It is built for Taiwan by Raytheon. Is Raytheon under sanctions already?
China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread
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Of course, they must do so. But we shouldn’t assume the other side is unprepared for that, nor will they make it easy for China to shoot at them.
A carrier strike force is designed for offense, relying on surprise as a force multiplier. The whole premise is that they remain undetected prior to launching an attack. If they are denied the element of surprise, then they are doomed to fail. CAGs are too small to go against a prepared enemy. They maintain their element of surprise by moving fast and striking from stand-off range. At the moment, that’s about 2000km without mid-air refueling. That puts them in range of DF-26. If they rely on mid-air refueling (and CVNs have organic refueling platforms) then they should be able to operate outside the ASHBM envelope while posing a credible strike threat to targets near or within the mainland.
AssassinsMace
Lieutenant General
China will have SSKs out there ready silently waiting to sink every ship that comes by before they get into range. And what about Chinese subs that could launch an ASBM and YJs? There will be nowhere within carrier strike range of China that is safe. THAAD will be pointing towards China. All the action will be behind it.
Hendrik_2000
Lieutenant General
Today is the year of 2020 and not 1944 80 years has gone by. The time that CBG can hide in pacific is long gone Today we have satellite that can track moving plane in real time Henri K wrote an excellent paper on Chinese surveillance satellite and Indian think tank did simulate the Chinese surveillance system Both come with conclusion they have enough satellite to track and find CBG
Here in english
Chinese satellites and maritime surveillance
BY
Analysis of Chinese reconnaissance satellites and their maritime surveillance capabilities
Historical context
Despite the conquest of mainland China by Mao in 1949, one province still resists the invader. This province is Taiwan, where the Republic of China has taken refuge. Separated from the continent by a hundred kilometers, it has been able to defend its independence thanks to the military support of the United States, which intervened on several occasions. The last episode to date took place in 1996: after the visit of the Taiwanese president to the USA, the People's Republic of China (PRC) responded with large-scale military exercises. The Americans responded with a show of force by sending two aircraft carriers into the region, forcing the PRC to bow.
Determined not to be so impressed in the future, it launched in the years that followed many military programs,
One of the main objectives of these programs is to put an end to the near invulnerability of American aircraft carriers: an aircraft carrier and the associated carrier strike group are extremely well defended. They are also very mobile, which is a problem because before you can threaten them, you must first find them. Since a 20-knot ship can travel more than 800km per day, locating a carrier strike group in the middle of the ocean is therefore a high-risk game of hide and seek.
One of the Chinese solutions to this problem has been to equip itself with a vast satellite intelligence system capable of monitoring the oceans, comprising constellations of electronic intelligence, optical imagery and radar. This article takes you through these constellations and then assesses how these maritime surveillance capabilities provide China with an accurate and comprehensive view of the situation at sea.
I. The ELINT system
Constellation JianBing 8
Satellites: Yaogan 9, 16, 17, 20, 25
Type: ELINT (+ optical & SAR?)
Orbit: 1100x1100km, 63 °
Yaogan 9? (CAST)
This constellation is made up of 3 orbital planes, inclined at 63 °. The satellites are launched there by triplets evolving in tight formation. These characteristics are similar to those of the US satellite constellation NOSS / INTRUDER, which is used to detect, identify and locate radar and telecommunications emissions, especially those from warships. The JB-8 constellation therefore fulfills the same function.
It can only detect ships in this way if they are not in radio silence, which is often the case with warships in times of stress. Even without being in radio silence, you just have to turn off your radar when the satellites pass over the ship (about 20 minutes every 2 hours) so as not to be detected. However, they can probably also detect early warning aircraft launched from an aircraft carrier, which gives a general idea of the carrier's location.
Some sources mention that each triplet would carry an optical and radar system. If so, these systems probably have limited coverage: the 3 satellites of the same triplet fly close to each other, so they have the same viewing angle limits. In addition, it would be more logical to take the time to analyze the electronic intelligence provided by these satellites and then to orient the sensors of other satellites passing after to remove any doubts. However, it cannot be excluded.
5 triplets were launched, the last 3 replacing the first 2 which are starting to get old:
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I'm sure China has a naval intel unit that knows the current or approximate location of all US carriers. They will have the Goafen and Yaoguan satelites, spy drones, civilian fleet info coupled with extensive use of AI / big data to help in determining the locations of ships. In sensitive area of the South China Sea, the degree of monitoring is even greater.
Hendrik_2000
Lieutenant General
Speed only matters when the approaches differ. For example if the interceptor is trying to catch its target then it needs obviously to have superior speed and range at the very least. Here the case is entirely different and more similar to let's say an ASAT missile destroying a LEO satellite traveling MANY times faster than the kinetic kill warhead. How is that done if there is such a variance in speed. Because velocity allows for interception. So with SM-6 and AShBM, it is far from impossible just considering speed and the trajectory of the warhead.
A LEO satellite is 100% on a ballistic trajectory though so once you have the orbit fixed there's very little lateral movement of the target you have to account for.
A manoeuvring AShBM warhead is going to be all over the place just from the fact that it's constantly adjusting its trajectory to home in on the target, never mind if it's doing any active avoidance.
It's not a problem that can't be overcome, but I suspect at this time there's no platform with the right mix of performance charaistics because no one took it seriously enough until now. To fill in this hole will require many years, in the mean time what are you going to do in the western pacific?
And that's not taking into account wild cards like DF-ZF. Who's to say there won't be an AShBM version of DF-17, if it's not already capable of being used this way.
The 3km was just an example of some arbitrarily close point. SM-3 for sure is the main weapon and useful since they'll be defending the carrier which is riding next to it rather than boosting to catch a ballistic missile who's target is thousands of km away. SM-3 designed for this and I suspect why China has positions AShBM so far from the coast, the warheads are within the atmosphere when the SM-3 is being boosted. They cannot see the launch or a great part of its climb by the time AEGIS stops and targets the rocket, the SM-3 cannot catch it or meet the warhead outside the atmosphere which is what the SM-3 is supposed to do anyway.
I'm assuming here that the "warhead" payload on the AShBM would have come back into atmosphere well before it reaches the airspace of the coastline. The specific trajectory is secret unless the Americans were watching it closely enough. I suspect it's using a Qian Xueshen trajectory pattern but can also use the Von Braun trajectory. If this is the case, it's even harder to intercept. The Qian Xueshen trajectory for hypersonic glide and ballistics is a true assassin's mace against such targets.
I can't find English literature that says this was jammed in the past. Do you have link/s?
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