’s Republic of China — any “short, decisive war” involving the PRC is likely to end in a PRC victory.

In a potential conflict with China, it is the U.S. that is geographically and numerically disadvantaged. Further, China has organized military developments for the past two decades around one key principle — that the U.S. would not be allowed to repeat Desert Storm.

The U.S. Department of Defense summarizes the Chinese approach under an “anti-access, area denial,” a.k.a A2AD label, but is overly focused on finding technological means to operate in the A2AD environment in order to attempt a repeat of the Gulf War’s air campaign. China is perhaps the least likely country to succumb to such a strategy, which is really an attempt to match strength against strength in an epic, mano-a-mano battle where China holds advantages in distance and mass that we are unlikely to ever overcome conventionally.

If the Air Force is going to do its part in deterring the PRC, the Pentagon must contribute to a viable offset strategy that relies as much on geography as technology. This is not to say that the United States cannot effectively fight the PRC, only that it cannot do so with a replay of techniques that proved successful more than two decades ago over Iraq.

The war the United States should base its strategy upon is another conflict in which it fought an island nation that had successfully executed an “A2AD” strategy by physically occupying much of the Asian landmass from Manchuria to Burma — to Wake Island and the Solomons.

The example we are looking for, and should be planning to, is the Pacific War from 1941 to 1945.
An analysis of the flow of goods and materials into and out of China reveals that with 98 percent of all freight moving by sea, China is practically, if not geographically, an island nation.

As such, it is vulnerable to interdiction of trade routes and energy supplies to a far greater degree than a land power, and this is a national vulnerability that air power is well-positioned to exploit — if applied properly."

CONTINUE HERE:

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

While nothing new from what it stated, it makes sense and makes a case of WHY the Pentagon and US Navy is increasingly harassing China on the SCS and promoting its "freedom of navigation" propoganda. It is critical part of US's future strategy to contain/win war against China. From SCS one can see the great game being play before our eyes - US's maneuvering (or over-maneuvering) which prompted China's response to "One-belt One Road" land based supply chain which would deter US's sea-lane based containment (which would be critical blow to China's economy and war-fighting ability until One-Belt One Road becomes operational).

In order for China to break US's containment strategy over both SCS, Indian ocean and the Pacific, China has to have CVBG or CSG, but currently China's is lacking in both quanitity and quality. The most critical part of its CSG weakness is the supply chain - as noted by David Axe of War is Boring:







China Flaunts First Carrier Battle Group Photo Op
Impressive images include hints of naval limitations

......"But the details of the Liaoning battle group’s portraits also reveal the weaknesses in Chinese naval organization as Beijing struggles to match the world’s leading maritime power......"

Where are the logistics ships?
"The true secret to American naval power is not the numerous and powerful front-line warships, but the less visually impressive vessels that you rarely see on TV or read about in the news.

They are logistics ships, including tankers, dry stores vessels and ammunition ships. The Pentagon’s three-dozen active combat-support vessels, manned mostly by civilian mariners, busily crisscross the globe, carefully plotting their courses to regularly meet up with the carriers and other task forces in order to refuel and resupply them.

Without logistics ships, the U.S. Navy would never venture far from its major home ports in Virginia, Florida, California and Hawaii. These vital but unattractive supply vessels occasionally enjoy the privilege of appearing in carrier battle group photo ops.

But no logistics ships are visible in Liaoning’s recent photos. That could be because China possesses only a token naval logistical flotilla—and mostly uses it to support Beijing’s counter-piracy force off of East Africa. “Limited logistical support remains a key obstacle preventing the [Chinese] Navy from operating more extensively beyond East Asia,” the Pentagon reported recently.

It’s no accident that in her two years of trials, Liaoning has never sailed far from the Chinese coast. Her recent deployment to the South China Sea was the farthest she’s traveled from Qingdao, but the voyage still kept her only a short distance from shore bases."

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

 

[davidau]

"China flaunts first carrier battle group photo op.." Wait till the fleet of J-15s is ready, with may be 10-12 on the flight deck, coupled with 052Ds, 054As, 093 sub, 094 subs armed with JL-2 missiles, and the new > 40K ton 901 replenishment ship ( a huge logistic ship), that will be the time for a group photo...

 

[Ultra]

"China flaunts first carrier battle group photo op.." Wait till the fleet of J-15s is ready, with may be 10-12 on the flight deck, coupled with 052Ds, 054As, 093 sub, 094 subs armed with JL-2 missiles, and the new > 40K ton 901 replenishment ship ( a huge logistic ship), that will be the time for a group photo...

I am definitely interested in the Type 901 Fast Combat Support Ship. Anyone got pics or know how fast this one travels?

 

[joshuatree]

Alot tougher to interfere in Paracel islands; they are far away from busy trade route and they have natually formed islands with real inhabitants since 1974.

The paracel island chain is 230 miles from vietnam almost equi-distance from Hainan. So, EEZ 200 miles UNCLOS from Vietnam can also be throwing out the window.

The only one left is FON but unlikely spratley, there's 12 miles limit due to naturally formed island.

anyhow, PLAN is ramping up and paracel will be a major naval base , possibly able to host a carrier group there. China already said it won't have major militerization in Spratley man-made island but it's banking on enhanced Paracel to a major reimforcement point for Spratley.

Hosting a carrier group in the Paracels doesn't make much sense since the infrastructure would not be able to meet the needs of the crew sizes associated with a CBG. It seems right now, they want to shore up the outer perimeters of the Paracel group. However, I still think it would be strategic to forward deploy newer diesel subs out there because of its proximity to deep water. And homeport a few type 022s. That combination will create headaches for any potential opfor's planning. Those islands supporting crew sizes of anything 40 and below would be much more sustainable.

 

[PanAsian]

I was just browsing the web and happened upon this article:

To Defeat China in Battle, America Should Study World War II
The U.S. Pacific strategy was to intercept and deny energy resources
by MICHAEL W. PIETRUCHA
...

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

While nothing new from what it stated, it makes sense and makes a case of WHY the Pentagon and US Navy is increasingly harassing China on the SCS and promoting its "freedom of navigation" propoganda. It is critical part of US's future strategy to contain/win war against China. From SCS one can see the great game being play before our eyes - US's maneuvering (or over-maneuvering) which prompted China's response to "One-belt One Road" land based supply chain which would deter US's sea-lane based containment (which would be critical blow to China's economy and war-fighting ability until One-Belt One Road becomes operational).

In order for China to break US's containment strategy over both SCS, Indian ocean and the Pacific, China has to have CVBG or CSG, but currently China's is lacking in both quanitity and quality. The most critical part of its CSG weakness is the supply chain - as noted by David Axe of War is Boring:

China Flaunts First Carrier Battle Group Photo Op
Impressive images include hints of naval limitations
...

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

I have to disagree with both points.

For the US to successfully contain and defeat China both prior to an outbreak of military hostilities as well as in the event of military hostilities is for the US to deprive China of neighboring countries' neutrality and preferably sow hostility as per how the Soviet Union was defeated or more accurately imploded.

This successful strategy is well under way and China is already in a bind. It most efficiently leverages the immense US advantages in having both more carrots and more sticks to use on smaller countries which China cannot possibly hope to match. Together with US willingness, capability, and expertise acquired through a longstanding practice of persistent, aggressive exercising of both hard and soft power to shape the domestic politics and hearts and minds of smaller countries, especially those with a history of being Western colonial subjects. Essentially the US exercises textbook divide and conquer with the colonialist touch of self-proclaimed cultural superiority, which is akin to the psychology of hazing capitalizing on the idolization of the wealthy and powerful including the deliberate immoral pursuit of both.

Carriers mostly help China in breaking the US containment strategy as an additional venue for international relations in friendly training exchanges and technological co-operation. Further improved national internal development, a more active and refined foreign policy and exercise of soft power including developing deeper friendly relations with continental neighbors, and maintaining sufficient military deterrence against any possible hostile gang bang including the US, are all necessary moves by China to counter the containment. China is pursuing these moves but the inertia of the circumstances are much to the advantage of US containment, both China and the US are vigorously contending the momentum though so things are only going to get more interesting.

Strictly militarily speaking China must possess sufficient military power to deter any hostile actions within the first island chain with the goal of no successful attacks on the Chinese mainland. To this end carriers don't help much but subs, frigates/destroyers, long range attack aircraft/fighters/bombers/UAVs, ballistic/cruise missiles, long range ISR and air defense systems do.