Blackstone
Brigadier
Global Times mentioned army, navy, and air force as separate forces, will all of them use the same army badge?
China's Defense/Military Breaking News Thread
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Phoenix_Rising
Junior Member
I was telling the history reason why only ground force branch, but not navy and air force, is set up in this reform .
ofc the navy and airforce have their own badge, they have been seperated branches since their foundation in 1949.
The foundation of specific ground force leading orgnaization means the status of Army is "DESCENDed" to the same level of navy and ground force, since China no longer need to worry about a invasion from land but maritime security is a more important concern now.
Phoenix_Rising
Junior Member
Offical Chinese-English translation.
Lethe
Captain
I have no idea where to post this, hopefully here is ok:
I found this statement from a senior US defense official remarkable because it articulated US policy defined explicitly in opposition to China and which implicitly envisions China as a potential adversary.
Obviously China has preoccupied Washington for some time now, but whether as a diplomatic nicety or out of strategic caution not to unnecessarily inflame relationships, US government statements have typically avoided naming China at all, and certainly not as an adversary. That such increasingly blunt language is now being employed may not constitute an event in and of itself, but is nonetheless noteworthy as reflecting the evolving tenor of the Sino-US relationship.
I found this statement from a senior US defense official remarkable because it articulated US policy defined explicitly in opposition to China and which implicitly envisions China as a potential adversary.
Obviously China has preoccupied Washington for some time now, but whether as a diplomatic nicety or out of strategic caution not to unnecessarily inflame relationships, US government statements have typically avoided naming China at all, and certainly not as an adversary. That such increasingly blunt language is now being employed may not constitute an event in and of itself, but is nonetheless noteworthy as reflecting the evolving tenor of the Sino-US relationship.
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Phoenix_Rising
Junior Member
Not surprising at all.
Apperance cannot change essence. Obama declared "Pivot to Asia", Hilary screwed the almost-completed SCS issue negotiation, not mention millitary theories like "Offshore Contain" or "A2/AD Penetration"......China learns what is behind those easily and clearly, avoiding the word "China" wont change it.
But I can't get the point, what for?
What US is going to do is,
1, keep global military presence;
2, launch a military confront with the world largest industry country (170%(nominal)/227%(PPP) of US nominal, in 2014, according to CIA's the World Factbook);
3, set the frontline so close to the target country, and support the confront with several bases on small islands.
It is completely different from the Cold War era.
At that time,
The potiencial battlearea is on ground;
Sides were clear, NATO is NATO, W(Warsaw)TO is WTO;
The theatre in mid-Europe was small (Area of today Germany territory: 350000km²);
Mid-Europe is one of the world's most developed area, filled by sufficient infrastructure.
In West-Pacific?
Sides arre unclear.
Even if we unrealisticly put aside China's economy influence, SK's security require China's discouragement against NK's impulsion, the lifeline of Indochina countries, Mekong River, lies in China's hand. Could US find any ally it could count on to counter China other than Japan and Aus? Oh, guess who is the largest and unreplaceable tradepartner of these 2 countries?
The potential battle area is vast.
Let's assume a battle for Taiwan, the nearest US airbase to Taipei is Kaneda, 465nm away. F-22's combat radius (with 0 supersonic cruise) is only 470nm! That means, if USAF's most capable aircraft want to join the aircombat on Taiwan, it have to re-fuel in air, alongside Chinese coastline. That is a perfect example of "the might of distance".
These is no reliable ground to set foot on, and most Asian-Pacific countries are still under-developing, thus, US expedition forces have to rely on few and vulnerble island bases.
When Admiral Greenart admited that DF-21D is IOC in 2010, the balance in West-Pacific is changed.
Since the risk of USN's CVNs getting close to Pacific's west shore became sky-high, China secured an overwhelming tactical airforce advantage in the area, which make PLA undefeatable in a local conflict. The foreign policy and military strategy should adapt the the situation, so WTF is "Pivot to Asia" under such circumstance?
What can they do to China after 50% of USAF and USN are deployed in Pacific?
An offense risking unlimited consequence? Maniac fantasy.
Have people in DC and pentagon gone mad?!
How long they gonna continue to refuse the fact?
US Senator, Henry John Hyde, delivered a speech before his retirement, ten years from now.
I think that speech perfectly explained the why the US cannot face China squarely, I share it in next reply.
To deal with such US aggressive move, China would do nothing more than strengthen the A2/AD force as planned.
PLA just need to be capable to prevent any provocation, then watch US cramping after overstretch itself.
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Phoenix_Rising
Junior Member
Perils of the Golden Theory
Senator Henry John Hyde,
Feb.26, 2006, in US Senate
Lying at the heart of America's relationship with the world is a paradox. We have a global reach, voluntarily assuming responsibility for preserving peace and order in much of the world and for the blessed charge of bettering the lives of its inhabitants. And yet we are simultaneously very distant from that world, stubbornly uninstructed by its ancient cynicism and preaching a confidence in the future that defies the constraints of the present. This paradox - to massively engage the world while living on an autonomous island in the global sea - is made possible by our unprecedented power.
It is a truism that power breeds arrogance. A far greater danger, however, stems from the self-delusion that is the more certain companion. For individuals and countries alike, power inevitably distorts perceptions of the world by insulating them in a soothing cocoon that is impervious to what scientists term "disconfirming evidence."
Our power, then, has the grave liability of rendering our theories about the world immune from failure. But by becoming deaf to easily discerned warning signs, we may ignore long-term costs that result from our actions and dismiss reverses that should lead to a reexamination of our goals and means.
To illustrate my point, let me focus one school of thought that has gained increasing prominence in our national debate, namely the assertion that our interests are best advanced by assigning a central place in our foreign policy to the worldwide promotion of democracy. This I term the Golden Theory.
I should state at the outset my own conviction that democracy and freedom are directly linked, and that democracy has proven highly beneficial in those states where it has been securely established. But I take issue with those who argue that it is self-propagating and that it invariably produces beneficent results, for this view rests on a misinterpretation of cause and effect in our history.
Proponents rest much of their case on the triumph of democracy in post-World War II Europe and East Asia, focusing on the peace, stability, and cooperation those war-torn regions have experienced in its aftermath. Certainly, democracy contributed enormously to these regions' transformations, but I would argue that this outcome depended far more on the direct and long-term presence of American power. Far from being inevitable, prior to 1945, democracy had been virtually wiped out in Europe even before Hitler began his conquests. It had been delegitimized in most of the continent, and authoritarian governments had become the norm. Democracy held on in Britain and in remnants elsewhere in Europe but ultimately survived only because of U.S. intervention in the war.
Following the Allied victory, democracy was reintroduced on the continent in large part because the overwhelming U.S. presence made it both possible and virtually mandatory throughout Western Europe. From this beginning, we devoted enormous resources toward enforcing order, promoting cooperation, defending against invasion, removing barriers, reviving economies, and a host of other unprecedented innovations. The resulting transformation is usually ascribed to the workings of democracy, but it is due far more to the impact of the longterm U.S. presence. And that role continues to this day, six decades later.
In regions where our presence extended over long periods, as in East Asia, the usual result was peace, stability, and cooperation, with democracy as an added and reinforcing benefit. But few areas outside those fortunate lands have become stably democratic, with examples such as India being exceptions that are far too rare.
I note these cases because they are invariably cited by those who believe that similar transformations can be effected elsewhere by the magic formula of democracy alone. But viewed in its more complete historical context, implanting democracy in large areas would require that we possess an unbounded power and undertake an open-ended commitment of time and resources, which we cannot and will not do. But without that long-term dominant American position, the odds of success are long indeed.
I am not suggesting that we adopt a Realpolitik approach. Even were that preferable, which it is not, it is not within the realm of the possible for us. The American people are unlikely to ever accept the U.S. as yet one more actor in a grim Hobbesian world of fear, betrayal, and numbing amorality. And this is all for the best, as the record of the classic balance of power is not to be envied, being an inherently unstable system that has produced worldwide cataclysms in the past.
Of greater centrality, however, is the fact that, by its very nature, the U.S. is a revolutionary power. Its foundational beliefs posit universal truths that permeate all of its actions and perceptions of the world. These have had, and continue to have, catalytic effects on other societies. Fidelity to our ideals means that we have little choice but to support freedom around the world. No one with a heart or a head would wish it otherwise.
But we also have a duty to ourselves and to our own interests, the protection and advancement of which may sometimes necessitate actions focused on more tangible returns than those of altruism. Lashing our interests to the indiscriminate promotion of democracy is a tempting but unwarranted strategy, more a leap of faith than a sober calculation.
There are other negative consequences as well. A broad and energetic promotion of democracy in other countries that will not enjoy our long-term and guiding presence may equate not to peace and stability but to revolution.
We can and have used democracy as a weapon to destabilize our avowed enemies and may do so again. But if we unleash revolutionary forces in the expectation that the result can only be beneficent, I believe we are making a profound and perhaps uncorrectable mistake. History teaches that revolutions are very dangerous things, more often destructive than benign, and uncontrollable by their very nature. Upending established order based on theory is far more likely to produce chaos than shining uplands. Edmund Burke's prescient warning of the deadly progress of the French Revolution, a revolution guided by intoxicating theory and heedless of all warnings, endures.
There is no evidence that we or anyone can guide from afar revolutions we have set in motion. We can more easily destabilize friends and others and give life to chaos and to avowed enemies than ensure outcomes in service of our interests and security.
Let me return to my original theme, namely that our enormous power allows us to maintain a highly theoretical approach to the world, one that draws so deeply from the universal truths embedded in our makeup as to be impervious to contrary evidence.
I am not making an abstract point. We are well advanced into an unformed era in which new and unfamiliar enemies are gathering forces, where a phalanx of aspiring competitors must inevitably constrain and focus our options. In a world where the ratios of strength narrow, the consequences of miscalculation will become progressively more debilitating. The costs of golden theories will be paid for in the base coin of our interests.
For some, the promotion of democracy promises an easy resolution to the many difficult problems we face, a guiding light on a dimly seen horizon. But I believe that great caution is warranted here. Without strong evidence to the contrary, we should not readily believe that, without an enduring American presence, democracy can be so easily implanted and nourished in societies where history and experience suggest it is quite alien. It may, in fact, constitute an uncontrollable experiment with an outcome akin to that faced by the Sorcerer's Apprentice.
A few brief years ago, history was proclaimed to be at an end, our victory engraved in unyielding stone, our preeminence garlanded with permanence. But we must remember that Britain's majestic rule vanished in a few short years, undermined by unforeseen catastrophic events and by new threats that eventually overwhelmed the palisades of the past. The life of preeminence, as with all life on this planet, has a mortal end. To allow our enormous power to delude us into seeing the world as a passive thing waiting for us to recreate it in an image of our choosing will hasten the day when we have little freedom to choose anything at all.
Senator Henry John Hyde,
Feb.26, 2006, in US Senate
Lying at the heart of America's relationship with the world is a paradox. We have a global reach, voluntarily assuming responsibility for preserving peace and order in much of the world and for the blessed charge of bettering the lives of its inhabitants. And yet we are simultaneously very distant from that world, stubbornly uninstructed by its ancient cynicism and preaching a confidence in the future that defies the constraints of the present. This paradox - to massively engage the world while living on an autonomous island in the global sea - is made possible by our unprecedented power.
It is a truism that power breeds arrogance. A far greater danger, however, stems from the self-delusion that is the more certain companion. For individuals and countries alike, power inevitably distorts perceptions of the world by insulating them in a soothing cocoon that is impervious to what scientists term "disconfirming evidence."
Our power, then, has the grave liability of rendering our theories about the world immune from failure. But by becoming deaf to easily discerned warning signs, we may ignore long-term costs that result from our actions and dismiss reverses that should lead to a reexamination of our goals and means.
To illustrate my point, let me focus one school of thought that has gained increasing prominence in our national debate, namely the assertion that our interests are best advanced by assigning a central place in our foreign policy to the worldwide promotion of democracy. This I term the Golden Theory.
I should state at the outset my own conviction that democracy and freedom are directly linked, and that democracy has proven highly beneficial in those states where it has been securely established. But I take issue with those who argue that it is self-propagating and that it invariably produces beneficent results, for this view rests on a misinterpretation of cause and effect in our history.
Proponents rest much of their case on the triumph of democracy in post-World War II Europe and East Asia, focusing on the peace, stability, and cooperation those war-torn regions have experienced in its aftermath. Certainly, democracy contributed enormously to these regions' transformations, but I would argue that this outcome depended far more on the direct and long-term presence of American power. Far from being inevitable, prior to 1945, democracy had been virtually wiped out in Europe even before Hitler began his conquests. It had been delegitimized in most of the continent, and authoritarian governments had become the norm. Democracy held on in Britain and in remnants elsewhere in Europe but ultimately survived only because of U.S. intervention in the war.
Following the Allied victory, democracy was reintroduced on the continent in large part because the overwhelming U.S. presence made it both possible and virtually mandatory throughout Western Europe. From this beginning, we devoted enormous resources toward enforcing order, promoting cooperation, defending against invasion, removing barriers, reviving economies, and a host of other unprecedented innovations. The resulting transformation is usually ascribed to the workings of democracy, but it is due far more to the impact of the longterm U.S. presence. And that role continues to this day, six decades later.
In regions where our presence extended over long periods, as in East Asia, the usual result was peace, stability, and cooperation, with democracy as an added and reinforcing benefit. But few areas outside those fortunate lands have become stably democratic, with examples such as India being exceptions that are far too rare.
I note these cases because they are invariably cited by those who believe that similar transformations can be effected elsewhere by the magic formula of democracy alone. But viewed in its more complete historical context, implanting democracy in large areas would require that we possess an unbounded power and undertake an open-ended commitment of time and resources, which we cannot and will not do. But without that long-term dominant American position, the odds of success are long indeed.
I am not suggesting that we adopt a Realpolitik approach. Even were that preferable, which it is not, it is not within the realm of the possible for us. The American people are unlikely to ever accept the U.S. as yet one more actor in a grim Hobbesian world of fear, betrayal, and numbing amorality. And this is all for the best, as the record of the classic balance of power is not to be envied, being an inherently unstable system that has produced worldwide cataclysms in the past.
Of greater centrality, however, is the fact that, by its very nature, the U.S. is a revolutionary power. Its foundational beliefs posit universal truths that permeate all of its actions and perceptions of the world. These have had, and continue to have, catalytic effects on other societies. Fidelity to our ideals means that we have little choice but to support freedom around the world. No one with a heart or a head would wish it otherwise.
But we also have a duty to ourselves and to our own interests, the protection and advancement of which may sometimes necessitate actions focused on more tangible returns than those of altruism. Lashing our interests to the indiscriminate promotion of democracy is a tempting but unwarranted strategy, more a leap of faith than a sober calculation.
There are other negative consequences as well. A broad and energetic promotion of democracy in other countries that will not enjoy our long-term and guiding presence may equate not to peace and stability but to revolution.
We can and have used democracy as a weapon to destabilize our avowed enemies and may do so again. But if we unleash revolutionary forces in the expectation that the result can only be beneficent, I believe we are making a profound and perhaps uncorrectable mistake. History teaches that revolutions are very dangerous things, more often destructive than benign, and uncontrollable by their very nature. Upending established order based on theory is far more likely to produce chaos than shining uplands. Edmund Burke's prescient warning of the deadly progress of the French Revolution, a revolution guided by intoxicating theory and heedless of all warnings, endures.
There is no evidence that we or anyone can guide from afar revolutions we have set in motion. We can more easily destabilize friends and others and give life to chaos and to avowed enemies than ensure outcomes in service of our interests and security.
Let me return to my original theme, namely that our enormous power allows us to maintain a highly theoretical approach to the world, one that draws so deeply from the universal truths embedded in our makeup as to be impervious to contrary evidence.
I am not making an abstract point. We are well advanced into an unformed era in which new and unfamiliar enemies are gathering forces, where a phalanx of aspiring competitors must inevitably constrain and focus our options. In a world where the ratios of strength narrow, the consequences of miscalculation will become progressively more debilitating. The costs of golden theories will be paid for in the base coin of our interests.
For some, the promotion of democracy promises an easy resolution to the many difficult problems we face, a guiding light on a dimly seen horizon. But I believe that great caution is warranted here. Without strong evidence to the contrary, we should not readily believe that, without an enduring American presence, democracy can be so easily implanted and nourished in societies where history and experience suggest it is quite alien. It may, in fact, constitute an uncontrollable experiment with an outcome akin to that faced by the Sorcerer's Apprentice.
A few brief years ago, history was proclaimed to be at an end, our victory engraved in unyielding stone, our preeminence garlanded with permanence. But we must remember that Britain's majestic rule vanished in a few short years, undermined by unforeseen catastrophic events and by new threats that eventually overwhelmed the palisades of the past. The life of preeminence, as with all life on this planet, has a mortal end. To allow our enormous power to delude us into seeing the world as a passive thing waiting for us to recreate it in an image of our choosing will hasten the day when we have little freedom to choose anything at all.
Lethe
Captain
It cannot, but the fact that senior US government officials are no longer bothering even with appearances, I think, a noteworthy development.
Thanks for posting that speech by Senator Hyde, by the way. Whilst it echoes many of the usual tropes of American mythology, it nonetheless contains several insights that one can only wish had rather more currency in the halls of American power. It seems the US lost a good Senator when he retired.
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Take PLA to mean People's Liberation Armed forces?
I am just a sofa strategist. Regardless, from my point of view the Obama administration is doing a great mistake by being agressive towards China. Not because China is stronger than america or anything. But because China and USA are natural allies.
China wants not lebenraum but safety for its coastal cities. Chinese A2AD effort is a reminder of its intention. I am afraid the US is Playing the wrong game here. By deepening its relationship with China, it would continue to be the prime beneficier of chinas economic rise. Being a friend, America could have greater infuence on chinese politics and therefore the strateric decisions of a 1,5 billion strong nation. As allies they could conduct joint patrols along pacific shores.
Again, China is not a natural enemy of USA and vice versa. Not geographically, militarily or culturally. There is no need for China to push its defensive wall to the eastern pacific. I think Xi Jinping was sincere when he said the pacific ocean is big enough to accomodate both major powers.
On the other hand: Japan, Australia and India are not reliable partners in a Indo-Pacific containment of China. I want to emphasize that i am not questioning braveness or integrity of people in these three countries. But the fact is, neither Australia, Japan or India has anything to offer that China can't.
Japan is in decline, both economically and demographically. The population is prosperous, score high on HDI and have the longest average life expectancy. In other they are pretty much satisfied. Japan will probably be a East Asian version of Italy, Spain or Netherlands in 50 years. A third rate power.
Australia is vast but have a small economy and population. Due to restrictive immigration policies (it wants to safeguard its anglosaxon heritage), exponential population growth is unlikely. China is closer geographically to Australia and its biggest trade partner. Why would a country want to go to war with a costumer and benefactor?
America is actively courting India but its futile iMO. India is not like Britain, Germany or France who are cultural/ethnically siblings of the US. Too weak to play on a global scale they follow America wherever they go. Indians on the other hand, have the benefit of billion man strong population. Deep inside they sense a belonging to Asia. India is not westernized like Australia and Japan. India will not fight eventual wars in either SCS, ECS or the Pacific realm.
China controls major rivers like Ganges and Bramaputra, vital to the overcrowded area south of the Himalaya.
China is also the key to the solution of Indian infrastructure problems. With its huge account surpluses, China could (as a carrot) provide India with much needed foreign investment on a scale the US neither can or will not match.
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