I read how people think SM-6s will deal with China's hypersonic gliders. SM-6 only has a range of 200 miles(?). Get a map of the US and draw a 400 mile circle to scale and place them all around encircling the US. That's how many Aegis ships the US will have to build. And that's not counting the land parts of the earth. The number of Aegis ships will have extend around the artic parts of Alaska and Canada and down to the Panama Canal. Anywhere else around the globe, what are the chances that a hypersonic vehicle will be passing over an Aegis vessel for it to have a chance at intercept? You can always get a world map and fill the oceans and seas with 400 mile to scale circles to see how many more Aegis ships the US will have to build to cover. Of course, it's unrealistic just as thinking SM-6s will deal with it is unrealistic.
Your opinion has some value and is correct, but it doesn't reach a conclusion.
What we have:
The American version: FOBS + HGV + One released object
The Chinese version: A spaceship.
Departing from the Chinese interpretation, comments are being driven by the American version.
Let's go to the American version:
If this really is what the US is revealing, then the system set up would look like this:
When the test took place in July/August, what was essentially said to be confirmed was precisely an FOBS with HGV, but the longest-reaching HGV in China was the DF-17 with a range of 2500 km, even with the possibility of attacking by the South Pole, American radars could still see something when the vehicle releases the HGV, so the American dedicated ABM radars might have some chance of detecting the FOBS, because of the short range of the HGV. Afterwards, Hytten confirmed that the released vehicle had an intercontinental range, the HGV therefore actually had a range above 5500 km, this until then was new for the whole world, as China had never tested this glider with this range that it is in the same category as the Avangard.
What then changes from 2500 km to 5500 km? Everything.
As American radars do not have a precise resolution above 4500 km of range for altitudes above 1,000 km, and the altitude of the FOBS which is below 150 km of altitude was already unfeasible in terms of missile detection, now everything changes with this new news. With a range of 2500 km, it would mean that the FOBS would have to remain in orbit up to the height of Jamaica if it attacked from the South Pole, a mobile radar like Aegis or even the SBX could detect the missile if it were under the height of Miami, as soon as the HGV performed the maneuver by re-entering the atmosphere, it could be tracked continuously until it reached Washington.
Already, an intercontinental range HGV changes everything. The FOBS could carry out the movement in orbit up to the height of the Equator calmly that as soon as it arrived in that position, the vehicle would release the HGV, therefore, the HGV would come gliding until reaching Washington. Even with Aegis and SBX aimed at the South Pole, the detection range would be greatly reduced due to the gliding altitude of the HGV, giving even less time for the American anti-missile system to respond. China has simply rendered the entire ABM apparatus useless with this supposedly new tested weapon.
And that's more, now the HGV releases another vehicle or missile or countermeasure. This demonstrates that the Chinese are not pro-reactive, but pro-active, they have even thought of a possible countermeasure to increase the missile's chances of success. In terms of hypersonic technology, this demonstrates that the Chinese are way ahead of Russia and the US, the Americans themselves have recognized this and that's why Milley claimed to be a Sputnik moment for the US.
Some conclusions lead to believe that Americans, knowing all this, are already able to detect hypersonic missiles, but this is just an untold part of the story.
What I said earlier about current ABM radars are true, but they don't explain how the US manages to track China's hypersonic missiles. Let's first point out that the released missile was in the SCS (South Sea China) and the north facing ABM radars are not able to track a missile in the SCS. That's why this need to have a satellite detection and tracking capability is impossible to achieve with land, naval and air sensors and is the reason for the HBTSS and the American Blackjack. What Americans have today in terms of this are land, naval and air sensors in the SCS (South China Sea), not a few but many around China and in the SCS.
For example, last year when the DF-21D and DF-26B were launched at the SCS, the US already knew in advance that the shooting would take place and took off with the RC-135S Cobra Ball, there are three such aircraft currently in service at the ACC, although apparently permanently operating under the PACAF, has seen the many North Korean and Chinese tests at SCS, which are currently based either in Guam or Japan. These aircraft are responsible for collecting ballistic missile information last year, when there was that incident where the Chinese launched the two missiles, the RC-135S tracked the DF-21D and DF-26B when they were accelerating in the reinforcement phase and re-entry, the aircraft was able to track that the missiles had hit the ship that was moving nearby in the Paracel Islands, which was mentioned in the ONI report as Naval published. Some reports even said that there was a tracking of 4 missiles instead of the two previously launched, some conclusions here even hinted that this is a technology released for communication in atmospheric reentry.
Today, these RC-135S Cobra Ball aircraft and some MASINT-capable spy satellites are permanently operating on the SCS precisely because of the Chinese and North Korean hypersonic rise. But this tracking capability is small and located in SCS, unable to perform a global tracking, this will change with HBTSS and Blackjack, which are a set of MASINT, ELINT, SIGINT sensors... acting together, this was impossible until then , there was no coordination between MASINT and the other forms of sensors, this changed a few years ago, not even two decades ago this change, this coordination between the different space sensors will give the chance of successful interception anywhere on the planet, after For successful screening, the question that remains is the intercept that would have to rely on interceptor missiles capable of intercepting at the required range and speed.
What the Americans have today in terms of hypersonic missile tracking are land, air and naval assets that actually have insufficient range to maintain a large area covered by radars, which explains the large number of these sensors around the SCS, mainly from China , not even an ASBM launch can be covered up, the US achieves it through these sensors based on land, air and sea, but the range is small. What the US has in terms of satellites with MASINT sensors are spy satellites, which act rigidly in one area, making tracking globally impossible, and even these satellites are unable to communicate with other satellites, this would limit the concept of automatic acquisition of targets, but the evolution of technology today allows retransmission of MASINT data with other forms of sensors ELINT, SIGINT... among others and this will happen to the Americans through HBTSS and Blackjack and the new interceptor missile, the GPI that will probably be placed first in Guam.
Japan is doing the same thing. It will build a constellation of 3 satellites to track a hypersonic missile.