China ICBM/SLBM, nuclear arms thread

[Maikeru]

5C is liquid fuelled? So not a good choice for a silo-based system.

My understanding was that DF-45 is the silo-based version of the DF-41?

But my point is that if China has no plans to put 10 warheads on each missile, they might as well use a smaller and cheaper DF-31 instead.

Liquid fuel is way better for a silo-based system than it is for a mobile or sea-based system. Ampoulisation and other measures reduce the downsides of liquid fuel, while its much higher energy density enables greater payloads for the same size of missile compared to solid fuel.

 

[AndrewS]

Liquid fuel is way better for a silo-based system than it is for a mobile or sea-based system. Ampoulisation and other measures reduce the downsides of liquid fuel, while its much higher energy density enables greater payloads for the same size of missile compared to solid fuel.

They can keep liquid-fuelled missiles continuously fuelled now?

 

[Maikeru]

They can keep liquid-fuelled missiles continuously fuelled now?

Either that or in ampoules next to the silo so fuel loading is done in seconds.

 

[ACuriousPLAFan]

Quotes on China's missile fleets (in general) from CMPR 2025:

China produces a wide range of ballistic, cruise, air-to-air, air-to-surface, and surface-to-air missiles, many comparable in quality to those of other international top-tier producers, for domestic use and export. China has the world’s leading hypersonic missile arsenal and continued to advance the development of conventional and nuclear-armed hypersonic missile technologies during the past year. In May 2024, China revealed a bomber-launched version of the YJ-21 hypersonic anti-ship ballistic missile and displayed an export version at Air Show China 2024 in November. China unveiled the land-based HQ-19 anti-ballistic missile system, with potential midcourse and hypersonic glide vehicle interception capabilities. China also revealed the air-launched CM-98 stealth cruise missile with stand-off abilities, the multi-domain CM-502X loitering munition, and the TM6 precision strike air-to-ground missile at Air Show China 2024. In 2023, China publicized the PL-17 beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile, and at Air Show China in November 2024 China revealed export versions of PL-12A, PL-15, and PL-11 AAMs that have been either improved for performance or completely redesigned.

Yep. No mention of all the missiles exhibited on the 9-3 parade. They certainly did lock the CMPR-2025 authors in a sealed room in mid-2025.

Quotes on China's nuclear arsenal from CMPR 2025:

China’s stockpile of nuclear warheads remained in the low 600s through 2024, reflecting a slower rate of production when compared to previous years. Despite this slowdown, the PLA has continued its massive nuclear expansion. While this report assessed in 2020 that China’s nuclear warhead would double from a stockpile of the low 200s over the next decade, the PLA remains on track to have over 1,000 warheads by 2030.

Same sh1t, different flavour.

China probably has faced delays constructing and commissioning its two CFR-600 sodium-cooled fast breeder reactors at Xiapu. China previously planned for the first unit to come online in 2023, but it is probably still undergoing testing. The second reactor unit is still under construction. Once online, the CFR-600s will reestablish China’s ability to produce weapons-grade plutonium. China has continued to expand its reprocessing capacity at the China National Nuclear Corporation Gansu Nuclear Technology Industrial Park in Jinta County, Gansu Province where a third 200-ton per year reprocessing plant is now under construction.

No comment. @Kalec would know better than me on this.

In addition to the 100+ DF-31BJ loaded into silos news, there's this:

The PLA is probably pursuing nuclear weapons with yields below 10 kilotons. Such weapons address long-held PLA desires to be able to conduct limited nuclear counterstrikes against military targets and control nuclear escalation. Of China’s currently fielded systems, the DF-26 IRBM and the H-6N’s ALBM are both highly precise theater weapons that would be well suited for delivering a low-yield nuclear weapon.

Alongside mentions of China's continuous pursuing of Launch-On-Warning (LOW) capability:

In 2024, China probably made progress on its attempts to achieve an early warning counterstrike (EWCS) capability, similar to launch on warning (LOW), where warning of a missile strike enables a counterstrike launch before an enemy first strike can detonate. China likely will continue to refine and train on this capability throughout the rest of the decade.

• China probably expanded its space-based early warning architecture in 2024 and early 2025 by launching two additional Tongxun Jishu Shiyan (TJS), also known as Huoyan-1, satellites with likely infrared sensor payloads into geosynchronous orbit. China’s early warning infrared satellites can reportedly detect an incoming ICBM within 90 seconds of launch with an early warning alert sent to a command center within three to four minutes.

• China also employs several ground-based, large phased-array radars (LPARs) probably to support EWCS, which detect incoming ballistic missiles thousands of kilometers away and high into the atmosphere. LPARs probably can corroborate incoming missile alerts first detected by the TJS/Huoyan-1 and provide additional data, with the flow of early warning information probably enabling a command authority to launch a counterstrike before inbound detonation.

• In December 2024, the PLA launched several ICBMs in quick succession from a training center into Western China, indicating the ability to rapidly launch multiple silo-based ICBMs, as required for an EWCS operation. The PLA has likely loaded more than 100 solid-propellant ICBM missile silos at its three silo fields with DF-31 class ICBMs, which are very likely intended to support EWCS.

Last-but-not-least, the missile arsenal tally:

 

[tamsen_ikard]

Quotes on China's missile fleets (in general) from CMPR 2025:



Yep. No mention of all the missiles exhibited on the 9-3 parade. They certainly did lock the CMPR-2025 authors in a sealed room in mid-2025.

Quotes on China's nuclear arsenal from CMPR 2025:


Same sh1t, different flavour.



No comment. @Kalec would know better than me on this.

In addition to the 100+ DF-31BJ loaded into silos news, there's this:


Alongside mentions of China's continuous pursuing of Launch-On-Warning (LOW) capability:





Last-but-not-least, the missile arsenal tally:
View attachment 166756

Some of the things mentioned here defies logic.

So according to them China completely lacked ability to produce plutonium for the last 20-30 years? That doesnt make sense. Even if a nuclear power is happy with its current arsenal size, they would still never lose ability to produce more fissile material should the need arise.

Moreover, China has 550 icbm launchers but only 400 missiles? How come they have more launchers than missiles. Even if you ignore the silos, each road mobile launcher should have atleast 2 missiles, one in the launcher and one as backup as contingency.

If we take the 400 icbm missile numbers as accurate that means they have 400 icbm but just 600 warheads. This again doesnt make sense. There should be multiple warheads per missile.

I feel like they are undercounting things by a lot.

 

[AndrewJ]

The report was finished about May 1st 2025. That's why it's totally missing 5/7 air combat & The Grand Parade in Sept.

 

[Temstar]

Some other tidbits about the nuclear force:

That's pretty cool, sounds like enough time for LOW as long as politicians don't hesitate for too long.

 

[Temstar]

Quotes on China's missile fleets (in general) from CMPR 2025:



Yep. No mention of all the missiles exhibited on the 9-3 parade. They certainly did lock the CMPR-2025 authors in a sealed room in mid-2025.

Quotes on China's nuclear arsenal from CMPR 2025:


Same sh1t, different flavour.



No comment. @Kalec would know better than me on this.

In addition to the 100+ DF-31BJ loaded into silos news, there's this:


Alongside mentions of China's continuous pursuing of Launch-On-Warning (LOW) capability:





Last-but-not-least, the missile arsenal tally:
View attachment 166756

Fun fact: IRGC launched something like just under 600 ballistic missiles at Israel in the 12 day war this year, out of a stockpile of something like 3000.

PLARF has a smaller stockpile than IRGC according to this.

Also what is with that 400 missiles but 550 launchers for ICBMs?

 

[RoastGooseHKer]

Fun fact: IRGC launched something like just under 600 ballistic missiles at Israel in the 12 day war this year, out of a stockpile of something like 3000.

PLARF has a smaller stockpile than IRGC according to this.

Also what is with that 400 missiles but 550 launchers for ICBMs?

That’s what I mean when I argued that the PLA could similar shortage of long range weapons the U.S. faces in a Taiwan contingency. The PLARF could quickly run out of conventional ballistic missiles in a war of attrition.

I don’t know the detail designs of PLA’s ballistic missiles. However, based on Iran’s failed strikes against Israel, it is very likely that most of the older DF-11/15s would be intercepted by Patriot series or Taiwan’s own TK3. The only way to break this dilemma would be the PLA manages to use loiter drones and other asymmetrical weapons to neutralise most of Taiwan’s air defense prior to launching ballistic and cruise missiles.This has yet to be proven.

 

[Temstar]

Oof, that's a spicy missile that DF-27. Conventional strike ICBM with up to 8000km range and can hit both land and sea targets.