Brumby
Major
As I said, the remaining debating point is the driver leading to any deployment. I read yours as "reactionary" but I would not rule out "opportunistic" or even normative according to China's own internal timetable.
China's SCS Strategy Thread
- Thread starter lilzz
- Start date
That particular debating point was not a matter of contention between Samuraiblue and I in the original discussion.
My original point was simply that the degree of militarization would be dependent on the perceived security situation there, and that we should not assume the most highly militarized scenario as the only immediate option.
As to whether a deployment change would be considered as "reactionary" or "opportunistic" -- I think we have quite differing opinions regarding what drivers would be considered as a sufficient driver for whatever kind of deployment change occurs.
That said, I do believe that in the long term (two or three decades time scale), China may seek to gradually increase the deployed force there as standard operating procedure, to a certain level (but even then it probably would not be near the full capacity of the bases) -- that would also accompany a greater Chinese Naval presence in the SCS as part of its standard operating procedure as well... and this would probably be accompanied by political overtures and initiatives to some nations in the region to assure them that this gradual increase in Chinese naval and air presence is not a threat to them and to offer cooperation and trust building, even alongside any possible territorial disputes which may still exist at that time... with the end goal of normalizing a greater Chinese presence in the SCS with acceptance by some if not most of the nations in SCS.
However I also think that in the short term I think they would not be seeking to immediately turn up their presence to an excessively aggressive posture such as permanently deploying as many strike aircraft on each island as possible.
Brumby
Major
I agree it wasn't in the initial discussion point but the underlying driver in my view dictates any likely action. De-coupling it would make the conversation rather hollow.
I agree any immediate high end militarization would be unlikely and I don't believe anyone is making that suggestion. I think it would be counter productive on a wider political front to make such a move. I would expect to see enhancement of ISR assets though.
I don't know, the way Samuraiblue described his position made it seem like the potential for stationing more assets on the islands means that China definitely will do so, and that China would seek outright militarization. The position seemed rather extreme (hollow is another word for it) to begin with.
Discussing potential "drivers" for changing a deployment is a deeper layer, which I'm not unwilling to discuss, but the nature of such a discussion is dependent on one's view of what constitutes a "driver" in the first place, and chances are we will disagree on the perceived demand/threat of a multitude of potential "drivers" across a range of differing potential scenarios.
Yes, and I did mention the deployment of MPAs there as a possibility, as well as in past discussions of the potential deployment there.
Brumby
Major
What the "drivers" are would be speculative at this stage as there are insufficient evidence to form an opinion. It would be one of those "time will tell" as more pieces come into play eventually.
plawolf
Lieutenant General
All the hostility of western governments and the FON ops western navies have been conduction in the region is a perfect example of the total lack of finess, imagination and coherent strategy on the part of the west in dealing with China.
By immediately being irrationally and unreasonably hostile in its rhetoric to China's island building, and by jumping in at the deep end with its response and employing the most extreme measures reasonably possible, the US has actually achieved nothing concrete at the expense of wasting almost all its bargaining chips, while at the same time giving the Chinese military all the cover and pretext it needs to arm those islands to the back teeth.
What the US should have done was express their concerns repeatedly and clearly. And asked the Chinese to clarify their position and intentions, both in terms of the territorial implications of the new islands, as well as their intended use.
By not answering those reasonable questions asked in a calm and measured way, China would have lost credibility and diplomatic leverage.
If China had answered, it's answer would have been reasonable and focused on the peaceful nature of its intentions and the civilian benefits of the islands.
The US could then hand effectively locked China in on those early promises by agreeing to implicitly recognise the new islands up to the internationally acceptable safety limits allowed, limiting them to primarily civilian use, and maybe even opening them up to international use.
These are not things I have just made up, they were all mentioned by the Chinese government early on, but have not been repeated since.
That gives you an idea to the great lengths China was prepared to go to be accommodating initially.
All that early goodwill has now been needlessly destroyed by the baseless accusations the US has flung China's way, and by the extremely hostile nature of military FON.
The only things the US has managed to achieve with its angry words and deeds is cut the legs out from under those in the Chinese government urging compromise and restraint.
Now the prevailing view is that if you have already been wrongly accused and convicted of the crime, you might as well do the deed since there is actually little else left to loose but plenty to gain.
If the US wants to accuse China to claiming 12nm around its islands, China will play along. As that only works to China's advantage by effectively creating new facts on the ground. In that respects, all these FON ops actually help China by giving it the perfect pretext to establish a consistent record of challenging foreign 'intrusions' within 12nm of the islands without having to explicitly break with intentional laws and rules by challenging civilian vessels or foreign military assets conduction innocent passage.
Really think about it, without all these FON ops by foreign military forces, how could China have established and demonstrated that it 'owns' 12nm around its islands? Same thing with militarisation of the islands.
Without all the media circus and foaming rants from the US government before the fact, if one of their warships came within 12nm of one or more of those new islands as it was making a straight line innocent passage course to a known destination (the US could have been extra clever by doing that during a friendly port call visit), that would have truly tested China's intents with those islands.
That is how FON missions should have been planned and executed. You first get a baseline of what your target actually is doing, and then extrapolate their intentions from those real actions.
Instead the US formed its opinions of Chinese intentions with zero evidence (all the while studiously ignoring what the Chinese government has been saying about its intnetions), and then devised its military strategy and tactics based on those unfounded and baseless ideas. That's call getting things ass backwards in my book.
Now China is going to challenge foreign FON ops from 12nm out like clockwork, and make those islands into massive military bases and say it is only doing that because of US military FON missions which started first. And there isn't much the US can do about any of that since it has already played all its cards prematurely.
The net result is that the US has provided the perfect diplomatic cover for China to militarise those islands, and actually look reasonable doing it. At the same time, regular foreign military FON ops have also on the flip side become a way for China to create new facts on the ground by establishing a clear pattern of challenging foreign military presence within 12nm of its islands.
As the Americans ironically stated in justifying FON, international laws about maritime matters is more about facts on the ground rather than written laws and treaties.
Now it's a question of who can persist longer.
China has already built its islands. Sitting on them costs very little compared to the costs foreign militaries pay to mount FON missions.
As far as China is concerned, the US and others can waste all the money it wants sending bombers and warships on glorified jaunts while China just trolls them on the radio.
How long before the costs of mounting these FON ops adds up to enough to buy a new fighter or warship?
By immediately being irrationally and unreasonably hostile in its rhetoric to China's island building, and by jumping in at the deep end with its response and employing the most extreme measures reasonably possible, the US has actually achieved nothing concrete at the expense of wasting almost all its bargaining chips, while at the same time giving the Chinese military all the cover and pretext it needs to arm those islands to the back teeth.
What the US should have done was express their concerns repeatedly and clearly. And asked the Chinese to clarify their position and intentions, both in terms of the territorial implications of the new islands, as well as their intended use.
By not answering those reasonable questions asked in a calm and measured way, China would have lost credibility and diplomatic leverage.
If China had answered, it's answer would have been reasonable and focused on the peaceful nature of its intentions and the civilian benefits of the islands.
The US could then hand effectively locked China in on those early promises by agreeing to implicitly recognise the new islands up to the internationally acceptable safety limits allowed, limiting them to primarily civilian use, and maybe even opening them up to international use.
These are not things I have just made up, they were all mentioned by the Chinese government early on, but have not been repeated since.
That gives you an idea to the great lengths China was prepared to go to be accommodating initially.
All that early goodwill has now been needlessly destroyed by the baseless accusations the US has flung China's way, and by the extremely hostile nature of military FON.
The only things the US has managed to achieve with its angry words and deeds is cut the legs out from under those in the Chinese government urging compromise and restraint.
Now the prevailing view is that if you have already been wrongly accused and convicted of the crime, you might as well do the deed since there is actually little else left to loose but plenty to gain.
If the US wants to accuse China to claiming 12nm around its islands, China will play along. As that only works to China's advantage by effectively creating new facts on the ground. In that respects, all these FON ops actually help China by giving it the perfect pretext to establish a consistent record of challenging foreign 'intrusions' within 12nm of the islands without having to explicitly break with intentional laws and rules by challenging civilian vessels or foreign military assets conduction innocent passage.
Really think about it, without all these FON ops by foreign military forces, how could China have established and demonstrated that it 'owns' 12nm around its islands? Same thing with militarisation of the islands.
Without all the media circus and foaming rants from the US government before the fact, if one of their warships came within 12nm of one or more of those new islands as it was making a straight line innocent passage course to a known destination (the US could have been extra clever by doing that during a friendly port call visit), that would have truly tested China's intents with those islands.
That is how FON missions should have been planned and executed. You first get a baseline of what your target actually is doing, and then extrapolate their intentions from those real actions.
Instead the US formed its opinions of Chinese intentions with zero evidence (all the while studiously ignoring what the Chinese government has been saying about its intnetions), and then devised its military strategy and tactics based on those unfounded and baseless ideas. That's call getting things ass backwards in my book.
Now China is going to challenge foreign FON ops from 12nm out like clockwork, and make those islands into massive military bases and say it is only doing that because of US military FON missions which started first. And there isn't much the US can do about any of that since it has already played all its cards prematurely.
The net result is that the US has provided the perfect diplomatic cover for China to militarise those islands, and actually look reasonable doing it. At the same time, regular foreign military FON ops have also on the flip side become a way for China to create new facts on the ground by establishing a clear pattern of challenging foreign military presence within 12nm of its islands.
As the Americans ironically stated in justifying FON, international laws about maritime matters is more about facts on the ground rather than written laws and treaties.
Now it's a question of who can persist longer.
China has already built its islands. Sitting on them costs very little compared to the costs foreign militaries pay to mount FON missions.
As far as China is concerned, the US and others can waste all the money it wants sending bombers and warships on glorified jaunts while China just trolls them on the radio.
How long before the costs of mounting these FON ops adds up to enough to buy a new fighter or warship?
Phoenix_Rising
Junior Member
While China constantly urging SE Asia countries stop the attempt of fortifing their booty, and solve such illicit occupation in a peaceful way, Vietnam built 5 hectares of artificial islands in 5 years.
In 2010, when a negotiation between China and the countries involved SCS issues almost came to an conclusion, US Secretary of State Mrs.Clinton visited SE Asia. Then they suddenly found some guts from nowhere (maybe I should say "you know where" ?), quitted the negotiation, and showed high-profile hostility to China.
After China built 1200 hectares in 18 months. These countries began comlaining China is a bully, just forgot how they trashed the kindness from their giant neighbor.
In 2010, when a negotiation between China and the countries involved SCS issues almost came to an conclusion, US Secretary of State Mrs.Clinton visited SE Asia. Then they suddenly found some guts from nowhere (maybe I should say "you know where" ?), quitted the negotiation, and showed high-profile hostility to China.
After China built 1200 hectares in 18 months. These countries began comlaining China is a bully, just forgot how they trashed the kindness from their giant neighbor.
Blackstone
Brigadier
Unless China collapses, the power gap between China and the rest of Asia will only grow. Therefore, it's not hard to understand why China's neighbors want sovereignty issues settled now.
Zool
Junior Member
My own view of militarization is based on the actual assets deployed and not the supporting infrastructure (Radar & Runways) that allows for potential deployment. That is to say, actual aircraft squadrons on station and available for use, or the installation of ASM or SAM Batteries on these islands.
Related to this topic and the regional landscape, I just posted the following on Japanese Plans for ECS Defence. Not to redirect the spotlight at Japan but to highlight that all sides are engaging in these preparations and that they all have their reasons that point back to one another. Very circular and compounding unless something changes.
Related to this topic and the regional landscape, I just posted the following on Japanese Plans for ECS Defence. Not to redirect the spotlight at Japan but to highlight that all sides are engaging in these preparations and that they all have their reasons that point back to one another. Very circular and compounding unless something changes.
It is worth mentioning that Japan fortifying their islands is not quite the same as what China is doing, because those islands of Japan are considered their territory and not currently embroiled in a territorial dispute, whereas the reclaimed islands that China has built are part of a larger territorial dispute.
That said, the reasoning behind potential militarization of any degree, by any nation, in any theater in the world, is all the same -- that is, it depends on the perceived security environment.