China can and will achieve total air superiority over Taiwan

crobato · Nov 8, 2006

Kongo said:
Blast radius increase by 1m per kg of explosives? Don't make me laugh. What's the blast radius of a 1MT nuke then? 1000,000,000m? LOL. Taiwan would have hardened their critical structures, like their comms facilities, aircraft shelters etc.

They have hardened shelters, but the antenna used for communications are still exposed.

And most of these are hardened against what was perceived as a pre 1990s PLA. Somehow the infrastructure has not kept up with the advancements.

What that means, is that a virtually direct hit is required to take them out. Miss you might as well not have bothered. Now what that means, is that these hardened targets will need MANY missiles to take EACH out. Even non-hardened ones will need multiple missiles to take out if the missiles are not GPS guided. (and are you going to count on them having GPS guidance?) Try reading the link I put up. In that link there is another link to an analysis on the effectiveness of SRBMs. Do yourself a favour and educate yourself with that info.

Why don't you read the RAND report mentioned above. Runaways are well within the the accuracy of short range SSMs (50m CEP), and so they will get cratered.

Does not matter if the targets are hardened, what matters is they can be disrupted. You failed to attend to that point. You only need to disrupt the base for bombers carrying KAB-1500krs to really slam the bunkers.

Trying to disrupt runway repair operations means having to expend MORE missiles than whats already spent in the first volley. As said, read and educate yourself to get a clue on the numbers of targets and the number of missiles required to service them all. There are FAR more targets than missiles, leaving none for your disruption effort.

What targets are you talking about. The missiles only need to hit the vital sites, air bases mostly. You failed to see that the PLAAF has now has a growing strike capability, and that's what aircraft will do to take out the rest of the targets. ARMs to take out SAMs and radar sites. After EO and LG means, you have added to the fundamental equation that the PLAAF now appears to be using GPS/INS kits that can be added on older bombs to give them PG capability. Whether they are using Beidou, Glossnass and civilian GPS isn't the point, since satellite positioning is used as a back to what is now for a certain very accurate INS systems.

They could leave some missiles in reserve for disruption, but that means other targets and air fields would go unharmed. (In fact many will already go unscathed) And no, field engineers are not going to cower in fear while terrifying Chinese missiles are falling on their heads (if there are even any SRBMs left)

You can count on the fact that they will bravely try to repair the airfields. You can also count many of them can die as a result with follow up bombing.

Finally, those bombs and missiles have to reverse direction to hit those cave entrances. There are a few problems. One is that the mountains mean that data-link connectivity is virtually assured to be cut off. Second, since the bomb's transmission power is lower than any ECM, the link has an even higher chance of being cut-off. And just because the PLAAF 'trains under ECM conditions' doesn't mean they are immune to it. What, you mean other countries don't train their forces under ECM conditions?

Jeez, you don't know missiles at all. These are air launched missiles with turbojets that can be redirected by a weapons officer. Mountains count off the datalink connectivity? Do you know how EO missiles work do you? They only need to see the target from above, the operator picks the target, missile locks, and it becomes autonomous since then. That can be done well above the mountain ranges, and besides, the launching aircraft would have to be flying at a height in the first place to maximize range.

As for ECM, you think somehow only Taiwan's ECM is effective and the PLAAF not at all? Why don't we factor the PLAAF using ECM to the equation and cutting off ROC links and see how that worsens the situation. Its not easy to cut off a datalink as you think it does, and you would need to bring your ECM asset high up in the air because like any radar, they tend to lose their strength greatly by distance and they don't form into sharp focused beams like radars. Unless of course, you have truly dedicaed aircraft to this purpose with multipoint all 360 degree coverage jamming. But the ROCAF don't have that, while every Su-27, J-11 and Su-30 in the PLAAF often mount jammers.

And if you have a jammer on the ground, it's only bait against an ARM.

Kongo said:
Yeah, as if there wasn't any fighters available to take them down.

How can the fighters take off if the runaways have to be repaired?

Pointblank · Nov 8, 2006

Kongo said:
Blast radius increase by 1m per kg of explosives? Don't make me laugh. What's the blast radius of a 1MT nuke then? 1000,000,000m? LOL. Taiwan would have hardened their critical structures, like their comms facilities, aircraft shelters etc. What that means, is that a virtually direct hit is required to take them out. Miss you might as well not have bothered. Now what that means, is that these hardened targets will need MANY missiles to take EACH out. Even non-hardened ones will need multiple missiles to take out if the missiles are not GPS guided. (and are you going to count on them having GPS guidance?) Try reading the link I put up. In that link there is another link to an analysis on the effectiveness of SRBMs. Do yourself a favour and educate yourself with that info.

No.

Taiwan has not significantly hardened their military. Recommendations to harden these facilities have been continuous, and the Taiwanese military hasn't really acted on these recommendations, and have made some token efforts. With airfields, only two, Hualian and Jiayi, have hardened aircraft shelters that are actually strong enough to survive an attack. Your link is anyways not as authoritative as the sources I am using, which are peer-reviewed journals and reports on a possible conflict. Again, get your hands on the book, "Dire Strait? Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Confrontation and Implications for U.S. Policy," by David A. Shlapak. You can order it from Amazon here:

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It's an excellent book, from a highly reputable source.

Current and near-term TMD's, such as Patriot, and Arrow are designed to intercept Scud-like missiles and only limited capability against the more advanced weapons currently in Chinese inventory. And all these systems are dependent on cumbersome surveillance radars that are highly vulnerable to attacks (i.e.: By special forces), and are difficult and expensive to replace.

Trying to disrupt runway repair operations means having to expend MORE missiles than whats already spent in the first volley. As said, read and educate yourself to get a clue on the numbers of targets and the number of missiles required to service them all. There are FAR more targets than missiles, leaving none for your disruption effort. They could leave some missiles in reserve for disruption, but that means other targets and air fields would go unharmed. (In fact many will already go unscathed) And no, field engineers are not going to cower in fear while terrifying Chinese missiles are falling on their heads (if there are even any SRBMs left) This is war, and risk of casualties will be taken. And the risk isn't high anyway, if China can only afford to lob a few missiles at random intervals.

Not exactly.

The Chinese will have placed communications nexus and airfields as their top targets for attack, meaning that these sites will receive the bulk of the missiles attacks. Only six airfields in Taiwan have tactical aircraft, meaning that they are on the very top of the list for attack. According to the simulation done by David A. Shlapak, such attacks, coupled with bomber raids, will drop air base sortie generation to 20% by the first day of such attacks. Repairs done overnight will bring that back up to 33%. The few fighters able to get airborne in the inital few hours will probably be occupied the escorting fighters than dealing with the bombers. Airplanes can't stay in the air forever without fuel and pilot rest.

Also, continued attacks on those airfields will disrupt work on repairing those airfields. If the engineers continued work while under attack, not only will there be significant casualties, it also means that some of the equipment that is being used in repairing those airfields will also get destroyed. You can't fix a runway without the equipment to do so, and if that equipment gets destroyed in an attack, your not fixing that runway anytime soon.

Finally, those bombs and missiles have to reverse direction to hit those cave entrances. There are a few problems. One is that the mountains mean that data-link connectivity is virtually assured to be cut off. Second, since the bomb's transmission power is lower than any ECM, the link has an even higher chance of being cut-off. And just because the PLAAF 'trains under ECM conditions' doesn't mean they are immune to it. What, you mean other countries don't train their forces under ECM conditions?

1. There is a thing called terminal guidance. Once the missile is oriented at the target during mid-course (and this can be done through either intelligence from spy satellites, of which China has a few, including few that has synthetic aperture radar), the missile is pretty much falling onto its target, and is fairly accurate already. Being able to disable the runways is sufficent enough to keep airplanes on the ground; hitting hardened airplane shelters would be futile with ballistic missiles, the follow up air attacks will handle those shelters.
2. Such missiles can have the target pre-programmed into them; any transmissions to and from the missile are only for course correction and adjustment, and that can be done through satellites, due to the hight some of these missiles can reach before plunging to Earth. Significant damage can still be inflicted against those two airbases, and follow-up attacks by aircraft can continue to keep aircraft on the ground. ECM is only strongest against those that are close to the emitter. If that emitter is on the ground it means two things:
First of all, even if the ECM is strong enough to disrupt the data link, it will only do so when the missile is almost about to hit the ground; not exactly useful then.
Secondly, those emitters are also a big "kick me" sign for anti-radiation weapons as well.

Any analyst worth his weight in gold (no, not the pseudo-analyst that you keep referencing) will tell you that in the event of war, the Taiwanese will have a significant challenge in being able to get combat aircraft into the air. That is why there has been repeated recommendations for the Taiwanese to harden those airfields, and to procure VSTOL fighters. Get your hands on some book or peer-reviewed sources (like I have) and come back when you have read them.

Violet Oboe · Nov 8, 2006

Your analysis is quite convicing dear Pointblank. Taiwan´s options are severely limited and obviously more and more moderate political forces on Taiwan (KMT, PFP) are recognizing that simple fact.

A couple of questions would additionally be worthy to discuss:

1. The PLA missile force also includes cruise missiles meanwhile (according to DoD in 06) in rapidly expanding numbers and after Chinas´s new satellite positioning system Beidou (5 geostationary sats + up to 30 low orbit auxilliary sats) will get operational in 2009/10 they will achieve deadly strike precision in the 5 m CEP range without being dependent on foreign satsystems (GPS, GLONASS, GALILEO). Correspondingly there will be no place to hide left in a few years for ROCA/ROCAF assets on Taiwan.

2. The number of operational PLA SRBM´s (DF-11A/15A) is far greater than the often mentioned 600-800 units. These numbers are estimates produced by the CIA/DIA on the basis of IMINT/ELINT data of their satellites which are only valid for the ´Taiwan theater of operations´ (i.e. the area opposite the taiwanstraits up to a depth of ca. 300 km). Indeed the PLA has currently stationed around 120 launchers and 750 missiles in that area on several missile bases but they are forming only the permanent garrison.

Of course in case of heightened tension or imminent conflict the regional PLA missile force would be massively reinforced by all deployable SRBM units the PLA can field. The PLA has conducted several maneuvers in recent years where mobile missile brigades (DF-11/15) have been relocated over 2000 km in a couple of days and that shows how swiftly these weapons can be employed if the need arises.

Estimating the entire PLA SRBM arsenal is very difficult since the PLA is very stealthy about this but a number of currently 2000-2500 missiles seems to be a good guess since China´s missile production capacities are already impressive and would certainly be rapidly enhanced in times of conflict. One thing is indeed for sure: China´s stockpile is massive and it is certainly a delusional hope that PLA´s rocketeers will run out of munition after some initial strikes.

crobato · Nov 8, 2006

Let's make one thing clear.

Destroying the air force and achieving air supremacy is a different goal from total destruction of all armed resistance via aerial means.

For the first, you can see examples in the 1956 Hungarian upprising, when the SU completely wiped out their air force on the ground; the 1967 Six Day war; and the initial phase of the GW1 conflict. An enemy airforce can be wiped out decisively and quickly, and in one case, it can even be achieved with numerically inferior forces (Six Day War).

However, the second goal is far far more difficult. For this, you need to see Vietnam, the Korean War, Serbia, the rest of the GW1 and GW2, that even with aerial supremacy, ground assets and an enemy willing to fight a guerilla war is a far more tenacious and resilient foe than most credit it to be. You can waste thousands of bombs and missiles, and never achieve this goal.

Deleted member 675 · Nov 8, 2006

Pointblank said:
Your link is anyways not as authoritative as the sources I am using, which are peer-reviewed journals and reports on a possible conflict. Again, get your hands on the book, "Dire Strait? Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Confrontation and Implications for U.S. Policy," by David A. Shlapak. You can order it from Amazon here:

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

It's an excellent book, from a highly reputable source.

In regards to what are you using that book as a reference? It was published in 2000, so obviously it's not going to have current information on how far the ROCAF has strengthened its airfields - the other book was only 2002.

Do you have some recent sources on what has been happening on this front?

Pointblank · Nov 8, 2006

FuManChu said:
In regards to what are you using that book as a reference? It was published in 2000, so obviously it's not going to have current information on how far the ROCAF has strengthened its airfields - the other book was only 2002.

Do you have some recent sources on what has been happening on this front?

My prof on Chinese government and politics has contacted one of his contacts in Taiwan who happens to have contacts with higher up Taiwanese military officials, and has reported to me that the Taiwanese have not made major efforts to harden their aircraft shelters. Also, this document, written in 2003, continues to confirm what is already known:

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Deleted member 675 · Nov 9, 2006

Pointblank said:
My prof on Chinese government and politics has contacted one of his contacts in Taiwan who happens to have contacts with higher up Taiwanese military officials, and has reported to me that the Taiwanese have not made major efforts to harden their aircraft shelters.

You'll have to excuse me if I'm a little sceptical of that. I'm not saying that you're lying, but I've heard enough "I know someone, who knows someone, who is a pretty big cheese" stories to know not to rely upon them.

So currently I'm not going to assume anything either way.

By the way, that link just causes my browser to crash. Please edit to link to the file itself and tell me where to find out the relevant information.

Pointblank · Nov 9, 2006

FuManChu said:
You'll have to excuse me if I'm a little sceptical of that. I'm not saying that you're lying, but I've heard enough "I know someone, who knows someone, who is a pretty big cheese" stories to know not to rely upon them.

So currently I'm not going to assume anything either way.

By the way, that link just causes my browser to crash. Please edit to link to the file itself and tell me where to find out the relevant information.

I perfectly understand. But for me, the source (comming from my professor) is creditable enough that I can accept it and use it in my arguement.

Here's a better link to the same document. Be warned, it is long:

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The document stresses the need for Taiwan to harden its airfields even more so beyond some of the initial efforts at Cha Shan Air Base and Taitung Air Base.

Another article also makes the same suggestion as well:

In the National Interest
Volume III, Issue 30
July 28,2004

Is Taiwan Acquiring an Offensive Capability?

David M. Lampton

Very recently, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice was in
Beijing for tough talks with Beijing's leaders about Taiwan, among
other things. China's continued force modernization, military
exercises and buildup of missiles beyond the 500-plus already near the
island is an undeniable problem. Debate over how to address this
threat is underway on the island and in the United States. One option
is for Taipei to move toward its own offensive capability designed to
"deter" Beijing from attacking the island.

In its late-May 2004 "Report to Congress on PRC Military Power," the
Pentagon notes the call of Taipei's political and military leaders for
the creation of "credible threats to China's urban population or
high-value targets, such as the Three Gorges Dam," to deter Chinese
military coercion against the island. At another point the report
says, "Asymmetric capabilities that Taiwan possesses or is acquiring
could deter a Chinese attack by making it unacceptably costly," giving
rise to questions about the Pentagon's actual attitude, which seems
somewhere between unclear and encouraging by default. Nowhere in the
report does the DOD disassociate itself from these views.

Offensive deterrence is a terrible idea for Taiwan and the United
States should explicitly disassociate itself from this approach. Were
Taipei to launch such an attack on the mainland, it would lead almost
assuredly to the destruction of the island as we know it. Moreover,
the acquisition of such capabilities by Taiwan would diminish
stability in crises and increase the odds that actions would be taken
that would embroil the United States in conflict. Most fundamentally,
this approach is entirely inconsistent with the rest of the Bush
Administration's effort to deescalate cross-Strait tensions.

I was in Taiwan recently, spoke with various high-level officials and
came away believing that there is debate over whether or not to
acquire the ability to take Chinese cities and high-value targets
hostage. Indeed, elements of such a policy may already have been
adopted. Some Taiwan officials with whom I spoke mentioned "fighting
a war without mercy" and the need to "cost-effectively deter" the PRC
from coercing the island. Other more sober analysts realized that,
given the PRC's enormity, any conventional strike by Taiwan would only
infuriate a nuclear Beijing and rain terror down upon the island.
China is a very large sponge for any such attacks by Taiwan, while the
island's ability to absorb even conventional strikes is relatively
small. Whatever Taiwan's offensive capabilities may be, they are far
less than the PRC's—and the disparity will grow over time. Moreover,
such a strategy puts a hair trigger on an already delicate situation
and will fuel more rapid PRC force acquisition. As one former senior
Taiwan official recently put it to me, "This is the worst, to talk
about an offensive strategy that inflames Beijing when you don't have
the capacity to implement it."

Why is Taiwan seemingly moving in such a potentially dangerous
direction? It is doing so because China is building the capacity to
deliver a quick military stroke to the island before the United States
could respond effectively; Taiwan's land army still inappropriately
dominates the island's defense in a naval, air force and missile age;
Taiwan's military services are insufficiently coordinated with one
another; and, the island's citizens and leaders do not wish to spend
the necessary resources on their own defense, at the same time they
refuse to accept Beijing's "one-China principle" as a basis for
negotiation. In short, those advocating offensive deterrence are
seeking the cheap way to seem to be doing something while avoiding
making hard budgetary or political decisions. They jeopardize the
island's survival and increase the odds of conflict that could embroil
America. Indeed, in moving in offensive directions, Taipei could well
provide Beijing a pretext for preemption.

It is a fair question to ask, "If acquiring an offensive deterrent is
such a bad idea, what do you recommend?" A first step would be to
promote better civilian defense, harden command and control sites and
better protect aircraft that are exposed on the ground in sheds with
no doors (as I recently saw in Hualien, Taiwan). This would be
relatively inexpensive and at least buy the island additional time for
the United States to respond, assuming that Washington decided to do
so. In the longer run, however, Taiwan needs to come to terms with
the reality that it has bet its economic future on integration with
the mainland Chinese economy in the globalization process at the same
time that it is pursuing a political strategy that estranges the
island from Beijing in very dangerous ways. The fact is that, with a
high degree of economic interdependence with the mainland, Beijing
will have numerous ways to destabilize the island, short of an
outright assault to occupy the island—if Beijing is willing to pay the
associated economic and international political costs.

Instead of leaving ambiguous its attitude toward an offensive
deterrent approach, the Pentagon should have been explicit in
distancing the United States from such a strategy. Moreover, a more
offensive based deterrent approach runs counter to the logic of the
1979 Taiwan Relations Act that mandates that only defensive weapons be
transferred to Taipei by the United States. By not explicitly
distancing itself from an offensive deterrent approach, the Pentagon
raises further questions about what actually is occurring in its
non-transparent military-to-military cooperation with Taipei.

In turn, this raises a more general set of questions about the role of
President Bush, the effectiveness of the National Security Council and
the degree to which the Pentagon tends to move in its own policy
directions. In this case, as so many others, we see that President
Bush is so preoccupied with the war in Iraq that he lets other
problems fester. We see a president that is ineffective controlling
the Pentagon and a National Security Council that does not adequately
coordinate policy. The ambiguity of the Pentagon's position on an
issue of such centrality to China's interests will not foster
Beijing's cooperation in the war on terror or other key issues such as
North Korea. Where is the National Security Council as the guarantor
of consistency and where is the president as guardian of his own
policy? President Bush needs to assert himself with a Pentagon that
will only follow his China policy if explicitly ordered to do so.

David M. Lampton is Hyman professor and director of China Studies at
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and director of
Chinese Studies at The Nixon Center.

An alternative version of this article originally appeared in The
Straits Times on July 26, 2004.

Deleted member 675 · Nov 9, 2006

Pointblank said:
I perfectly understand.

Thanks for your understanding. :china:

As to the other documents, I had read them previously. I'm still looking from something describes what has been happening (or not been happening) since 2005 until now - unfortunately the way these reports come out, we could easily not know how things are now (save your prof.'s chat) until they've changed again!

I'm sure Taiwan has more to do - the problem is I'm not sure what it has done, what it is planning to and what it won't be doing any time soon.

cabbageman · Nov 11, 2006

Interesting discussion. I’d definitely say the current situation favors PLAAF on paper. That said, the real issue isn’t quite simple – people forget some stuff.
1. Soft factor matters. It is not enough to have the hardware. Training, tactic development, logistics, operational strategy, and environment cannot be ignored. This applies to both PLAAF and ROCAF.
2. War is not fought in one day, unless one side decides to surrender at the first opportunity. With exception of situations like Afghanistan (which had very little air defense assets and lost entire national air defense within first hour), even the relative short contests for air superiority take time. Operation Desert Storm spent about one week in attacking airbases, then moved on to attacking aircrafts in harden shelters (ODS may not apply directly here, but you get the idea).
3. War isn't one-sided affairs. Even Superpowers taking on weak military powers must adjust plans according to enemy reactions. And when discussing future weapons, don’t forget to talk about both sides.

Now, moving on to specific issues.
1. Ground ECM assets do have range limitation, but its purpose isn’t to blind enemy assets deep in enemy territory – it is to provide local defense. EW aircraft with “360 degree coverage jamming” is not the only way.

In summer this year, ROCAF conducted operation testing of the new mobile electronic warfare air defense system. ROCAF sent the rarely seen C-130HE to act as Aggressor. This isn’t a ‘magical weapon’ to end PLAAF, but indeed should not be dismissed. The goal of this system isn’t to render missiles inaccurate, it has a much larger operational effects.

The airborne self-defense jammers carried by fighters are useful, but they are as the name implied: self-defense. Don’t automatically expect airborne system to be stronger than larger ground systems.

2. Don’t forget SAM systems also affect air superiority. It seems like everyone either forgets about it or assumes SEAD is easy. PLA’s deployed S-300 batteries would give ROCAF aircrafts a hard time above Taiwan Strait. Conversely, PLAAF must deal with the 25+ batteries of SAM in Taiwan.

Look at number of:
-SEAD platform
-ARM
-Towed Decoys
-EW platforms
- SAM mobility / hardened defense
We could conclude both PLAAF and ROCAF has a long way to go.

3. Real problem for ROCAF still isn’t PLA’s TBM, but LACM.

4. PLA's SRBM quantity is uncertain, but would not come out of nowhere. Professional stimation is more than Satellite photos, it also includes direct HUMINT, watching materials and factory scales. Saying "2000-2500" TBM is a "good guess" isn't meaningful, unless there is analysis/evidences to back it up.

Last thing, a simple reminder: PLA is not transparent at all, even though it has received a lot of attentions because China’s position as a major regional power. While ROCAF supposedly follows and copies western doctrine, some of its development are less known (i.e. you won’t see major coverage of eastern airbase expansion or additional C4 command centers). To tackle the complex issues of military balance and war gaming for Taiwan Strait, it is not enough to read older western assessment in conjunction with latest PLAAF rumors. There are a lot more hidden problems and new developments about ROCAF / PLAAF.

China can and will achieve total air superiority over Taiwan

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