China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread

[Violet Oboe]

Re: China's DF-41

@adeptitus, goldenpanda:
generally I wanted to clarify that China must avoid putting limited resources into SSBN's since during a crisis USN will come after PLAN's 4,8 or at best 12 boomers (may be around 2020) with around 50 SSN's (L.A. class, Seawolf, Virginia and Virginia successor) and other ASW assets.

As far as we know today the soviet navy was only in the mid to late 80's successfull in their attempts to protect their boomers sufficiently in massively built up (SSN + surface assets and air cover) ´bastions´in the Kara and Okhotsk sea basins. Only in this kind of ´playing field´USN SSN's had let to slip away perhaps 50% of soviet Delta or Typhoon SSBN. Soviet SSBN patrols in the northern pacific and atlantic were tracked very accurately (SOSUS!) resulting in preemptive destruction if the soviets had ever attempted to launch their SLBM's.
(Nevertheless this kind of stories could be clever propaganda since USN has almost nothing really declassified from the 80's and russian sources tell a different story at least sometimes but I am not able to verify both., I hope though that PLAN intelligence is well informed about this period )

Creating a similar bastion in suitable chinese waters would be difficult and additionally for enhancing China's second strike capability it is quite expensive redundance since road and rail mobile ICBM's and also air launched long-range cruise missiles would do the job more cost effectively. (although sufficient numbers (150-200) and a good penetrability aganist ABM systems must be assured!)

Of course PLAN needs 4 or may be even 8 SSBN (in 2020) for showing off China's parity/superiority with powers like Russia, France (and in the coming decades also India) but without any valuable SSBN oversea bases (Gwadar may be a first, who knows? ) China should avoid building up a giant SSN/SSBN fleet emulating US and former USSR efforts. (Perhaps PRC is around 2025 in a strategic position which would enable chinese leadership to take bolder steps but today that would be mere speculation. )

 

[Schumacher]

Re: China's DF-41

What Violet Oboe says is very reasonable. SSBNs are very expensive, just like carriers. If u haven't mastered the technology to make your SSBNs hard to detect or mastered the AAW or ASW to protect your carriers, they'll become huge costly sitting ducks.
Fortunately, PLAN does appear to be taking a very measured pace with her carrier & SSBN, SSN development. No indication that they'll embark on a blind massive investments to try to beat the USN by numbers, as what USSR did.
Having said that, once PLAN attained the expertise, there's no reason not to go for SSBN as they're powerful weapons indeed.
Too bad it's close to impossible to get any reliable public info on the gap between 094 & USN subs.

 

[Kongo]

Re: China's DF-41

Everybody likes to talk missiles and warheads, but nobody likes to talk about command and control. Yet it is command and control that is critical in any analysis of a nuclear deterrent. Mobile ICBMs and SSBNs are nice, gives every fanboy an andrelin rush. But take out their command and control systems and see those ICBMs and SSBNs suddenly turn very useless. Instead of looking at how far ICBMs can go and how many DF-41s will be fielded, try looking deeper for once. Ask yourselves just how redundant is China's command and control systems? How do they maintain the robustness of their networks in the face of a nuclear attack? How do they maintain links with mobile assets like SSBNs and truck launched ICBMs?

 

[goldenpanda]

Re: China's DF-41

command and control..The Internet?

I think China has a parallel military "internet" using similar technology.

 

[Violet Oboe]

Re: China's DF-41

China's capabilities regarding command and control of their nuclear assets are highly classified but I think that C3-I is probably adequate for their limited arsenal. The technological level of China's fibre optics industry is quite impressive and it is known that massive subterranean military structures exist throughout the country.

The US intelligence community underestimated the soviet capability of conducting a protracted nuclear war during the 70's and 80's as recently declassified documents are showing. During the mid 80's the USSR introduced a kind (although actually more comprehensive) of ´dead hand´system called ´Perimetr´ to send emergency fire codes through ballistic beacons enabling dispersed forces to strike against a new set of countervalue targets. Correspondingly the superiority in C3-I of SAC was indeed much more limited than US warplanners thought e.g. in 1985.

May be that Second Artillery employs some inventive and unusual ways of C3-I which are probably hard to detect and difficult to interrupt. Of course PLA's ´missile men´are informed about the mighty capabilities of their respective counterparts and they draw certainly their conclusions but I suspect that they still have also some surprises in store for them!

 

[Kongo]

Re: China's DF-41

I think that C3-I is probably adequate for their limited arsenal.

The robustness of the C3I system is not so much determined by the size of the arsenal. A limited arsenal cannot get away with a limited C3I system. For instance, where are the TACAMO equivalents required to get the shoot order out to the SSBNs when things turn hot?

The technological level of China's fibre optics industry is quite impressive and it is known that massive subterranean military structures exist throughout the country.

Fibre optics are not some miraculous communications device. The Iraqi defense network relied on fibre optics too. These connections were severed.

The US intelligence community underestimated the soviet capability of conducting a protracted nuclear war during the 70's and 80's as recently declassified documents are showing. During the mid 80's the USSR introduced a kind (although actually more comprehensive) of ´dead hand´system called ´Perimetr´ to send emergency fire codes through ballistic beacons enabling dispersed forces to strike against a new set of countervalue targets. Correspondingly the superiority in C3-I of SAC was indeed much more limited than US warplanners thought e.g. in 1985.

You would have to come up with official documents to back your claims up. Even during the time of Polaris, the C3I network used to support it was already ridiculously robust. Declassified 1969 CNO files indicated that the system required more than 70 jammers distributed globally in order to jam it, and any physical effort to destroy the C3I assets by the Soviets had to be done within 7 minutes of a launch order from the United States. A 1968 Polaris report also gave a 97.7% reliability for the message getting through. There is also nothing spectacular about missile retargeting. It can be done by the US side too, reportedly in a short amount of time, though how short is not public knowledge.

May be that Second Artillery employs some inventive and unusual ways of C3-I which are probably hard to detect and difficult to interrupt.

May be that the Chinese C3I just isn't as robust as many here hope?

Of course PLA's ´missile men´are informed about the mighty capabilities of their respective counterparts and they draw certainly their conclusions but I suspect that they still have also some surprises in store for them!

Conjuring things up to convince yourself? The simple answer could be the Chinese government does not want to spend money on a robust C3I system. Few know that the real costs of a nuclear deterrence program comes not from the missiles, but from establishing a robust and secure C3I network. Spending on this meant spending less on conventional weaponry.

 

[crobato]

Re: China's DF-41

also some surprises in store for them!
Conjuring things up to convince yourself? The simple answer could be the Chinese government does not want to spend money on a robust C3I system. Few know that the real costs of a nuclear deterrence program comes not from the missiles, but from establishing a robust and secure C3I network. Spending on this meant spending less on conventional weaponry.

Then you certainly don't know the Chinese government. Control of the military comes first and heads above any need and requirement for more conventional weaponry. They are after all, control freaks.

 

[Kongo]

Re: China's DF-41

Then you certainly don't know the Chinese government. Control of the military comes first and heads above any need and requirement for more conventional weaponry. They are after all, control freaks.

Control over the nuclear forces is not in doubt during peacetime. The crunch comes when efforts are being made to isolate the leadership from the nuclear forces. Do you have any info proving that China has a robust and secure C3I system in place over the nuclear forces?

 

[crobato]

Re: China's DF-41

And do you have proof that they do not?

During Mao's time, the PLA and the 2nd Artillery was built with lots of redudancy that was fueled in intention by a combination of paranoia and control freakiness. You got mountains that are honeycombed with shelters for example.

Fibre optics are not some miraculous communications device. The Iraqi defense network relied on fibre optics too. These connections were severed.

China isn't Iraq with a rudimentary network that only works half of the time. This is now one of the most heavily and redudantly connected networked state in the entire world, boasting among other things, the highest internet bandwidth in the world.

 

[Kongo]

Re: China's DF-41

And do you have proof that they do not?

You're a funny one. How can I prove something doesn't exist? Have you seen any equivalent to the US DSP satellites? Their TACAMO planes for SSBN communications? BMEWs networks? What MILSTAR equvalent satellites do China have? I haven't. On the other hand, you believe they have a robust network, which means that you must have seen evidence that they exist. If not, then you are making false claims.

China isn't Iraq with a rudimentary network that only works half of the time.

The Iraqi network certainly wasn't as weak as you hoped it to be, at least until the US military gave it a makeover.

This is now one of the most heavily and redudantly connected networked state in the entire world, boasting among other things, the highest internet bandwidth in the world.

So the DF-31s have internet terminals? Do they have designated internet cafes to provide their internet connection? I do hope they pay their subscription fees.