plawolf
Lieutenant General
India was let to have control.
The south Tibet region was taken over by China but the PLA was called back from beyond the other slopes of Himalayas by the leaders in Beijing.
Why? No answer that'd convince everyone (or me). One among the long list of things that I'd like to think as a pointer towards China leader's "long strategic vision". Maybe that's naive of me. But certainly it was a gamble. Did the leaders of China predict that India would remain as wobbly and lackluster regarding development and comprehensive power till 2020? It seems like it.
The rational for pull back was multi-levelled.
At the long term strategic level, at the time China very much hoped/expected India to turn back from its path of idiocy and embrace China as a friend and maybe even ally eventually. Pulling back creates the necessary pre-requisite to allow that detente.
Also, you need to appreciate that at the time, both China and India had newly emerged after long term armed subjugation and predation by foreigners. As such, China was keen to show India that it was not more of the same. It was hoped that by leading through example, China might have taught India a new, more mature and civilised way to handle disputes rather than reaching for the gun as the first response as their British colonial masters were used to doing. It was ultimately proven to be a false hope, but it was worthy of trying at the time, without the knowledge of hindsight.
At the medium/long term strategic level, China’s withdraw utterly obliterated all the propaganda BS the Indian government and media were heaping on China, and the impact was both immediately profound and long lasting. That, coupled with the utterly crushing nature of the military defeat China dealt India completely obliterated any and all Indian will to come back for round 2. Instead all of the nationalist fury that was whipped up in preparation of being directed at China instead turn inwards. And India was too scared to even think about making trouble for a whole 3 generations.
Its only now that almost all people who had first hand experience of the magnitude of that mental trauma had passed that India is once again having delusions of grandeur with a heavy dose of revisionist rewriting of history. But that’s more India’s fault for squandering all those years to normalise relations with China than China’s fault.
In the short term, there was also the tactical consideration in that the new positions China took were hard to garrison and defend.
This was way before China had decent infrastructure or powerful economy, and the logistical costs of maintaining a large garrison on the other side of the Himalayas would have been prohibitive.
Had China tried to hold onto its gains, the Indians would almost certainly have used that as a rallying call to unite against Chinese aggression and it would have basically been the same as the Indian-Pakistan situation of endless clashes, and China didn’t want any of that nonsense.