Henri K. made an extraordinary find, yet keeps it on hold
HK, please don't blame me for impatience and share with us your thoughts
First missile base outside continental China
View attachment 46419
It is NOT outside China, the exact location Danzhou in Hainan province. A debate is brewing between Raj47 and Henri K . Rja47 think this is base for DF31A Here is his article
Today Henri K refute this thesis His main argument is that locating DF31A in Hainan does not make sense from pov of missile trajectory to reach CONUS and it is so exposed with no strategic depth making it ieasier to take it out at the onset of hostility.So his conclusion is this is missile site must be for DF26A because it now shifted the radius of operation southward and conver almost all of SEA
A new anti-ship missile base in Hainan?
BY
After the Air Force and Navy, China's rocket force, responsible for China's nuclear deterrence and long-range conventional support for other corps, appears to have entered a new phase too expansion. The new "Bases" and brigades would then be formed, as for example that which is planned on Hainan, a tropical island of 33 920 km², or three times the size of the Ile de France, in the South China Sea.
Indeed, the satellite images show that construction work on a new military base started towards the end of 2016 near the city of Danzhou (儋 州), located northwest of Hainan.
Recent images from March 2018 reveal the presence of numerous infrastructures such as barracks, administrative and training buildings, training grounds and large enclosed hangars, spread over an area of half a kilometer. square, which could accommodate more than 1,000 people visibly. The site could therefore correspond to that of a new brigade forming part of "Base No. 62" (formerly Base No. 53) mentioned in certain American reports.
The new base of the Chinese rocket force on the island of Hainan, coordinates 19 ° 28'24.04 "N 109 ° 27'32.08" E (Image: Digital Global)
The new Chinese base is located near Danzhou on Hainan Island (Image: East Pendulum)
As for the regiments and especially the types of ballistic missiles that could lodge in this new base, no official trace is found in public sources for the moment. But given the geographical location of Hainan, an island bordering international maritime areas of significant but also "isolated" continent and with little strategic depth, it is unlikely that nuclear arsenals are deployed on site.
This would rule out that it could be mobile intercontinental missiles like the DF-31A, DF-31AG and DF-41. Despite their relatively high mobility, they will be more easily identifiable, localizable and especially vulnerable by air and naval means in a comparatively smaller "space" like the island of Hainan than if they are on the Chinese mainland.
The trajectory of such an intercontinental missile from Hainan to reach the United States, for example, is not of particular interest either, or even the inconveniences of flying over the Sea of Japan, so to cross as well. South Korea and Japan with an even longer and more closely watched route, while the same missile fired from Henan in central China or Jilin in the north-west of the country will reduce flight time and fly over Russia alone. and Canada.
Image: East Pendulum
From these considerations, our hypothesis therefore naturally concerns conventional vectors, such as cruise missiles, and short and medium range ballistic missiles. In recent years, a new generation of these missiles has been designed, tested and entered into service within the Chinese rocket force. Examples include the new DF-10A cruise missile, the MRBM
, the AShBM DF-21D and
.
The missiles that will be deployed in this new base on Hainan are therefore probably among them.
However, in order to reach South-East Asia, that is to say a part of ASEAN member countries such as Vietnam, the Kunming, Chuxiong, Jianshui and Luorong sites of base No. 62, equipped with the MRBM DF-21 and cruise missiles, are humbly sufficient in terms of range or firepower. The deployment of these same resources on the new Hainan base would therefore represent a redundancy that is probably unjustified.
Then remains the new anti-ship means that China has been developing for 20 years now such as the DF-21D and the DF-26B (?). If the deployment of these missiles in Hainan suffers the same inconveniences related to the isolation of the island and the lack of strategic depth, the geographical position of this Chinese island also very touristy will perhaps provide significant advantages for the Chinese army in order to push his circle A2 / AD even further from his ribs.
The DF-21D and DF-26 at a Chinese parade (Photo: Chinese Army)
Considering an estimated range of 1,700 km for the DF-21D, its launch from mainland China will allow it to reach the Fiery Cross and Mischief reef line in the Spratleys in the South China Sea. But the same launch from Danzhou on the island of Hainan for example will gain about 500 km in reach and will reach the Riau Archipelago, thus putting the entire South China Sea under its "cover".
When it comes to the new DF-26, with a range of at least 4,000 km and at least one anti-ship variant, it can even reach Guam, one of the most important the US Army in the West Pacific, and also almost all of India including the Bay of Bengal and the Strait of Malacca, or even almost on the North Coast of Australia.
If the deployment of these anti-ship and denial weapons is confirmed on this new base of Danzhou, they will then complement the Chinese air and naval means more and more consistent on the island of Hainan to assert his political will on this a very coveted and watched part of the world, and at the same time provide a tactical and strategic advantage that is of great interest to China in the face of politico-military challenges just as high in the South China Sea.
Image: East Pendulum
This is of course a simple hypothesis here and should be confirmed or invalidated with future elements, but the first approximate measurements of the facilities of the new Danzhou base show that the site is able to accommodate at least twenty people. TEL of DF-21D or DF-26, plus other support vehicles and associated equipment.
To be continued.
Henri K.